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Bureaucrats, Generals, and the Domestic Use o f Military Troops: Patterns of 
Civil-Military Co-operation concerning Maintenance of Public Order in French 
and Prussian Industrial Areas, 1889-1914.
Ph.D. thesis submitted by Anja Johansen, European University Institute, Florence, 
November 1998.
The purpose of the thesis is to understand the role o f the army in the management of 
civil conflicts within the ‘democratic’ republican system in France and the ‘semi- 
absolutist* and ‘militaristic’ Prussian system. In both countries, existing interpretations 
of the domestic role of the army focus on legal-constitutional perspectives, 
governmental and parliamentary policy making, and social conflicts, and are often 
normative. However, the lack of a cross-national comparative perspective has led to a 
series of conclusions that are called into question when the French and Prussian cases 
are compared. The thesis seeks to answer the question why the authorities in French 
and Prussian industrial areas, when confronted with similar challenges from mass 
protest movements between 1889 and 1914, adopted strategies that involved very 
dissimilar roles for the army in maintaining public order.
On the basis of empirical observations of the process of bureaucratic decision making 
and inter-institutional co-operation between the state administration and the military 
authorities in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the analysis was established using a 
‘historical institutionalist’ framework of interpretation. The thesis puts forward two 
main arguments: that the strategies adopted by the French and Prussian authorities in 
the early 1890s that involved very dissimilar roles for the army in domestic 
peacekeeping were linked to dissimilar perceptions of the threat to the regime. The 
French Republic, despite its democratic and civilian ideals, made extensive use of the 
army because the fragility of the regime meant that it could not afford the danger that 
public unrest might get out of control. Conversely, the Prussian authorities considered 
their regime to be sufficiently stable to experiment with strategies to deal with public 
unrest that did not imply military intervention, even if these strategies provided a much 
lower degree of control over public unrest. The other main conclusion of the study is 
that the repeated implementation in the French case o f strategies that involved 
mobilisation of the army and the implementation in the Prussian case of strategies that 
drew upon civil forces alone, led to different strategies, organisations and uses of 
forces available. Hence, veiy dissimilar patterns of inter-institutional co-operation 
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The thesis presents a comparative analysis of the co-operation in the maintenance of 
public order with military assistance between civil and military authorities in the 
Prussian province of Westphalia and the French region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais between 
1889 and 1914. In most Western European states, responsibility for the management 
of public order was gradually taken over by civil forces during the late nineteenth 
century, thus leaving the army to intervene only in emergency situations. From the late 
1880s onwards, the civil authorities in both France and Prussia were repeatedly 
confronted with the problem of larger-scale cases of popular unrest. For this reason, 
they occasionally had to seek military assistance. However, whereas in Prussia, the 
practice of calling upon the army became a measure that was only implemented very 
occasionally, in France, the frequency of military intervention in domestic conflicts 
increased markedly during the 1890s and reached an unprecedented level during the 
First decade o f the twentieth century.
Among historians and political scientists working on civil-military relations or on the 
maintenance of public order in the nineteenth century, there is a tendency to link a 
state’s use of troops for internal peacekeeping to the position of the military authorities 
in the organisation of that state. Thus, historians have attributed very different roles to 
the military authorities in the French Third Republic and Imperial Germany, especially 
within the confines of Prussia. Whereas the role of French military commanders is 
generally downplayed because of the dominant position of the civilian authorities, 
interpretations of the Prussian system strongly stress, and sometimes tend to 
overestimate, the influence of military leaders in civil matters.
The assumption that Prussian military commanders had a powerful influence on civil 
matters at the regional and local level is based on three factors. In the first place, the 
formal distribution of powers between civil and military authorities gave the military 
commander a powerful and independent position. Secondly, because of both the strong 
anti-Social Democrat attitude of certain general commanders and the high degree of
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involvement of the military elite in Berlin in domestic and foreign politics, it has been 
assumed that military commanders were also inclined to participate actively in 
controlling social and political unrest at the regional and local level. Finally, those 
historians who stress the importance of the persistence of traditional elites also argue 
that one o f the key features o f the Prussian ‘peculiarity* was close co-operation 
between the military elite and the state bureaucracy in defending their common 
interests against challenges from emerging social and political movements.
In contrast, interpretations regarding French military commanders point out their 
accommodation with the republican regime, their declared political neutrality, and the 
refusal o f generals to interfere in political decision making or civilian conflicts. All of 
these factors appear to support the assumption of a high degree of involvement of 
Prussian military commanders in the physical repression of public unrest compared to 
the role o f the military elite in more socially and politically ‘advanced* state systems - 
in particular, Great Britain or France during the Third Republic.
The central problematic o f  the thesis.
Given the literature on the role of the army, the observation that it was French military 
commanders who were, comparatively speaking, far more involved in the preparation 
and management of measures to deal with civilian conflicts than their Prussian 
counterparts is something of a paradox. It is a finding that needs to be explained and 
forms the key question of the present study. Thus the thesis seeks to explain why the 
Prussian and French systems, when confronted with similar problems of mass unrest in 
the 1890s onwards, adopted very dissimilar strategies, policies which, moreover, went 
counter to what one might otherwise have expected, knowing the political profiles of 
the two regimes.
Comparative observations on the domestic role o f  the army in France and Prussia 
In order to  understand the dissimilar policies pursued towards maintenance of public 
order, the study examined the question of who took the decision to call upon the army 
to maintain public order when domestic unrest occurred, and what were the means of 
influence o f various groups affected by the strategies implemented. Looking at the two
most turbulent industrial areas in France and Prussia during the period from 1889 to 
1914 - the Westphalian districts around the River Ruhr and the French Region of 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais - the first significant observation is that, in both areas after 1889, 
decision making was increasingly concentrated around the senior civil servants and 
senior military commanders at the regional level, with very few means of influence for 
local authorities or industrial interests. At the same time, after the great strike wave of 
the years 1889-1893, very dissimilar practices of civil-military co-operation developed 
in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais. As a result o f these observations, it proved 
necessary to analyse the structures of decision making in the light of the bureaucratic 
logic that existed within each system. The main argument put forward therefore 
focuses on the importance of the respective patterns of administrative practice and the 
dissimilar structures of civil-military co-operation in the cases of France and Prussia. 
The aim of the study is to explain why these dissimilar patterns developed and to 
determine their impact on the evolution of the strategies concerning the use of troops 
in the two systems.
Several aspects of the patterns and strategies of intervention are analysed. In the first 
place, the concepts behind the domestic role of the army developed in different 
directions within the French and Prussian administrations. The notion of ‘extreme 
urgency,’ which justified a military intervention, came to be interpreted very differently 
by the authorities in Westphalia and in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Similarly, the number of 
soldiers which was thought to be appropriate for certain types of conflict, differed 
significantly between the French and Prussian cases. Moreover, an administrative 
procedure developed in France whereby military troops could be mobilised 
preventively for certain types of conflict, whereas in Prussia, troops were not mobilised 
unless riots or violent actions had already taken place. Secondly, the inter-institutional 
relationship between the civil administration and the military authorities became far 
more intense in France than it ever was in Prussia. The degree of exchange of 
information and the level o f co-operation between the civilian authorities and military 
commanders became very high in the French case, whereas the relationship at all levels 
between the Prussian army and the civil administration constituted of two bodies 
isolated from each other and having only limited interaction. Finally, being specialists
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in the management of violence, French military commanders were constantly being 
drawn into the process of process of planning and preparing measures against greater 
public unrest. Through this institutional practice, French army corps commanders 
acquired direct influence in issues such as domestic conflict from which they were 
formally excluded.
In contrast, due to the lack o f inter-institutional co-operation, although Prussian 
commanders were powerful in formal terms, in practice they were increasingly 
marginalised in questions concerning the maintenance of public order. The authority o f 
military commanders was also restricted by the fact that they were unprepared for this 
type of task. They did not possess detailed information about the demographic and 
industrial conditions that would enable them to develop detailed plans independently o f 
the civil authorities. Military preparations for domestic intervention remained limited to  
very general instructions that were issued to the local commanders; these concerned 
questions such as how to deal with public gatherings or directives regarding the 
suppression of an uprising with military means, instructions that proved to be 
inapplicable to the types of conflict that actually occurred. Moreover, the preparations 
made by the military commanders for domestic intervention were not co-ordinated 
with those o f the civil authorities. As a consequence, Prussian military commanders 
depended upon the experience and detailed knowledge of civilian authorities which 
they had acquired through dealing continuously with maintaining order. Military 
commanders were therefore, in practice, generally obliged to follow the indications and 
instructions issued by the civilian authorities. Similarly, notwithstanding the very close 
social connections between the bureaucratic elites in the Prussian state administration 
and army, their professional exchanges became far more limited than was the case in 
France. This was despite the potentially conflictual relationships that existed between 
the French military establishment and representatives of the republican regime.
Not withstanding the differences in the formal distribution of powers between civil and 
military authorities or the dissimilar political profile of each regime, the study shows 
that a set o f institutional norms developed in each country that defined rules for what 
was perceived as an appropriate response to deal with the problem of public disorder.
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The state administrators and military commanders operated within this system, and it 
was therefore difficult for the politicians governing the central executive to break with 
these practices in order to change their respective strategies towards public disorder.
Framework o f analysis and structure o f the argument
In order to analyse the dissimilar bureaucratic procedures which developed in 
Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais between 1889 and 1914, an historical 
institutionalist framework of interpretation was adopted. This model of interpretation 
was adopted because it allows conclusions to be drawn on three key aspects. In the 
first place, it aids an analysis of the administrative background of the development of 
dissimilar strategies to deal with a similar problem. Secondly, it draws attention to 
decision-making procedures linked to the adoptation by the early 1890s of particular 
strategies which were then repeatedly implemented over the following twenty-five 
years examined. Finally, it allows conclusions to be made about the interior dynamics 
of the procedures and organisation developed around the particular strategy adopted 
within each system. i
► f
The argument is organised in three parts. The first part sets out the basis of 
comparison of the two cases, and looks at three aspects which have previously been 
used to explain the development of the use of military troops for internal peacekeeping 
in France and Prussia respectively. It will compare the size of the challenge presented 
to the public authorities in terms of the extent of the conflicts occurring and in terms of 
civil forces available to deal with large-scale unrest (Chapter Two). Then an analysis 
will be undertaken into the formal constitutional organisation of civil-military 
authorities in France and Prussia and the significance o f the distribution of powers 
within the two state systems for the dissimilar functioning of civil-military co-operation 
in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais (Chapter Three). Finally, an investigation is 
made into the relationship between the senior civil bureaucrats and military 
commanders at the regional level, as well as their connections to the local society in 
which they served (Chapter Four). The main point of this part is to demonstrate that, 
in a comparative perspective, neither the size of the challenge, nor the formal 
institutional organisation of civil-military relations, or the patterns of local powers and
5
co-operation of elites, can explain the development of dissimilar strategies in 
Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais.
The second part is an analysis o f political discussions in France and Prussia about 
whether or not to use military troops for internal peacekeeping. It will show that both 
in France and Prussia, similar arguments were put forward against the domestic use o f  
the national army (Chapter Five). In Chapter Six and Seven, the various priorities o f  
key authorities within the French and Prussian systems will be analysed in order to  
show that, in both countries, the issue of the domestic role of the army remained 
largely unsettled right until the outbreak of the First World War, with powerful forces 
continuously calling for a radical change of strategy. It also demonstrates why different 
strategies were adopted by the French and Prussian ministries of the interior and 
followed by their respective state administrations.
Part three consists of two chapters, and analyses in detail the administrative procedures 
and organisation that grew up in both countries around the particular strategy adopted. 
In Chapter Eight, the interior dynamics of the French system is analysed in order to 
show the elements that facilitated the mobilisation o f military troops in Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais and the factors that made a change of strategy increasingly difficult to 
undertake. Conversely, in the case of Westphalia, Chapter Nine analyses the 
organisation of strategies for public order that were based exclusively on civil forces, 
and shows the difficulties in terms of organisation and lines of authority linked to any 
inter-institutional co-operation between the state administration in Westphalia and the 
Prussian army.
In the conclusion, two main factors are pointed out as an explanation for why 
dissimilar strategies to deal with public unrest were adopted and pursued in Westphalia 
and Nord-Pas-de-Calais. The first is linked to the degree to which the decision makers 
in charge o f maintenance of order were willing to adopt measures that implied a risk of 
losing control over a situation. The second main factor points to the bureaucratic 
organisation and procedures in order to explain the perpetuation of the particular 
strategies adopted in the two countries.
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Chapter One. The study of maintenance of public order in 
nineteenth century Germany and France
The army is a potentially significant element in the functioning of any civil society, and 
this study started with an interest in the role of a military organisation in the peacetime 
management of a civil society. The investigations into a particular case study began 
with the discovery that, in France and Prussia between 1871 and 1914, vety senior 
generals, who had previously occupied the most powerful position in the central 
military institutions, spent years outside the capital as commanders of large military 
regions. Given the very dissimilar position of the army within the Prussian system and 
the French Third Republic, the question then arose concering the relationship between 
these powerful commanders and the civil authorities at the regional level. This was 
particularly relevant with regard to the role performed by the army as a force of order 
during the great social and political conflicts that took place within both countries 
during the decades preceding the outbreak of the First World War.
No detailed study appeared to exist on the internal role of the army for either of the 
two countries, and nothing substantial seemed to have been written on the relationship 
between civil and military authorities outside Paris or Berlin. The literature on the 
French Third Republic never paid much attention to the military authorities in cases of 
domestic intervention, assuming that the army blindly obeyed detailed orders from the 
governmental authorities. By contrast, the literature on Imperial Germany simply 
assumed that the army functioned as a highly interventionist force, largly uncontrolled 
by the civil authorities, and always prepared to repress any opposition to the existing 
social and political order through military means.
Two case studies were chosen: the Westphalian districts around the River Ruhr and 
the French region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, both turbulent industrial areas where similar 
problems of public disorder existed. The investigations into the domestic role of the 
French and Prussian armies in these two regions came out with two very surprising 
findings. The first was that between 1889 and 1914, French military troops participated
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with increasing frequency in the maintenance of public order, whilst the Prussian army, 
over the same years, became largely released from its traditional role as a force for 
internal peacekeeping. Secondly, the close examination of the decision-making process 
concerning military intervention in civilian conflicts showed that, in France, the civil 
and miltiary authorities worked closely together on the issue of maintaining public 
order. In constrast, in Prussia, the civil and military branches of the state formed two 
highly separated entities with little mutual connection even at the occasions went 
military troops were called to perform as a force of internal order.
The thesis therefore seeks to explain why the Prussian and French systems, when 
confronted with similar problems o f mass unrest in the period between 1889 and 1914, 
adopted very dissimilar strategies, policies which attributed a highly dissimilar role to 
the army.
Given that the findings of the study run counter to the logic of all the interpretational 
models which have been applied to the domestic role o f the French and Prussian army 
respectively, the challenge of the case study was to find a framework of interpretation 
that could analyse and explain this apparent paradox. Observing that decisions about 
calling for military assistance in both areas were taken almost exclusively by the senior 
state administrators, and that a strong pattern of continuity could be discerned in the 
strategies implemented over the entire period, this led to focusing on the decision­
making process within the French and Prussian bureaucracy, and on the institutional 
patterns behind the inter-institutional co-operation with the army. A ‘historical 
institutionalist’ approach was therefore adopted as a framework of interpration in 
order to explain why the state administration in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Westphalia 
developed and pursued such dissimilar responses to public unrest, which furthermore 
run counter to what might otherwise be expected on the basis of the political profile of 
the two regimes.
The chapter begins by setting out the literature on the relevant aspects around this 
issue: policing and maintenance of order in France and Prussia, the constitutional 
position o f the army in the two countries, the involvement of the military elite in
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politics, social structures of French and Prussian bureacratic and military elites, and the 
professionalisation of the army in each country (1.1). It then sets out the analytical 
approach followed to explain the findings (1.2), before turning to the choice of case 
studies (1.3), methodology, sources and limits of the study (1.4), and finally summary 
the structure of the thesis (1.5).
1.1. The army and maintenance of order in nineteenth-century France 
and Germany: gaps and shortcomings of the existing interpretations
The literature on politics and society of the French Third Republic and on Imperial 
Germany has said little about the question of domestic mobilisation of the army, except 
for a couple of notorious cases o f military intervention.1 In the research on policing 
and social control in Prussia and Germany, the specific role of the army has only been 
treated briefly as a minor subject.2 The general lack of interest may be explained by the
1 In the Prussian case, the great Westphalian miners* strikes of 1889, 1899, 1905 and 1912, are the 
cases of reference in which the army played a part by being called upon, or, as in the case of the 1905, 
by not being called upon. In France, the cases generally mentioned in the literature are the shooting of 
fourteen striking workers at Fourmies (département Nord) on May Day 1891, and the revolt of wine 
growers in the South of France during the summer 1907.
2 During the 1980s and 1990s, a vast body of literature on police and state enforcement of discipline 
has appeared. Alf Liidtke’s works on maintenance of public order are concerned both with the police 
and the army. However, Liidtke’s works are focused mainly on the period before 1848, and do not 
treat the Imperial period. (Alf Liidtke *“Gemeinwohl', Polizei und ‘Festungspraxis ’. Staatsliche 
Gewaltsamkeit und innere Verwaltung in Preussen, 1815-1850' Göttingen, 1982; ‘The Role of State 
Violence in the Period of Transition to Industrial Capitalism: the Example of Prussia from 1815 to 
1848’ in Social History No.4, 1979 pp.175-221; ‘Praxis und Funktion staatlicher Repression: 
Preussen 1815-1850’ in Geschichte und Gesellschaft No.3, 1977, pp. 190-211). Albrecht Funk makes 
some interesting points about the ‘de-militarisation’ of the maintenance of public order after 1870, but 
does not enter into an analysis of the role of the army as a force of domestic peacekeeping. (Albreckt 
Funk ‘Polizei und Rechtsstaat: Die Entstehung des Staatsrechtlichen Gewaltsmonopol in Preussen, 
1848-1918' Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1986). The works of Ralph Jessen ( ‘Polizei im 
Industrierevier' Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991; ‘Unternehmerherrschaft und staatliches 
Gewaltmonopol. Hüttenpoliziten und Zechenvehren im Ruhrgebiet 1870-1914’ in ‘Sicherheit und 
Wohlfart: Polizei. Gesellschaft und Herrschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert’ (ed. A lf Lüdtke), 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992) specifically deal with the problem of maintenance of public 
order in the Ruhr area between 1848 and 1914. However, Jessen’s research is focused on policing and 
police institutions, and only mention the role of the army in relation to the general policy of ‘de­
militarisation’ of the internal peacekeeping. Harald Klückmann deals specifically with the question of 
use of military troops for internal peacekeeing, but, his analysis mainly focuses on the legal- 
constitutional aspect with little attention to the practical functioning of these institutions. Harald 
Klückmann 'Requisition und Einsatz bewaffneter Macht in der deutschen Verfassungs- und 
Militärgeschichte’ in Militärgeschichtlichen Mitteilung No.l 1978 pp.7-50. The role of army in 
domestic peacekeeping is treated in detail in the works of Elaine Glovka Spencer ( ‘Management and 
Labor in Imperial Germany. Ruhr Industrialistas as Employers, 1896-1914’ New Brauswick, New
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fact that the relatively few cases of intervention did not attract the attention o f  
scholars. In contrast, it is surprising that the increasing frequency of militaiy 
intervention after 1890 has not drawn much analysis. The phenomenon is often 
mentioned in the recent literature on policing, but is rarely dealt with as a significant 
problem in itself.3 The study o f Georges Carrot on maintenance of order in France 
1789-1968, and two articles by Jean-Charles Jauffret and by Patrick Bruneteaux about 
the French debate on establishment of special troops for internal peacekeeping, are 
exceptions to this rale.4 Otherwise, the role o f the army of the French Republic or o f  
Imperial Germany is occasionally treated in relation to research on strike movements 
and 'collective actions* with analysis of individual cases where troops were used.5 *10As a 
comparative problem, the dissimilar policies pursued in France and in Germany seem 
to be generally ignored.
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1984; ‘Police-Military relations in Prussia, 1848-1914’ in the 
Journal o f  Social History No. 19, 1985 pp.305-317; 'Police and Social Order in German Cities: the 
Düsseldorf District, J848-1914’ Northern Illinois University Press, 1992), but her description of the 
role of the army rests mainly on the studies of Liidtke, Funk, and Jessen, and offers little new in terms 
of interpretation of the role of the army.
3 As in Germany, recent French research on the maintenance of order has paid attention almost 
exclusively to the rise, the organisation, and the functioning of municipal police corps and the French 
gendarmerie. The dissertation of Georges Canos ('Le maintien de l ’ordre en France, depuis la fin de 
l ’Ancien Régime jusqu’en 1968’ Dissertation, University of Nice, 1984) is the fundamental reference 
work for the legal framework around police and gendarmerie insi tut ions as well as for the army as a 
force of internal order. Jean-Charles Jauffret deals with the political aspect of use of troops in ‘Armée 
et pouvoir politique: La question des troupes spéciales chargées du maintien de l’ordre en France de 
1871 à 1914’ in Revue Historique No.270, 1983. The works of Jean-Marc Berlière and Patrick 
Bruneteaux mention the role of the army although only in very general terms with no detailed analysis 
of its functioning. (Jean-Marc Berlière ‘Institutions policière en France sous la Troisième 
République, 1875-1914’ Dissertation, University of Dijon, 1991; 'Le Monde des Polices en France * 
Paris: ed.Complexes, 1996; Patrick Bruneteaux ‘Le désordre de la répression en France, 1871-1912: 
des conscrits aux gendarmes mobiles’ in Genèse No 12, May 1993 pp.30-46; ‘Maintenir l ’Ordre’ 
Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 1996). The article of Diana Cooper-Richet only deals with the aspect of 
implementing the protection plans during the miners’ strike of 1902. (‘Le plan général de protection à 
l’épreuve de la grève des mineurs du Nord-Pas-de-Calais (Septembre-Novembre 1902)’ in Maintien 
de l ’ordre et polices en France et en Europe au XIXe siècle (ed.Philippe Vigier) Paris: Créaphis, 
1987).
4 Carrot (1984); Jauffret (1983); Brunetaux (1993).
5 Michelle Perrot ‘Les ouvriers en Grève, France 1870-1890’ Lille: Service de réproduclion des
thèses, 1975; Hansjoachim Henning ‘Staatsmacht und Arbeitskampf: Die Haltung der preussischen
Innenverwaltung zum Militàreinsatz wàhrend der Bergausstande 1889-1912’ in (H.Henning ed.)
Wirtschafts- und Socialgeschichtliche Forschung und Problème - Festschrift fu r  K.E.Bom, 1987;
Klaus Saul ‘Staat, Industrie, Arbeiterbewegung im Kaiserreich. Zur Innen- und Sozialpollitik des 
wilhelminischen Deutschland 1903-1914’ Düsseldorf: Droste, 1974; Klaus Tenfelde ‘Die ‘Krawalle 
von Heme’ im Jahre 1899* in Internationale wissenschaftliche ¡Correspondent zur Geschichte der 
deutschen Arbeiterbewegung No.15 1979 p.71-104.
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Due to the lack of detailed studies of the domestic role of the French and Prussian 
army of the second half of the nineteenth century, the interpretations have been subject 
to general assumptions mainly based on a series of plans developed in the French and 
Prussian war ministry, and, in the Prussian case, on the declarations of intent expressed 
by members o f the military establishment. As a consequence of the generally 
sympathetic historical judgement of the French Third Republic, and the contrasting 
negative appreciation of the Imperial German system, the use of troops for internal 
peacekeeping between 1890 and 1914 has been the subject of very dissimilar 
interpretations. In contemporary historiography on the German Empire, there has been 
a genera] tendency to consider each case of domestic military intervention as yet 
another example of the military predominance of civilian life in Prussia, and in the 
German Empire. The causal link seems obvious when considering the extended powers 
of the military command and the numerous declarations of many Prussian generals 
stating their intentions to launch a crack down on the Social Democrats. In the 
influential Sonrfenveg-thesis, with its emphasis on the dominance of traditional forces 
in the German Empire, the use of the army in civil conflicts has been seen as the 
determination of traditional elites *  in casu the military and the state bureaucracy - to 
defend their position against ‘unwanted’ social and political movements, through all 
available means.6
6 This interpretation is particularly pronounced in the works by Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Volker 
R.Berghahn on the Imperial Germany. (Hans Ulrich Wehler 'Symbol des Halbabsolutistischen 
Herrschaftssystems: Der Fall Zabern von 1913/1914 als Verfassungskrise des wilhelminischen 
Kaiserreichs* in Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs Göttingen (1970); ‘Das Deutsche Kaiserreich : 187b 
1918' Göttingen, 1973; ‘The German Empire 1871-1918' Leammington Spa, Dover: Berg Publishers, 
1985; ‘Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, 1849-1914” München: Beck, 1995; Volker R. Berghahn
*Modem Germany, Society, Economy and Politics in the twentieth Century * Cambridge University 
Press, 1982; ‘Imperial Germany 1871-1914. Economy, Society, Culture and Politics' Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 1994). The idea of the German Empire as being ruled by ‘traditional elites’ and the 
hypothesis of a causal relationship between the failed démocratisation after 1848 and the 
establishment of the Nazi regime underlies much of the historiography written after 1945. The works 
of scholars with quite dissimilar sympathies and intentions follow a similar path, notably Gordon 
A.Craig ( ‘The Politics o f the Prussian Army, 1640-1945’ Oxford University Press, 1955; ‘Germany 
1866-1945' Oxford University Press, 1978), Hans-Jürgen Puhle (‘Preussen: Entwiklung und 
Fehlentwiklug* in ‘Preussen im Rückblick’ (eds.Puhle & Wehler) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1980), and Michael Stürmer ( ‘Bismarks Deutschland als Problem der Forschung* in “Das 
kaiserliche Deutschland: Politik und Gesellschaft, 1870-1918” Ed.Michael Stürmer, Düsseldorf: 
Droste, 1970). The idea that policy in cases of internal unrest was being conducted by a widespread 
military conspiracy against the working class movement underlies the main body of interpretations of 
the labour movement as well as the army. (Reinhard Höhn ‘Sozialismus und Heer' Vols. 1-3, Berlin, 
Bad Homburg, 1956-1969; Klaus Saul 'Staat, Industrie, Arbeiterbewegung im Kaiserreich. Zur 
Innen- und Sozialpolitik des wilhelminischen Deutschland 1903-1914' Düsseldorf: Droste, 1974; 
Klaus Tenfelde ‘Die ‘Krawalle von Heme’ im Jahre 1899’ in Internationale wissenschaftliche
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The idea that the Prussian State and the German Empire was being ruled by a trust o f  
‘traditional elites’ with the tacit agreement of a submissive bourgeoisie was challenged 
in the 1980s by Geoff Eley and David Blackboum, followed by Richard Evans, who a ll 
pointed to the problems o f the German-Prussian system in adapting itself to th e  
challenges of a society undergoing rapid social and economic change.* 7 Evans a lso  
challenged the idea of the Germans being particularly disciplined by the s ta te  
authorities.8 Recent research on German police of the nineteenth century has sustained 
this point of view by showing the problems of permanently understaffed police forces, 
incapable o f dealing efficiently with violence and crime arising from a society in a  
process of rapid industrialisation.9
Analyses of the difficult establishment of the Third Republic in France have presented a  
description of the issue as complex and politically very sensitive. This is particularly 
true for the period after the turn of the century, when succesive Radical-Socialist 
government and their officials at the regional level made extensive use of the army 
during strikes and other types o f social and political unrest. Two major camps o f  
historians can be distinguished concerning the interpretation of the role of the army o f  
the Third Republic. On one side, there are historians studying the workers and the 
developing labour movement. Here, the predominant interpretation is that of a  
conspiracy of conservative bourgeois forces working through the Republican
Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung No. 15 1979 p.71-104; Gerhard 
A.Ritter & Klaus Tenfelde ‘Arbeiter im Deutschen Kaiserreich, 1871 bis 1914’ Bonn: Verlag 
J.H.W.Dietz, 1992). Particularly on the army need to be mentioned the works of Craig (1955), of 
Martin Kitchen {‘The German Officer Corps 1890-1914' Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), and of 
Manfred Messerschmidt ( ‘Die Armee in Staat und Gesellschaft. Die Bismarckzeit’ in Das kaiserliche 
Deutschland (ed. Michael Stürmer) Düsseldorf: Droste, 1970; 'Militär und Politik in der Bimarckzeit 
und im wilhelminichen Deutschland’ Darmstadt, 1975; ‘Preussens Militär in seinem 
gesellschaftlichen Umfeld’ in Preussen im Rückblick (ed.H-J Puhle) Gottingen: Vandcnheock & 
Ruprecht, 1980).
7 Geoff Eley & David Blackboum 'The particularities o f German history: bourgeois society and 
politics in 19th century Germany’ Oxford University Press, 1984; Geoff Eley ‘From Unification to 
Nazism’ Boston, London, Sydney: Allen & Unwin 1986; David Blackboum ‘The Marpingen Vision: 
Rationalism, Religion and the Rise o f  Modem Germany’ London: Harper Collins, 1993; ’The 
Fontana History o f Germany, 1780-1918: The Long Nineteenth Century' London; Fontana Press, 
1997; Richard Evans 'Rethinking German History: Nineteenth Century Germany and the Origins o f  
the Third Reich ’ London: Harper Collins, 1987.
8 Richard Evans (1987) p.167. The argument is sustained by the results of Charles and Richard Tilly 
in 'The Rebellious Century 1830-1930’ Harvard University Press, 1975
9 Spencer (1984; 1985; 1992); Funk (1986); Jessen (1991).
institutions and supported by the army leaders to repress labour actions.10 Historians 
whose sympathies towards the working class and the Communist C.G.T. trade union 
are less pronounced, strongly emphasise that the frequent military interventions in 
strikes and political demonstrations were politically very controversial. On the other 
hand, specialists of policing and maintenance o f order commonly point to the 
‘structural constraints* around the public forces of order, and see the extended use of 
the army as a direct result of inadequate municipal police and the problems of adapting 
the police and gendarmerie to the needs of a modem industrial society.11 Jauffret and 
Carrot see these problems as resulting from an inability to reach a political compromise 
in the National Assembly about creating a serious alternative to the army as an internal 
force, whilst Berlière and Bruneteaux also consider the cases of mass unrest with 
which the French authorities were confronted, in particular during the decade 1900- 
1910, as a serious challenge. Whilst subscribing to the interpretation of ‘structural 
constraints/ military historians also strongly emphasise the reluctance of the military 
establishment to perform as a force of internal order. Thus, the use of troops against 
civilians is often argued to have presented a problem of professional conscience for the 
officers. Similarly, the use of the ‘army of the nation* against citizens, and the 
mobilisation of conscript soldiers recruited among the workers and peasants to fight 
against their own families, is interpreted as giving rise to serious problems in the army 
of loyalty and legitimacy.12
The role of the army as a force of internal order has thus only been treated as a very 
marginal aspect in the French and German historiography, and no attempts have been 
made so far to consider the domestic use of troops from a comparative perspective. On
10 Maurice Agulhon 'La République: l'élan fondateur et ta grande blessure, 1880-1932’ Paris: 
Hachette Pluriel, 1990; Madeleine Rebérioux ‘La République Radicale ? 1898-1914’ Paris: Le Seuil, 
1975; Rolande Trempé ‘La France Ouvrière: Des origines à 1920’ (ed. Claude Willard), Paris: Les 
éditions de l’atelier, 1995. In a much more moderate form, this view point is also behind the 
interpretations of Perrot (1975) and of Charles Tilly (Charles Tilly & Edward Shorter ‘Strikes in 
France 1830-1968’ Cambridge University Press, 1974; Tilly, Tilly, & Tilly (1975); Charles Tilly ‘La 
France conteste de 1600 à nos jours’ Paris: Fayard, 1986).
11 Jauffret (1983); Carrot (1984); Berlière (1993; 1996); Bruneteaux (1993; 1996).
12 Raoul Girardet ‘La société miliaire dans la France contemporaine 1815-1939’ Paris: Plon, 1953; 
‘Civil and Military Power in the Fourth Republic’ in (ed.Samuel Huntington) Changing Patterns of 
Military Politics Glencoe: Free Press, 1962; Allan Mitchell ‘Victors and Vanquished’ University of 
North Carolina, 1984; David B. Ralston ‘The army o f the Republic: The place o f the military in the 
political evolution o f  France, 1871-1914’ Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967; William Serman ‘Les 
officiers français dans la nation, 1848-1914’ Paris: Aubier, 1982.
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the other hand, much has been said about civil-military relations in Imperial G erm any 
and in France during the early Third Republic. Interpretations have revolved a ro u n d  
four main themes. In the historical literature, one theme has been the constitutional 
position of the army within the state, and formal organisation of civil and military 
authorities. A second aspect has been the role of the military elite in domestic a n d  
foreign politics. Thirdly, recent reserach has been preoccupied by the importance o f  
social relationships between the military establishment and other leading groups of th e  
French and German society. Finally, sociologists and political scientists working o n  
civil-military relations have seen a direct link between the degree of professionalisation 
of an officer corps and the willingness of the army to intervene in domestic conflicts.
The paradox about the domestic use of troops is that a comparison of the French and 
Prussian cases contradicts all the main conclusions drawn by studies focusing on these 
four aspects. Therefore each of these approaches is briefly analysed and the central 
contentions most relevant to the present study are set out. For each approach, the 
ways in which the findings o f the present study conflict with these contentions are 
summarised.
1.1.1. In terpretations o f the constitutional position of the Prussian-G erm an arm y 
and the arm y of the F rench  T h ird  Republic
In terms of the constitutional position of the French and Prussian army of the late 
nineteenth century, there is general agreement that, because of its extra-constitutional 
position, especially its exemption from any parliamentary control, the Prussian army 
within the German Empire was a legacy of the absolutist era. The civil-military 
relationship of the German Empire has thus become the archtype of a politically 
‘backward’ system compared to the more ‘advanced* systems of the second half of the 
nineteenth century, such as the US, Great Britain and the French Third Republic.11
13 Samuel Huntington, in his theorising on the relationship between civil political and military 
institutions, explicitly refers to the nineteenth-century Prussian experience as the archtype of a system 
with a high degree of military independence from civilian command and control. (Samuel Huntington 
‘The Soldier and the State ’ Harvard University Press, 1957).
In the historical debate about the Imperial German system, there is little disagreement 
with this fundamental viewpoint, since the officer corps was not subject to the 
constitution, the military organisation was exempt from parliamentary control, and in 
questions of command the army was directly under the Emperor in his capacity as 
Supreme Warlord with no need for a counter signature from a minister who was 
politically responsible to the Reichstag?* Whilst there is a general agreement about the 
‘semi-absolutist’ and strongly 'militaristic* nature of the Prussian-German system of 
civil-military relations, historical discussions revolve around the question of the ability 
of the Imperial system to reform itself and, in particular, the issue of whether the 
Prussian-German system would eventually have moved towards constitutional 
arrangements involving military submission to parliamentary control and command, 
had it survived the First World War. The adherents of the hypothesis of structural 
continuity from 1848 to 1945 point to the formal organisation of the system as the 
core of the problem.14 5 These critics of the Imperial system describe it not only as 
authoritarian, but also as fundamentally arbitrary and incompatible with the principles 
of a state under the rule of law.16 At the other end of the spectrum stand Gerhard 
Ritter and more recently Wolfgang Mommsen and Thomas Nipperdey, who argue that 
despite the restrictions placed on the executive by the constitutional arrangements of 
Imperial Germany, the system, in particular after the turn of the century, showed
14 The main interpretations on the position of the German army: Craig (1955); Ernst Rudolf Huber 
‘Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789’ vol. Ill ‘Bismarck und das Reich’ and vol. IV ‘Struktur 
und Krisen des Kaiserreichs’ Stuttgart: W.Kohlhammer, 1963-1969; Gerhard Ritter ‘Staatskunst und 
Kriegshandwerk. Das problem des “Militarismus” in Deutschland’ Munich: Oldenburg, 1965; 
Wolfgang Sauer ‘Das Problem des deutschen Nationalstaates’ in Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte 
(ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler) Köln, 1966; Hans-Ulrich Wehler ‘Symbol des halbabsolutistischen 
Herrschaftssystems’ in Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs, 1871- 1918’ Göttingen, 1970; Hans Meier- 
Welcker 'Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte 1648-1939 ’ Munich: Oldenburg, 1979.
15 In the 1980s and early 1990s, a long debate took place about this interpretation between adherents 
of the Sonderweg-lhesis (Wehler, Berghahn, Puhle, Stürmer) and its German critics, in particular 
Wolfgang Mommsen ( ‘Der autoritäre Nationalstaat: Verfassung, Gesellschaft und Kultur im 
deutschen Kaiserreich' Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1992) and Thomas Nipperdey ( ‘Deutsche 
Geschichte 1866-1918: Machtstaat vor der Demokratie’ Munich: Beck, 1992), who rejected the 
normative judgments of the Sonderweg historians and argued in favour of simply considering society 
and politics of the Imperial period in its own right with no consideration for the later development of 
Nazism. In this discussion, Mommsen and Nipperdey joined the critique of Blackboum, Eley and 
Evans, although the intention of these latter scholars was simply to reduce the most gross 
exaggeration of the Sonderweg interpretation rather than doing away altogether with the idea of a 
structural continuity.
16 The argument about ‘Cesarism’ and ‘Charismatic Führertum’ is a fundamental element in the 
Sonderweg argument, that sees the Imperial tradition of ‘militaristic semi-absolutism’ as the 
ideological condition for the later establishment of the Nazi regime. Sauer (1966); Stürmer (1970); 
Wehler (1973; 1995); Puhle (1980); Berghahn (1982; 1994).
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evidence of changes towards the formal recognition of civilian supremacy.17 M oreover, 
Nipperdey argues that the Prussian army could only get its way in so far as its ac tio n s  
were supported by silent acceptance by important parts of civil society, and that th e  
actions o f the army were confined to what civilian elites would allow the m ilitary 
authority to get away with.1* In this interpretation, Nipperdey take up some of the k e y  
point o f the critique coming from a number of Anglo-Saxon historians challenging th e  
Sonderweg interpretation of the relationship between the formal organisation and th e  
functioning in practice of the German-Prussian system.19
In contrast to the Prussian system, the constitutional position of the French army under 
the Third Republic has been interpreted as politically ‘advanced’ due to the clear 
placing o f the armed forces under civilian authority and control.20 However, if th e  
constitutional arrangements were quite clear about the submission o f the military 
organisation to civilian authorities, the political reality behind the civil-military relations 
was a delicate balance between the Republican regime and its army. Thus, the 
literature on the relationship of the Third Republic and its army revolves mainly around 
the establishment of the key institutions of the military,21 and around the various crises 
between the army and the Republican regime (the ‘seize mai’ 1877; the Boulanger 
crisis; the Dreyfus Affair; military opposition to anti-Catholic legislation). The main 
debate concerns the degree to which the regime was under threat from a military elite
17 Ritter (1965); Mommsen (1992); Nipperdey (1992).
18 Nipperdey (1992) pp.234-235
David Schoenbaum 'Zabem J9J3: Consensus politics in Imperial Germany ’ London; Allen & 
Unwin, 1982; Eley & Balckbum (1984); Eley (1986); Blackboum (1993; 1997); Evans (1987);
20 The main work on the military organisation of the French Third Republic remains Eugène 
Delaperrière 'L'armée Française, administration et organisation* Vols.1-4, Paris 1898-1902; 
Guinard, Devos, & Nicot ‘Inventaire sommaire des archives de la Guerre, Série N ’ Vincennes: 
Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre, 1975; and Carrot (1984). The recent 'Histoire Militaire de la 
France de 1871 à 1940’ vol. 3 (ed. by Guy Pedroncini) Paris: PUF, 1992 is less thorough on the 
descriptional side, but richer in terms o f interpretation.
21 Numerous political analyses have been undertaken on various aspects of the reorganisation and the 
reforms o f the army during the period 1871-1914. The Jean Monteilhet’s ‘Les Institutions militaires 
de la France (1814-1932)’ Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1932, must now be considered too general and 
out of date, whereas David B.Ralston’s ‘The army o f the Republic; the place o f  the military in the 
political evolution o f  France, 187F 1914’ Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967, remains the main 
standard work on French military institutions. Of more recent date, and with a most limited scope, are 
the works of Allan Mitchell ( ‘A Situation of Inferiority: French Military Reorganization after the 
defeat of 1870’ in the American Historical Review No.86 (1981), pp.49-62; ‘The Freycinet Reforms 
and the French Army, 1888-1893’ in Journal o f  Strategic Studies No.4 (1981) pp.19-28), and the 
study of Jean-Charles Jauffret on the professional army ( ‘Parlement, Gouvernement, Commandement: 
l’armée de métier sous la 111e république’ Vincennes: Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre, 1987).
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that was potentially hostile to the Republican institutions, and the various factors that 
allowed a reconciliation to take place between the army and the Republican regime 
between the end of the Dreyfus Affair and the outbreak of the First World War.
In comparison with the constitutional question being a key issue in the German 
historiography, it is interesting to notice that, although the literature does points out 
lacunae in the French legislation where the army was not placed under any civilian 
control, and that these questions often remained unsettled because they were too 
politically sensitive, these elements never, as in the German debate, provoked any 
unfavourable historical judgement on the French Republican constitution.22 Similarly, it 
is interesting to note how little attention the literature pays to the fact that the French 
officers did not swear formal loyalty to the constitutional laws. The French officers’ 
formal loyalty to the Constitution has been considered of minor importance as long as 
officers were legally bound through the hierarchical subordination to politically 
responsible authorities.23 In contrast, the fact that the Prussian officers were not 
formally obliged to respect the Imperial constitution has been a key example of the 
extra-constitutional and uncontrolled position of the officer corps in the German 
historiography. In contrast to the German historiography, the scholars on the French 
Third Republic do not make it an object of historical judgement over the regime that 
there were political limits to the ability of the civilian institutions to assert control over 
the army.
Thus the present study’s findings of a considerable involvement of the French army in 
civilian conflicts until the outbreak of the First World War, in contrast to significant 
decrease of military involvement in domestic peacekeeping of the Prussian-German 
army compared with the period previous to 1889 runs counter to the assumptions
22 The creation of very powerful posts such as the chief of the general staff or as army corps 
commander are considered as reluctant concessions by the political power to the military leaders. 
Ralston (1967) particularly points to a number of important aspects which fell outside civilian control, 
and stress the very powerful and independent position of French military commanders until after the 
Dreyfus Affair. These point is also stressed by William Serman in ‘Les élite militaires françaises et la 
politique, 1871-1914’ in Eliten in Deutschland und Frankreich, XIX. und XX. Jahrhundert Munich: 
Oldenburg Verlag, 1994.
23 Both Girardet (1953), Ralston (1967), and Scrman (1982) mention the absence of a formal oath to 
the Republican Constitution, but all refrain from passing any jugement about the nature of the regime 
on this basis.
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based upon the constitutional arrangements of the French and Prussian army. I t  
indicates that a strong constitutional position of the military authorities was n o t  
directly linked to a high degree of military involvement in domestic conflicts.
1.1.2. Interpretations of the political role of the P russian  and French arm y 
Much attention has been paid to the extra-constitutional status of the Prussian a rm y  
both because of the question of the constitutional definition of powers, and a lso  
because of its importance in the long struggle between the Kaiser and the Reichstag. 
Particularly during the early Wilhelminian period, when the threat of an Imperial coup  
was ever present, senior generals openly declared their loyalty to the Emperor against 
the Reichstag. The argument about the predominance of the officer corps - especially 
its elite - within the German Imperial system has almost become a truism and has been 
linked to the idea of the German-Prussian system as ‘militaristic*.24
24 The literature on German-Prussian ‘militarism’ is vast, and covers a series of different political, 
institutional, social and cultural aspects. The term ‘militarism/ used to describe the Prussian system 
of the second half of the nineteenth century, was already adopted by contemporary observers. 
‘Militarism’ was introduced as a concept in the academic debate by the writings of Eckert Kehr ‘Zur 
Genesis des Königlich Preussischen Reserveqffizierskorps' (1931) followed by Alfred Vagts ‘A 
History o f  Militarism' New York, 1937; Gerhard Ritter ‘Das Problem des Militarismus in 
Deutschland* in Historische Zeitschrift No. 177, 1954 pp.2I-48; Volker R. Berghahn ‘Militarism. The 
History o f  an International Debate, 1861-1979’ Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, 1981.
In its purely political sense, ‘militarism’ has been used to describe a system with military supremacy 
to political authority (Huntington (1957); Morris Janowitz ‘The Military in the Political Development 
o f  New Nations' University of Chicago Press, 1964) and the role of military officers in domestic and 
foreign politics (Craig (1955); Ritter (1965)). More recently Stig Foerster ( ‘Der doppelte 
Militarismus’ Stuttgart: Franz Sterner, 1985) has argued for what he describes as the pressure towards 
militarisation of the German foreign policy: a state-militarism from above and a civilian popular 
militarism from below.
In a broader sense ‘militarism’ has been used to describe the ideological and cultural influence of 
military values on civil society. In Eckert Kehr’s definition ‘militarism is the state of mind of the 
civilian’ ( ‘The Genesis of the Prussian Bureaucracy and the Rechtsstaat’ in Economic interest, 
militarism and foreign policy, University of California Press, 1977). According to this definition, a 
series of social and cultural phenomena of the Imperial period has been treated under the heading of 
‘militarism’. The discussion in German historiography of social militarisation - particularly during 
the Wilhelminian period - is connected to the wider argument about the ‘feudalisation’ of the 
bourgeois elites. Various aspects, such as the reserve officer corps, the veteran clubs and warrior 
associations, and certain social practices such as duelling, have been seen as indicators of the 
predominance of the military in the mind of civilians. Recent literature, however, has challenged the 
argument about duelling and integration of civilians in the army through the reserve officer corps as 
solely an indicator of the predominance of the military in the mind of the civilians, and has viewed it 
rather as a very civilian and bourgeois interpretation of military values.
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To contemporary observers and in the early historiography, it seemed obvious that the 
Prussian officer corps had remained unaffected by the social and political currents of 
the nineteenth century. However, according to the now classic thesis of Karl Demeter, 
this was rather a illusionary self-perception among Prussian officers, and indeed the 
more perceptive minds within the military establishment by the end of the nineteenth 
century did not believe it.25 At the same time, the officer corps managed to convince 
wider German society and foreign observers that the army was still led by the old 
Prussian Junker families and that it remained the stronghold of traditional social order 
and pre-democratic values. On the basis of similar observations, Martin Kitchen 
develops the opposite argument, namely the increasing gap between civil society and 
the officer corps, and the impossibility of the military establishment o f accommodating 
to a society in change26. Although Kitchen is more limited in his conclusions about the 
impact of the ‘backward’ ethos of the officer corps for the later political development 
of twentieth century Germany, his interpretations follow the same lines as Eckert 
Kehr’s interpretations of the Prussian officer corps as a closed caste, which was not 
only unaffected by mainstream democratic views, but which also managed to transfer 
its pre-democratic and ‘feudal’ values to civic society during the period from the 1848 
revolution, until the unification in the Imperial era.27 Kehr’s argument about the 
importance of ‘pre-democratic’ and ‘pseudo-feudal’ attitudes from the military realm 
to civil society was later taken up by the Sondenveg historians. The political role of the 
army elite thereby became an integrated part of the general interpretation of the 
political and social mis-development of Imperial Germany. In addition, a series of 
major works on the army concentrate on the influence of the military elite on political 
decisions leading to the out-break of the First World War.28
25 Karl Demeter ‘Das Preussisches Offizierskorps' orgn.publ.1933. English revised edition entitled 
‘The German Officer Corps, 1650-1945’ London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1965.
26 Matin Kitchen ‘The German Officer Corps1890-1914’ Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.
27 Eckert Kehr ‘The Genesis of the Prussian Reserve Officer* in Economic interest, militarism and 
foreign policy, University of California Press, 1977.
28 Ritter (1965); Fritz Fischer ‘War o f  Elutions’ London 1973; Of particular importance are the 
numerous specialised interpretations of Manfred Messerschmidt and of Wilhelm Deist on, 
respectively, the Bismarkcian and the Wilhelminian period. (Manfred Messerschmidt ‘Die Armee in 
Staat und Gesellschaft. Die Bismarckzeit’ in Das kaiserliche Deutschland (ed. Michael Stürmer) 
Düsseldorf: Droste, 1970; ‘Militär und Politik in der Bimarckzeit und im wilhelminichen 
Deutschland’ Darmstadt, 1975; ‘Preussens Militär in seinem gesellschaftlichen Umfeld’ in Preussen 
im Rückblick (ed.H-J Puhle) Göttingen: Vandenheock & Ruprecht, 1980. Wilhelm Deist ‘Kaiser 
Wilhelm II als Oberster Kriegsherr’ (1991) in Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft 1890-1945 Freiburg: 
Militärgeschichtliche Forschungsamt, 1991, pp.1-18; ‘Die Armée in Staat und Gesellschaft 1890-
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The active role of the Prussian military elite in foreign and domestic policy-making h a s  
therefore been at the centre of attention not only of historians but also of political 
scientists working on the relationship between military organisations and involvement 
in politics. Morris Janowitz refers directly to the Prussian case as the classic exam ple 
of ‘designed militarism’, defined as ‘the positive and premeditated intent to intervene in  
domestic politics’ and which involves ‘modification and destruction of civilian 
institutions by military leaders acting directly and premeditately through the state an d  
other institutions.’29 In constrast to Prussia, Janowitz, like Huntington, sees the French 
Third Republic as one of the main examples of the principle of military submission to  
political institutions.30
Indeed, compared to the central position of the German-Prussian army, the role of the 
military in French history does not occupy a similar central role in the general 
interpretations of political development during the nineteenth century. French 
historiography tends to attribute a rather marginal role to the army in politics. The 
influence o f the French military elite on the political development of the Third Republic 
is so discreet that many general descriptions of the origins of the Third Republic pass 
over the army with little or no comment.31 Despite debates about the details, the
1914’ (1970) in Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft 1890-1945, Freiburg: Militärgeschichtliche 
Forschungsamt, 1991, pp. 19-41; ‘Zur Geschichte des preussischen Offizierkorps 1888-1918’ (1980) 
in Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft 1890-1945 Freiburg: Militärgeschichtliche Forschungsamt, 1991, 
pp.43-56).
29 Morris Janowitz ‘The Military in the Political Development o f  New Nations’ Chicago, London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1964 p.16.
30 Huntington (1957).
31 A comparison of the general works of the establishment of the Third Republic is significant at this 
point: Jean-Pierre Azéma & Michel Winock ‘La Troisième République’ Paris: Hachette, 1970; 
Georges Duby et al. ‘Histoire de la France: de 1852 à nos jours’ Paris: Larousse, 1973; Jean-Marie 
Mayeur ‘Les débuts de la République, 1871-1898’ Paris: Le Seuil 1973; Serge Berstein & Pierre 
Milza ‘Histoire de la France au XXe Siècle, 1900-1930' Ed.Complexe, 1990. In these works, the 
army only apears in relation to the Dreyfus Affair, the Boulanger movement, and military intervention 
in various cases of popular uprising. These descriptions of the army are purely functional and do not 
mention the military authorities at all. In contrast, Maurice Agulhon ( ‘La Troisième République, 
1889-1932’ Paris: Hachette, 1990) mentions the army in connection with the so-called ‘Fusillade de 
Fournies’, but has no analysis of the military as such. Madeleine Rebérioux (‘La République 
Radicale?’ Paris: Le Seuil, 1973) discusses the military commanders only in relation to the Dreyfus 
Affair. It is also significant that the recent large-scale project on the army within the French society, 
*Histoire Militaire de la France’, deals with the role of the military command in relation to the 
political debate about the reorganisation and the development of the army in nine pages out of 474 
(with two full pages of illustrations), and analyses the delicate question of use of troops to maintain
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literature generally agrees that the French military establishment was not strongly 
involved in conspiracies against the Republic and that the Boulanger movement was a 
predominantly civilian phenomenon.32 Recent historical interpretations of the role of 
the French military elite have generally abandoned the ‘conspiracy theories’ and insist 
on the de facto  submission, or rather lack of revolt, o f the French military elite during 
the decades preceding the outbreak of the First World War, and the generally loyal and 
conformist attitude among French officers, in particular after the Dreyfus Affair.33
The evidence of the present work that the French military authorities between 1890 
and 1914 were far more involved in the management of social and political unrest than 
were their Prussian counterparts thus runs counter to the many studies showing a 
highly politicised Prussian military elite and a comparatively a-political and introvertal 
French military establishment.
1.1.3. The social and political significance of the elite structures in France and 
Prussia
In both the French and the Prussian cases, detailed studies of the social and 
professional profile of the military elite of the late nineteenth century have been 
undertaken,34 and it is one of the areas where direct comparison between the French
public order in only three pages. (Guy Pedroncini (ed.)*Histoire Militaire de la France de 1871 à 
1940* vol.3 Paris: PUF, 1992).
32 Girardet (1953) seems to be the first to stress this point. Recent French interpretations underline the 
lack of connection between the military establishment and far right political movements. Zeev 
Sternhell in his work on ‘La France Révolutionnaire’ Paris: Le Le Seuil, 1978 affirms that it is 
impossible to establish any direct connection between groups like ‘Action Française’ or ‘La Ligue des 
Patriotes’ and prominent officers. Similarly, there seems to be a general agreement that the menace 
from the military establishment against the Republic during the Dreyfus Affair was more limited than 
has been believed. Paul de la Gorce goes as far as stating that the underlying significance of the 
Dreyfus affair was precisely that it did not lead the military to challenge the Republican institutions. 
Paul de la Gorce ‘The French Army: A Military-Political History ’ London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1963.
33 This point is commonly stressed by the specialised literature as well as the general literature of all 
political sympathies: Ralston (1967); Azéma & Winock (1970); Serman (1982); Jauffret (1983); Hélie 
(1994); Azéma & Winock (1970); Agulhon (1990).
34 The most thorough investigations are Daniel Hughes ‘The King’s Finest: a Social and Bureaucratic 
Profile o f  Prussia’s General Officers, 1871-1914’ New York, 1987, and Walter S. Barge 'The 
Generals o f the Republic: the Corporate personality o f high military rank in France, 1889-1914 ’ 
(unpublished Ph.D.Dissertation) University of North Carolina, 1982. These studies cover the most 
important biographical aspects of the military elite. They also define the most important lacunae in 
the existing documentation about these groups. Certain interesting studies with a narrower scope help 
to specify particular aspects of the social profile of the military elites. (Nicolai von Preradovich ‘Die
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and Prussian military elites has been attempted.35 These studies draw two types o f  
conclusion: The studies on the Prussian officer corps stress the high recruitment f ro m  
the nobility as well as the social, cultural and political cohesion of the military e lite , 
despite serious modifications of the idea of the Prussian military elite as exclusively -  
or even predominantly - a noble corps.36 Although the French military elite was socially 
less uniform than their Prussian counterparts, it was nevertheless still a stronghold fo r  
men with family ties to the landed nobility.37 Moreover, in contrast to the unquestioned 
commitment of the Prussian military elite to the monarchy and existing social order, 
the majority of French officers, in particular the senior officers, were politically 
indifferent or potentially unsympathetic to the Republic.38
Whilst the analysis of the social and professional profile of the French and Prussian 
military elite appears rather straightforward, the interpretation o f the significance o f  
these structures is not. The second element of the analysis of social structures concerns 
their importance for the professional performance of the military elite, and in particular 
its relationship with the state bureaucracy. One of the fundamental assumptions about
Führungsschichten in Österreich und Peussen (1808-1918)* Wiesbaden, 1955; William Serman *Les 
Généraux français de 1870’ in Revue de Défense Nationale, August-September 1970 pp. 1319-1330; 
Ulrich Trumpener ‘Junkers and others: the rise of commoners in the Prussian army, 1871-1914’ in 
Canadian Journal o f History No. 14 (April 1979) pp.29-47; Bemd Philip Schröder 'Die Generalität 
der deutschen Mittelstaaten, 1815-1870’ Osnabrück: Institut zur Erforschung Historischer 
Führungsschichten, 1984; Günter Wegner ‘Stellenbesetzung der deutschen Heere, 1815-1939’ 
Osnabrück: Institut zur Erforschung Historischer Führungsschichten, 1990). These detailed analyses 
of the biographical data match the broader examination of the social profile of the officer corps, its 
transformations from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, and the role of the military 
organisations for social mobility. Girardet (1953); Demeter (1965); Kitchen (1967); Serman (1982).
35 In their contributions to the Colloquiums of the German-French History Committee (October 1990 
and November 1992) Manfred Messerschmidt and William Serman attempt comparisons of the social 
structures of the two corps and undertake interpretations of their different relationship with the 
political regime. (*Eliten in Deutschland und Frankreich* Munich: Oldenburg, 1994).
36 Demeter (1965); Trumpener (1979); Hughes (1987), all notice the decline of the influence of the 
old Prussian noble families.
37 Barge (1982); Serman (1982).
38 The political sympathies of the French officer corps is methodologically difficult to handle. The few 
existing studies of the political sympathies of French generals, however, sustain this assumption. 
Francois Bédarida ‘L’Armée et la République: Les opinions politiques des officiers français en 1876- 
1878’ in Revue Historique 1964, pp.l 19-164. The infamous files established on the initiative of 
General André do not seem to have been examined to historically. In a letter of 13 January 1905 to the 
Army Corps Commanders and the Military Governors of Paris and Lyon, General André’s successor 
as War Minister, Maurice Berteaux, affirms that the original files had been destroyed (Military 
Archive, Vincennes, 5.N.6 ‘Cabinet du Ministre, bureau de correspondance générale, 1905-1906) The 
few data that were published in the French press during the winter and spring 1904 are of too poor 
quality and dubious origin to allow a scholarly investigation of the political tendencies of the military 
elite.
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elite structures is that close social ties between two elite groups (through family, 
geographic origin, or religious affiliation) should further co-operation in promoting 
their common goals. All studies of the social profile o f the senior civil servants and the 
general corps in Prussia and France show that in Prussia these bureaucratic elites were 
socially closely connected,39 whereas the French military elite and the prefects of this 
period were recruited among quite distinct social groups.40 The close social connection 
between Prussian civil servants and military elite has sustained another key argument 
of the Sonderweg thesis, namely the assumption of traditional elites working closely 
together in maintaining their predominance over the state apparatus against the 
influence of the bourgeoisie and, in particular, the emerging working class.41 
According to a similar logic, French historiography generally assumes that co­
operation between the prefects and the senior commanders was characterised by a high 
degree of conflict and military obstruction against initiatives coming from the state 
administration.42
Contrary to these assumptions about the functioning of civil-military relations in 
Prussia and France, the findings o f this study show that the French civil and military 
authorities worked closely and continuously together to maintain public order, whilst 
the Prussian authorities in Westphalia did not. The assumption about a direct 
relationship between close social ties and professional co-operation therefore did not 
apply to the policy of maintaining public order in cases of labour conflicts or political 
unrest.
39 Nicolai von Preradovich 'Die Führungsschichten in Österreich und Peussen (1808-1918)' 
Wiesbaden, 1955; Klaus Swarbe ‘Die preussischen Oberpräsidenten, 1815-1945' Boppard am Rhein, 
1985.
40 Several studies have been undertaken of the social profile of the French prefectoral corps of the 
nineteenth century. Brian Chapman ‘The Prefects and Provincial France' London:Allen & Unwin, 
1955; Jeanne Siwek-Pouydesseau ‘Le corps préfectoral sous la Troisième et la Quatrième 
République' Paris: Armand Colin, 1969; Vincent Wright & Bernard Le Clère 'Les Préfets du Second 
Empire’ Paris: Armand Colin, 1973; Vincent Wright ‘La réserve du corps préfectoral’ in La France 
de l'affaire Dreyfus (ed.Pierre Birnbaum), Paris: Gallimard, 1994. Moreover, changes and persistence 
in the social profile of the military elite has been considered in relation to other elites of the Third 
Republic : Christophe Charle 'Les Elites de la République 1880-1900’ Paris: Gallimard, 1987; 'Les 
Hauts fonctionnaires en France au XIX' Paris: Gallimard, 1980; Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret (ed.) 
‘Histoire des élites en France du XVI e au XXe siècle ' Paris: Hachette (Pluriel), 1991.
41 Wehler (1973; 1995); Berghahn (1982; 1994); Stürmer (1970); Puhle (1980).
42 This point is commonly stressed by scholars working on the public forces and on the French army: 
Ralston (1967); Serman (1982); Canot (1984); Bruneteaux (1993; 1996).
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1.1.4. Professionalisation o f the military elite
Finally, some attention had been paid to the professional profile o f the military elite in  
the tw o countries and its process of bureaucratisation. This aspect has been connec ted  
to the general issue o f exchange between different elite groups, and the integration o f  
new social groups in elites via the army. From a political-constitutional point of v iew , 
the professionalisation o f the officer corps and the army elite is linked to the argum ent, 
originally formulated by Huntington, of a connection between high degree o f  
professionalisation of the military elite, and a professionally justified submission o f  
military authority to civilian political supremacy.43
The link between the increasing formal professionalisation of the French officer co rps 
after 1870 and the silent acceptance of the Third Republic among the majority o f  
French officers is often drawn. However, such a causal relationship cannot b e  
established in the Prussian case, since the Prussian military elite was the m ost 
professionalised in Europe, but, throughout the Imperial period rejected any 
submission to civilian supremacy. Huntington’s link between professional profile and  
professional behaviour has not been followed by detailed historical investigations, and 
both Barge and Hughes have refrained from drawing conclusions about these tw o  
factors.44
However, the present case study will show that the French senior generals who became 
strongly involvement in the process of maintaining public order were highly 
professionalised officers. Similarly, the Prussian senior generals, although belonging to  
the most professionalised army elite of the time, did not refrain from developing plans 
for domestic intervention and from claiming in public the readiness to intervene against 
any opposition to existing social and political order. In a comparative perspective, the 
degree o f professionalisation o f the French and Prussian military elite is therefore not 
sustainable as an explanation for the dissimilar patterns o f civil-military co-operation in 
Prussia and France.
43 Huntington (1957); Similar lines of argument have been pursued by Janowitz ‘The Professional 
Soldier. A Social and Political Portrait’ New-York: The Free Press, 1960; Janowitz (1964); Samuel 
E.Finer ‘The Man on Horseback’ London; Pinters Publisher, 1962; Bengt Abrahamsson ‘Military 
professionalization and political power’ Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972.
44 Barge (1982); Daniel Hugues (1987).
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1.2. Framework of interpretation and Unes of argument
The interpretation of the use o f troops against public disorder could have been 
approached from at least four perspectives. In the first place, it could have been 
analysed in relation to the challenges arising from the type of conflict. This approach 
would have sought to either confirm or reject the idea of a direct causal relationship 
between the type of challenge and the response to the degree o f unrest. Since the 
comparison of the French and Prussian cases show that the dissimilar responses to 
unrest in the two areas were not due to different types of challenge, this approach was 
not seen as fruitful.
Secondly, the issue could have been seen in relation to wider governmental politics, in 
particular industrial, labour market, and social policies in the two countries. Given the 
observation that the strategies developed and implemented by the state administration 
at the regional level were largely detached from the general policies pursued by 
succeeding governments, the possible outcome of this approach would be to focus 
attention of the fact that in both countries the use of troops for internal peacekeeping 
went counter to the political line followed by the central power.
In the third place, the question of use of troops could have been seen in the light of 
centre-periphery relations and the ways in which the central power acted in local 
conflicts. This might have led to two main conclusion, namely that, in both France and 
Prussia, senior civil servants enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from interference by 
the central power to develop and implement measures to deal with public disorder. 
Moreover, in relation to local authorities, it would conclude that senior civil servants 
were capable of imposing their measures with little regard to the wishes of local 
authorities.
All three approaches, however, still leave the question open as to why the Prussian and 
French systems pursued markedly dissimilar strategies to deal with public unrest in 
Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais. In order to answer this particular question, the 
interpretation focuses on the process bureaucratic decision making and inter­
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institutional co-operation between the senior civil servants at the regional level and t h e  
military authority.
The approach used some key elements of ‘historical institutionalist’ models o f t h e  
functioning of administrative policy making.45 Historical institutionalists observe t h a t  
the same strategies are often implemented again and again over a p ro trac ted  
timeframe, even when measures which were perfectly appropriate at one stage h a v e  
become quite inappropriate decades later. They focus on the dynamics o f  
administrative policy making in order to understand why strong patterns o f continuity 
exist in the strategies implemented by public authorities. They suggest that, due t o  
repeated implementation of a certain set of procedures and strategies, the m easures 
taken at one time tend to become determinants for decisions taken in later periods - s o -  
called ‘path-dependency’.
There are three reasons for this phenomenon. In the first place, the organisation o f  
responses to a problem strongly depends on past experiences with similar cases. T h e  
more a system has organised and planned its response to a problem in a particular way, 
the more difficult becomes a radical change of strategy. Secondly, due to the repeated 
implementation of one particular type of strategy, a set of standard operating 
procedures tend to develop that facilitate the bureaucratic processes linked to that 
particular strategy because, at all levels, the bureaucrats know exactly how they are 
supposed to proceed. At the same time, a change of strategy would create a high 
degree of uncertainty. Bureaucrats, it is argued, tend to implement the same strategies
45 The literature on ‘new institutionalism’ and ‘historical institutionalism’ is abundant. The 
characteristics described here were established in the 1980s by Stephen D. Krasner (‘Approaches to 
the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics' in Comparative Politics 1984 January, 
vol.16 No.2, pp.223-246), Theda Skocpol ( ‘Bringing the State Back In: Stategies of Analysis in 
Current Research’ in Bringing the State Balck In (eds. Skocpol, Evans, Rueschmcyer) Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), Peter Hall ( ‘Governing the Economy: The Politic o f State Intervention in 
Britain and France' Oxord: Polity Press, 1986) and James March & Johan P.Olsen ( ‘Rediscovering 
institutions: The Organisational Basis o f Politics' New York: The Free Press, 1989). The recent 
debate still refers to these works as the theoretical basis for the historical institutional approach. 
(Kathleen Thelen & Sven Steinmo ‘Structuring Politics - Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Analysis’ in American Political Science Review 1995, vol.89. pp. 174-178; Peter Hall & Rosemary 
Taylor ‘Political Science and the Three New Inslitutionalisms’ in Political Studies 44 No.5 (1996) 
936-957; Ellen Immergut ‘The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism’ in Politics and Society 
vol.26 No.l. March 1998; and Sven Steinmo & Caroline Tolbert ‘Do Institutions Really Matter? 
Taxation in Industrialised Democracies’ in Comparative Political Studies vol.31 No.2 April 1998 
pp. 165-187).
26
again and again because these provide the highest degree o f security and predictability. 
Thirdly, historical institutionalists argue that bureaucratic decision making is often 
linked to rules of appropriateness and codes of conduct. This is based on the 
observation that bureaucrats often make their choices from a rather limited range of 
option, whilst other measures and strategies are never considered. This helps to explain 
why decision makers seemed to refrain from certain measures which they were 
formally empowered to implement
The historical institutionalist approach was adopted in this thesis, not in order to prove 
the general appropriateness of this theory, but because it provides a useful framework 
of interpretation in which to consider the central problematic. The framework allows 
analysis of policies and strategies developed over a long period of time. Hence, 
arguments can be put forward that generalise beyond individual cases whilst still being 
focused on patterns of response to a particular problem. The study focuses on the inner 
logic of the process of administrative policy making within each of the two systems as 
the main factor to explain why dissimilar strategies were developed in the French and 
Prussian case.
This does not suggest that the dissimilar social structures, wider political culture, and 
the formal institutional organisation were of no significance. Whilst accepting that 
France and Prussia were two quite distinct societies with very dissimilar relationship 
between the regime and the army, the study argues that within a given context of social 
structures, wider political culture and formal institutional organisation, there was room 
for a series of very dissimilar policies to develop. However, once one way of dealing 
with a particular problem was adopted, this became a determining factor for the ways 
in which similar situations were handled in the future.
27
1.3. Case study: state bureaucrats and military commanders in two 
industrial areas, 1889-1914
To analyse the importance of institutional organisation in the role of m ilita ry  
authorities in domestic peacekeeping, this investigation is based on a case c r o s s ­
national comparative study, which in turn allows an analysis to be made of h o w  
bureaucrats and military commanders operated within the two systems. The case s tu d y  
concentrates on co-operation at the regional level between Prussian m ilitary 
commanders and the senior civilian authority, the Prussian province governors 
(Oberpräsidenten) and district governors (Regierungspräsidenten), on the one h a n d , 
and the French prefects and the general commander of the military region, the a rm y  
corps commander, on the other. These regional authorities occupied a central position 
because they were the main institutional link between the various civil and military 
authorities that existed below central governmental level.
The investigation focuses on two industrial areas; in Prussia, the seventh military 
region is chosen, which covered the province of Westphalia and the district o f  
Düsseldorf, thus comprising all of the industrial districts around the River Ruhr.46 In  
France, the study concentrates on the first military region that covered th e  
départements o f Nord and Pas-de-Calais. These two regions represent the m ost 
turbulent areas of large scale labour unrest during the years 1889 to 1914. From a  
militarily strategic point of view, peacekeeping in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
was o f particular significance because not only were they frontier areas, but they were 
also vital in regard to national coal supplies. The regions were chosen to compare the 
areas where military intervention was most likely to occur in each country and, 
additionally, to see where the military authorities had a particular interest in 
considering civil unrest as a strategic issue.
The timeframe for these two investigations starts with the great Westphalian miners’ 
strike in 1889, followed by the international strike wave of the years 1889-1893,47 and
46 Although the district of Düsseldorf was administratively speaking, a part of the Rhineland, it 
belonged to the seventh military region. In all situations when troops were needed to assist civil 
forces, the district governor co-operated with the civil and military authorities in Westphalia.
47 This strike wave has been documented for both France and Germany by Charles and Richard Tilly 
in Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly & Richard Tilly 'The rebellious Century 1830-1930' Harvard University
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ending with the outbreak of the First World War. The study concentrates exclusively 
on the internal role of the aimy in peace-time. In time of war, formal relationships 
between the civil and military authorities undergo important changes; therefore they 
ought to be the subject of a different study.
1.4. Methodology, sources, and limits of the study
1.4.1. Methods applied and the problems of methodology
Quantitative investigations have been made to establish a basis for comparison between 
the two industrial areas tested. It was essential to demonstrate in simple terms that the 
frequency of domestic military intervention was, in fact, much higher in Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais and in France in general, than it was in Westphalia or Prussia as a whole.4* 
Secondly, in order to show that the dissimilar use of military troops was a question of 
political choices, it was demonstrated that there was no direct relationship between the 
size of a conflict (that is, the number of persons actually or potentially involved) and 
the use of military troops; indeed, neither was there a direct relationship between the 
size of the civil forces available (that is, the state police, municipal police, 
gendarmerie) and the use of military troops.
Then, in demonstrating that the dissimilar policies that were being implemented in 
France and Prussia were primarily a question of policy making, a qualitative analysis 
was undertaken into the decision-making processes using documentary evidence from 
three sets of sources, namely each state’s administration at the regional and local level, 
the senior commanders at the regional level, and the war and interior ministries. The 
aim was to define exactly who took the decisions about mobilising the army and how 
these decisions were implemented. 48
Press, 1975, as well as by Michelle Perrot 'Les ouvriers en Grève, France 1870-1890’ Lille: Service 
de réproduction des thèses, 1975, and by Friedhelm Boll ‘Arbeitskämpfe und Gewerkschaften in 
Deutschland, England und Frankreich’ Bonn: Verlag Dietz Nachfolger, 1992.
48 For a more detailed description of the methodological problems of estimating the frequency of 
domestic military intervention, see Chapter Two.
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The study has been confronted with two significant methodological problems. On t h e  
one hand, there is the question of the influence exercised by local pressure groups o v e r  
the measures implemented. Since the existing documentation almost exclusively 
derives from state administrations and the military authorities, evidence o f influence 
from other actors - in particular from local pressure groups - is virtually absent. F rom  a  
methodological point of view, this issue is difficult to handle. However, a series o f  
significant indicators have been traced in the course of the research which point to th e  
conclusion that, from the early 1890 onwards, local pressure groups - in Westphalia a s  
well as in Nord-Pas-de-Calais - had very few means of asserting much influence o v e r  
the decisions taken by the state administrations or military authorities.
The second methodological problem follows on from the first; even if local pressure 
groups had at their disposal some means of influencing the policies pursued by th e  
state administration and the army, a logical question arises: did these authorities n o t  
tend to pursue the interests of those groups in local society calling for heavy-handed 
measures to be taken against public disorder because they themselves belonged to th e  
local establishment? Inevitably, to some extent, they did. However, an analysis of the  
social profile and geographical origins of the senior civil servants and the commanding 
generals (the army corps commanders) in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais between 
1889 and 1914 reveals that, in both the French and Prussian cases, the senior civil 
servants and the army corps commanders were always outsiders to local society. They 
were meant to represent the interests of the state. Moreover, the analysis of the social 
profile o f senior civil servants and army corps commanders demonstrated that the 
patterns of civil-military co-operation in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais actually 
run counter to the assumption that close social ties between two bureaucratic elites 
would lead to close professional connections. In Prussia, where the majority of senior 
bureaucrats and military commanders were recruited witin a very limited number o f 
Prussian noble families, the level o f inter-institutional co-operation was lower than in 
France where the elites of the state administration and the army were recruited among 
quite dissimilar social groups.
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1.4.2. Documentation and selection of sources
The central bulk of information comes from each state’s administration at the regional 
level (province and district governors in Westphalia, prefects in Nord-Pas-de-Calais) 
and, to lesser extent, from state representatives at the local level (local governors in 
Westphalia and sub-prefects in Nord-Pas-de-Calais).49 *The documents from the state 
administration at the local level are not particularly informative about relationships 
with the army, but decisions concerning the army were rarely taken at that level. This 
is even more true for the documents left behind by the municipalities, since the papers 
at this level contain almost no documentary evidence related to cases of major conflict 
involving the army. The most interesting sources of information involving municipal 
authorities appear among the state administration papers where there is occasional 
correspondence with the municipal authorities or the local police.
The destruction in 1945 of the central Prussian military archive left posterity with 
almost no documentation from the offices of the army corps commanders in any of the 
Prussian provinces.30 The documents from the army corps command in Münster 
therefore mainly appear in their correspondence with the state administration at the 
provincial level and with the war ministry, as well as among the personal papers that 
have been left behind by some o f the generals. In contrast with the problems of 
documentation from the army corps commanders in Münster, the military sources that 
have survived from the army corps commander’s office in Lille are both excellent and 
abundant.51 Thus, this research faced a situation in which not only are there more cases 
of military intervention on the French side, but also that these cases are also far better 
documented from the side of the military authorities. The asymmetrical nature of the 
documents in itself gives an impression that there was a higher frequency of military
49 Nordrhein-Westialisches Staatsarchiv Münster (HaStA Münster); Departmental Archives, Lille; 
Departmental Archives, Arras.
30 Only the documents from the thirteenth army corps covering the Wurtemberg military region, 
deposited in the central archive in Stuttgart, survived the Second World War. They provide an 
impression of the internal functioning of a Prussian army corps. Since the Würtemberg kingdom was 
a rather peaceful area, these documents contain little information about the mobilisation of military 
troops to maintain public order. Similarly, the central archive in Munich (Abteilung IV - 
Militararchiv) contains the documents from the Bavarian army corps in Munich and in Würtzburg. It 
contains reports of domestic military intervention in the years between 1870 and 1890, as well as 
information on the preparations for mobilisation on for the occasion of 1 May 1895. However, no 
documents can be found which are related to the period after the turn of the century.
51 Military Archive, Vincennes, papers from the First Army Corps (I.A.C.).
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intervention and of civil-military correspondence in the case of Nord-Pas-de-Calais. I t  
was therefore found necessary to provide a series of independent indicators in o rd e r  t o  
sustain both the argument that military intervention was more frequent in the case  o f  
Nord-Pas-de-Calais when compared to the case o f Westphalia (Chapter Two) and t h e  
argument about higher intensity of civil-military correspondence (Chapters Eight a n d  
Nine).
In relation to the question of the functioning of civil-militaiy co-operation in F ra n c e , 
the Department of General Security within the French Ministry of the Interior has le f t  a  
great deal of documentation linked to the problems of maintaining public order.52 T h e  
army played an integral part in the development of strategies for dealing with p u b lic  
unrest, and therefore this series is highly relevant for an analysis of civil-military c o ­
operation at the ministerial level, as well as for the correspondence between th e  
Ministry of the Interior and the prefects. In the Prussian case too, the papers from th e  
ministry of the interior are a major source of information concerning the policies 
developed in order to deal with problems of great unrest.53 Since the ministry of th e  
interior was the only institutional link between the state administration at the provincial 
level and the war ministry, both the instances of actual military intervention and those  
where military requisition was only discussed, are well documented. In turn, these 
papers provide documentation related to the policy of ‘de-militarisation’ of internal 
peacekeeping. In particular, they give an insight into the perceptions of state  
administrators at the ministerial and provincial level about how far they could pursue 
‘de-militarisation’, as well as information concerning the moment when the requisition 
of military troops was considered appropriate.
As for the Prussian war ministry’s documents related to the issue of domestic military 
intervention, the only available material is the collection entitled ’Eingreifen der 
bewaffheten Macht bet Unterdriickung von Unruhen, 1889-1914’ as it survived the 32
32 National Archives, Paris, Series F.7.
33 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, l.H.A. - Rep.77. In addition, the Central Archive Potsdam 
(III) contains the papers from the Imperial ministry of the interior, and has some documents of 
general interest. In contrast, the material in the Bundesarchiv - Koblenz proved of little interest for 
this question.
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war-time bombing of the Prussian military archive.54 This collection, which is 
comprised of little more than two hundred pages, gives a very incomplete idea 
regarding the individual cases o f military intervention or the policies pursued by the 
war ministry. On the other hand, it appears that this collection is not a random 
compilation of what happened to survive the archive’s destruction in 1945, because it 
was gathered as an entity throughout the Imperial period up to 1918. Thus it contains 
what was perceived at that time to be the most significant documents concerning cases 
of domestic military intervention. In France, the relevant documents from the war 
ministry mainly derive from the general staff, and primarily contain legal texts, decrees, 
and copies of the protection plans for the case of internal unrest, which were 
elaborated between 1897 and 1913.55 56A great deal of the ministerial documents were 
deliberately destroyed during the First World War because of fears that they might fall 
into the hands of the Germans.36
Unfortunately, the memoirs and correspondence left behind by Prussian senior state 
administrators are not very informative on the question of domestic military 
intervention.57 *The relationship of these administrations with the local commanders 
seems to have occupied an insignificant part of their time, even when they subsequently 
give accounts of the great crises in which the army was involved. The military 
authorities - if cited at all - are mentioned in passing as ‘the army’ without further 
specification.
In contrast to these senior civil servants, the memoirs and papers from the Prussian 
generals are far more informative. A senior commander of the early Imperial period, 
General von Alvensleben, is quoted as declaring that: ‘A Prussian general dies, but
54 The collection is now in the military archive in the Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /14.
55 Military Archive, Vincennes, Sériés 7.N. The Sériés 5.N, covering the ministerial correspondence, 
does not contain significant material conceming this issue.
56 Guinard, Devos, & Nicot ‘Inventaire sommaire des archives de la Guerre. Série N ' Service 
Historique de l’Armée de Terce, 1975 p.14.
57 Hans von Berlepsch *Sozialpolitische Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen’ Mönchen-GIadbach: 
Volksvereins-Verlag, 1925; Geheimess Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, Persönliche Nachlässe Konrad
von Studt. Papers from the province govemors in Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l. - 
Rep.89 - No. 13723 ‘Die Oberpräsidenten der Provinz Westphalen 1825-1918.’ Papers from the 
province govemors in HaStA Münster, PA Oberpräsidium or Regierung Münster.
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leaves no memoirs behind/58 This textual austerity fortunately does not apply to  t h e  
generation of generals promoted during the Wilhelminian period, men who p o sse ssed  a . 
higher intellectual training and who were more politicised than the generals o f  t h e  
Bismarck era. Moreover, the end of the Empire and defeat in the First World W a r  
removed a great deal of inhibition; indeed, many former senior generals were e x tr e m e ly  
verbose in recording their accounts for posterity.59 In most cases, these accounts a b o u t  
their time as army corps commanders only constitute a couple of pages. H o w e v e r ,  
generally speaking, these pages are very revealing because of their perceptions o f  t h e  
senior state representatives and of wider local society. Secondly, a number of f o r m e r  
army corps commanders also left their personal papers behind them, documents w h i c h  
reveal their connections with the province in which they served.60 Finally, some o f  t h e  
books written contemporarily about individual senior generals, although often p o o r ly  
written hagiographies, sometimes provide useful information about their position i n  
local society and details of the generals’ social acquaintances.61
38 Demeter (1965) p.I68,
39 Friedrich von Bernhard) 'Denkwürdigkeiten aus meinem Leben ’ Berlin: E.S.Mittler & Sohn, 1 9 2 7 ; 
Bertold von Deimling ‘Aus der Alten in die neue Zeit' Berlin: Im Verlag Ullstein, 1930; General K a r l  
von Einem ‘Erinnerungen eines Soldaten 1853-1933’ Leipzig 1933; Paul von Hindenburg ‘A u s  
meinem Leben’ Leipzig: S.Hierzel Verlag, 1934; Alexander von Kluck 'Wanderjahre - Kriege  -  
Gestalten’ Berlin: Verlag R.Eisenschmidt 1929; Alfred von Waldersee ‘Denkwürdigkeiten d e s  
Generalfeldmarschalls Alfred von Waldersee* Vols. 1-3, (ed. H.O.Meisner) Berlin: Mittler & S o h n , 
1922; Alfred von Waldersee ‘Aus dem Briefwechsel des Generalfeldmarschalls A. Graf v o n  
Waldersee’ Vols. 1-3 (ed. H.O.Meisner) Berlin: Mittler & Sohn, 1927. The text in the Meisner ed itio n  
of Waldersee’s diaries and correspondence has been significantly edited and ‘improved’ by M eisner. 
The quotations used here have therefore been compared with Waldersee’s original manuscript i n  
Berlin-Dahlem : HAI - Rep.92 ‘Persöliche Nachlässe von Graf Alfred von Waldersee.
60 The former army corps commanders’ personal papers in the military archive in Freiburg include 
Otto von Below; Berthold von Deimling; von Eichhorn; Karl von Einem; Herman von Francois; 
August von Goeben; Colmar von der Goltz; Paul von Hindenburg; Alexander von Kluck; Bruno v o n  
Mudra; and Sigismund von Schlichting. The private papers of Alfred von Waldersee are in th e  
Geheimess Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem.
61 E. von Witzleben ‘Adolf von Deines. Lebensbild 1845-1911’ Berlin: Verlag der Liebelschen 
Buchhandelung, 1913; Wilhelm Georg ‘Unser Emmich. Ein Lebensbild’ Berlin: August Scherl, 1915; 
Walther von Bremen ‘Denkwürdigkeiten des Preussischen Generals der Infanterie Eduard vo n  
Fransecky' Bielefeld und Leipzig: Velhagen & Klasig, 1901; Gerhard Bemin ‘August von Goeben in  
seinen Briefen’ Berlin: E.S.Mittler & Sohn, 1903; Georg Körting (No title. Unpublished memoirs o f  
his time with General von der Goltz) The military archive, Freiburg: personal papers of Colmar von 
der Goltz, N 80/18; Eugen Wölbe ‘Alexander von Kluck' Verlag Otto Spamer, Leipzig 1917; T h ilo  
Krieg ‘Hermann von Tresckow, General der Infanterie und Generaladjutant kaiser Wilhelms 1. E in  
Lebensbild’ Berlin: E.S.Mittler & Sohn, königliche Hofbuchhandlung, 1911; Elisabeth Gräfin von 
Wartensleben 'Herman Graf von Wartensleben-Carow, ein Lebensbild 1826-1921' Berlin: 
E.S.Mittler & Sohn, 1923; C. von Conrady 'Grafen August von Werder. Königlicher preussischer 
General der Infanterie’ Berlin: E.S.Mittler & Sohn, 1889.
A similar pattern can be observed on the French side, where the main descriptions of 
civil-military relations come almost exclusively from the viewpoints of officers. The 
memoirs of politicians and prefects pay little attention to the relationship between the 
prefectoral and military authorities.62 French senior officers were apparently less 
inclined to write their memoirs or to leave personal papers behind than were their 
Prussian counterparts. In addition, the memoirs of French generals which are in print 
make little mention on the issue of domestic military intervention; indeed they are 
mostly preoccupied in affirming their excellent relations with a particular politician or 
in declaring their commitment to the Republican regime.63 In contrast, the French 
general commanders who left their memoirs behind in the form of unpublished 
manuscripts tend to be franker in their negative descriptions of their relations with the 
civil administration.64 Similarly, generals still in active service tended to be very 
discrete, whereas retired generals allowed themselves to be openly critical towards the 
use - or misuse - of military troops in performing as the extended arm of the political 
executive.
The attempts made by local pressure groups to influence the measures taken to 
maintain or restore public order are difficult to trace except for what appears among 
the collections of documents mentioned above. Nevertheless, an examination of the 
minutes from most important elected bodies at the regional level (the General Council 
of the département Nord and the Provincial Diet of Westphalia) was carried out in
62 The personal papers of these prefects contain little information related to the instances of military 
intervention as the issue was very likely considered either too unimportant to be mentioned or too 
politically sensitive for the prefect to want to leave this kind of information lying about. Paul Cambon 
'Correspondance’ (1870-1924) Vols 1-3, Paris, 1940-1948; Archives départementales de Lille, the 
personal files of the prefects of Nord, M 6 /19-20; Archives Nationales, AP 269 Trépont.
63 Louis André ‘Cinq ans de ministère ’ Paris: Louis Michaud, 1906; Raoul-Marie Donop *Lettres d ’un 
vieux cavalier, 1870-1907’ 1906; Gaston Gallifet ‘Souvenirs’ in Le Journal des Débats August 1902; 
Général Zédé ‘Souvenirs de ma vie’ published in Le carnets de la sabretache (1933-1936); Emile 
Zurlinden ‘Mes Souvenirs depuis la guerre, 1871-1901 ’ Paris 1913.
64 Henri Brugière ‘Mes mémoires’ (1841-1914) (unpublished manuscript). Military Archive, 
Vincennes, 1 K 160 / 1 Kmi 46; Emile Jourdy ‘Mémoires’ (unpublished manuscript ca.1913). 
Military Archive, Vincennes, 392/GD/3; Hubert Lyautey ‘Choix de lettres* (1882-1919) Paris 1924; 
Hubert Lyautey *Paroles d ’action, Madagascar, Sud-Oranais, Oran-Maroc' (1900-1926) Paris: 
Armand Colin, 1948; Charles Millet ’Souvenirs’ (unpublished manuscript circa 1913), Military 
Archive, Vincennes, 1 K mi 9. The personnel files of the general corps contain some documents 
linked to the command in the main garrisons but are generally not very useful. In the National 
Archives in Paris, the private papers of General Antoine Chanzy and of Marchai Hubert Lyautey.
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order to see whether the question of military intervention appeared on their ag en d as .
It appears that these elected bodies were only very occasionally concerned with t h e  
question of military intervention and that their decisions usually only amounted t o  a  
statement in principle which had little significance for the policies that were b e in g  
pursued by the state authorities.
An analysis of the local press was also undertaken at an early stage of this s tu d y  
because it was felt that by scrutinising this source, evidence pointing to the frequency  
of use of troops in the two regions could be established. This procedure, how ever» 
soon proved to be inconclusive because, very often, the press did not make a n y  
distinction between the gendarmerie and regular troops; in addition, due to t h e  
political sensitivity of the issue, the press sometimes mistakenly refers to the p resence  
of troops when in fact only the gendarmerie or municipal police were present.
6 3
1.4.3. The limits of the study
The study does not consider normative issues concerning political decision making in  
Prussia, and therefore avoids concepts and debates over the degree to which th e  
Prussian system was ‘semi-absolutistic’, ‘militaristic’ or ‘politically backwards’ . 
Similarly, the thesis is not concerned with questions such as whether the actions of th e  
bureaucrats and military commanders were ‘feudal’, authoritarian, or undemocratic, o r  
whether the use of troops was the response of a ‘bourgeois capitalist’ system against 
the emerging labour movement. Secondly, the study seeks to explain overall patterns 
of civil-military relations rather than why the army was mobilised to individual cases o f  
conflict. In the third place, this is not a study of social conflicts. Such investigations 
have already been undertaken both from the perspective of emerging political and 
social movements, and from the perspective of ‘collective actions*. Similarly, this 
thesis is not concerned with the questions of policing and social control or with the 
public forces in the actual theatres of conflict and their relationship with strikers and 
demonstrators. Finally, the response from wider civil society to domestic military 65
65 'Délibérations du Conseil Général du Nord, 1887-1914’, in Archives départementales de Lille, 
I .N. 131-160 and the minutes from the Proviciai Diet (Provinziallandtag) of Westphalia in Münster 
HaStA respectively.
36
intervention is not examined. Investigations on the reactions appearing in the local 
press were initiated at an early stage of this research. These were abandoned because 
the information contained within turned out to be of little interest because it failed to 
explain the differences in the strategies adopted in the two industrial areas. In 
particular, similar arguments were raised in public about the domestic use of troops; 
indeed, there was greater public critisism in France o f military intervention than in 
Prussia. Hence such public critisisms did not lead to any clearer understanding of why 
the patterns in the use of troops were so different in the two countries.
1.5. The structure of the thesis
The thesis is organised in three parts. The first part establishes the elements to be 
compared, by analysing the three sets of alternative explanations indicated above: the 
relationship between the challenge in terms of public unrest compared to the available 
forces of order, the legal-institutional framework of civil-military co-operation, and the 
elite structures in the local society, in particular the social affiliations between the 
senior civil servants and military commanders, as well as their acquaintance with local 
elite groups.
Chapter Two provides the elements of comparison used in analysing the problems of 
maintaining public order in the industrial areas of Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais. 
The analysis involves a comparison between the size and development of the working 
population in both regions between 1889 and 1914, the type of industries, and the 
extent of the labour conflicts. In turn, it also compares the numbers of civil forces 
(police and gendarmerie) in the two regions. Two important points are being made 
here. In the first place, the size of the working population and extent of the labour 
conflicts were greater in Westphalia than in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Moreover, despite 
serious attempts in Prussia to develop police and gendarmerie forces, so that they 
could manage the challenges of policing an industrialising area alone, the ratio of civil 
forces compared to the population did not change markedly between 1890 and 1914, 
due to constant increases in population. Thus, the dissimilar use of troops between
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Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais was not due to the balance between numbers o f  
forces available for maitaining public order and the extent of conflicts or the s ize  o f “ 
population.
Chapter Three analyses the formal institutional framework and the distribution o f  
powers between the civil and military authorities at the regional level. The main p o i n t  
is that the formal distribution of powers provided a much higher degree of authority t o  
the Prussian military commander compared to his French counterparts. N evertheless, 
the formal authority o f the Prussian commanders to  intervene in civil conflicts w ith o u t 
being formally requested by a civil authorities or the right to refuse requisitions o f  t h e  
were of little consequence for the actual functioning of civil-military co-operation . 
Only once in during the Imperial era did a Prussian military commander in tervene 
without being formally requested, thus creating a public outcry that forced the w a r  
ministry to abolish the right to independent military intervention.66 Similarly, n o  
example has been found where a request from the civil authorities was refused, a n d  
when requested military commanders generally followed the wishes of the c iv il 
authorities.
In Chapter Four, the means o f influence of the different authorities at the regional level 
in questions concerning the use of troops are examined. Two crucial points are made in  
this chapter. The first one concerns changes in decision-making procedures that saw  
power moving from the local to the regional level. This development took place in 
both the French and Prussian cases. The result was that locally-elected authorities, 
although formally entitled to call for military assistance, were virtually excluded from 
such decisions. Similarly, the industrialists interested in the intervention of military 
troops had limited opportunities to put forward their interests through locally-elected 
bodies; additionally they had almost no social contact with, or access to, senior 
officials or military commanders. With decision-making structures concentrated at the 
regional level, the relationship between the senior state administrator and the army 
corps commander becomes crucial. However, the second central point of this fourth 
chapter is that, despite the close social ties between the senior members of the Prussian
66 For an account on the Zabern affair, see Chapter Three.
38
State administration and the higher ranking officers, their professional interchange was 
limited. Conversely, despite the notoriously tense relationship that existed between the 
French military commanders and the representatives of the Republican regime, these 
two groups enjoyed continuous professional co-operation. Thus, the mere frequency of 
military intervention in the French and Prussian cases strongly contradicts the 
assumption that close social ties should in turn lead to close professional co-operation.
Part II of this thesis is entitled Debates, priorities and policies implemented; it is 
comprised o f three chapters. Chapter Five looks at the arguments put forward in 
France and Prussia for and against the use of military troops in internal peacekeeping 
and compares their political implications in the two systems. Chapters Six and Seven 
then analyse the policies pursued by the central power both in Berlin and Paris, and the 
inconsistent and contradictory priorities of the different branches of the two central 
governments. They also examine the alliances that grew up between different groups 
within the French and Prussian systems amongst those supporting the peacekeeping 
strategy and those by the civil and military institutions in Paris and Berlin who opposed 
it. In both countries, the authorities had to strike a balance between, on the one hand, 
the need to keep situations of unrest under control - thus avoiding a major uprising - 
and, on the other hand, the wish to keep the army out of domestic conflicts. At the end 
of the day, the decisions about when, where and how was to be used the army were 
taken by the senior state administrators in the two countries.
The central point in understanding the dissimilar policies implemented in Westphalia 
and in Nord-Pas-de-Calais is that the French and Prussian civil and military authorities 
at the regional level had a series of reasons for preferring intervention or non­
intervention of military troops. In the Prussian case, both the civil administration and 
the military command agreed to leave the management of conflicts to the local 
authorities, without interference with state forces, at least until quite a late stage; in 
practice, this meant calling for military assistance only when violence and riots went 
out of control. On the French side, however, both the prefects and the army corps 
commanders knew that their own positions, and in a wider sense the existing social and 
political order, depended on the strict and rapid control of any unrest, even at the local
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level. They therefore tended to be far more interventionist than their Prussian 
counterparts. In both cases, it was important that the civil and military authorities a t  
the regional level supported each other and that they defended the measures chosen 
before the Ministry of the Interior and the War ministry respectively.
Part III, entitled The institutionalisation o f the strategies adopted and the diverging  
trajectories o f  administrative practice, is composed of the Chapters Eight and Nine. 
They analyse the administrative lines of civil-military co-operation and decision making 
as these developed between the early 1890s and the outbreak of the First World War. 
The crucial point is that, in the French case, the very fact o f working closely together 
made the mobilisation of troops increasingly convenient; the authorities in Nord-Pas- 
de-Calais therefore tended to take the option of calling out the army whenever there 
was the slightest risk of a situation getting out o f control. Conversely, due to the 
increasingly low frequency of military interventions in the Westphalian part o f the Ruhr 
district, the civil and military authorities lost the habit of co-operating. The 
mobilisation of troops for internal purposes became an increasingly complicated 
measure to implement, since the lines of communication and authority, as well as the 
number of troops to be mobilised and the points to  be protected, had to be established 
ad hoc, whilst the crisis was taking place. Thus a self-perpetuating dynamic in 
administrative procedures can be observed, that shaped the tendency either towards 
the choice o f mobilising troops or the option of avoiding military intervention.
In the conclusion, two main factors are used to explain the diverging trajectories of 
policy towards maintenance of public order in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais. 
First of all, the reason for adopting dissimilar policies in the early 1890s seemed to 
have been linked, above all, to the degree of confidence in the stability of the regime 
and its capacity to survive a situation o f open revolt. In both Prussia and France, 
successive governments, as well as their civil and military representatives at the 
regional level, were constantly expecting a revolution to break out. However, the 
Prussian authorities in Westphalia had sufficient confidence in the stability o f their 
regime and the capacity of the army to put down any revolt, if necessary. Additionally, 
the political consequences of violent confrontations between public forces and
population did not have the same devastating effect on the legitimacy of the regime in 
Prussia as it had in France. The Prussian ministry o f the interior and the state 
administration at the regional and local level could therefore afford to undertake a 
policy of ‘de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping, even if this was connected with a 
considerable degree of risk of losing control.
In contrast, the French Republican system was a fragile construction. Government 
ministers, as well as the prefects and military commanders, knew that the existing 
social and political order could easily be reversed by a popular uprising, as had 
happened four times since 1789. The Republican regime could not allow any instances 
of unrest to get out of control, because violent confrontations between public forces 
and citizens always had a devastating effect on the legitimacy of the regime and how it 
was perceived by wide sections of the population. The strategies implemented in a 
turbulent area like Nord-Pas-de-Calais were a reflection of this, and the mobilisation of 
large numbers of soldiers was one way of avoiding a situation from getting out of 
control, and preventing violent confrontations.
The second main factor, which in turn explains the diverging trajectories of the 
strategies is the dissimilar degree o f inter-institutional connection and co-operation 
between the state administration and the respective military authorities in Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais and Westphalia. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the development of detailed plans and 
procedures around the mobilisation of military troops made the use of troops 
increasingly convenient and effective. This explains why calling upon the army - a 
measure which might be considered appropriate for situations of major crises - was 
also implemented for very minor incidents. It also explains why the French army was 
sometimes used to perform ordinary crowd management when a large number of 
people were expected to gather. Conversely, the lack of inter-institutional connections 
in Westphalia between the state administration and the military authorities made calling 
for military assistance an increasingly complicated procedure, and a strategy which 
implied many unforeseeable elements. Accordingly, the state administration in 
Westphalia increasingly refrained from this option, which they could not control. At
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the same time, the Prussian state administration became increasingly confident o f i ts  
own capacity of managing even large-scale cases of conflict with civil forces alone.
The main implication of this study is that the outcome of administrative policy making 
cannot simply be deduced from the wider social and political context, but has to  b e  
studied in its own right. The development in France of policies that strongly implied 
the army and in Prussia a rather successful policy o f ‘de-militarisation’ of interna] 
peacekeeping took place despite strong social and political forces opposing this 
strategy towards public disorder.
Part I. Context of Military Intervention in Westphalia and Nord 
Pas-de-Calais
Chapter Two. The domestic use or troops: challenges and 
responses
The use of the Prussian army for internal peacekeeping during the Imperial period has 
not been the object of much detailed research. In particular, issues of the importance of 
the Imperial army as a force of law and order during the great labour conflicts have 
been based on assumptions rather than on empirical evidence.1 Interpretations of the 
domestic role of the army have been based partly on detailed analysis of isolated cases, 
partly on the principle declarations of intent from individual general commanders. In 
addition, interpretations are usually confined to the analysis the War Ministry’s policy 
with little attention paid to how that policy was implemented.2 Above all, general 
interpretations of the political development of Imperial Germany, aiming at stressing 
the authoritarian nature of the system, have led to a series of strictly inaccurate 
estimates concerning the importance of military involvement in labour conflicts.
Martin Kitchen vastly overestimates the frequency and importance of military 
involvement in internal conflicts, claiming that calls for military troops to put down 
strikes happened ‘quite often’;3 meanwhile, Messerschmidt describes the requisitioning 
of military assistance as a measure which was almost automatically implemented in the 
case of labour conflicts.4 Despite Wehler’s famous designation of the Prussian army as
1 Liidtke’s research only deals with the first half of the nineteenth century; Klückmann (1978) just 
considers the legal-constitutional aspect of domestic military intervention, while Funk (1986) focuses 
on the changes in the legal definitions of the state's monopoly in coercion. As with Funk, Jessen 
(1991; 1992) is mainly preoccupied with the ‘de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping in the light 
of the development of civil police forces. Given the declining importance of the army, the few cases of 
domestic military intervention which took place have not been considered relevant for detailed 
investigations.
2 Craig (1955); Kitchen (1968); Messerschmidt (1970; 1979; 1980); Deist (1991); Berghahn (1982; 
1994).
3 Marlin Kitchen (1968) p.163.
4 “Bei Arbeiterunruhen wurden in bald selbstverständlicher Praxis Truppen zusammengezogen" 
Messerschmidt (1980) p.68.
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an instrument for internal repression {Kampfinsirument nach Innen),5 he admits in h is  
more recent works that after 1889, military commanders in situations of labour conflict 
maintained a pragmatic wait-and-see attitude which often resulted in non-intervention.6 
In contrast, recent literature, focusing on policing, social control, and the maintenance 
of public order, seriously modifies the idea of the army as an important actor in  
domestic peacekeeping during the Wilhelminian period; it also stresses important 
changes in the use of the army for internal purposes during the Imperial period.7 
Similarly, despite important methodological difficulties linked to Richard Tilly’s  
quantitative research into violent incidents appearing in the German press, it is 
important to notice that his figures of military involvement point towards the same 
conclusion.8
Within French historiography, the increasing frequency of domestic military 
intervention - particularly during the first decade of the twentieth century - is a well 
known phenomenon which is mentioned by historians working on the French army,9 
and by scholars working on policing and the maintenance of public order,10 as well as 
by the historians working on French labour movements,11 and in the general literature 
on the French Third Republic.12 Except for Perrot’s estimates of military interventions 
in labour conflicts through the years 1870-1890,13 none of these works attempt to  
provide a more precise estimate of the figures behind this term ‘high frequency.’ As a 
comparative problem, however, it should be noted that the paradox of increasing 
frequency of military interventions in France has been largely ignored. Only Samuel 
Huntington has made any mention the high degree of involvement of the French
5 This expression was first used by Wehler (1973) pp. 159-160.
6 Wehler (1995) p.1123.
7 Lüdtke (1981; 1982), Funk (1986), Jessen (1991), Spencer (1985; 1992). Similarly, Harald 
Klückmann, whose article deals specifically with the question concerning requisition of military 
troops during the Imperial era, point to a significant decline in the frequency of intervention. 
Klückmann (1978) p.31.
8 Tilly, Tilly, & Tilly (1975) p. 210, Richard Tilly & Gerd Hohorst (1976) p.252.
9 Girardet (1953) p.262, Ralston (1967) p.281, Serman (1982) p.59.
10 Carrot (1984) p.647, Bruneteaux (1996) pp.46-47, Belière (1996) p .l 18.
11 Rebérioux (1975) pp.78-79 & 89, Perrot (1975) pp.83,192-195, Trempé (1995).
12 Rebérioux (1975) 78-79 & 89, Azéma & Winock (1970) only mention the army in its external role 
or as the ‘school of the nation*. Agulhon (1990), pp. 100-101, only mentions the incidents at Fourmies 
in 1891.
13 Perrot's quantitative estimates are only comprised of instances of labour conflict; her figures for 
military intervention involves both the cases where regular troops were mobilised and cases where 
only the gendarmerie intervened. Perrot (1975) p,195.
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military establishment in civilian affairs compared to Prussia, although he explains it 
away by arguing that it all stemmed from the higher level of professionalisation of 
Prussian officers when compared to the French.14
In this chapter, some elements are presented which allow quantitative comparison to 
be made between the two cases. In the first place, a comparative analysis will be 
undertaken regarding the challenge presented to the authorities in Westphalia and 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais in terms of the size of the working population, the increase in 
population, the degree of labour organisation and the potential for violence linked to 
instances of public disorder. The findings show that the size of great labour conflicts, 
both in terms of the actual number participants, as well as the extent of the working 
population as a whole, was significantly higher in Westphalia than it was in Nord-Pas- 
de-Calais. (1.1.)
Secondly, it is important to stress that dissimilarities in the use of military troops were 
not due to differences in the development of civil forces either. Although the Prussian 
authorities put significant efforts into extending their civil forces in the period between 
1889 and 1913, these attempts were largely neutralised by the rapid population growth 
in the industrial areas of Westphalia. Conversely, despite a reputation that the French 
countryside was badly policed right up until after the First World War, the density of 
policing in Nord-Pas-de-Calais - and also in France as a whole - was actually slightly 
higher here than it was in Westphalia throughout the period examined (2.2).
Third, a series of indicators are presented in order to show that, between 1890 and 
1914, the number of military interventions in Nord-Pas-de-Calais was actually much 
higher than was the case either in Westphalia or in Imperial Germany as a whole. The 
documents concerning maintenance o f public order left behind by the Prussian 
Ministries of War and of the Interior are quite substantial and do not suffer from 
important gaps. Although there might be instances of militaiy intervention in Prussia 
which do not appear in these ministerial documents, the finding of only three cases of 
military intervention in Westphalia whilst seventy-eight cases were traced in Nord-Pas-
14 Huntington (1957) pp.49-53; 70-79.
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de-Calais indicates dissimilarities which do not seem to be linked to lack o f*  
documentation. Moreover, the Prussian documents refer to these three cases in a  w a y  
that indicate that these were indeed the only cases of military intervention i n  
Westphalia between 1889 and 1914 (2.3).
Finally, not only did the authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais call for military a ss is tan c e  
more frequently than did their Westphalian counterparts, but the authorities in N o r d -  
Pas-de-Calais also tended to send a significantly higher number of men - both civil a n d  
military - to deal with instances of unrest which were comprised of much lo w e r  
numbers of actual or potential paricipants. Similarly, while the total number of days t h e  
army was mobilised in Prussia went down between 1889 and 1912, the periods o f  
mobilisation in Nord-Pas-de-Calais were longer than they ever were in Prussia d u rin g  
the Imperial era.(2.4).
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2.1. The challenges faced by the French and Prussian authorities in the 
two industriai areas
One fundamental question that appears when considering the domestic use of the army 
in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais would be the degree to which the French and 
Prussian adminstrations in the two industrial areas faced comparable challenges. The 
following analysis looks at the material conditions under which the civil authorities in 
Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais had to operate. It examines the size and the 
developement o f the working population in the two areas, the number of participants in 
the conflicts occuring, the degree of labour organisation and the potential for violence 
linked to labour conflicts in the two areas. A second key factor for comparison 
concerns the size of the civil forces in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais, in order to 
see whether there was a significant structural difference within the two systems, that is 
whether the Prussian authorities had a serious alternative to the military that the French 
authorities had not in terms of a greater number of civil forces. The comparison of 
these factors show that the size of the great strikes occurring in Westphalia actually 
involved a larger number o f people than even the greatest confrontations that took 
place in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Similarly, the figures for available civil forces clearly 
indicates that despite significant increase in the Prussian civil forces after 1889, their 
number in relation to the population always remained lower in Westphalia than in 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais.
2.1.1. The two regions and their populations
The two regions differed by virtue of their size, because the Westphalian entity was 
considerably larger than the region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais. The province of Westphalia 
covered 20,214 square kilometres, with a population which increased rapidly from 
1,760,000 in 187015 to a 4,125,096 in 1910.16 In comparison, the territory of the region 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais, with its 12,414 square kilometres, was only two-thirds of 
Westphalia. Similarly, the population was smaller and the demographic increase during 
the second half of the nineteenth century was less dramatic than that which occurred in
ls Wehler (1995) p.9.
16 Jcssen (1991) p.359.
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Westphalia. The population of the départment Nord increased from 1,158,885 in 1851 
to 1,867,408 by 1901 and 1,962,155 in 1911. During the same period, th e  
demographic structure of Pas-de-Calais underwent important changes due to th e  
opening of important coal mines in a traditionally agrarian region. The majority o f  
miners were recruited in the rural areas of Pas-de-Calais, but the new activities w ere  
also followed by influx of workers from other areas of France and from th e  
neighbouring Belgium. Accordingly, the population in Pas-de-Calais increased from  
694,294 in 1851 to 1,013,492 in 1906."
The dissimilar response to labour conflicts in the two areas is all the more striking 
since the working population, and thereby the potential for challenges to the 
authorities, was considerably greater in Westphalia compared to Nord-Pas-de-Calais. 
The three main industrial sectors in the industrial areas o f Westphalia17 8 were its mining 
industry, its metal industry, and its textile industry. From the mid-nineteenth century, 
the mining population grew from fewer than 50,000 to 117,000 by 1882 and to  
342,000 by 1907.19 Similarly impressive were the figures for the workers employed in 
the metal industry which increased from fewer than 17,000 in 1882 to 111,000 by 
1907. During the same period, the textile sector increased from 19,000 employees to  
43,700.
Although the industrial boom of the second half of the nineteenth century also brought 
about an important growth in the number of industrial workers in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, 
the working population was still significantly smaller than it was in Westphalia. The 
mining sector employed 45,000 people in 1879.20 This number increased to 87,000 by 
1901,21 and exceded 100,000 employees by 1906. Given that the labour conflicts in 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais tended to spread to other professional categories, it is relevant to 
consider at the total number of striking workers in all professional categories in Nord- 
Pas-de-Calais. Looking at the most turbulent years that is 1902, 1906, 1909, 1910, 
1912, and 1913, the annual strike statistics provide the figure of the total number of
17 Trempe (1995) p.235.
18 Comprising the districts of Dortmund, Bochum, Essen, Duisburg and Recklinghausen.
19 Tenfelde (1990) pp.148-149.
20 Sorlin (1966) p.290.
21 Cooper-Richet (1984) p.402.
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strikers for each département throughout the year.“  For the entire year of 1902, there 
were 87,815 striking workers in all professional categories in the two départements 
Nord and Pas-de-Calais. In 1906, when the entire region was struck by the general 
strikes in several professional branches, 92,191 workers were reported as strikers 
during the entire year. In 1909, there were 33,680 strikers and 43,717 in 1910, 
whereas in 1912 and 1913 there were respectively 97,724 and 89,643 strikers annually.
The total figure for striking workers in Nord-Pas-de-Calais - even in the most turbulent 
years - thus remained far behind the number of workers which were mobilised among 
the miners during the great Westphalian strikes of 1889 (90,000 miners), 1905 (more 
than 200,000) and 1912 (100,000-150,000). It was only quite late in the period 
investigated (1906, 1912 and 1913) that the annual figure for strikers in Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais came close to that of the number of miners who could be mobilised in 
Westphalia as early as 1889.
2.1.2. The levels of violence linked to  the conflicts occurring in Westphalia and 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais.
One of the most persistant arguments regarding Germans in the Imperial period is the 
idea of lawabiding and docile subjects, imbued with a ‘spirit of submission* 
(Untertanengeist).21 Accordingly, there is a tendency among historians to explain away 
the decline in the use of the army as being the result of a lack of serious protests; even 
in cases when protests did occur, it is held that they took place peacefully under the 
discipline of the Social Democratic organisation.2 34 Conversely, in interpretations of
22 'Statistique des grèves ’ 1893-1913.
23 For an anlysis of the concept of the ‘Untertanengeist’ see Evans (1993) pp. 157-159.
24 This is due to mainly to two factors. Firstly, as a consequence of the strong emphasis on the 
authoritarian nature of the Prussian regime, any confrontation between public forces and protesters is 
seen as the violent attack of an oppressive state against peaceful citizens. Recognising that the 
protesters were not always peaceful would be an implicit retreat from the position that state 
interventions were by definition repressive and unjustified. Secondly, there is a tendency among 
scholars of the working class movement to consider the Social Democracy as the only true working 
class organistion and to emphasise the discipline among the workers participating in labour actions 
organised by the Social Democratic trade unions.
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public protest in France, there is a tendency to assume that all of the p r o t e s t
25movements which took place were connected with a high degree of violence.
There can be little doubt that the culture of protest was markedly dissimilar in France 
and Prussia. Similarly, the public authorities* expectations of riots and violent actions, 
as well as their perception of the seriousnes of public unrest, were closely linked to  the  
dissimilar experiences of revolts and revolutions in France and Prussia during the 
course of the nineteenth century. The findings of Charles and Richard Tilly on the 
French and German cases respectively confirms this: Between 1882 and 1913, Charles 
Tilly found between 520 and 525 incidents in France where a group of at least fifty 
people were involved in a protest action during which some persons or objects w ere 
either damaged or seized.25 6 During the same period, Richard Tilly counted only 203 
violent incidents taking place within the German Empire.27
Athough the number of incidents taking place in France was higher, there were still 
203 cases of violent incidents occurring within the German Empire. Similarly, recent 
research has started to question the idea of the docile Germans, particularly in the 
Westphalian industrial areas.28 Everyday life was tough and violent. In the years 
preceding the outbreak of the First World War, six people on average were killed in 
accidents every day (Sundays and holidays included) in the German mining industry.29 
During the industrial boom, more than half of the newcomers were young single men, 
originating from the rural areas in the East, who were also badly integrated in the local 
society. Moreover, the Westphalian workforce contained a strong proportion o f 
migrant workers who mainly came from the Eastern provinces, particularly a large
25 Protest movements in France, even when ¡involving a high degree of violence, are often described 
as the justified reaction against an unfair system from groups which were excluded from equal 
participation in social and political life. Similarly, there is a tendency of stressing the ‘revolutionary 
tradition’ by which the ‘French people’ fought for their right by undertaking demonstrations, riots, or 
sabotage.
26 Tilly, Tilly & Tilly (1975) p.57. Unfortunately Charles Tilly does not provide the exact numbers, 
but a careful reading of his graphs leads to this figure.
27 Tilly, Tilly & Tilly (1975) p.227.
28 Blackboum (1997) pp.370-374; Evans (1987) pp. 171-174.
29 According to Hobsbawn (1987; p.306), on average 1,430 British miners were killed every year 
(almost four a day) between 1910 and 1914, while 165,000 were reported injured. The casualties in 
Britain, however, were only two thirds the rate of persons killed and injured in the German mining
sector.
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proportion of Poles. These were mostly young single men, who were employed as 
unskilled workers in the mining sector or in heavy industry. The Polish workers - both 
as an ethnical minority group and as Catholics - were particularly badly integrated, and 
openly discriminated against by the Prussian authorities, who kept a close eye on their 
cultural and religious activities.
It is therefore hardly surprising that mining towns, like for instance Hambom, were 
simply ‘no-go areas* for the police. The ‘forcible release o f prisoners* from police 
stations was one of the most common offences in the Westphalian industrial area. 
Many foremen canried revolvers, even in times of peace and quiet, and guns were 
common among the workers as well. It was said at the time that the first thing a young 
miner would buy for himself was a watch, the second a revolver. Subsequent reports 
about people shooting from windows frequently appeared during the confrontations 
with public forces.30 The findings o f this study reveals a similar picture, with many 
reports - even if exaggerated - of miners shooting at the police and army during the 
great labour confrontations. Reports of strikers throwing stones and bottles at the 
public forces thus belonged to the more innocent incidents. Violence against workers 
who continued working was an inevitable part of a strike movement, in Westphalia as 
well as in Nord-Pas-de-Calais,31 and the assaults on strike breakers seem to have been 
as violent in Westphalia as they were in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, with serious bodily harm 
regularly occurring, along with occasional casualites.
Any comparison between the degree o f violence linked to labour confrontations in 
France and Prussia presents some obvious methodological problems. However, the 
number of people killed in confrontations between the crowds and the public forces 
gives some idea of the level of violence that occurred in the confrontations between 
these two groups. The most bloody confrontation in Prussia between a crowd and the 
public forces took place during the Westphalian miners’ strike of 1889, when at least
30 Evans (1987) p.172.
31 Miinster HaStA, Regierung Münster, VII - 14 Vol.l /32-1 ‘Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912.’ 
Letter from the district governor in Münster to the minister of the interior of 20 May 1912. The 
district governor reported after the end of the 1912 strike that although there had been no attack on 
the mining installations, many strike breakers were assaulted in their homes or on their way to work. 
Moreover, the police had been powerless in the face of the riots taking place in the towns when 
thousands of people were gathered.
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eleven people were killed during the month of May. On the French side, the shooting 
of fourteen striking workers at Fouimies on May-day 1891 was the most violent 
confrontation that took place between the the time of the Commune and the outbreak 
o f the First World War. Thus the labour conflicts in the Westphalian industrial area  
were often linked to a degree o f violence that was no less serious that the incidents 
taking place in France.
2.X.3. The level of labour organisation in Westphalia
A second aspect linked to the challenge coming from the workers is the frequency o f  
labour conflicts. All of studies comparing labour conflicts in France and the German 
Empire show that, after 1889 and particularly after the turn of the century, the German 
workforce was just as willing to go on strike as were the French workers. This was 
both in terms of the number of strikes, the figures for workers participating, and the 
number of working days lost as a result of these conflicts.32
In relation to the strike movements, the question arises whether the decline in the use 
of troops in Prussia reflects the fact that the German workforce the best organised in 
Europe. In contrast to some of the French trade unions, the Social Democratic trade 
unions strongly discouraged their members from undertaking violent action during 
strikes, because it would in turn provide the authorities with an excuse to launch a 
crackdown against the strikers. On the other hand, a disciplined and orderly strike was 
a way of gaining sympathy from wider society, thereby putting increased pressure on 
the employers* organisations. The importance of this non-violence policy of the Social 
Democratic organisation can hardly be underestimated, since it justified the state 
administration*s policy of ‘de-militarisation,’ while giving the Ministry of the Interior 
the self-confidence to pursue this policy, despite the obvious inadequacies of the civil 
forces to manage crowds during mass action. On the other hand, the Social 
Democratic trade unions did not control the majority of the labour force, and they 
were in competition with other types of trade unions.33 The employers - particularly in
32 Perrot (1975) p .51; Boll (1989) p.62 & (1992) p.104; Wehler (1995) pp.791-792.
33 In 1913, the Social Democratic Free Unions organised no more than thirteen per cent of the 
employees in the mining sector, thirty-one per cent in the building sector, twenty-four per cent of the
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the chemical, iron and steel industries - were very effective in their attempts to split the 
workforce through the establishment of ‘yellow unions* and various forms of 
blacklistings or privileges for sections of their employees.34 They thereby created a 
great basis for frustration and discontent among those who were excluded, and who 
did not have much to lose through violent actions.
In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the rapid growth of industrial sectors with poor conditions in 
the workplace and in the crowded living quarters brought about problems of violence 
and crime. The industrial population, in particular in the mining sector, was difficult to 
control, because of its various groups of socially malajusted and poorly integrated 
workforce. The workforce was characterised by a large tum-over of workers and an 
uncontrollable migration from the countryside to the cities, as well as between cities 
and even between factories. Many o f the industrial workers coming from neighbouring 
rural areas had difficulties in adapting themselves to the conditions of modem 
industry.35 In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, there was also a substantial group of young single 
men, with a high degree of mobility, migrating at the local, as well as at a trans­
national, scale. Many of these came from other French regions, from Belgium or Italy. 
Until 1911, the départment Nord was the area with the highest proportion of foreign 
workers, mostly Belgians and Italians.36 As a result of this, the different social groups 
that constituted the working population thus lacked homogeneity and stability.
Due to these difficulties of adaptation for a large group of the population, larger labour 
conflicts - in particular those occurring in the mining sector - in both Westhalia and 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais were connected with a high potential of violence. At the same 
time, the civil authorities in both areas were aware of the powerlessness of the civil 
forces if a strike developed into riots or into a general uprising. The diffenrent type of 
strategy adopted by the French and Prussian administration therefore have to be linked 
to other factors than to dissimilar challenge presented by the workers in Westphalia 
and Nord-Pas-de-Calais.
workers in the chemical industry, and thirteen per cent of the workers in the textile industry. Groh 
(1978) p.359.
34 Geary (1993) pp.141-143.
35 Haupt (1986) p.248.
36 Yves Lequin ‘La Mosa'ique France' Paris : Larousse, 1988.
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2.2. The army as the ultimate force ? a comparison of the civii forces 
During the period 1890-1914, the inconvenience of using military troops and conscript 
soldiers against social and political unrest was recognised by the civil and the military 
authorities in both countries.37 The most obvious alternative to the mobilisation o f  
military troops was to increase and improve the civil forces. Accordingly, the number 
of civil forces increased markedly in both countries during the period between 1890 
and 1914.
In the literature on German policing, the enlargement of the civil forces is generally 
pointed out as a major factor in explaining the ‘de-militarisation’ o f internal 
peacekeeping in Prussia during the second half of the nineteenth century. The 
argument goes that the development of civil forces after 1889 allowed the civil 
authorities to manage internal peacekeeping on their own and that the extension of the 
municipal police and private security corps in most cases made the call for military 
assistance unnecessary.38 Liidtke and Funk in their works on policing and 
administration in Prussia describe the gradual ‘de-militarisation’ of internal 
peacekeeping as the result of a process of modernisation in both the mentalities o f 
Prussian bureaucrats and the instruments in the hands of the civil authorities.39 Jessen 
takes up, and then develops, these two points. He particularly stresses the importance 
of the extension of the civil forces after 1889, arguing that this was the key factor that 
allowed the army to become of secondary importance in internal peacekeeping. 
However, while Tenfelde and Saul see requisitions for the Prussian army during the 
miners’ strikes of 1899, and again in 1912, as an unnecessarily authoritarian measure 
indicating an attempt to provoke a violent confrontation with the labour movement,40 
Jessen, Henning, and Spencer all admit that Prussian administrators made serious 
attempts to avoid involving the army. Thus they see the military interventions on these 
occasions as marking the limits to how far it was possible to ‘de-militarise* internal 
peacekeeping.41
37 See below Chapter Five.
38 Jessen (1991); Funk (1986) Spencer (1985) pp.310-311; ibid. (1992) pp.86-87; Henning (1987) 
pp. 140-141.
39 Liidtke ( 1982) pp.289-290; Funk ( 1986) p. 155-156.
40 Tenfelde (1979); Saul (1981) p.232.
41 Jessen (1991) p. 132-134; Henning (1987) p.141; Spencer (1984) pp. 100-101 & p. 126.
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If historians dealing with Prussian policing tend to regard the extension of civil forces 
during the Imperial period as being sufficient in providing for the need to maintain 
public order, this point of view was not shared by the contemporary civil authorities. 
The conflict o f 1905 made the civil authorities stress the insufficiency of their available 
forces. However, the demand by the province governor in 1906 for at least 1,250 
designated gendarmes for Westphalia was not met; in 1912, due to the rapid growth of 
population in the Westphalian industrial areas, the civil forces were yet again 
hopelessly inadequate numerically to deal with instances of unrest of any size.4’
In comparison with the use of troops in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the question whether the 
measures taken by the Prussian administration in 1899 and in 1912 were necessary or 
an overreaction appears in a different light. In the French literature, the frequent use of 
the French army is explained partly as a structural problem, partly as a political 
problem. As a structural problem, it was the poor state of the civil forces and the 
insufficient number of personnel, in particular outside Paris, that made the military 
presence necessary.42 3 As a political problem, the frequent intervention of the army is 
seen as a result of frustrated attempts in the National Assembly to reach a compromise 
regarding the organisation of a civil force to deal with greater cases of internal 
unrest.44 The causal link between the size of the civil forces and a decrease in military 
interventions appears obvious, but does not explain the dissimilar use of the military 
intervention in the two cases. Indeed, if Prussian civil forces did increase during this 
period, the density of policing remained lower in Prussia than in France throughout the 
period. Similarly, despite the development of the existing civil forces in France, the 
army was called out regularly even in very minor conflicts.
42 During the conflict of March 1912, there were in the county of Lüdinghausen, where 2,000 miners 
out of 2,800 went on strike, a total number of eighteen gendarmes and policemen, including those 
mobilised from other provinces. In the county of Recklinghausen, one of the great centres of the 
mining industry with a population including 44,000-46,000 miners and a strike rate at 21,000-24,000, 
there were less than one hundred men to keep order at twenty-eight mines. In a report from the 14 
March 1912, the district governor in Münster told the minister of the interior that until the military 
requisition of two days before, the six local policemen faced the impossible task of maintaining order 
during a demonstration in which 8,000-10,000 people had participated. Münster HaStA, Regierung 
Münster VII-14voI.3.
43 Berliere (1993) p.9; ibid. (1996) p. 118; Bruneteaux (1993) p.32; ibid. (1996) p.47.
44 Bruneteaux (1993) p.32; Carrot (1984) p.653; Jauffret (1983) pp. 143-144.
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2.2.1. The development of available civil forces, 1889-1914
The civil forces both in France and Prussia consisted in a series o f d ifferent 
organisations: these included the state police and the gendarmerie, the municipal 
police forces, and - in the Prussian case - private security corps. The following section 
provides a brief look at the developments within each force.
The state police in Prussia was created during the reform era in order to watch o v er 
the capital; the corps was directly under the authority of the Berlin police 
commissioner. Very early on, this corps of Royal Guards (königliche Schutzmänner) 
was extended from the capital to other German cities.
In 1882, seventeen larger towns were being watched over by the Royal Guards, which 
by 1908 had been extended to twenty cities.45 Meanwhile, the number of Royal Guards 
had increased from 5,444 men in 1889 to 10,507 by 1900 and then to 16,501 by 
1913.46 In case of major unrest, the Prussian Royal Guards also provided a mobile 
supplementary force which could operate anywhere within Prussian territory.
The development of state police in France was a slower process than in Prussia. The 
French state police corps was originally conceived in order to guard Paris and was 
directly under the authority of a police prefect. From 1851, the police at Lyons also 
obtained the status of a state corps, while the prefect of the département Rhône 
obtained the same powers as those of the Paris police prefect. By 1907, the state police 
in Paris and Lyons together comprised 9,755 policemen; when the Marseilles police 
corps was turned into a state force in 1908, the total number of state police was in turn 
increased to 10,610 policemen.
45 These cities were Danzig, Schonberg, Rixdorf, Charlottenburg, Stettin, Posen, Magdeburg, 
Hannover, Kiel, Wiesbaden, Frankfurt-am-Main, Fulda, Hanau, Kassel, Cologne, Coblenz, and 
Aachen. (lessen (1991) p.357). In France, state police forces were only organised in Paris and Lyons, 
as well as in Marseilles from 1908.
46 Funk (1986) p.213. There is a slight degre of incongruity between the figure for 1913 provided by 
Funk and the number provided by lessen, who sets the number of Royal Guards at 16,801 in 1913. 
(1991, p.359).
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The majority of these - 83 per cent - belonged to the Parisian police but in contrast to 
the Prussian Royal Guards, the French state police organisations were permanently 
based in a town, and did not operate outside of Paris, Lyons or Marseilles.47 However, 
if the size of the state police in France was slightly lower that of the Prussian Royal 
Guards, the number of municipal policemen in the former was higher than in Prussia.
In France, every town with more than 5,000 inhabitants was obliged by law to organise 
and finance a municipal police corps.48 Although, in many towns the municipal police 
corps only comprised one or two policemen, by the end of the Second Empire there 
were already more than 12,000 municipal policemen in France.49 50
In Prussia, the conditions in which the municipal police forces operated were first 
described in the Allgemeine Landrecht of 1794 and further elaborated in the 
Stadteordnung of 1808. However, until the Imperial period, the policing of Prussian 
provinces was still primarily ensured by corps of night watchmen and by the 
gendarmerie?0 Thus, in 1889, the number of municipal policemen in Prussia was as 
low as 2,39351 a figure which had increased to more than 17,000 policemen by 19J0.52
The generally dissimilar density of policing in French and Prussian urban areas appears 
clearly when the number of inhabitants per policeman in the larger Prussian towns are 
compared with the equivalent figures for the twelve largest towns in France. By 1888, 
the density of policemen in larger French towns was generally higher than that of the 
Prussian cities. During the following two decades, the number of French policemen 
increased less dramatically than was the case in Prussia, but due to their uneven 
starting points, the density of policing both in the French and Prussian cases still came 
out at the same level by 1908.
47 Berlifcre (1996) p.28.
48 Law of 28 Pluviose in Year VIII (1800).
49 Haupt (1986) p.244.
50 lessen (1991) p.28; Funk (1986) pp.26-27.
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Without Berlin 1,358 654
1889 1907
Paris 358 31 6
Lyons - 57 5





Saint Etienne 1,100 829
Roubaix 993 806




W ithout Paris 852 692
In contrast to the figures for the larger towns, a comparison o f the developments in 
Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais suffers from a lack of comprehensive data. 
However, a comparison of how the police density developed in the main industrial 
towns shows a similar pattern to that o f the large cities. In 1889, there was a higher 
density of policing in the main towns in Nord-Pas-de-Calais when compared to the 
figures for the Westphalian towns. By 1907-1908 the figure for the number of 
inhabitants per policeman in the Westphalian towns were brought down to a level 
equal to that of the towns of Nord-Pas-de-Calais in 1888. By that time, however, the 
rate of police density in the main industrial towns of Nord-Pas-de-Calais had improved 
markedly since 1888.
53 The sources for this table are lessen (1991) p.357, and Berlière (1996) pp.26-28.
Number o f inhabitants per municipal policeman in the main towns in Westphalia and in Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais54
Westphalia 1889/1890 1907-1910 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 1889 1907
Düsseldorf . 886 Lille 960 853
Dortmund 1,333 1,041 Roubaix 993 806
Essen - 821 Calais 1154 -
Bochum 1,250 925 Tourcoing 1380 -
Oberhausen - 1,630 Boulogne 956 -
Hagen 1,666 862 Dunkerque 1000 406
Gelsenkirchen 3,225 1,020 Douai 1363 -




Average 1,949 1,024 1189 736
Behind this reduction in the Prussian towns regarding the number of inhabitants per 
policeman, there was a constant struggle to keep pace with the demographic growth of 
the industrial towns. Whilst the police forces in main towns grew with several hundred 
per cent 1889 and 1909, so did the population. Compared with the growth in the 
population of Nord-Pas-de-Calais which never exceeded one hundred per cent, it 
appears that the development of municipal police forces in Westphalia took place 
under particularly difficult conditions. Whereas 54
54 Berühre (1996) pp.26-28, Jessen (1991) pp.63 & 357, Spencer (1985) p.311, and Geheimes 
Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.1 Rep.77, Titel 2513, 1 Beiheft 12 ‘Die Entsendung von 
Gendarmen, Polizei beamten und Militärs in die Austandsbezirke 1906-1910’ (documents 378-379).
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The growth o f policemen and inhabitants o f main towns in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais.55
Number of Number of Increase in Population Population Grow th in
policemen policemen policemen in 1886-89 in 1908-11 population
in 1889 in 1909 (per cent) (per cen t)
Westphalia . 438 3,741 754 2,000,000 4,125,000 106
Dortmund 67 198 195 87,700 202,248 130
Essen - - - 78,000 295,000 278
Bochum 37 130 251 45,725 130,807 186
Hagen 20 99 395 33,090 83,948 153
Gelsenkirchen 4 - - 28,000 170,000 507
Lille - 188,000 218,000 56
Roubaix - 100,000 123,000 23
Tourcoing - 58,000 83,000 43
Calais - 59,000 72,000 22
Boulogne - 49,000 53,000 8
Dunkerque - 38,000 39,000 2
Douai - 30,000 36,000 20
Valenciennes - 28,000 35,000 25
Lens - 12,000 32,000 167
Armenti ères - 28,000 29,000 3
Cambrai - 24,000 28,000 16
Thus, the constantly higher levels of police density in Nord-Pas-de-Calais compared to 
Westphalia has to be seen as the result of two factors. In the first place, already by 
1889, the density of policing was higher in French towns than in the larger Prussian 
towns. Secondly, the important increases in the Prussian municipal police forces after 
1889 managed to reduce the difference, even if these achievements in Westphalia were 
constantly neutralised by the rapid growth in population. Thus, by 1907, the main 
industrial towns in Nord-Pas-de-Calais were still, generally speaking, more densely 
policed than were their industrial counterparts in Westphalia. *
35 The sources for this table are Jessen (1991) pp.63, 359, 361, Flora (1975) pp.263-264, and Berlière
(1996) p.28.
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2.2.2. Th e gendarm erìe  in the two industrial regions
The traditionally higher level of police density in France, compared to that of Prussia, 
was equally remarkable for the gendarmerie, which was the main force of order in the 
rural communities. The gendarmerie, although technically a military arm, was created 
to undertake policing in rural areas. The corps was under the command of the civil 
authorities, and is therefore to be regarded as a civil force on equal terms with those of 
the other police forces. Already by 1872, this force was comprised of over 18,000 
gendarmerie officers, organised into units of five and placed in rural communities all 
over the national territory.56 By the turn of the century, this force had exceded 20,000 
officers,57 * and by 1907 it was comprised of more than 26,000 officers, thus 
constituting the single most important force directly under civil authority. In Nord- 
Pas-de-Calais, despite the growth of population, the number of local gendarmes did 
not increase significantly throughout the period. In 1901, the first military legion, 
covering the départements of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, were comprised of 397 mounted 
gendarmes and 449 footmen.59
The first Prussian gendarmerie force was established in 1812,60 and throughout the 
century, rural communities were mainly policed by this force just as in France. 
However, compared to the French gendarmerie, the Prussian force was and remained 
one of modest size. Between 1873 and 1882, the number of Prussian gendarmes was 
merely 3,500. From 1889 to 1913, the number of gendarmes increased from 4,698 to 
5,802 officers,61 thus remaining in number only a fifth of the size of their French 
equivalent. Compared to the 846 gendarmes in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, with a population 
of less than three million, the presence by 1913 of 544 Prussian gendarmes in 
Westphalia, with a population of over four million, was hardly an impressive number.62
56 Carrot (1984) p.654.
57 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12780, ‘4e Bureau de la Sûreté Générale: Grève générale des 
mineurs’. The first plans from 1901 concerning a potential nationwide strike in the mining sector 
operated with a gendarmerie force of 20,849 officers.
5i Carrot (1984) p.654.
59 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12780, *4ème Bureau de la Sûreté Générale: Grève générale des 
mineurs’.
60 As was the case in the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, and Italy, the gendarmerie, as an institution, 
had been brought to Prussia with the French occupation during the Napoleonic wars.
61 Funk (1986) p.213, lessen (1991) p.359.
62 lessen (1991) p.358.
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Together with the 534 Royal Guards permanently stationed in Westphalia/3 the 
Prussian state forces present in the region outnumbered the state forces stationed in 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais, in all 850 gendarmes. In relative terms, however, differences in 
the number of state forces per inhabitant were almost insignificant: one Royal Guard o r 
gendarme to 3,827 inhabitants in Westphalia by 1913, as opposed to one gendarme 
per 3,389 inhabitants in Nord-Pas-de-Calais by 1901.
2.2.3. The civil forces designated to be m obilised to the industrial areas in case o f 
conflict
In addition to the police and gendarmerie officers who were already present in the 
industrial areas, both the French and Prussian system functioned with forces that were 
designated to be called upon from other provinces in case of unrest.
Whereas the French designation lists were organised as one big force in which all of 
the designated officers could be sent to any part of the country, the Prussian 
designation lists determined a particular supplementary force of gendarmes and of 
Royal Guards who were to be sent to a particular province or district. In the wake of 
the great miners’ strike of 1889, the number of designated gendarmes who could be 
sent to the Westphalian mining areas in case o f unrest increased from 170 to 227 in 
1893,63 4 before rising to 493 in 1906.65 Similarly the number of external policemen who 
were to be sent to the Westphalian province if major unrest broke out, had only 
increased from 205 reserves in 1889 to 255 by 1905. This was changed after the great 
miners’ strike of 1905, so that the designated external police forces increased to 1,051 
in 1906.66 In 1911, the Ministry of the Interior operated with an external force of 1,167 
gendarmes, Royal Guards and municipal policemen, who could be sent to Westphalia 
in case of major unrest. Together with a force o f 2,155 gendarmes, Royal Guards and 
municipal policemen from the province of Westphalia who were designated to mobilise
63 Jessen (1991) p.358.
64 Münster HaStA, Kreis Lüdinghausen, Regierungsbezirk Arnsberg /389; Münster HaStA, Münster 
Regierung, VII - 57 Vol. 1.
65 Münster HaStA, Münster Regierung, VII - 57 Vol.4 (documents 23-34).
66 Jessen (1991) p.361.
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s
to the industrial areas in case of major unrest, this brought the maximum available civil 
force to 3,322 men.67
In comparison, the French authorities operated with two lists of the number of 
gendarmes within each military region who could be mobilised to other regions in case 
of major unrest. In 1901, the list of gendarmes who could be transferred to other 
regions without disrupting the regular service comprised 1,819 footmen and 1,850 
horsemen. In the case of urgent need, a total force at 6,300 gendarmes could be 
gathered from the entire country.68 In principle, such a drain on the forces from other 
regions was supposed last for no longer than ten to twelve days. On several occasions, 
however, the number of mobilised forces went beyond the 6,300 and were sometimes 
in place for months.69 Similarly to the Prussian case, there was a lack of correlation 
between the designated forces and the number of men who were actually called upon 
in the great cases of unrest. The reason for this was that the number of gendarmes 
actually available varied enormously; thus, the local civil authorities could never count 
upon a full force of external gendarmes. Given that the number of French gendarmes 
only increased by 6,000 men from 1901 to 1913, the distribution of these gendarmes 
became increasingly ill-adapted to the needs of the civil authorities when several 
greater conflicts were taking place simultaneously in different regions.
2.2.4. Private security corps
A final important dement among the Prussian civilian forces were the private security 
forces (Zechenwehre and Hiittenwehre) established by the mining companies and 
factories. No comparable force existed in France, where the idea of breaking with the 
state’s monopoly on violence was never popular with the state administration or in the 
political executive.
67 Funk (1986) p.308.
68 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12780, ‘4e Bureau de la Sûreté Générale, grève des mineurs.’
69 After the strike in Moniceau-les*Mines in October 1901, the last external gendarmes were only 
demobilised in June 1902. Similarly, after the great uprising in tSouthem France during the summer 
of 1907, vast contingents of gendarmes from all over the country remained in place until October.
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Previously during the nineteenth century, there had been a significant element of 
privatisation of the civil forces in Westphalia,70 for instance private companies paying 
for municipal policemen or even a gendarme whose main task would then be to ensure 
order at the plant in case of trouble, but otherwise he was at the disposition of the local 
authorities.71 This practice was stopped during the 1880s, but the idea of some 
privatisation of forces of order reappeared in the 1890s when the Westphalian state 
authorities began encourage private companies - particularly the mining companies - to  
organise private security corps conferred with a certain degree of police authority. 72 
The intention was that these private security corps could take an important part o f the 
burden away from the municipal police and gendarmerie forces during labour conflicts.
Their task was to function within a mine or factory as a bulwark to protect strike 
breakers or in order to prevent sabotage of mining installations or other property. In 
1904, there were forty-three corps with more than 1,000 members; during the mining 
strike of 1905, this number increased to 2,562 security guards in 117 mining 
companies, thus with 22 guards on the average per mining company.73 In number, 
these men were not sufficient to compensate for the serious problems of understaffed 
police forces. On the other hand, the private security corps were an indispensable 
element in the attempts by the Prussian state administration to manage larger cases of 
conflict without military intervention.
It therefore appears that, when confronted with situations of major unrest, the 
authorities in Westphalia faced challenges which were no less serious that those 
occurring in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. At the same time, in Nord-Pas-de-Calais - and in
70 Jessen (199 l)p p . 120-125
71 The most notorious example of this were the six gendarmes in Essen sponsred by Krupp, whose 
privately financed corps of gendarmes only ended in 1910 when the last of these six officers retired. 
Jessen (1991) p.120-121.
72 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l - Rep.77 - Titel 2513, vol.4. Letter of 8 September 
1894 from the district governor in Amsberg to the minister of the interior: "...die 
Zechenverwaltungen die Auffassung vertraten, dass der Schutz der Zechenanlagen ebenso wie die 
Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen Ruhe, Sicherheit und Ordnung überhaupt lediglich Sache des 
Staates sei.” Cit. Jessen (1991) p.140.
73 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.I. - Rep.77 - Titel 2513, 4, ‘Die Errichtung von 
Sicherheits-Korps gegen Unruhen der Arbeiter in den Bergwerken (Grubenwehren) desgleichen die 
Anstellung von Hilfs-Polizeibeamten bei grösseren Arbeiterbewegungen, 1872-1914.’ Statements 
from December 1907.
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France on the whole - there were more civil forces available to deal with problems of 
public disorder than was ever the case in Westphalia. This was the situation in 1889 
and this remained the case by 1914. This was inspite o f the various initiatives in 
Westphalia to strengthen the corps of Royal Guards, the gendarmerie, and the 
municipal police as well as the existance in Westphalia of private security corps which 
could take over some of the tasks which would otherwise fall on the municipal police.
2.3. The frequency of domestic military intervention in Westphaiia and 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais
Compared to the authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the authorities in Westphalia faced 
more potential of unrest due to the larger working population. Moreover, the 
Westphalian authorities had less civil forces available to deal with problems of public 
disorder that had their French counterparts. It is on this background that the 
significantly higher frequency of domestic military interventions in Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
compared to Westhalia has to be seen.
2.3.1. Methodological problems in estimating frequency
No attempt has been made thus far to describe more precisely the changes that took 
place in the frequency of military intervention. This may be explained, however, by the 
methodological difficulties which are linked to such an estimate. First of all, no 
statistical material on the use of military troops seems to exist in either of the two 
countries. Accordingly, this thesis can only operate with the cases which appear in the 
documents from the Ministry of the Interior and the War Ministry, in the bureaucratic 
correspondence from the state administration at the regional and local levels, and from 
what remains from the offices of the army corps commanders. A issue such as the 
extent to which these documents reflect the majority of the actual cases that took place 
cannot be tested. Therefore, particularly in context of the French case, this study has to 
operate within the limits of the recorded cases as a research level minimum, whereas 
the actual number is likely to have been a great deal higher.
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Secondly, it can also be difficult to isolate the cases where military troops were used 
from those in which only civil forces (the police, gendarmerie, or the Royal Guards in 
Prussia) were mobilised. Often, very general terms being used in the documentation 
such as 'la force de Vordre' or *die Ordnungsgewalt’. There is also some confusion in 
relation to the use of the words ‘troops* and ‘military* because these terms refer just as 
easily to the gendarmes as they do to soldiers. Due to the potential political 
significance of sending in the army to deal with a conflict, rumours sometimes 
appeared in the press about the military’s presence in cases where documents from the 
civil and military authorities clearly state that no troops had been requested.74 Finally, it 
is sometimes difficult to distinguish between cases where troops were only kept in a 
state of preparedness, but never called out, and actual instances of military 
intervention.
In the French case, moreover, a quantitative evaluation is complicated by the immense 
frequency of the phenomenon. No comprehensive record was made when troops were 
actually requested, and no statistical material was ever established, as was the case for 
strikes in general. Another problem in stating the frequency of requisitions is the fact 
that the larger instances of military intervention usually consisted of a series of smaller 
requisitions. Similarly to the larger conflicts that took place in Westphalia, troops were 
generally moved around within a large territory in order to assist at various local 
confrontation. However, whereas the presence of military troops in Westphalia were 
clearly limited in duration, military interventions in Nord-Pas-de-Calais tended to be 
prolonged. Indeed, during very turbulent periods, a strike in one professional branch 
could easily develop to strikes in other branches, so that several independent strike 
movements might be linked together. As a consequence of this, the French troops 
requested for one conflict were often directly transferred to another once when the 
former strike appeared to be over. The military authorities could therefore have troops 
designated to peacekeeping and law enforcement activities for weeks or months on end 
and for a series o f strikes. Thus, it is very difficult to state exactly how many 
requisitions took place and at what moment an individual requisition ceased. In some
74 This is the main reason why the figures provided by Charles and Richard Tilly (1975) for ‘military 
interventions’ as they appeared in the French and German press, cannot be considered as being 
entirely reliable.
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of these cases, material exists which provides comprehensive figures and descriptions 
of the conflict, as well as the measures taken; for others, only minimum numbers can 
be established on the basis of incomplete material.
It is equally difficult to trace instances of troops being requisitioned among the 
documents left behind by the state administrations. No particular collection of 
documents concerning this question has been left from either of the French ministries 
in charge of maintenance of public order. The correspondence between the prefects in 
the départments Nord and Pas-de-Calais and the army corps commander in Lille must 
be traced throughout a variety of papers concerning each individual case of strike, 
political unrest, or public event. The most substantial and continuous collection of 
documents is the papers from the office of the general commanders responsible for the 
first military region covering the départements Nord and Pas-de-Calais. However, this 
series in itself presents problems. The boxes entitled ‘Strikes* or ‘Requisiton of 
Military Troops by the Civil Authorities* can in no way be regarded as reflecting all of 
the cases which took place or even a majority of cases. Moreover, the distribution of 
documents is unchronological and disorderly, with documents related to the same 
instance to be found under many different headings.
An estimate of the frequency of military intervention during the years 1889 to 1914 
must therefore be established on the basis of a series of indicators, none of which 
actually presents a comprehensive picture. However, these indicators unequivocally 
point to a very dissimilar development in the use of troops in France and Prussian 
between 1890 and the outbreak of the First World War, whereby the frequency of 
military intervention in Nord-Pas-de-Calais increased markedly whereas mobilisation of 
troops became a very unusual measure in Westphalia.
2.3.2. Domestic military intervention during the nineteenth century: 
developments in Prussia and W estphalia
In France and Prussia, internal peacekeeping was one of the regular tasks undertaken 
by the army until the second half of the nineteenth century. From the late eighteenth
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century onwards, different types of civil corps were organised in urban communities, 
resulting in a multitude of municipal police corps and night watchmen, as well as the 
civic guards made up by volunteer citizens. At the national level, two types o f corps 
existed. The gendarmerie was a branch of the regular army charged with the particular 
task of policing rural areas. In both Prussia and France, the capital and a number of 
larger cities were policed by a state police force. However, the gradual establishment 
of civil forces such as these during the nineteenth century moved at a slow pace. 
During the first half of that century, the army was, in many cases, the only public force 
present in towns. In the French and Prussian garrison towns - which constituted 
practically all the towns of some importance - the army continued to assume the 
responsibility of keeping public order right up until after 1848.
In the case of Prussia, the intervention o f the military troops in civil conflicts was the 
general rule until the middle of the nineteenth century.75 In the rural areas, the Prussian 
gendarmerie were so dispersed and as a force so understaffed that trouble of any 
importance required the assistance o f the nearest garrison. The municipal police forces 
- even with help of the gendarmerie from the neighbouring countryside - were too 
weak and ineffective to withstand turbulence or to control gatherings which comprised 
more than a couple of hundred participants. Out of 323 incidents of public unrest 
registered in Prussia between 1816 and 1847, the military intervened in 178 of these 
reported incidents.76 Similarly, the repression of opposition movements rallying against 
the Hohenzollem regime during the years 1848 to 1850 was characterised by the 
extensive use of military troops. However, while the number of cases of collective 
action fell during the second half of the nineteenth century, the number of cases in 
which the Prussian army intervened seemed to have further declined.77 Between 1851 
and 1882, the number of cases where military troops were involved - at least in the 
cases recorded by the press - dropped to 130; indeed, between 1882 and 1913, this 
figure fell to thirty-three cases.78
73 Liidtke (1982) p.238ff, Funk (1986) p.47.
76 Tilly, Tilly & Tilly (1975) p.210, R.Tilly & G.Hohorst (1976) p.252.
77 The average number of cases per year fell from 10.4 between 1816 and 1847 to 7.5 cases per year 
between 1851 and 1882, and to seven between 1883 and 1913. Tilly, Tilly, & Tilly (1975) p.210.
78 R.Tilly & G.Hohorst (1976) p.252.
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Despite the methodological difficulties which are connected with the figures provided 
by Richard Tilly, this number appears to be quite consistent with the number of cases 
arising in the ministerial records. The collection of documents left by the Prussian War 
Ministry concerning the domestic use of troops contains twenty-five cases covering the 
period 1889-1913.79 These twenty-five recorded cases refer both to instances where 
the troops were mobilised and to cases where the troops were only raised to a state of 
preparedness but where they never left the garrison. Out of these particular twenty-five 
cases, five concerned disorder in Westphalia (May 1889, January 1891, April 1893, 
June 1899, and March 1912); indeed, only in three of these cases were the troops 
actually mobilised (May 1889, June 1899, and March 1912). It appears from the 
handwritten index to the collection that these documents have been carefully selected 
and that they were put together concurrently during the period 1889 to 1918.80 Indeed, 
they do not represent a casual collection of documents which happened to survive the 
destruction of the Prussian military archives in 1945.
A question remains about the degree to which the cases recorded in these documents 
cover the entire number of cases in which the troops were mobilised. However, the 
documents remaining from the Prussian Ministry of the Interior - although these 
comprise very substantial collections of the documents that survived the Second World 
War as an entity - do not reveal additional cases of military requisition to those 
recorded in the War Ministry, either for Westphalia or for any other area.81
For the cases occurring in Westphalia, other indicators suggest that the three cases of 
military intervention recorded were the only instances which took place during this 
period. In the first place, the documents from the Westphalian administration at the
79 Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /14, ‘Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von 
Unruhen 1889-1914.’
80 Certain changes in the handwriting of the index - such as the modernisation of the orthography and 
the way of recording dates - indicates that the index to this dossier was established at three stages 
during the period: 1889 to 1899, 1902 to 1912, and, finally the notes on the Zabem affair and the 
remaining papers covering the period from January until November 1918.
81 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.I.- Rep.77 - title 2513 l \  ‘Die Entsendung von 
Gendarmen und Militärs in die Ausstandsbezirke' (this also contains the cases of military intervention 
due to political unrest); Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2523 ‘Die 
Arbeitseinstellung in den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westfalen und die daraus 
hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen in den Jahren 1889-1912’.
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provincial and local levei indicate that the cases of military intervention, which appear 
for that region in the papers from the War Ministry and the ministry of interior are 
referred to as the only incidents of this kind.82 During the crisis of March 1912, the 
Westphalian civil administration refers to the military interventions of 1889 and 1899, 
as well as to the experiences of 1905, when a general miners* strike was managed 
without any assistance from military troops. Moreover, a systematic scrutiny o f the 
monthly reports, both from the district governor of the Arnsberg area and from the 
local governors in the counties o f Gelsenkirchen and Recklinghausen for the period 
1893-1905 does not reveal any other case of military intervention, even in these very 
turbulent areas.83
Finally, from the correspondence between the state administrators at the regional and 
local level, it appears that requisition of military troops was an uncommon event. In 
periods of crisis, the province governor received many letters from subordinate civil 
servants asking questions about the procedure in case such a requisition should prove 
to be necessary. There seemed to have been a widespread uncertainty about the most 
basic formal definitions concerning civil-military co-operation, even among 
administrators who had occupied their post for many years. From the viewpoint of the 
military authority the impression is the same. General von Einem, who held the post as 
army corps commander of the seventh military region between 1909 and 1914, 
described the mining strike of 1912 as the only case during his tenure in which he was 
requested to provide troops to support civil forces.84
Even if there were isolated cases that do not appear in the documents from either the 
state administration or the military authorities, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
number of cases in the years between 1889 and 1914 where the Prussian army was 
either requested to intervene in a civilian conflict or asked to keep troops prepared for
82 Münster HaStA, OP 685, ‘Einsatz von Militär zur Unterdrückung bzw.Verhinderung von Unruhen 
enthält 1848-1852, 1880-1881’; OP 6095 ‘Notstandsmassnahmen 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’; OP 
6681, ‘Verstärkerung der Polizei im Ruhrgebiet bei Arbeitemnruhen’ (1906-11); Münster HaStA, OP 
6889, ‘Verstärkerung der Polizei im Ruhrgebiet bei Arbeiterunruhen’ (1912-19).
88 Münster HaStA, OP 2934, ‘Zeitungs- und Verwaltungsberichte: Erstattung der Zeitungsberichte’ 
(1860-1891; 1903-18); Münster HaStA, OP 1407, ‘Zeitungs- und Verwaltungsberichte der Regierung 
Amsberg 1903-1913’; Münster HaStA, OP 1406, ‘Zeitungs- und Verwallungsberichte der Regierung 
Münster 1873-1893.’
84 General von Einem 'Erinnerungen eines Soldaten J853-1933' Leipzig, 1933 pp. 165-168.
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domestic intervention is probably not much higher than the twenty-seven instances 
recorded in the ministerial documents. Similarly, it seems that military interventions in 
Westphalia only occurred on three occasions, that is, in May 1889, in June 1899, and 
again in March 1912. This is sufficient evidence to conclude that the frequency of 
domestic military intervention in Westphalia was significantly lower than in Nord-Pas- 
de-Calais where the number of recorded cases between 1890 and 1914 reached a level 
that had not been seen in Prussia since the period between 1848 and 1850.
2.3.3. Estimates of the frequency of military interventions in France
Until the mid-nineteenth century, the pattern of domestic military intervention in 
France seems to share the features of the situation in Prussia, with the army intervening 
whenever several hundred people assembled. The incidents were occasional and 
geographically isolated, and the measures to control or disperse the crowd were dealt 
with between local authorities and local garrison commanders. In France, as in Prussia, 
the municipal police forces in the towns and the gendarmerie in the rural areas were 
understaffed, badly trained, and often powerless when confronted with assemblies of 
any size.85 No figures have been established for the number o f military interventions, 
but given that military troops were called out to virtually any case of unrest of 
importance, the number of violent incidents with at least fifty participants established 
by Charles Tilly can reasonably be considered as a minimum figure.86 Charles Tilly 
enumerates 258 such incidents for the decade 1830-1839 and 293 for the following 
decade 1840-1848. This is a very rough figure with enormous variations depending on 
the year and covers no less than three revolutions.87
The turbulent years of 1848-1851 were a particularly busy period for the armed forces. 
The revolutions of 1848-1849 were followed in France by the establishment of the 
Second Empire with extensive assistance from the army. At that time, however, the 
majority of public demonstations were comprised of fewer than one hundred 
participants. Most of the cases of popular disorder were dealt with by the gendarmerie
83 Berlière (1996) pp.23-24.
86 Tilly, Tilly & Tilly (1975) p.57.
87 Tilly, Tilly & Tilly (1975) p.69.
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and the nationa] guard, and, apart from a series of bloody interventions during the 
strikewave o f 1866-1869, the French army did not play a major role in the maintenance 
of order during the 1850s and 1860s. Not counting the events of May 1871, when the 
French army was used on a massive scale to launch a crack down on the Commune, 
military interventions in France were very occasional. Michelle Perrot, in her work on 
labour conflicts during the years 1870-1890, estimates a rate of military intervention 
(including cases where only the gendarmerìe intervened) at approximately thirteen 
cases of public disorder in every thousand in 1872, whereafter it fell to three cases in 
every thousand by 1882.88 With the military intervention in Decazeville in 1886 and 
following turbulence surrounding the political campaign o f General Boulanger during 
the same year, the rate of military interventions increased on a national scale from ten 
out of one thousand cases of public unrest in 1886 to fifteen in every thousand by 
1890.89
If an estimate of the frequency of the use of military troops in Westphalia between 
1889 and 1914 constitutes certain methodical problems, these are next to nothing 
compared with the problems one faces when trying to get an idea of the use of troops 
in France during the same years. One general pattern, however, is too obvious to 
overlook. The number of domestic military interventions o f the first two decades of the 
Third Republic - even when the repression of the Parisian Commune in 1871 is 
excluded - significantly increased when compared to previous periods during the 
nineteenth century;90 after the turn of the century, it reached levels that had not 
previously been seen in peacetime.
The French Third Republic was bom  with a major military intervention against the 
Paris Commune, which verged on civil war. After the rather calm years of the 1870s 
and early 1880s, the strike wave o f 1889-1893 introduced, for the first time, the 
problem of nationwide mass actions. After a couple of years of moderate activity, the 
second strikewave, between 1899 and 1902, was followed by years of general unrest - 
politically and socially - against which unprecedented military forces were mobilised.
88 Perrot (1975) p.195.
89 Perrot (1975) p .83&  195.
90 Tilly, Tilly & Tilly (1975) p.28.
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Up until after the end of the First World War, the army remained an important 
instrument of a Republican regime which was struggling to control social protest 
movements, violent political actions, and increasingly organised labour conflicts. Only 
in Paris was there a certain decline in the frequency of military interventions, primarily 
due to the expansion of the Parisian state police corps after Lepine took over as police 
prefect in 1893.91
The documents from the garrison in Lille - which are the only documents left from any 
of the regional military commands in all of France's main garrisons - provides excellent 
material concerning the question of military intervention in domestic conflicts for a 
region, notoriously the most turbulent area outside of Paris. The region of Nord-Pas- 
de-Calais undoubtly had the highest frequency of military intervention of all French 
provinces. The annual statistics on labour conflicts published by the French labour 
ministry since 189392 show that among the French provinces, the departments of Nord 
and Pas-de-Calais had by a long way the highest number of strikes and strikers. The 
combination of mining areas, the textile industry, and three important ports 
(Dunkerque, Calais, and BouIogne-sur-Mer) made this region particularly turbulent 
even when compared to other industrial regions, such as Le Creusot, Saint Etienne, 
and the area of Longwy, or to the main cities, Paris, Lyons and Marseilles. The 
frequency of military intervention in this region must therefore be considered as the 
maximum level for a military region. However, the documents left by the Ministry of 
the Interior indicate that the requisitioning of military assistance also happened 
frequently in the Paris area, and in the industrial centres of Le Creusot and Longwy, as 
well as in the main province towns (Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Saint Etienne).
Although it is not possible to provide a complete list of cases, it is possible to 
demonstrate a pattern of extremely frequent military mobilisation for the years 1886 to  
1888 and 1900 to 1903. A complete record of the confidential correspondence to and 
from the army corps commander in Lille, covering the years 1880 to 1888, allows a 
close examination to be made into the pattern of military intervention during the years
91 Berlière(1993)p.9.
92 ‘Statistique des grèves* Annua] publication from the labour ministry, (1893-1913).
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which preceded the first important strike wave of 1889 to  1893.93 These copy books 
are a compete and continuous record o f the commanding general’s reports to the 
ministry and his orders to the commanding generals under his own command. They 
should therefore provide a valid impression of the cases which landed on an army 
corps commanders* desk. It is not possible to verify whether all cases that took place 
would actually appear in the confidential correspondence of the army corps 
commander since some cases might have been dealt with at the local level between the 
civil authorities and the commander o f the nearest garrison. Whilst taking all of these 
qualifications into consideration, the confidential correspondence still provides a 
minimum rate of the frequency of these requisitions.
The letters from the early years point to the fact that the involvement of the military 
was a rather unusual event. In a letter from 1880, for example, when there was talk 
about a possible requisition for military assistance,94 it appears from the army corps 
commanders’ instructions to the general of the first division that the formal rules 
concerning requisition were not consulted on a regular basis.95 Between 1880 and 
1885, there were few cases of military intervention apart from one big case in 1880 
when 35,000-42,000 textile workers went on strike in Tourcoing, Roubaix and 
Armentiere, and another in February-April 1884 with the great miners* strike in 
Anzin.96 This all changed in 1886, when army was requested no less than ten times.97
93 The strike wave of 1889-1893 has been documented for all of France by Tilly, Tilly & Tilly (1975) 
p.57 & 73; Perrot (1975) p.51.
94 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C./2.I.2., ‘Correspondance générale confidentielle 1880-1888* 
March 1880-December 1884 (document 25).
95 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1 .A.C./2.I.2. ‘Correspondance générale confidentielle 1880-1888* 
March 1880 - December 1884 (document 24): “Les grèves, qui se sont déclarées sur certains points 
de la région du Nord et qui malheureusement tendent à se prolonger, peuvent faire craindre que les 
autorités civiles aient à faire appel au concours de la force armée. Je tiens essentiellement à ce que, si 
cette éventualité vient à se produire, Ton se conforme strictement aux règles posées par les lois du 10 
juillet 1791 et du 3 août 1791 et autres instructions sur la matière. Toutes ces règles ont été réunies et 
résumées dans une brochure que le Ministère de la Guerre a fait paraître en 1874 sous le titre de 
‘Instructions en cas de troubles’ d’après les lois et règlements.”
96 Otherwise the army was only contacted on the occasion of a textile strike in March 1883, but the 
troops were not mobilised; during the general elections of 1885, trouble was also expected to take 
place in Roubaix.
97 Twice that year (March-April and again in October) the prefect in Lille requested the army to patrol 
the fronter because of major strikes and other trouble in Belgium. During the summer and autumn 
small units were called out to Fourmies (June 7), to Lille (June 11), to Hesdin (June 11), to 
Armentière (August 1), to Roubaix (August 1-11), to Lille again (August 14), and to Calais (October 
7). In November, 250 infantry soldiers were requested to ensure public order during the visit of a
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The following year was rather uneventful until the Boulanger crises broke out. That 
December, 600 infancy soldiers were sent to Paris, but in 1888 the Boulanger crisis 
moved directly to the region when General Boulanger presented himself as a candidate 
for the département Nord. During that year, troops were mobilised three times due to 
danger of political unrest, while on an other occasion they were kept in a state of 
preparedness due to a minor strike by three hundred textile workers.
Unfortunately, the years between 1888 and 1901 are not well covered in the 
documents available. Only the largest conflicts of the strikewave of 1889-1893 are 
documented individual cases. It is therefore not possible to get an idea of the frequency 
of domestic military interventions during this decade. Only for the period after the turn 
of the century is material available which shows a pattern of military requisition which 
was similar to that of the years 1886 and 1888. A collection o f telegrammes covering 
the period from September 1900 until September 1903, provides a more precise idea 
of the extent of the phenomenon,98 with similar qualifications, as were stated 
previously that this only comprises the cases which actually arrived on the army corps 
commander’s desk. Compared to the cases appearing in the 1880s, it appears that, 
after the turn of the century, the cases of large labour conflicts increased and that the 
contingency of military forces being sent to manage these crises was generally more 
important after the turn of the century compared to the 1880s :
- 6 September 1900: an unspecified number of cavalry officers sent to a strike among dock workers in 
Dunkerque.
- 30 April 1901: one cavalry squadron (80-100 men) is made ready to leave for Valenciennes if the 
May-day demonstrations should develop into disorder.
- 21 July 1901: two cavalry squadrons were in a state of preparedness in Roubaix because of the 
general elections.
- 27-29 July 1901: the garrison at Lille was in a state of preparedness because of the elections.
- October-November 1901: troops from the entire military region were mobilised because of the 
general miners’ strike.
minister; later the same month, all the troops of the first military region were also kept in a state of 
preparedness because of the elections.
98 Military Archive, Vincennes, l.A.C. /2.I.83, ‘Péluries de la correspondance expédiée par le 
commandant du corps d’armée 1900-1903.’
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- March 1902: al) garrisons in the industrial areas were in a state o f preparedness, due to rumours 
about a new general strike among the miners, together with unrest among the dockers in Calais and 
Dunkerque, and rumours about a general strike among railworkers. No troops were called out.
- 30 July 1902: strike in Vieux Condé (Nord), with the subsequent requisition of one cavalry 
squadron.
- October-November 1902: troops from the entire military region, as well as supplementary troops 
from the neighbouring regions are mobilised because of a general strike among the miners.
- April-July 1903: cavalry and infantry are mobilised to a major strike among textile workers in 
Estaire-La Gorgue (Nord).
-1 June 1903: two cavalry squadrons (160-200 men) are called out in Dunkerque on the occasion of a 
religious ceremony, in which it was thought that a demonstration against the government's politics 
towards the Catholic Church might have developed.
- 27 June 1903: an unknown number of cavalry are requested to maintain order during renewed unrest 
among the Catholics in Dunkerque.
- 14-15 August 1903: the cavalry was requested to ensure public order during a procession in 
Dunkerque, on the occasion of the feast of the Holy Virgin.
- 15 August 1903: the same in St.Pol-sur-Mer.
- 6 September 1903: the cavalry was in a state of preparedness during a strike among spinners in 
Baroeul.
- 10 September 1903: the infantry of the garrison in Boulogne-sur-Mer was in a state of preparedness 
because of the forced closure of a religious order.
The number o f requisitions did not decline during the following years. In December 
1904, for example, the army corps commander reported to the prefect of the 
département Nord that, over the preceding twelve months, there had been no moment 
in which troops were not mobilised somewhere in the department." Similarly, the 
years 1906, 1907 and 1909 seem to have been marked by the uninterrupted presence 
of military troops at some place within the first military region.
Altogether, the documents from the first military region, for the years 1889-1914, 
reveal no less than seventy-eight cases in Nord-Pas-de-Calais alone where the regular 
army was contacted in relation to problems of maintaining public order, - whether 
mobilised or just kept in a state of preparedness. Fifty-nine o f these cases came after 
1900. This figure should be considered as a minimum rate, because the sources 9
99 Military Archive, Vincennes, l.A.C. /2.I.325, ‘Grèves. Dispositioins à prendre, 1902-1909’. Letter 
of 13 November 1904 from the army corps commander to the prefect.
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consulted only provide a very incomplete picture. The relevant documents are 
concentrated around the years 1901-1907, with 1890s and the years after 1907 less 
represented. It was not possible from the material still available to state whether this 
indicates an actual decline in the frequency of cases of requisition or whether it is due 
to the random way in which the documents from the first military region have been 
passed down. The documents left by the prefecture in Lille and Arras, as well as by the 
Ministry of the Interior, only mentions the cases which are also found among the 
papers from the military authorities. In addition to the great conflicts that are so well 
documented, an unknown number of smaller requisitions took place. These only 
occasionally appear in the available documents. The frequency of these smaller cases of 
requisition is almost impossible to state.
2.3.4. Comparisons of frequency and the cases referred to in this thesis
However incomplete the list of recorded cases may be, it clearly indicates the great 
difference between the French and the Prussian cases. Moreover, a clear continuity in 
the patterns in the two industrial areas can be discerned. The Prussian army played a 
certain role in the policy of maintaining a political and social status quo during the first 
two decades of the Imperial era, but the number of internal military operations seemed 
to have decreased significantly during the 1890s. After the great Westphalian miners’ 
strike in 1889 and the turbulent labour conflicts of the years 1890-1893 in France, one 
can observe two markedly different developments in the use of military troops with an 
increasing frequency of military intervention in Nord-Pas-de-Calais - and in France as a 
whole - and a comparatively low number of instances where the Prussian army was 
called to assist the civil forces in maintaining and restoring public order. Thus, while 
the requisitioning of military troops to help the civil forces became a rather rare 
phenomenon in Prussia after 1889, this remained extremely frequent in France with an 
ever more increasing intensity after the turn of the century.
In contrast, in Westphalia the number of requisitions was reduced to a very limited 
number of cases. This thesis has therefore concentrated on the three cases in which the 
troops were actually mobilised (May 1889, June 1899, and March 1912) and the three
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cases when troops were kept in a state o f preparedness (January 1890, April 1891, and 
January 1893). The cases where the army was kept in a state of preparedness, but 
never mobilised, are not well documented and are of minor significance for the purpose 
here. In contrast, the great miners* strike of January 1905 is of particular interest 
precisely because the military authorities were never contacted, despite the great 
sensitivity of the conflict. This incident reflects some important fault lines separating 
the state administration and groups in local society which were calling for military 
intervention. It also clearly shows how the Prussian administration preferred to 
navigate its own way through situations whereas the French authorities Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais would have called for military assistance.
Indeed, in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the pattern from the 1880s was that the army was 
called upon in quite minor instances o f trouble or for ordinary tasks of crowd 
management. This pattern continued throughout the period investigated. The seventy- 
eight cases traced in the documents - although not a comprehensive list of cases - 
reflect the variety of types of conflicts for which troops were requested; thus, it 
consitute a sufficient sample. The study, however, pays particular attention to a limited 
number of conflicts which were significant for the development of a specific pattern of 
administrative response to public disorder. Hence, references will therefore be made to 
the three great strikes which occured in the mining sector of Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
during October-November 1889, November 1891, and September through to 
November 1893. Reference will also be made to the violent incidents which took place 
at Fourmies (département Nord) on May-day 1891, when fourteen workers were killed 
in confrontations with military troops. This incident is particularly important because it 
was a point of reference in the debate concerning the domestic use of the army up until 
the outbreak o f the First World War.
During the years following the strike wave of 1889-1893, no significant changes 
appeared in the measures against public unrest until the Ministry of the Interior took 
the initiative in 1897 of establishing plans in case of a nationwide strike among 
railworkers. Similarly, the nationwide strikes in the mining and transport sectors, of 
October 1901 and of October-November 1902, were of particular significance in the
consolidation of these measures conceived and developed after the strike wave of the 
early 1890s. The following years of 1903, 1904 and, in particular, the spring of 1906 
were characterised by a very large number of greater and smaller instances of strikes 
and politically-motivated conflicts. There is no point in treating the cases occurring 
during these years individually; it is better to view them as a series of events in which 
the strategies developed by the French authorities were consolidated and 
institutionalised because of their repeated implementation. Finally, reference will be 
made to the nationwide strikes of 1907-1910 among public employees (postal and 
telegraph workers) and in the private companies providing public utilités (the railways, 
gas and electricity as well as public transport), when the French army performed a 
strictly non-military role.
2.4. Patterns of response: when and how to use military assistance
2.4.1, Types of conflict in which troops were called upon
The troops in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, and in France generally, were called more 
frequently to assist the civil forces than was the case in Westphalia. Moreover there 
were three other significant differences which can be discerned in the patterns of 
intervention:
• the size of the conflicts in which troops were called to assis were greater in 
Westphalia than in Nord-Pas-de-Calaist;
•  the number of troops mobilised was significantly higher in Nord-Pas-de-Calais; and
• in the French case, troops were mobilised for longer periods than in Westphalia.
Looking at the cases of military intervention in Nord-Pas-de-Calais during the years 
1880-1888, it appears that - apart from the great textile strike in 1880 and the miners’ 
strike in Anzin 1884 - the conflicts were normally only comprised of a couple of 
hundred persons; they were also limited to one town, without ever usually spreading to 
the neigbouring areas. Compared to the number of forces mobilised for serious unrest, 
these small cases of mobilisation usually only involved between 100 and 600 men, 
mostly from the cavalry, and the reasons for mobilisation are difficult to distinguish
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from ordinary police tasks of crowd management.100 By looking at the cases appearing 
in the collection of telegrammes covering the years 1900 to 1903, it is clear that this 
type of smaller requisition was still frequent. It appears that until the eve of the First 
World War, this use of troops for smaller cases of unrest and ordinary crowd 
management was still quite common.101
In at least twenty-six per cent of the cases recorded in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, troops 
were called to assist in a situation o f strike where the maximum number of potential 
participants could not be higher that one thousand persons. In nine of the seventy-eight 
recorded cases in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, troops were requested or kept in a state of 
preparedness because the authorities feared non-authorised assemblies or spontaneous 
gatherings (for instance, this happened in politically sensitive situations like the 
Boulanger candidature in the départment Nord, or also on the occasion of an 
election).102 In some cases when a significant number of people was expected to gather 
at a public event, troops were called out to undertake ordinary police tasks which, for 
instance, invovled the security of VIPs (such as the passage of foreign sovereigns, a 
visit by the president of the Republic or a govemement minister, et cetera), or isolated
100 Military Archive, Vincennes, l.A .C  /2.I.2., ‘Correspondance générale confidentielle 1880-1888.’ 
4 June 1886: one cavalry squadron (one hundred men) was kept ready to intervene in Fourmies, an 
industrial town with less than 20,000 inhabitants. 11 June 1886: a cavalry squadron was kept ready to 
intervene in Lille. 26 June 1886: twenty-five cavalry officers were sent to Hesdin. llJuly 1886: a 
cavalry squadron and two-hundred infantry soldiers were sent to Armentières, an industrial town with
28,000 inhabitants. 1 August 1886: fifty cavalry officers were kept ready to intervene in Armentière. 7 
October 1886: one battalion of cavalry (500-600 men) was sent to the port of Calais. 6 November 
1886: 250 soldiers from the infantry and artillery were mobilised for Douai, a town of 30,000 
inhabitants, to maintain order during a visit by the minister of education. 26 March 1887: an 
unknown number of troops was mobilised to maintain order during a public celebration in Saint- 
Omer, a town of less than 20,000 inhabitants. 12 May 1888, an unknown number of troops was 
mobilised to Lille and Douai on the occasion of political meetings in which General Boulanger was 
participating. 12 August 1888: a cavalry squadron and two companies infantry (in all 300 men) were 
kept in a state of preparedness due to a strike among 300 textile workers in Neuvilly.
101 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12722, ‘Police générale, pouvoirs des préfets en matière de police 
municipale, 1902-1916. Emploi de la troupe pour le maintien de l’ordre.’ Two telegrammes of 21 
March and 21 December 1911 from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects in ‘Loiret’ and ‘Alpes 
maritimes’ forbade the requisitioning of military troops to maintain public order during horse races at 
the local hippodrome, by making reference to an instruction of 23 August 1910 from the war minister.
102 In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, no case of requisitioning the army related to the Dreyfus affair can be 
found. This may be explained by the fact that the documents from the years 1888-1901 are much less 
substantial than for the previous and following periods, as well as the fact that instances may not have 
been recorded. There is, however, reason to believe that the army was not used much to restore order 
during the Dreyfus affair because the Nord-Pas-de-Calais was a region where it only made 
insignificant impression. Moreover, the civil authorities may have been more hesitant about calling 
the army, than it was for other types o f conflict.
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events such as a public execution, or celebration of the Bastille Day, when the army 
was involved both in the parades and in the management of crowds. In contrast, the 
Prussian army had a purely ceremonial role during public events, while the streets and 
squares were watched by the civil forces. Thus, from the late 1880s onwards, right 
until the eve of the First World War, the cases of military intervention in Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais were comprised of both situations involving greater unrest, such as labour 
conflicts or political manifestations, and ordinary police tasks, such as management of 
crowds or the security of VIPs. Moreover, after the turn of the century, the army was 
also used to fulfil strictly non-military functions.
During the period previous to 1889, the military authorities in Westphalia - just as in 
the case of Nord-Pas-de-Calais - were requested to provide troops in a variety of 
situations of greater or smaller unrest. These included social protest movements, local 
riots, smaller strikes in all types of industry, and also religious conflicts linked to the 
Kulturkampf - the trial of strength which took place between the Prussian state and the 
Catholic Church. After the great Westphalian miners* strike of 1889, all of the cases of 
military intervention in Westphalia were linked to conflicts in the mining sector. This, 
however, does not appear to be the result of any particular policy by the state 
administration. Indeed among the cases o f military intervention in the German Empire, 
there were others related to strikes in other professional sectors, and also incidents that 
had no connection to labour conflicts.103 In contrast to the example of Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais, military intervention by the Prussian army was a measure implemented ad hoc 
with no preconceived planning. This was the case in 1889 and it was still the case at 
the outset of the First World War. The main reason for all the cases in Westphalia 
being linked to the mining industry must be explained primarily by the size of those
103 Out of the twenty-seven cases from the entire German Empire (excluding Bavaria) where the army 
was mobilised or kept in a state of preparedness, ten were linked to conflicts in the mining sector. 
Four incidents were linked to other professional categories (construction workers, electricians, and 
factory workers), while one incident talks of ‘unrest among workers’ without being more specific. On 
three occasions, troops were mobilised to patrol the a national borders when conflicts were taking 
place in a neighbouring contry (the Habsburgian Empire, Russia, and France), and the troops were 
also mobilised to prevent strikers from crossing the border and drawing the workers on the German 
side into the conflict. Four cases were linked to political demonstrations, another four incidents were 
related to unspecified public disorder (Krawall), and in one case the nature of the conflict is not 
stated.
81
conflicts and, secondly by the potential of violence which was linked to labour conflicts 
in this particular professional category.
It is important to note that the conflicts in which the Prussian army was called upon or 
kept in a state of preparedness, were all significantly larger than the cases which 
triggered a military intervention in Nord-Pas-de-Calais.104 Similarly, certain incidents 
of mass demonstration or large strikes occurred in Prussia which were comprised o f a 
significant number of participants without triggering a military intervention.105 This 
experience was very different to the French case, where assemblies involving a 
significant number of people would almost certainly be followed by the mobilisation of 
military troops, at least for areas outside Paris.
2.4.2. Responses to challenge: the num bers of men requested
Given the strong tendency of historians to stress the authoritarian nature of the 
Prussian system, it is worth noting that, in all the cases investigated in which troops 
were called upon, the Westphalian authorities mobilised significantly fewer civil forces 
and soldiers when relative to the numbers of strikers than did the authorities in Nord- 
Pas-de-Calais under similar circumstances. Despite the fact that the overall challenge in 
Westphalia in absolute numbers was greater than in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, a comparison 
of the forces used during the most significant confrontations shows that the French
104 The great strike of 1889 was comprised of approximately 90,000 miners in Westphalia and, 
together with the conflicts in the other great mining areas in Saarland and Silesia, the number of 
miners of participants is estimated to have been close to 150,000. (Spencer (1992) pp.86-87). In April 
1891, 12,000 miners were on strike in Westphalia and, in January 1893, the Westphalian authorities 
expected a strike o f a similar size as that in 1889 to break out. The unrest among young Polish miners 
in June 1899 remained within a geographically limited area around the mining town of Heme; it 
involved 6,000 out of the 18,000 workers in the local mines. During the miners* strike of 1905, more 
than 200,000 miners out of 260,000 went on strike. In 1912, the number of strikers was again around
200,000 but, due to expansions in the mining sector, the number of workers employed in the 
Westphalian mines had by that time been extended to 320,000 men,
105 During the two month strike among 33,000 dock-workers in Hamburg from November 1896 to 
January 1897, the military authorities were never contacted. Similarly during the Westphalian miners* 
strike of January 1905, when 200,000 miners went on strike. In March 1906, during the nationwide 
Social Democratic demonstrations for a revision of the franchise to the Prussian Diet, no troops were 
called upon either. During the so-called Moabitter unrest in Berlin of March 1910, which was 
comprised of more than 150,000 demonstrators before ending in violent confrontations with the 
public forces, the whole episode was entirely dealt with by the civil forces; ideed, no evidence has 
been found of contacts being made with the military authorities on that occasion.
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authorities mobilised a larger number of civil forces and soldiers than did their Prussian 
counterpart.106
In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the most extended conflicts of the 1890s were the three great 
miners* strikes which occured in 1889, 1891, and respectively 1893. During the strike 
o f October-November 1889, more than 13,000 miners went on strike.107 The total 
number of forces mobilised is not stated, however, the presence of troops comprising 
more than 1,600 men can be documented,108 *1as well as an unknown number of 
gendarmes.m  The strike of September-November 1891 involved approximately
15,000 miners from the main mines in the area of Douai (Pas-de-Calais). In this 
conflict, 180 gendarmes and 1,987 soldiers and officers were mobilised."0 Two years 
later, in the autumn of 1893, a strike broke out among the miners from the same 
minens around Lens, Li£vin and Courrifcres. It soon developed into a strike comprising 
over 40,000 miners from all over Nord and Pas-de-Calais.,n For this conflict, troops 
were requested from the neighbouring regions. Given that the first military region was 
capable of providing 6,000-7,000 soldiers and officers from its own forces, the fact of 
requisitioning the assistance of other military regions indicates that the total number of 
mobilised forces exceded this particular figure.
During the general strike of 1901, between 6,000 and 8,000 soldiers were mobilised in 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais,112 as well as at least 344 gendarmes.11* No documentation has
106 The number of strikers mentioned are the official figures for the number of workers not appearing 
on the morning. The figures must only be seen as a basis for comparison with the Westphalian case 
and are used in order to provide an idea about the extent of these conflicts. The actual number of 
persons involved in the marches and gatherings occurring during the strikes is significantly higher, 
since these events mobilised entire families and sympathisers with no direct connection to any of the 
individual conflicts concerned.
107 Departmental Archives, Arras, M.1231, ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houiller, 1889. Documents 
divers.’ Report of 10 December 1889 from the chief mining engineer in the département Pas-de- 
Calais to the ministry o f public works.
108 1,310 infantry soldiers, 245 men from the engineers and artillery, and a cavalry squadron (100
men).
,09 Departmental Archives, Arras, M.1231, ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houiller, 1889. Documents 
divers’.
1,0 Departmental Archives, Arras, M.2284, ‘Grèves, émeutes, manifestations, 1885-1914.’
111 Departmental Archives, Anas, M.4864, ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houiller 1893. 
Correspondance avec les autorités administratives et militaires/ Report of 18 September 1893 from 
the gendarmerie of Lens.
112 This entailed 61 Vi infantry companies and 21 cavalry squadrons. The exact number of men 
mobilised is impossible to deduce from these figures because the squadrons and companies during
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been found that provides the exact number of striking miners in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, 
however, according to the official strike statistics, only 19,454 miners went on strike in 
all of France in 1901; in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the total number of strikers in all 
categories during 1901 was 14,709.IU The mobilisation of such a large number o f  
military forces seems to have been out of proportion when compared to the number o f  
strikers. It can only be understood in the light of the strategy that was was being 
developed by the French administration during the summer of 1901 which was to  
mobilise forces, not according to the number o f actual strikers, but according to the 
number o f potential strikers, that is to a total mining population of 87,000 in Nord and 
Pas-de-Calais. This logic helps to understand the surprisingly large numbers of troops 
which were mobilised during the conflicts that were to occur over the following years.
The nationwide miners’ strike of October to November 1902 was comprised of around
100,000 miners from all the French mining areas.* 1415 In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, 71,000 out 
of 87,000 miners went on strike.116 In addition, 4,000-5,000 dockers from Dunkerque 
also went on strike during the same weeks. From 5 October to 19 December no less 
than 16,715 soldiers and officers were mobilised within the area of Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais,"7 which represents one soldier for every five striker. The arrondissement o f 
Valenciennes, which had 18,000 miners, saw the presence of eighteen cavalry 
squadrons (1,350-1,800 men); that meant one cavalry soldier for every ten or thirteen 
miners, strikers and non-strikers.11* To this figure has to be added 736 local and 
external gendarmes,119 as well as an unknown number of municipal policemen.
these years were comprised of only 75 men instead of one hundred. National Archives, Paris, 
F.7.12779, ‘4ème Bureau de la Sûreté Générale. Grève générale des mineurs, 1901-1914*. Letter of 25 
October 1901 from the prefects of the département Nord to the minister of the interior.
1,3 This figure is only for the département Nord. National Archives, Paris, F.7.12780, *4ème Bureau 
de la Sûreté Générale. Grève générale des Mineurs*. Letter of 17 October 1901 from the prefect of 
département Nord to the minister of the interior.
114 'Statistique des grèves ’ (1901).
115 No exact figure has been found, but, according to the official ‘Statistique des grèves’ (1902), there 
were fifteen strikes registered in the mining sector which comprised a total of 119,000 striking 
miners.
116 Cooper-Richet (1987) p.402.
117 This made a total of 7,708 soldiers and 367 officers being sent to the département Nord and 8,240 
soldiers and 400 officers to Pas-de-Calais. Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C/2.I.326, ‘Grèves, 
renseignements sur les troupes détachées aux grèves, 1901-1902’.
118 Letter from the prefect of the département Nord to the minister of the interior, March 20 1903. 
National Archives, Paris, F.7.12780, *4e bureau de la Sûreté Générale: Grève générale des mineurs*.
1,9 Cooper-Richet (1987) p.403.
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The strike wave in the spring of 1906, however, beats all previous records in the 
number of forces called out to maintain public order. In March of that year, a 
catastrophe in one of the mines at Courrieres (Pas-de-Calais) causing hundreds of 
casualties gave rise to spontaneous strikes among miners throughout the entire region 
against poor working conditions. The strikes spread to other professional categories 
and developed into the greatest strike movement in Nord-Pas-de-Calais between 1889 
and 1914. Due to the large number of individual strikes in many different branches, it is 
difficult to give an estimate for the number of workers participating in the movement. 
The total number of strikers in the two départements for the entire year of 1906 
amounted to 92,191 people; accordingly, the number of strikers during the spring must 
have been lower.120 The forces called to the region, however, ammounted to an 
unprecedented level. In Lens, on the 20 April, a force of 20,000 troops was 
mobilised.121 As for the whole region, the military documents reveal a figure of more 
than 35,000 soldiers and officers.'22 In addition, at least 591 gendarmes were called 
out to the departement Nord;123 probably a comparable number was mobilised to Pas- 
de-Calais, to which one must add an unknown number of municipal policemen. During 
the discussions which followed in the Ministry of the Interior, a total figure of 52,000 
men is mentioned.124 This is a very high number of forces given that the number of 
strikers could not have been higher than 92,000, even when taking into account the 
fact that the number of people involved in the conflict went far beyond the number of 
recorded strikers, and comprised entire families, villages, or local areas.
120 ’Statistique des grèves ’ (1906).
121 This figure appears in an anonymous front page article of La France Militaire from 28 April 1906 
entitled ‘Faiblesse et énergie.’ The number would appear unlikely if it was not sustained by the figures 
from the military authorities.
122 A report of 10 October 1907 from the Ministry of the Interior mentions that 129 infantry 
companies and 45 cavalry squadrons were mobilised to the département Nord, while 176V6 infantry 
companies and 37 cavalry squadrons were called out to Pas-de-Calais. Depending on the size of these 
units, this brings the number of soldiers and officers to somewhere between 30,000 and 38,000 troops. 
National Archives, Paris, F.7.12912, ‘Statistiques. Projets de lois. Mesures de protection, 1884-1907.' 
Report of 10 October 1907, ‘Commission Chargée d’étudier la révision de l’exercice du droit de 
réquisition de la force armée par les autorités civiles et du plan de protection établi pour le cas de 
grèves dans les départements.’
123 Departmental Archives, Lille, M.626 /60, ‘Réquisitions de l’armée. Protection du travail des 
chemins de fer 1906’. An undated statement of mobilised troops, from around May 1906.
124 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12913, ‘Commissions et sous-commissions instilutées en vue 
d’examiner les mesures à prendre en cas de grève, 1908-1909’.
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That the authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais tended to mobilise very high numbers of 
soldiers for every potential person involved in a conflict becomes obvious when 
looking at the figures for the troops requested in relation to the implementation of the 
law of 9 December 1905 (Les Inventaires). During the first attempts in March 1906 to  
establish inventories of the possessions in parish churches, military troops were used 
on a massive scale. In larger and middle-sized towns such as Roubaix (121,017 
inhabitants) and Wattrelos (27,000 inhabitants), more than 1,000 infantry soldiers and 
cavalry officers participated.125 Again, in November 1906, when the inventories were 
to be finished, a similarly impressive military force was displayed; no risks were being 
taken. In the arrondissement of Lille, 1,708 soldiers and officers were mobilised on 20 
November, 754 soldiers and officers were moblised the next day, some 1,668 on the 22 
November, and 1,370 on the last day of the campaign. Similarly, villages with a total 
population of 1,000-3,000 inhabitants received a military presence around their local 
church of 150-200 infantry soldiers, 25-50 cavalry officers and 25-40 gendarmes.'2*
In comparison, the forces mobilised in Westphalia appear almost modest. During the 
great Westphalian miners’ strike o f 1889, with 90,000 striking workers out of a mining 
population of 104,000, the Prussian authorities called out ten battalions of infantry - 
between 6,000 and 10,000 soldiers'27 - and 8 squadrons (1,600-2,000 cavalry 
officers).128 In 1893, General von Albedyll kept a similar force of 6,800-8,000 infantry 
soldiers, 800 cavalry officers and 250 hunters in a state of preparedness, when a strike
125 National Archives, Paris, F.7.I2399, ‘Culte Catholique: Inventaires 1905-1907.’ Letter of 3 March 
1906 from the prefect of the département Nord to the Ministry of the Interior.
126 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C72.I.335, inventaires des Eglises 1906’. Report from the 
General Staff of the garrison at Lille.
127 The estimate of the number of soldiers is complicated by the fact that the military authorities often 
only refer to the number of military units (squadrons, companies, and battalions), without mentioning 
the number of men per unit. A Prussian battalion was comprised of between 600 and 1,000 infantry 
soldiers, whereas a French battalion only comprised 400-500 men. During the period 1901-1914, 
when the French army was particularly busy delivering forces for domestic peacekeeping the effective 
of a French battalion was reduced to 375 men, while squadrons were reduced from one hundred to 
eighty.
128 Central Archive, Potsdam III, R 43, film signature 11971-11972, ‘Handel und Gewerbe: 
Arbeitseinstellung 1889-1896 in der Rheinprovinz, Westfalen und Schlesien’ (documents 71-90) or 
Münster HaStA, OP 14317, ‘Acten betreffs den Streik der Bergarbeiter im Ruhr-Kohlen-Revier, 
1889’ (documents 53-73). Report from the meeting in Dortmund of 10 May 1889 between the 
minister of the interior, von Herrfurt, and the Westphalian civil authorities.
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of a similar extent as that of 1889 threatened to break out.129 During the miners’ strike 
of 1905, with more than 200,000 participants, troops were not mobilised at all, and the 
Westphalian mining district was guarded by 1,220 gendarmes, 2,313 policemen, and 
2,562 private security guards (Zechenwehrleute).130 Similarly, in 1912, the last great 
labour conflict in the mining industry before the war involved 160,000 strikers out o f a 
total mining population at more than 300,000. The civil force mobilised consisted of 
5,658 men (policemen and gendarmes) while the army mobilised 5,000 soldiers and 
officers from the infantry and cavalry; in addition, 2,000-3,000 private security guards 
were involved.131
Only during the riots in Heme of 1899 did the Prussian authorities respond to the 
challenge by mobilising a very large number of men compared to the number of strikers 
and rioters involved. In Heme, a strike among young Polish miners in eleven large 
mines developed into a strike comprising approximately 6,000 of the 18,000 miners 
employed in these eleven mining companies. The conflict developed into riots and 
violence and a military force was mobilised that consisted of three battalions ( 1,800-
3,000 infantry soldiers) and 100 cavalry soldiers.132 It thus appears that, when military 
troops were requested in Westphalia, the number of troops mobilised, compared to 
the size of the conflict - that is, the recorded number of people involved - was 
significantly lower than for cases of a similar size that occurred in Nord-Pas-de-Calais.
129 Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /14: ‘Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von 
Unruhen 1889-1914.’ (document 155) Letter of 10 january 1893 from General von Albedyll to 
William II.
130 Figures gathered from the correspondence between the Ministry of the Interior and the province 
governor of Westphalia. Munster HaStA, the district governor in Münster VII-57 Bd.2/ 40-2, ‘Das 
Verfahren bei Bekämpfung von Arbeiterunruhen 1904-1911’ and Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin- 
Dahlem, H.A.l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2523 II, ‘Die Arbeitseinstellung in den Bergwerksbezirken der 
Provinz Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen in den Jahren 1889-1912* 
Vols.11-12.
131 Figures provided by Jessen (1991) pp.136-137. Others appear in a report from a meeting in Essen 
on 1 July 1912. Münster HaStA, VTI-14 B d.l/ 32-1, ‘Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912’ or 
Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, Rep.77 - Titel 2523 /1 adh.l. vol.20 ‘Die Erfahrungen aus 
dem Bergarbeiterstreik im Ruhrgebiet im März 1912’.
132 Tenfelde (1979) pp.71-104.
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2.43 ,  Response to the challenge: the duration o f mobilisation
A final significant difference in the ways in which the troops were used in Westphalia 
and Nord-Pas-de-Calais was the number of days of mobilisation. During the great 
cases of unrest in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the troops tended to be mobilised for slightly 
periods when compared to the instances of military intervention in Westphalia. 
Moreover, the number of days where troops were mobilised during the major conflicts 
shows that, while the periods of mobilisation became longer in the French case, at least 
until after 1906, the number of days o f military mobilisation in Westphalia decreased.
The military intervention in Nord-Pas-de-Calais during the great strikes lasted, in 1889, 
for twenty days, in 1891, for twenty-two days, and, in 1893, again for twenty days. 
The great conflicts of the first decade of the twentieth century lasted for significantly 
longer. In 1901, troops were mobilised for at least forty-four days, in 1902 for fifty 
days, and, in the conflict during the spring of 1906, the army was mobilised for forty- 
seven days. Conversely, in the Prussian case. During the conflict of 1889, troops were 
mobilised for eighteen days in Westphalia and for sixteen days in the Saarland. In 
1899, during the Polish riots in Heme, troops were mobilised for thirteen days, and in 
March 1912 the military intervention lasted for only seven days. The only break with 
this pattern, among the cases of military intervention occurring in Prussia between 
1889 and 1914, was the intervention in the Mansfeld coal areas in October-November 
1909 which lasted for twenty-six days.
These dissimilar patterns do not reflect a situation whereby the conflicts in Westphalia 
were generally shorter than in France.133 It was first and foremost the result of the 
different ways in which troops were being used in the two areas. In France, 
mobilisation took place from the moment a strike broke out, sometimes even at the 
moment that it was declared. Similarly, the troops were not sent back until complete 
calm had been restored. In Westphalia, the actual period of conflict was considerably 
longer than the time in which the troops were mobilised. The army was called upon 
only when the province or district governor considered that the civil forces could no
133 The figures provided by Boll on the length of strikes in Germany, France, and England 1870-1913 
indicates that strikes in Germany tended to last longer than those in France. Boll (1992) p.l 15.
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longer manage on their own. This decision only arrived when a conflict had been going 
on for some time. Similarly, Prussian troops were sent back to their garrisons the 
moment that the authorities believed that the situation was sufficiently calm for the 
civil forces to handle the conflict on their own.
Thus, according to several measures, there is a clear pattern in Nord-Pas-de-Calais in 
which a larger military presence in civilian conflicts was displayed than was the case in 
Westphalia. This pattern cannot be explained away simply by the size of the conflicts, 
since the number of people involved in the great Westphalian strikes was significantly 
higher than the strikes occurring in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Moreover, many of the cases 
in Nord-Pas-de-Calais where the army was present had little potential for violence 
because often the troops were there in order to prevent any remote possibility of riots 




2.5. Conclusion: the lack of direct connection between challenge and 
response
In this chapter, three comparative observations have been made on maintenance of 
order in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais:
• that the dissimilar use of military troops in the two areas was not due to the extent 
of the challenge, since the conflicts occurring in Westphalia implied a significantly 
higher number of people than did the conflicts occurring in Nord-Pas-de-Calais;
•  that the dissimilar use of the army was not due either to the size of the available civil 
forces, since there were slightly more police and gendarmerie forces compared to 
the population in Nord-Pas-de-Calais than there was in Westphalia;
•  that after 1889, the frequency o f military intervention became significantly higher in 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais than in Westphalia, and that whilst the number of military 
interventions became increasingly rare in the case o f Westphalia, the number of 
instances almost exploded in the decade 1900-1910;
• that both in terms of the number of forces mobilised and the duration of 
mobilisation of troops, the authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais displayed a 
significantly more forceful responce to instances of public unrest than did their 
Westphalian counterparts.
The comparison of the conditions surrounding the problem of maintenance of order in 
Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais leads to three significant observations. The first 
observation is that the authorities in Westphalia faced challenges in terms of labour 
conflict that were no less serious than the ones occurring in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. In 
both cases, the problem of internal unrest could be met by two strategies. One was to 
improve and strengthen the civil forces; the other was to rely upon the army. The first 
strategy was adopted both in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Due to the 
demographic development in Westphalia, the outcome was the same, namely that the 
civil forces remained equally insufficient to guarantee the full control over the course 
of events. The question was then how to manage greater instances of public unrest 
with a permanently undermanned civil force. This was the key issue that the 
responsible authorities in both countries had to resolve.
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A second observation is that, in both of the cases examined, there seems to be a clear 
pattern of continuity in the strategies adopted. The French authorities used the army 
not only for labour conflicts, but for public events where the disturbance of the public 
order was only potential (demonstrations, elections) and for the simple task of 
managing larger gatherings, such as sports events, big markets and fairs, or the 
protection of VIPs. Moreover, the French authorities not only used the army much 
more frequently than did their Prussian counterparts, but they also mobilised 
significantly more manpower to maintain and restore situations of trouble than did the 
authorities of the Prussian administration. In contrast, the Prussian authorities, while 
recognising the insufficiency of their available civil forces, decided that, in the majority 
of cases, they would just have to take their chances rather than calling for military 
assistance.
Thirdly, a pattern of strong military involvement developed in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais, 
despite the fact that the number of potential participants in the collective actions here 
was lower than in Westphalia. Therefore, no direct line can be established between the 
size of the challenge and the magnitude of the response, and the dissimilar use of 
military troops cannot be justified by referring to the extent or to the type of the 
challenge. Nor can it be explained in terms of the size of the civil forces.
This leads back to the fundamental problem of this thesis: Since the cases of public 
unrest occurring in Westphalia were no less serious than those taking place in Nord* 
Pas-de-Calais, and since the state of the available civil forces in Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
was no worse than in Westphalia, why did the administration in the two countries solve 
the problem of maintaining order in such dissimilar ways? This is all the more 
surprising since the strategies adopted both by the Prussian and the French 
administration run counter to what has generally been assumed on the basis of the 
formal position of the aimy within the French and Prussian state organisation, and on 
the basis of the dissimilar political profile of the two regimes.
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In the following chapters Three and Four, two other sets o f explanatoiy factors will be 
analysed, which have been used to explain the development in France and Prussia 
separately. The one concerns the constitutional arrangements regarding civil-military 
relations in Imperial Germany and Republican France; the other concerns the 
relationship between the representatives of the central power at the regional level and 
the local authorities and elite groups who were concerned with the protection of the 
local society in case of public disorder.
>
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Chapter Three. The institutional framework and the allocation 
of powers between civil and military authorities
This chapter analyses the institutional organisation and the formal distribution of 
powers between French and Prussian civil and military authorities concerning the 
requisition of military troops for internal peacekeeping. This chapter sets out the 
formal framework for the role of the army in internal peacekeeping in France and 
Prussia. It distinguishes different levels of decision making. It therefore looks at 
different levels within the civil and military authorities. It deals with three aspects: 
formal organisation of civil and military authorities at the regional and local level; 
institutional linkages between the army and the state administration at the ministerial, 
regional and local level; and formal powers of French and Prussian military 
commanders.
The purpose is to establish common institutional points between the French and 
Prussian systems in terms of institutional arrangements and basic principles concerning 
military participation in maintenance of public order. The chapter sets out which formal 
institutional differences did and which did not affect the role of the army in the two 
countries and why, thus creating the basis for the analysis of subsequent chapters about 
the discrepancy between formal attribution of powers and functioning in practice.
Three conclusions are reached in this chapter which concerns both the elements of 
similarity and of difference between the French and Prussian legislation on civil- 
military co-operation. The first is that, in terms of similarities, both the French and 
Prussian systems were based on three principles: 1 ) that military troops could only be 
mobilised on the written request of a civil authority; 2) that maintenance of public 
order was primarily the responsibility of the civil authorities (the state administration 
and municipal authorities); and accordingly 3) that the army should only be called upon 
in situations of ‘extreme urgency*.
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In terms of institutional links between the state administration and the army, the French 
civil authorities were in a more favourable position compared to their Prussian 
counterpart to initiate and pursue contracts to the military authorities both at the 
ministerial and the regional levels. However, the formal difference in the position of the 
Ministry o f the Interior in relation to the War Ministry is not in itself sufficient to 
explain the development of close civil-military co-operation in France, or to explain 
why a similar development did not take place in Prussia. Following chapters will show 
how the formal links between civil and military authorities in France were strengthened 
through informal bureaucratic practices.
In terms o f the military commanders’ powers, there were considerable differences 
between the French and Prussian systems. However, these formal differences were 
largely neutralised by two factors. Due to the inter-institutional co-operation between 
civil and military authorities in France, the senior commanders gained informal 
influence over issues concerning maintenance of public order from which they were 
formally excluded. Secondly, in Prussia, the special powers of the senior military 
commanders (to refuse a requisition from a civil authority, to intervene in cases of 
public unrest without being requested by a civil authority, and the right to declare a 
provisional state of siege) were almost never used in practice and were thus 
insignificant for the functioning in practice.
Following chapters will show how, over a passage of time, repeated administrative 
practice led to certain of these differences becoming entrenched. Other practices 
overcame formal institutional arrangements over time and produced patterns of policy 
making in practice that differed from those one might expect from looking at formal 
institutional arrangements and occasionally were the contrary to those laid down 
formally. Similarly, the formally influential position of the Prussian commanders was 
largely neutralised by the fact that the particular powers attributed to the Prussian 
commanders which the French counterpart had not, were almost never put into 
practice.
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Chapter consists of four parts. First, it sets out the organisation of the state 
administration and the military authorities as the representatives o f the central power at 
the regional and local level (3.1). In the second section, a description will be made of 
the connections between the state administration and the army at the ministerial level in 
Paris and Berlin. (3.2). This aim is to describe the ways in which civil and military 
authorities at the regional level could assert influence and be influenced through their 
respective ministries. The French and Prussian legislation concerning requisition of 
troops was based on three similar principles: that troops should only be mobilised on 
the requisition of a competent civil authority; that the right to requisition of troops was 
given to both the civilian state representatives at the regional and local levels 
(province, district, and local governors in Prussia; prefects and sub*prefects in France) 
as well as to local authorities (mayors and municipal police authorities), and that 
troops should only be called upon in situations of extreme urgency. However, these 
principles were challenged in various ways by the powers o f the senior military 
commanders. An analysis will therefore be provided of the French rules and regulations 
concerning the position of military commanders in maintenance of public order (3.3). 
The limitations put on the powers of the French military commanders will then be 
compared with the powers of the Prussian military commanders in order to establish 
the importance of the special powers attributed to Prussian military commanders (3.4.)
In the following, a distinction will be made between four levels of decision making. 
The ‘national level’ refers to the central civil and military authorities in Paris and 
Berlin. The ‘regional level’ refers, both in the French and the Prussian cases, to the 
army corps commanders and to the senior civil servants who were in direct 
communication with the central power - in Prussia, this meant the province governors 
(Oberpräsidenten) and district governors (Regierungspräsidenten), and in France, the 
prefects. Third, the term ‘state representatives at the local level’ refers to the local 
governors (.Landräte) in Westphalia and to the sub-prefects in France. Finally, the term 
‘local authorities’ is used in contrast to the ‘state authorities’ and refers to mayors and 
to municipal police authorities.
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3.1. The organisation of civi! and miiitary authorities at the regional and 
local levels in Prussia and France
3.1.1. Westphalia within the German Empire and the Prussian Kingdom
The German Empire was a federal state that only functioned as an entity on matters 
such as foreign policy and defence, tolls and foreign trade, currency, and 
communication and transport infrastructure. The internal administration was organised 
at the level of federal states. Westphalia, as a part of the Prussian kingdom, was 
therefore governed by the Prussian state bureaucracy under the Prussian Ministry of 
the Interior, while the Imperial Ministry of the Interior (Reichsamt des Inneri) was not 
in charge of maintenance of order in local communities.
A similar situation existed for the military authorities. The Imperial army actually 
consisted of the Prussian and the Bavarian army, but these were two independent 
organisations with no institutional linkage other than through the German Emperor in 
his capacity of Supreme Commander.* The armies of the kingdoms of Saxony, 
Wurtemberg and Baden were integrated in the Prussian army as army corps but 
directly under the Prussian War Ministry. The army in Westphalia was therefore the 
Royal Prussian army and not the Imperial German army. In the following, reference to 
William II will therefore be made in his capacity of King of Prussia, and not as German 
Emperor, unless this is explicitly stated. In relation to the senior military commanders, 
William II’s position as Prussian King was also considered more important than his 
capacity as German Emperor, since all traditional military privileges dated from the 
period before 1871 and were linked to the Prussian King.
After its defeat by Napoleonic France in 1807, Prussia adopted the centralised 
Napoleonic model for its state administration as well as for its army. In this 
reorganisation, the Prussian territory was divided into six provinces. These were both 
administrative units, presided over by a province governor, and military regions, each 1
1 There was no Imperial War Ministry and the War Minister of the Reich was the Prussian War 
Minister who was politically responsible to the Prussian Diet, but not to the Reichstag.
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under the command and supervision of an army corps commander.2 During the wars of 
unification in the 1860s, which saw the expansion of Prussian territory, five new 
provinces and military regions were created. Among then was the seventh military 
region covering Westphalia with headquarters in Munster.3 The army corps 
commanders were thus conceived as the military counterpart to the province governors 
at the provincial level. Although the number of German army corps increased during 
the period 1866 to 1914, the parallel organisation o f military regions and 
administrative provinces remained the same within the Prussian territory.
Prussian provinces were divided into administrative districts {Regierungsbezirke), 
presided over by a district governor {Regierungspräsident). The thirty-four districts 
were organised into 490 counties (Kreise), presided over by local governors 
(Landräte). All these civil servants were appointed by the king and under the authority 
of the Prussian minister of the interior. Communications from the local governor with 
the Ministry would normally pass through the province governor or the district 
governor, whereas both province governors and district governors were in direct 
communication with the minister of the interior. The allocation of powers between the 
province and the district governor in terms of maintenance of public order was 
unclear.4 In principle, it was the district governors who were responsible for the 
implementation of measures against public disorder, whilst the province governor was
2 These were the province of East Prussia (also the first military region centrered in Königsberg), the 
province of West Prussia - Pommerania (also the second military region in Stettin), the province of 
Brandenburg (the third military region in Berlin), the province of Prussian Saxony (the forth military 
region centrered in Magdeburg) the province of Posen (the fifth military region), and the province of 
Silesia (the sixth military region centred in Breslau).
3 The other regions created were the Rhine Province (eighth military region with Coblenz as the main 
town), the province of Schleswig-Holstein (the ninth military region with military head quarters in 
Altona right outside Hamburg). The tenth military region covered the former kingdom of Hannover, 
and the eleventh military region based in Kassel covered the territory of Hessen-Nassau. With the 
establishment of the German Empire, when the kingdoms of Saxony, Wiirtemberg and Baden were 
linked to the Prussian army through individual defence treaties, the national armies of these 
individual kingdoms became contingents to the Imperial army as the twelfth, thirteenth and forteenth 
army corps respectively, and were submitted to Prussian organisation and command. The fifteenth 
military region covered AIcase-Lorraine which had a particular status within the German Empire. As 
a result of the general rearmament of the Williaminian period, another six army corps were 
subsequently established: the sixteenth in Metz, the seventeenth in Danzig (1890), the eighteenth in 
Frankfurt am Main, and the nineteenth army corps was based in Leipzig (1899). Finally, on the eve of 
the First World War, the twentieth army corps at Allenstein and the twenty-first at Saarbrücken were 
created.
4 A thorough analysis of the relationship between the two posts in Wolfgang Leesch ‘Verwaltung in 
Westfalen 1815-1945 Organisation und Zuständigkeit ’ Münster: Aschendorff, 1992, p.17.
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the representative of the minister of the interior at the provincial level and was 
supposed to function as a supervisor of the administration at all levels. In reality, the 
province governors and district governors worked together in organising the 
management of large-scale unrest by co-ordinating the strategies and various civil 
forces within the entire province. The linkage with the military authorities, however, 
mainly passed through the province governor.
During the Imperial period, the province governor and the army corps commander 
were located in the same town in eleven out o f the fourteen Prussian provinces.5 The 
post of army corps commander in the Imperial German army was among the ten 
highest positions within the military organisation. The post was reserved for generals 
with the rank of General-Feldmarschal, General, General-Leutnant, or General­
oberst, who held a position second only to the King in his capacity as ‘supreme 
warlord* (Oberster Kriegsherr). Within his military region, each army corps 
commander was highly independent in the performance of his duties; indeed, in most 
cases, he had no military equal.6 Ever since the Boyen reforms of the 1820s, the army 
corps commander enjoyed a higher rank in the official hierarchy of authorities at the 
provincial level than that of the province governor. The main task of the army corps 
commanders was the organisation and training of troops as well as supervision of 
conscription. However, no formal description of duties seems to have existed for 
Prussian army corps commanders, and it is often said that the position allowed a high 
degree o f freedom for the individual commander.7
5 The only exception was in the province of Schleswig-Holstein, where the province governor was in 
Schleswig whereas the army corps commander was placed in Altona. Similarly, two new army corps 
which were situated next to the eastern border (Danzig and AUenstein) were placed in the town of a 
district governor.
6 In Berlin and the capitals of five non-Prussian states, the army corps commander was placed in the 
same town as the general military inspector. According to Waldersee, who was army corps inspector 
in Hannover from 1898 to 1900, the presence in Hannover of both the army corps commander and the 
army inspector did occasionally create some tension. General von Waldersee *Denkwürdigkeiten des 
General-Feldmarschalls Alfred von Waldersee’ vols.1-3 (ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin: E.S.Mittler & 
Sohn, 1922, p.415. In the capitals of the non-Prussian states, the sphere of action of the Prussian army 
corps commander was also moderated by the presence of a local war minister, who was the official 
responsible for the use of troops for internal peacekeeping.
7 Hughes (1987) pp.l 19-122; E. von Witzleben 4Adolf von Deines. Lebensbild, 1845-1911’ Berlin: 
Liebelschen, p.270; Karl von Einem 'Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 1853-1933’ Leipzig: Koehler, 
1933 pp.165-168; Leopold, Prince of Bavaria ‘Leopold Prinz von Bayern 1846-1930. Aus den 
Lebenserinnerungen ’ ed.Körner Regensburg: Pustet, 1983, pp. 186-187.
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Contacts with the civilian authorities were limited. Before the first Prussian 
Constitution of 1850, the civil and military representatives at the regional level were 
two branches of the same source of monarchical authority. When the Constitution 
separated the state administration from direct monarchical control and placed it under 
a politically responsible minister, the military commander remained the only direct 
representative of the monarch at the regional and local level. The Prussian organisation 
of the civil administration and the army at the regional level was based on the strict 
separation of the military organisation from civilian influence. In situations where 
troops were needed to assist the civil forces, the civil authorities could only invite the 
military commander to mobilised troop, but the military commander was not obliged to 
follow such a requisition. At the regional and local level, the military organisation and 
the civil administration constituted two insulated bodies with no formal institutional 
connection and no formal definition concerning their mutual relationship with the 
powers of each. As a consequence of this, any decision to use troops to restore public 
order was based on informal contacts and required a mutual consensus between the 
civil and military authorities.
3.1.2. Prussian m ilitary organisation within the French Republican system 
Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the French state administration was 
organised according to the centralised Napoleonic model. Prefects were the 
representatives of the central government at the eighty-nine départements and the sub- 
prefects at the level o f arrondissements. The prefects and sub-prefects were given the 
executive authority of the government at the local and regional level where they had 
supreme authority both in relation to the local authorities and to the military 
authorities.
The French army of the Third Republic was organised according to the fundamental 
principles of the Prussian army, with eighteen permanent army corps spread over the 
national territory, as well as the introduction of universal male conscription.8 The 
adoption of the Prussian model of military organisation was a direct consequence of
8 Law of 24 July 1873, Article VIII.
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the French defeat by the Prussians in the 1870-1871 war, when the Prussian military 
model had proved to be superior to the French in terms o f leadership, efficiency, and 
numbers. As was the case in Prussia, the eighteen military regions were under the 
command o f army corps commanders, who were the highest military authorities 
outside of Paris. The size of the French military regions was comparable to that o f 
Prussia; however, the French army corps commander worked with a civil 
administration which was organised into smaller units than was the case in Prussia. 
Due to the incompatibility of eighteen or twenty-one military regions fitting into 
eighty-nine départements, a French military region would cover between two and four 
départements. In co-operating with the senior civil authority at the regional level, an 
army corps commander had therefore to work with several prefects within his military 
region.
In the military region, the French army corps commanders were individually defined as 
the délégué du ministre, in questions concerning administration, and as the délégué du 
gouvernement, in questions concerning commands.9 They had a larger territory under 
their authority than did the prefects, and until 1907, were superior to the prefects in the 
official hierarchy.10 Moreover, these generals belonged to the groups of the French 
establishment that Christophe Charle has defined as an elite not only in professional, 
but also in social, terms.11 Despite this outstanding position of the army corps 
commanders, the prefects - as the representatives of the executive at the departmental 
level - had ultimate authority over the army corps commander at the departmental 
level.12
As a consequence of the attempt to prevent army corps commanders from becoming 
too powerful within their regions, their maximum length of service was set at three 
years, a period which could be prolonged by the war minister. The practice of a six
9 Law of 24 July 1873, section II, Article III, title 2.
10 In the Napoleonic organisation of formal ranks of ‘Honour and Rank* senior military commanders 
were placed at number six, whereas a prefect occupied rank number twelve (Decree of 24 Messidor 
Year XII). Through a revision of the official ranks from 20 June 1907, a prefect then occupied the 
highest rank at the departmental level, whereas an army corps commander was downgraded to rank 
number four.
11 Charle (1987) p.167
12 Law of 27 July - 3 August 1791; Decree o f 4 October 1891 Articles 17-18.
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month extension to the initial three years of service became so customary that dismissal 
without the addition of a couple o f extra months came be considered a sign of 
disgrace. On the other hand, the three years was the entire period in which a senior 
officer could hold a post as commander, with no regard taken of whether the army 
corps commander had served as commander of several different corps during that 
period. Due to the frequent replacements between different army corps, a commander 
often stayed in the same army corps for less than one year.13 This meant that the 
average length of service of French generals was significantly lower than in Prussia, 
where the average length of service during the Imperial period was normally from 
three to five years, but where twenty-one per cent o f the Prussian army corps 
commanders stayed in service for more than six years. Due to the limits on the periods 
of command in France, the total number of generals reaching the highest position in the 
French army organisation was significantly higher than in the Prussia.
Due to the organisation of the Prussian state administration on the French Napoleonic 
model and the organisation of the French army of the Third Republic on the Prussian 
military model, there were significant similarities between the institutional organisation 
French and Prussian state administration at the regional and local level, as well as the 
military organisation as a parallel institution.
However, the allocation of powers between civil and military authorities differed 
significantly in the French and Prussian systems: the formal position of the French army 
corps commanders in relation to the civil authorities was far more modest than the 
position of the Prussian commander. The formal position o f the French army corps 
commanders, however, does not reflect their real weight and authority, either in their 
relationship with the prefects or in their relationship with the War Minister, This 
becomes clear when examining the problem of supreme military authority in the French 
Republican system.
13 This is evident from the list of army corps commander in the annual publication from the French 
War Ministry, *L'année militaire’ (1875-1913).
101
3.2. Civil-military linkages at the ministerial level
3.2.1. The supreme authority and the position of the French war minister as 
highest commander
In the French Third Republic, supreme authority over the armed forces was distributed 
amongst several bodies. By the terms of Article 3 o f the constitutional law of 25 
February 1875, the President of the Republic had the armed forces at his disposition, 
but could not personally command the troops. His use of the army was restricted by 
constitutional laws, according to which he could do nothing against the will o f the 
National Assembly; indeed, each of his actions had to have the countersignature of a 
politically responsible minister.14 The role of the president as the highest military 
commander soon came to have only symbolic meaning; thus, Ralston is probably right 
when he states that after Mac Mahon, no president of the Third Republic could be 
considered as being the real commander-in-chief.15 Supreme authority over the armed 
forces was thus vested in the Council of Ministers and in Parliament, which had both 
executive and controlling functions.
Within the government, the French W ar Ministry was directly exposed to the influence 
of the Ministry o f the Interior, since in most governments o f the Third Republic, the 
minister of the interior was also head o f the cabinet. Although the War Ministry was 
given a high degree of autonomy,16 it was more integrated in the government than was 
the Prussian W ar Ministry. Hence, the French Ministry of the Interior was in a more 
favourable position than its Prussian counterpart to establish inter-ministerial contacts 
to the War Ministry. The main problem for civil-military co-operation was not at the 
ministerial level but in the relationship between the war minister and the army corps 
commanders.
Formally, the war minister, rather than the President of the Republic, was considered 
the leader of the army and held the highest authority of command and the powers to
14 Constitutional law of 25 February 1875, Article 3 § 4.
15 Ralston (1967) pp. 146-147.
16 Ralston (1967) pp.141-143.
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dismiss and replace commanders.17 Thus, in formal terms, the French war minister 
occupied a powerful position in relation to the military commanders. However, this 
position in relation to the army corps commanders, in questions concerning the 
domestic use of troops, presents difficulties of interpretation. Two aspects need to be 
taken into consideration, both of which modified the importance of the minister. The 
first concerns the respect and authority of the post, and the second aspect is related to 
the relationship between the War Ministry and other sections of the French state.
The position of successive French war ministers in relation to the army corps 
commanders was influenced by the uneasy relationship which existed between the 
Republican regime and the military establishment. As a member of government, the 
position of the war minister was often affected by the general tendency of Republican 
representatives to avoid conflict with military leaders.18 In general, the prestige of the 
war minister within the military establishment was low. Nine out of the thirty-nine war 
ministers in charge during the period between 1870 and 1920 did not themselves 
belong to the military establishment, which made striking the balance between the 
designs of political leaders and opposition from the military establishment a very 
sensitive matter. In addition, an examination of the seniority of war ministers compared 
to army corps commanders makes it evident that the position as army corps 
commander, particularly in one of the prestigious corps (such as the seventh in 
Besancon, the eighth in Chalon-sur-Mame, or the fourteenth in Lyons), was more 
attractive to top generals than was the post of war minister. Many of the generals who 
served as war ministers, such as Thibaudin (1883) or Boulanger (1886-1887), 
occupied an inferior position in terms of seniority when compared to the army corps 
commanders.19
According to Jauffret, respect within the army for the post of war minister was further 
lessened after 1888, when the military establishment no longer retained its privilege to 
propose candidates for war minister.20 After this date, a good war minister was one
17 Craig (1955) p.230; Ralston (1967) p.161.
18 This is the basic argument of Ralston (1967) which is also taken up by Serman (1994, p.214), and 
by Jauffret (1987).
19 Ralston (1967) p.164.
20 Jauffret (1987) p.14.
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who could defend his budget in parliament, ensure good relations with the political 
executive, and be the voice of the military establishment within the political 
executive.21 As for the general functioning of military institutions, the minister often 
had difficulty in exercising his authority.22 With the creation in 1899 of the posts Chief 
of the General Staff and Vice-President of the Conseil Supérieure de la Guerre, the 
prestige of the war minister was further lessened. Jean Estèbe tends to consider the 
holders of these two new offices to be the real leaders of the army after the tum of the 
century, whereas within the military establishment the war minister was considered 
inferior to them.23 In a period with a strong minister such as Gallifet, and even 
Freycinet, the minister could make full use of his powers to nominate, dismiss and 
replace army corps commanders. At other periods, for example during the period when 
Miribel was Chief of the General Staff, administrative affairs, including personnel 
politics, were mainly decided by the chief of the General Staff together with the Vice- 
President of the War Minister's Cabinet, whereas the role of the war minister was 
reduced to ensure contact with the political executive and parliament.24 As in Prussia, 
the general commanders considered the role of war ministers to be first and foremost 
an administrator.25
Thus, the post of war minister was not in itself very prestigious and, indeed, his 
authority of command was de facto  limited in case of opposition from the military 
establishment. As a consequence, the degree of influence that the war minister had on 
the internal functioning of the military institutions varied greatly depending on the 
personal prestige of the person holding the office. In contrast to the weak position of 
the war minister, Ralston stresses the particularly strong position that was held by 
army corps commanders within their own military regions.26 Given that the position of
21 Jauffret(1987) p.14.
22 Estèbe (1994) p.38; Serman (1994) p.213.
23 Estèbe (1994) p.38.
24 Estèbe (1994) p.38; Serman (1994) p.2I3.
25 “Au moment de la guerre, le chef supreme de l’armée, c ’est le Président de la République et ses 
lieutenants, les généraux en chef de divers groupes d’armée. Le ministre de la guerre reste le chef de 
l’administration de l’armée, le grand pourvoyeur de l’arrière des années en hommes, en munitions et 
en vivres; mais il n’est pas le chef suprême, c ’est le Président de la République, et c’est pour cela que 
sa maison militaire lui est nécessaire.” Général Brugère ‘Mes mémoires, 1841-1914’ (unpublished 
manuscript), vol.5, p.2649, Military Archive, Vincennes, 1 K 160/ 1 Kmi 46.
26 Ralston (1967) pp.146-147.
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French war ministers in relation to the army corps commanders was relatively weak, 
the initiatives between the Ministry of the Interior and the War Ministry to undertake 
inter-institutional co-operation between civil and military authorities could not have 
been established without basic agreement from the French army corps commanders. A 
similar problem between the war ministry and the army corps commanders can be 
observed in Prussia.
3.2.2. Connections with the central power in Berlin: supreme command and 
problematic ministerial authority
After 1850, the Prussian state was - as Nipperdey has recently described it - an 
organisation with two peaks.27 The two were connected only in the person of the 
monarch, in his capacity as ‘supreme warlord* and as head of the executive. At the 
governmental level, there was also a formal linkage between the War Ministry and the 
other ministries including the Ministry o f the Interior. However, within government, 
the war ministry constituted a position apart, with little connection to other ministries. 
Moreover, as the only minister, the War Minister had direct access to the King and 
was thus equal to the prime minister.
According to the Prussian and Imperial Constitutions, the monarch had the right to 
command without consulting the executive, that is without any countersignature from 
a responsible minister and without being responsible to the Reichstag or the Prussian 
Diet himself.28 The degree to which the King interfered and issued orders seems to 
have differed between the different instances, but until the reign of William II, 
authority over decision making in questions concerning the use of troops for internal 
peacekeeping was mostly delegated to army corps commanders.
The army corps commanders also enjoyed the right direct access (Immediatstellung) to 
the King, which was one of the most important privileges linked to the post. Army 
corps commanders were nominated and dismissed by the monarch and were 
responsible to him alone in questions concerning the command and use of their troops.
27 Nipperdey ( 1992) p.431.
28 Prussian Constitution 4 February 1850 Article 46 and the Imperial Constitution of 1871 Article 64.
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This gave the commanding general an almost untouchable position as he retained the 
monarch’s support, but, at the same time, he was also totally dependent on the King’s 
goodwill. This strong position of the army corps commanders was originally conceived 
to counterbalance monarchical authority. However, during the reign of in the William 
II and because of the army’s shared drive to avoid constitutional control and 
limitations of their spheres of action, the King and his commanders constituted a 
strong entity, which thus united them in a common front against the governmental 
executive and the Reichstag. This alliance between the King and his commanders 
existed on most questions involving the army, including foreign policy issues. 
However, as the following chapters will show, the King and individual army corps 
commanders were split over the question of the role of the army in controlling and 
repressing internal disturbance.29
In contrast to the strong and independent position that the King had as ‘supreme 
warlord’, the authority of the war minister was particularly weak. As a member of the 
executive, the war minister was politically responsible to the Prussian Diet and was the 
only officer of the Prussian army who was bound by an oath to the Constitution. Both 
Bismarck, and later William II, thought that a politically responsible war minister being 
the functional chief of the army - as in the French Republican system - was pernicious 
for the independence of the army, and, additionally, was an intrusion into the 
monarch’s right to dispose freely over the armed forces. Through an administrative 
reform in 1883, the influence of the Prussian war minister was considerably limited, 
and thereafter it was confined to administrative matters.30 There have been some 
discussions about the weight of the W ar Ministry after 1883. According to Craig, the 
war ministers of the period after this administrative reform did little to regain the 
powers which had been lost in 1883.31 In particular, von Gossler (1896-1903) seemed 
to have attempted to abolish what was left of ministerial authority. The position of the 
Prussian war minister was therefore particularly weak in relation to the army corps 
commanders. In effect, he possessed no authority of command and, after the restriction
29 See Chapters Six and Nine.
30 On the undermining of the war minister’s position, see Craig (1955) pp.227-230; and H.O.Meisner 
‘Der Kriegs min is ter, ¡814-1914: ein Beitrag zur militärischen Verfassungsgeschichte’ Berlin, 1940.
31 Craig (1955) p.231.
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of the his role, he did not even have a formal right to information concerning the 
command and use o f troops and relied on the pieces of information which the army 
corps commanders deliberately chose to give to the Ministry.
Inter-ministerial co-operation between the War Ministry and the Ministry of the 
Interior was made difficult by two factors: the absence of direct linkages between the 
minister of the interior and the war ministry and the lack o f authority of the war 
ministry in relation to the army corps commanders. Under normal circumstances, 
internal peacekeeping was the responsibility of the minister of the interior. In the case 
o f conflict between the civilian regional authorities and an army corps commander, a 
minister of interior who wanted to support his subordinate official could act through 
the prime minister, who had direct access to the monarch. In terms of the institutional 
organisation, the minister of the interior could also pass through his governmental 
colleague in the War Ministry, who also enjoyed direct access to the King. Indeed, as a 
part of the military establishment, the war minister’s attempts to influence the monarch 
over issuing orders to an army corps commander concerning the intervention or 
withdrawal of troops was of greater weight than those of a civilian prime minister.
On the other hand, the War Ministry within government constituted a ministry apart, 
with few connections to the civil branches of government. Moreover, war ministers 
tended to be very jealous about their particular relationship with the King, very 
secretive about their initiatives and generally very reluctant to enter into co-operation 
with the minister of the interior. Moreover, in relation to the army corps commanders, 
the war minister’s authority to influence decisions taken by these powerful 
commanders, who were most often senior to the general holding the post of war 
minister, was insignificant. The war minister was most often regarded with contempt 
by other generals because of his submission to the Constitution and to the Prussian 
Diet.32 Although the War Ministry was often informed about important decisions taken 
concerning the use of troops, the ministry functioned as a forum o f discussion between 
the senior generals rather than as a source of authority, as shown by the collection of
32 Craig ( 1955) pp. 160-162.
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documents which is left behind from the War Ministry entitled ‘Eingreifen der 
Bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von Unruhen, 1889-1914 \ 33
Thus, although the state bureaucracy and the military authority were formally linked at 
the governmental level, this connection was made ineffective partly by the reluctance 
of the War Ministry to co-operate with the civilian sections of the executive, partly by 
the problems of the war minister to asserting influence on the army corps commanders. 
The connections at the national level between the state administration and the army 
were very indirect. On the one hand, there was the King and his military commanders, 
on the other, there was the politically responsible executive which had direct authority 
over the state administration, but no authority o f command over the army. The war 
minister occupied a position between the military establishment and government, 
without being really integrated in any of them.
3.2.3. Comparison of the access o f the state adm inistration to the arm y corps 
com m ander within the French and  Prussian system
Within the French and Prussian systems, the two war ministries performed this task 
under very different conditions. In Prussia, the King was the main institutional link 
between the military commanders and the war ministry. The War Ministry was linked 
to the Ministry of the Interior through government, but exchange between the two was 
limited. Since the Ministry of the Interior had only access to the King though the prime 
minister, the linkages between the state administration and the army corps commanders 
through the authorities in Berlin went though a chain of authorities (from the Ministry 
of the Interior, through the prime minister or the war minister to the King, and then to 
the army corps commanders).
In the Prussian system, strong institutional connections existed between the monarch 
as highest commander and the army corps commanders, whereas there were no means 
of direct influence given to the political executive. Since internal peacekeeping was 
primarily under the authority of the minister of the interior - who was not
33 Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2/14.
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institutionally closely connected to the monarch - the Prussian war minister was the 
closest institutional connection between the executive and the supreme commander. In 
practice, however, the War Ministry had little connection to the Ministry of the 
Interior, and the war minister’s means of influence on the army corps commanders 
were very limited.
At the regional and local levels, linkages between the state administration and the 
military commanders were not formalised and depended largely on the personal 
relationship between the persons holding the posts as province or district governor and 
as army corps commander. The civil authorities at the regional level could only express 
reach the military authorities through the Ministry of the Interior which had no direct 
linkage to the King, and given that the different sections of the Prussian civil service 
and military establishment were highly disconnected, the process of inter-institutional 
co-operation has to pass through many authorities from the state administration at the 
regional level to the army corps commanders.
Unlike the Prussian case, the formal connections between French civil authorities and 
the military commanders were much closer, both at the ministerial level and all the way 
down the civil and military hierarchies. Although French war minister, like his Prussian 
counterpart, had often difficulties asserting his influence over senior military 
commanders, the French War Ministry was much more closely linked to the rest of 
government than was the case in Prussia. Moreover, most French governments were 
headed by the minister of the interior as head of the cabinet. This gave the minister of 
the interior an excellent position for mediating between the civilian and military 
branches of the state organisation which his Prussian colleague had not. At the same 
time, the French prefects and sub-prefects could address themselves directly to a local 
military commander through formal institutional channels.
The French system functioned on the basis of a subtle balance between several sets of 
authorities, with the war minister as the primary military authority. The right to request 
military assistance was distributed among a series of bodies. The civil authorities at the 
regional level could themselves issue independent requests for military assistance that
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the military commander was then obliged to obey. In principle, the civil authorities 
therefore had no need to appeal to the ministerial authority in case o f requisitioning 
military assistance. Thus in terms o f institutional organisation, the military commander 
was incontestably the weaker part.
Thus, in France, the ministry of the interior was in a more favourable position to  
establish contacts to the war ministry than was the case in Prussia. However, this 
organisational difference was not enough to ensure effective civil-military co-operation 
at the regional level, since the French war minister, like his Prussian counterpart, had 
difficulties imposing his authority over the army corps commanders. In neither of the 
countries could close co-operation with the state administration in maintenance of 
order take place without the willing collaboration from the army corps commanders. In 
the following chapters, analyses will be undertaken of how and why French army corps 
commanders accepted participating in inter-institutional co-operation with the state 
administration at the regional level, whilst conversely in the Prussian case, such co­
operation proved to be impossible.
3.3. Civil-military co-operation at the regional: laws and regulations 
concerning the requisitioning and command of troops in internal 
peacekeeping
The first French and Prussian legislation concerning the use of troops in internal 
peacekeeping appeared in the 1790s.34 It defined the maintenance of public order as 
one of the main tasks of the armed forces. It was also stipulated that troops could only 
be mobilised for domestic conflicts at the explicit request of a competent civil 
authority. However, the background to this principle in the Prussian and the French 
cases appears to have been very different in the two countries: the French law
34 The Prussian law of 30 December 1798 ‘Zirkularverordnung über militärisches Eingreifen bei 
Tumulten und Aufläufen auf Requisition der Zivilbehörden.' French law of 8-10 July 1791 ‘Décret 
concernant la conservation et le classement des places de guerre ' and law of 26 July-3 August 1791 
‘Décret relatif à ta réquisition et à l'action de la force publique contre les attroupements. '
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concerning the civil requisition of troops from 179115 pointed to a limitation of 
arbitrary monarchical and military intervention in civilian conflicts, by giving authority 
over the use of troops to local and regional authorities. In contrast, the Prussian law 
1798 concerning the use of military forces against riots and disturbance should be seen 
rather as allowing certain civilian authorities at the regional and local level to call for 
military assistance without involving the monarch.35 6 The insistence on the need for a 
public authority to request military assistance was meant to exclude private persons 
from calling upon the army, rather than an attempt to limit the ability of the military 
authorities to take independent steps.37
In France, legislation in this field developed throughout the nineteenth century. In part 
it was shaped by the practical needs for effective co-operation between civil and 
military authorities. It was also influenced by the balance of power between groups of 
legislators who favoured civilian supremacy and those who wanted to maintain a high 
degree of independence for the military institutions from civilian interference and 
control. During the nineteenth century, the French legislation on domestic mobilisation 
o f troops became increasingly dense and detailed in its definition and distribution of 
powers between the civil authorities and the army.38 Due to the formal obligations of 
co-operation between the two authorities, and to civilian penetration into areas which 
were formally defined as a matter for the military authorities, the fields of authority 
sometimes overlapped. Problems of overlapping authorities were often solved in
35 Law of 26 July/ 3 August 1791 *Sur la réquisition et faction de la force publique' Articles 1 and
20.
36 Messerschmidt (1979) p.338-339.
37 Law of 30 December 1798 ‘Zirkularvorordnung über Militärische Eingreifen bei Tumulte und 
Aufläufe auf Requisition der Zivilbehörden. ' Article 6.
it is stated in Article 6 that the troops had to be requested by a public authority. This is at least how 
the law of 30 December 1798 was interpreted when the Cabinet Order of 17 October 1820 
'Mitwirkung der Militärbehörden zur Herstellung der Ordnung, wenn die Öffentliche Ruhe durch 
excesse gestört wird' stipulated the right of the military commander to intervene without a requisition 
from a competent civil authority.
38 Under the Third Republic, French legislation on the use of military assistance to restore public 
order rested on the following laws and decrees:
Law of 8-10 July 1791 ‘La conservation des places de guerre
Law of 27 July-3 August 1791 ‘Sur la réquisition et faction de la force publique’;
Law of 7 June 1848 'Sur les attroupements ';
Decree of 4 October 1891 ‘Sur le service des places de guerre et de villes ouvertes 
Decree of 20 October 1899 ‘Sur tes mouvements des troupes à ¡'intérieur';
Instructions of 24 June 1903 *Sur ta participation de formée au maintien de l'ordre public 
Instructions of 20-31 August 1907 *Sur la participation de l'armée au maintien de f  ordre. '
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practice by the governmental authorities asking the prefects and the army corps 
commander to take decisions jointly.39
In contrast, Prussian legislation was less detailed, and often new laws and regulations 
were enforced without the formal abolition of the previous legislation, thus important 
areas of the law were left open to interpretation, since recent instructions could be 
contradicted or even invalidated by reference to previous orders and instructions which 
had never been formally abolished.40 During the Imperial period, the entire body of 
laws and decrees concerning military involvement in internal peacekeeping, dated from 
the period prior to 1871, with the Imperial Constitution as the latest contribution. 
However, in contrast to the French case, there was a strict separation of civilian and 
military institutions at the regional and local levels, and the formal relationship of 
supremacy between civil and military authorities was clearly advantageous to the latter.
The laws o f 8-10 July 1791 and o f 27 July-3 August 1791 established a series of 
formalities for the requisition of armed forces. During the nineteenth century, with the 
increasing gradual take over of internal peacekeeping by civilian authorities, it was 
recognised by both civil and military authorities that, in principle, troops should be 
mobilised for internal purposes only in cases of ‘extreme urgency’.41 It was essentially 
the competent civil authorities (prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors) who decided when
39 A further analysis of ‘joint decision making* in Nord-Pas-de-Calais will be presented in Chapter 
Nine.
40 The legislation concerning domestic military intervention mostly dated from the period before the 
establishment o f the German Empire in 1871. The service regulation concerning the army's use of 
weapons and its participation in repression of internal unrest, (Dienstvorschrift über den 
Waffengebrauch des Militärs und seine Mitwirkung zur Unterdrückung innerer Unruhen) of 23 March 
1899 refers to the following laws and regulations:
Cabinet Order of 17 October 1820 ‘Mitwirkung der Militärbehörden zur Herstellung der 
Ordnung, wenn die öffentliche Ruhe durch excesse gestört w ird’;
Regulation of 17 August 1835 concerning maintenance of public order * Verordnung zur 
Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen Ordnung und der dem Gesetz schuldigen Achtung 
Law of 20 March 1837 on military use of weapons ‘Gesetz überden Waffengebrauch des 
Militärs V
Law of 4 June 1851 concerning states o f siege ‘Gesetz Überden Belagerungszustand 
The Imperial Constitution of 16 April 1871.
In the aftermath of the Zabem affair, the service regulation on the military's use of weapons from 
1899 was replaced by a new service regulation of 19 March 1914.
41 Serman (1982) pp.60-62. See also Chapter Five.
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they considered that this extra force was indispensable and, in most relevant situations, 
that it was possible legally to justify the call for military troops.
The laws of 1791 only referred to military assistance to apprehend criminals or to 
protect persons and property against a rioting crowd. With the law on crowds of 1848, 
however, a simple gathering in a public place was criminalised and could at any time be 
dispersed.42 When the decree of 4 October 1891 stated that the army was essentially 
the guardian of public order, the role of troops was no longer confined to the 
restoration of order but also to the maintenance of public order when a public 
authority considered that it was being threatened.43 Moreover, the law on crowds was 
also extensively used to intervene against demonstrations. The right to demonstrate in 
public was not recognised by French legislation until 1935 44 With the Waldeck- 
Rousseau administration in 1899, organised marches and gatherings were increasingly 
tolerated, although the 1848 law on crowds was still frequently used to prevent 
unwanted demonstrations. Although public gathering and marches were tolerated, 
though not legally recognised, troops were frequently called out during strikes, even if 
these were in fact recognised by law.45 Article 414 of the Penal Code, allowing the 
organisation of workers in trade unions, also forbade hindering the free exercise of a 
profession, thereby criminalising any attempts to prevent strikebreakers from working. 
The Article 414 was also used as the most common justification for calling out for 
troops during strikes, together with the arguments for defending persons and private or 
public property - in casu factories, mines or port facilities. The law of 26 July-3 
August 1791 stipulates that the army could also be used to ensure the respect of law 
and the implementation of the government’s policies. During the first decades of the 
Third Republic, this was particularly relevant for the disturbances caused by the 
implementation of the legislation against Catholic Institutions.46 In most situation, if
42 Law of 7 June 1848 on crowding ‘Sur les attroupements ’.
43 Decree of 4 October 1891 'Portant règlement sur le service des places de guerre et de villes 
ouvertes’. Article 63; “Les chefs de poste ne doivent pas perdre de vue que la force armée est 
essentiellement protectrice de l'ordre public, des personnes et de la propriété."
44 Law decree of 23 October 1935 abolishing the Article 6 of the ’Naquel Law.’
45 Since 25 March 1868, the French law recognised the citizens’ right to establish non-political 
organisations, although it was only with the ‘Naquet Law’ of 30 June 1881 that the freedom of 
assembly was extended to political organisations and trade unions.
46 Law of 29 March 1880 on illegal religious orders, and the legislation 1902 to 1905 on the 
separation of the French State and the Catholic Church.
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the civil authorities wanted to call for military assistance» it would be possible to find a 
legal justification to do so.
The fundamental principles for the requisition of troops in Prussia were similar to those 
in the French legislation in terms o f the legal justification for domestic military 
intervention47 and the distribution o f the powers to call upon the army between a 
variety of civil authorities at the regional and local levels.48 The major dissimilarities 
concerned the powers of the French and Prussian military commanders. The two last 
sections will therefore concentrate first on the limitations put upon the French military 
commanders (3.3). Then an analysis will be undertaken on the particular powers 
attributed to the Prussian military commander which their French had not (3.4). In 
both the French and Prussian case, a significant incongruity can be observed between 
the formal powers of the military commanders and the position in practice of these 
commanders.
3.3.1. French army corps commanders: legal definition o f the post
In the French system, as in the Prussian, the right to command troops was traditionally 
that of the military commander, and this remained the principle throughout the period 
examined. However, two important differences can be pointed out between the powers 
of French and Prussian military commanders: the means of civilian authorities to  
intervene in military commands, and the role attributed to the military authorities in the 
cases when weapons were used against civilians.
47 Circular decree of 30 December 1798 on 'Zirkularverordnung über militärisches Eingreifen bei 
Tumulten und Aufläufen auf Requisition der Zivilbehörden Cabinet Order of 17 October 1820 on 
*Mitwirkung der Militärbehörden zur Herstellung der Ordnung, wenn die öffentliche Ruhe durch 
Excesse gestört wird’; Decree of 17 August 1835 on ‘Verordnung zur Aufrechterhaltung der 
öffentlichen Ordnung und der dem Gesetz schuldigen Achtung*.
48 The principle of civil requisition was stated in the Prussian Constitution of 31 January-6 February 
1850, Article 36 “Die bewaffnete Macht kann zur Unterdrückung inerer Unruhen und zur Ausführung 
der Gesetze nur in den vom Gesetze bestimmten Fällen und Formen und auf Requisition der 
Civilbehörde verwendet werden'*.
The right was granted to the province, district and local governors as the representatives of the state at 
the regional and local level. Among local authorities, right to requisition was granted to the mayors 
and to municipal police authorities. Law of 11 March 1850 'Gesetz betrefend die Verpflichtung der 
Gemeinde zum Ersatz des bei öffentlichen Aufläufen verursachten Schadens*. Decree of 31 December 
1872 'Kreisordnung'. Decree of 31 July 1886 ‘Kreisordnung'.
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33.2 . Limitations imposed on the French commander's right to command
In questions of command, the French military commander faced a series of limitations 
which did not exist in the Prussian system. In the first place, it was the civil authorities 
who decided when the troops should be sent home, whereas in the Prussian system it 
was the military commander who decided when to send the troops back to the 
garrison. In cases of domestic military intervention, the French military commander 
was, in principle at least, empowered to decide the means by which public order should 
be maintained or restored,49 and the army corps commander had to formally approve 
the measures taken by subordinate commanders.50 In any case, the prefect * and 
ultimately the ministry of interior - had the last word. With the instructions of 1907, 
the French commander's authority to approve and suggest measures was also limited 
by the fact that the civil power could at any moment intervene and invalidate his 
decisions through a revised requisition51.
Similarly, and in contrast to his Prussian counterpart, the French army corps 
commander did not possess the right to issue orders to subordinate commanders which 
went against the word or the spirit of a requisition issued by a civil authority. The 
French army corps commander thus had no formal way of asserting any direct 
influence over the maintenance of order undertaken at a lower level, whereas his 
civilian counterpart, the prefect, could intervene and impose his will on subordinate 
civil servants. As a result, whilst the Prussian system had lines of command which went 
vertically down the military hierarchy, the French channels of command went 
horizontally from the civilian authority, which had asked for the requisition, directly to 
the military commander in charge.
This means that that the formal powers of the French army corps commander in an 
incident depended on whether a requisition had been made directly to him or w hether 
requisitions had been made to one of his subordinate commanders. In this light, and in
49 Law of 26 July-3 August 1791 Article 23; the decree of 4 October 1891. Article 167. stipulates the 
authority of the military commander to choose the means, but also stresses his responsibility. In the 
Instruction of 20-31 August 1907 Article 18, military responsibility was replaced by the demand for 
civil-military co-operation.
50 Instructions of 20-31 August 1907 Article 9.
51 Instructions of 20-31 August 1907 Article 22.
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order to understand the actual position o f the French army corps commanders, it is 
important to underline two elements. The first is a detail in the lines of authority within 
the military hierarchy as described in the most important military instruction on the use 
of troops for internal peacekeeping. It was issued in 1893 by the army corps 
commander in Lille,52 and was used by all the army corps until 1905, with several 
reprints.53 In these instructions, General de France emphasises that requisitioning 
should be made through the army corps commander and only in cases of immediate 
urgency through commanders of a lower rank.54 This was very important because the 
army corps commander could not issue orders to subordinate commanders unless he 
had been directly requested by a civilian authority. His involvement and his power of 
command therefore largely depended on whether a request had been directly made to 
him or not. Secondly, with the increasing practice that decisions concerning requisition 
of military assistance were taken by the prefectoral authority, the instructions meant 
that the requisitions would, in the majority of cases, be issued directly to the army 
corps commander thus providing him with the full authority of command. Thus, 
through bureaucratic co-operation with the prefect, the army corps commander could 
obtain influence on questions concerning the management of domestic conflict, from 
which he was formally excluded.
3.3.3. Military use of weapons between civilian control and demands for effective 
responses
In the French system as in Prussia, the military was entitled to use its weapons to 
defend its posts as well as to defend military buildings and materials.55 However, in 
contrast to the Prussian system, where troops could make use of force whenever the 
commanding officer thought that this was appropriate and where the presence of a 
representative from a civilian authority was not formally required,56 it was a well-
52 General de France ‘Intructions en cas de grève ou de troubles’ of 15 February 1893.
53 Military Archive, Vincennes, 5 N 6, ‘Cabinet du Ministre: Bureau de la correspondance générale 
1905-1906’. Note from 18 October 1905 from the French war minister to the General Staff about 
reprinting of the instructions of General France.
54 Military Archive, Freiburg, l.A.C. 2.1.330 ‘Instructions en cas de grèves ou de troubles’
55 French law of 26 July-31 August 1791 Article 25; Prussian law of 1837 Article 1-6.
56 This becomes clear from a report from the 1889 miner strike. It reports a case where weapons were 
used against unarmed civilians, with the result of two dead and several people injured. At that 
occasion, the commanding officer had taken these steps completely on his own since no civil authority
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established principle in the French system after 1848 that troops could not make use of 
force without the presence of a representative from the civilian authorities. Already 
since the Second Republic, it was stipulated that no officer could act without the 
presence of a representative of the civilian authority.57 However, after the turn of the 
century, with the increasing problems of mass unrest, French legislation makes certain 
concessions on this point, by introducing a legal basis for military commanders to use 
weapons in self-defence, without observing the procedure prescribed by the law of 
1848. In the 1891 decree it was still emphasised that :
En cas de troubles (...) dans lesquelles les troupes sont l'objet d'une agression cl doivent se défendre 
par tous les moyens possibles, elles ne peuvent faire usage de leurs armes pour le rétablissement de 
l’ordre que dans les conditions ci-aprës déterminées par la loi du 7 juin 1848.58
In the 1903 regulations, however, an article appears which enables the military to make 
use of their weapons in self-defence, even without the presence of a civilian 
representative.
Mais si la force armée, en présence de l’attroupement, se trouve dans l'un des deux premiers cas 
prévus (1. si des violences ou voies de fait sont exercées contre elles; 2. si elles ne peuvent défendre 
autrement le terrain qu'elles occupent ou les postes dont elles sont chargées.), elle fera usage de ses 
armes encore bien que les formes prescrites par l'art. 3 de la loi du 7 juin 1848 n'aient pu être 
observées.59
In the 1907 Instructions, two months after the great riots which look place in South 
France, this paragraph was still maintained as a footnote.60 The existence of this article 
seems to indicate three things. Firstly, it shows how French legislation changed to 
accommodate to the increasing problems of mass unrest and attacks on public forces. 
Despite the continuous sense of suspicion of the representatives of the Republic
was present. According to the report this was entirely compatible with existing rules. Central Archive. 
Potsdam III, R43, film signature 11971-11972, (documents 60-61). 'Bericht des Sdundlicuienants
von Strahndorff iiber des Einschreiten mit der Schusswaffe am 7. Mai i 889' addressed to the minister 
of the interior.
57 Law of 26 July-3 August 1791; and the law of 7 July 1848.
58 Decree of 4 October 1891 Article 169.
59 Instructions of 24 June 1903 Article 19.
60 Instructions of 20-31 August 1907 Article 23.
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towards the army, it seems that the degree of violence linked to popular unrest during 
the Third Republic made it imperative to allow legal military action to take place in 
cases of emergency. Secondly, the existence of this article may also indicate that the 
Republican regime in 1907 felt sufficiently self-confident to make certain concessions 
to the military authorities. Thirdly, it indicates that the French legislators by 1907 did 
not consider the prospect of the misuse o f weapons by the army to be a major problem, 
and that the fact that military commanders were covered by the criminal code was a 
sufficient means of control.
After 1907, therefore, a partial elimination took place of the legal differences between 
the French and Prussian system concerning the authorisation o f military commanders 
to use weapons independently from civilian authorities, in self defence or while 
performing their ordinary duties. Thus, thereafter, the biggest difference between 
French and Prussian legislation on this point was no longer whether the military 
commander could use weapons when he felt that his troops were being attacked, but 
that the French military commanders were professionally responsible, and that they 
could be prosecuted under the criminal code if they were found guilty of transgressing 
the limits of their authority.
3.3.4. Initiatives concerning the elaboration of plans for protection
In both nations, it was a part of the army corps commander's professional duties to 
develop plans for protection for internal peacekeeping. General Staff studies for 
domestic military action and plans for protection in the event of major popular unrest 
appeared in both France and Prussia during the 1890s. However, after the tum of the 
century, the number of French plans increased and these plans comprised greater areas 
and use of ever more armed force.
Since the maintenance of order was primarily the responsibility of the civilian 
authorities, the French Ministry of the Interior developed a series of plans for 
protection. All the French civilian plans for protection operated with the possibility of 
military involvement in large-scale unrest. Since the Ministry of the Interior could not
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allow the military to be unprepared for large-scale intervention, the co-ordination of 
civilian and military measures became an obligation with reference to the demand for 
civil-military co-operation as stated in the 1791 legislation.61 During the first decade of 
the twentieth century, the detailed definition of power between civil and military 
authorities was combined with an increasing number of obligations to co-operate. The 
French decree of 1891, which describes duties and obligations of military commanders 
in seventy-four pages 62 had only a few articles concerning civil-military co-operation. 
In contrast, the instructions concerning military participation in the maintenance of 
order from 1903 and 1907 repeat and increase the demand for co-operation: ten out of 
the twenty-seven articles stress the obligation of mutual information, particularly, in 
the field of the preparation of measures against possible cases of popular unrest.
In the French legislation, the efforts to gain control over the activities of the military 
authorities through co-operation with civilian authorities corresponded with the need 
for effective responses to large-scale internal disorder. The opposite occurred in the 
Prussian case, where the military authority and civilian authorities could not work 
together on this issue, because such co-operation would have interfered with the 
military authority’s absolute right to develop and implement measures. On the other 
hand, this also meant that the Prussian commanders had much less influence than their 
French counterpart over the measures which were actually implemented against public 
disorder. Thus, in the French system, the formal powers the army corps commanders 
to assert influence on questions concerning maintenance of public order were strictly 
limited compared to the powers of the Prussian commanders. However, the 
administrative practice in France granted the army corps commanders with a high 
degree of informal influence on matters from which he was formally excluded.
61 Law of 8-10 July 1791 Article 9 title III and Article 16.
62 Duvergier’s Law Collections XCI pp. 182-256.
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The differences between the formal powers o f French and Prussian military 
commanders were considerable. In contrast to the formal placing of the French military 
authority under civilian supremacy, the Prussian system provided the commanding 
general with four powers which gave him almost unlimited freedom of action in 
questions concerning internal peacekeeping:
• the right to mobilise military troops against civilians without being formally 
requested by the civilian authorities. Although the legal validity of this prerogative, 
dating from 1820, was highly questionable, it figured in all military service 
regulations until March 1914;
• the right to refuse to assist civilian forces when requested;
• in the case o f troops being requisitioned, the military commander held full authority 
of command over both civil and military forces, implying the right to maintain or 
dismiss troops at any moment; and
• the right to declare a provisional state of siege without consulting the civilian 
authorities.
However, in Prussia, like in France, important incongruities can be observed between 
the army corps commanders* formal position and their actual influence over measures 
and strategies concerning the maintenance of internal order. It is therefore important to 
distinguish between the formal powers o f the Prussian army corps commanders to 
intervene in civilian conflicts and the ways in which these powers were used. In this 
section attention will therefore be paid to three central aspects that were particular to 
the Prussian commanders* rights in relation to the civil authorities: 1) their right to 
refuse to provide troops when requested by a civil authority; 2) their right to intervene 
against civilians without being formally requested by a competent civil authority and 3) 
their right to declare a provisional military state of siege without consulting the civil 
authorities. The main point made here is that, although the army was very careful 
about maintaining these powers, they were, as far a this study can observe, never used 
during the entire period studied.
3.4. Prussian peculiarities: requisition of military assistance in the light
of civil-military antagonism
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In Prussia, the principle of civilian requisition was clearly expressed in Article 36 of the 
Prussian Constitution of 1850. However, for a long time it remained uncertain which 
civilian authority was supposed to be the principal contact with the military. Under 
normal circumstances, the maintenance o f public order fell under the authority of the 
province or district governor. As early as 1825, a cabinet order declared that the 
requisition of troops was supposed to pass to the military authorities only through the 
province governor;63 he alone was to decide whether and when the military should be 
called upon and he was supposed to be the direct link with the army corps commander. 
Similarly, whenever civil authorities requested assistance from military troops, the 
order was to go directly to the army corps commander, to whom the royal authority of 
command was delegated.
During the first half of the century, it was generally the local governor who requested 
troops directly from the nearest garrison depending on the seriousness and the extent 
o f the case.64 In the case of an immediate alert, the chief of a local police force could 
also ask for military assistance, even without formal approval from the administrative 
authorities.65 This procedure was only changed in 1906, in the aftermath of the 1905 
strikes, when the local authorities* right to requisition troops had been a serious 
impediment to the coherent management of the large number of strikes. It was 
therefore emphasised again by the Ministry of the Interior that requisitions should be 
issued only through province or district governors.66 However, the legal recognition of 
the provincial or district governor as the supreme authority over the military 
commander could not be established in the Prussian system, because it would have 
been an intrusion into the military commander’s authority and it would have been 
incompatible with the monarch’s position as supreme commander.
Thus, troops could only be provided for domestic purposes only through the army 
corps commander, as the monarch’s representative at the regional level. In this
63 Instructions to the province governors of 31 December 1825. For an analysis of this instruction and 
its application later in the nineteenth century see Messerschmidt (1979) p.339.
64 Messerschmidt (1979) p.339.
65 Jessen (1991) p. 133.
66 Minister of the interior to the province governor 28 September 1906. Cit Jessen (1991) p. 133.
3.4.1. Prussian com m anders' right to refuse requisitions from  the civil authorities
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context, the Prussian commander’s right to refuse to  send troops was an important 
feature, because it meant that a civil request for military assistance did not constitute 
an order, as was the French case. It is important to note that no example has been 
found in the entire period investigated in which an army corps commander made any 
use of his right to refuse a requisition from the senior state administration.
3.4*2. The Zabern-Affair, 1913: the principle of civilian requisition contested
Despite the fact that Article 36 of the Prussian Constitution stipulated that troops 
could be used only on the explicit demand of civilian authorities, the principle of 
civilian requisition was not finally settled until the eve of the First World War. As late 
as 1913, the principle that troops could only intervene against civilians at the explicit 
request of civilian authorities was placed in serious doubt during the infamous Zabem 
affair.
In November 1913, the population in a small Alsacian town began to demonstrate 
outside the local garrison after it become publicly know that a young lieutenant, while 
instructing newcoming recruits, had declared that he would reward any of his soldiers 
who was prepared to shoot an Alsacian. When the local population gathered in protest 
outside the garrison, and the local authorities did not provide sufficient police to 
disperse the demonstration, the local commander, Colonel Reuter, sent in troops 
without any civil requisition, before proceeding to imprison civilians. The independent 
military intervention against civilians raised a storm of protest that reached Berlin 
within days.
The fact that the Colonel was able to show that he was formally empowered to take 
these steps, did not help to appease the public uproar since it threw doubt on the 
validity of the whole legal framework regarding the principle of civil requisition for the 
previous period. Attempts to grant military commanders the right to use troops on 
their own initiative had been made several times during the Imperial period. In the first 
draft o f the military law of 1874, Bismarck tried to attribute powers to military 
commanders which would have allowed them to send in troops without a civil
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requisition.67 This proposal was rejected by the Reichstag. However* in the military 
regulation issued by the Prussian War Ministry in 1899* 'Dienstvorschrift über 
Waffengebrauch des Militärs' f military commanders were given the right to send in 
troops if they thought that the civilian authorities were hesitating too long before 
issuing a military requisition.68 This right was given to the military commander on the 
legal basis of a Prussian cabinet order from 1820. This indicates the ambiguity of the 
definition of powers in co-operation for internal peacekeeping* as the fundamental 
principle of civil requisition could be contradicted by pre-constitutional laws and 
regulations which had never been formally abolished. After the regulations concerning 
‘Military Use of Weapons* were made public, legal specialists agreed that these 
provisions could not be considered legally valid since Article 36 of the Prussian 
Constitution of 1851 and a Prussian cabinet order from 1820 could not be enforced in 
Alsace-Lorraine, since this region did not belong to the Prussian territory.69
The existence of these provisions, as well as the fact that Colonel Reuter went free of 
charge on the grounds that it was not the job of an officer to test the legal validity of 
the provisions in his service regulations, has been interpreted by Wehler as the ultimate 
proof of the powerlessness of Prussian civil authorities in relation to the army.70 To 
contemporary German and foreign observers it was obvious that behind the civil and 
constitutional facade, the army was still in charge in the German Kaiserreich.1* In an 
historical perspective, the Zabem affair has been described as the last chapter in the 
long history of frustrated attempts to bring the Imperial German army under 
constitutional rule and control.72 However, the indignation in the Reichstag and 
German public opinion was so violent that William II was forced to issue new service 
regulations wherein this article was abolished. The fate of this unfortunate Article II3a. 
indicates that the army was not in charge and could not operate against massive civilian 
protest according to its own self-defined rules. Although the responsible officer,
67 Kliickmann (1978) p.14.
68 'Dienstvorschrift überden Waffengebrauch des Militärs' (1899) Article II3a.
69 Huber (1969) pp.596-597.
70 This is the main argument in his analysis of the Zabem affair. Wehler (1970) pp.78-80.
71 Schoenbaum (1982) pp.171-175.
72 Wehler is very clear on this point; Nipperdey describes the concessions from the King and the 
military establishment as only a half-victory for a constitutional submission of the army to civilian 
control. Wehler (1970) pp.78-79; Nipperdey (1992) p.204.
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Colonel Reuter, went free of charge, hereafter, no commander could justify using 
troops without civil requisition.
The ‘Service Regulation about Military Use of Weapons’ (1899) makes rather 
depressing reading, however, the arrogant tone with which it describes the obligations 
and limitations on powers of the civil authority leaves no doubt as to how the officials 
in the War Ministry still in 1899 saw the relationship between civil and military 
authorities. Accordingly, it is unsurprising that Colonel Reuter in Zabem thought that 
he was within his rights when he sent in troops without civilian requisition and when he 
ordered his soldiers to proceed to imprisonment o f civilian demonstrators. With 
reference to a cabinet order from 17 October 1820, the Article III3a states that:
“Zur Unterdrückung innerer Unruhen und zur Ausführung der Gesetze sind aber die 
Militärbefehlshaber auch ohne Anforderung der Civilbehörde selbständig einzuschreiten befugt und 
verpfiichtet...wenn der Militärbefehlshaber nach Pflicht und Gewissen findet, dass die Civilbehörde 
mit der Anforderung um Militär-Beistand zu lange zögert73.
Three comments need to be made in relation to the importance of this article, by which 
military commanders were empowered - legally sustainable or not - to send in troops if 
they considered it appropriate. It should first be noted that this paragraph was 
apparently only used once, namely in Zabem in November 1913.74 Given the interest 
of this study in the nature of the co-operation between civil and military authorities, it 
is therefore important that the civil authorities apparently ignored the provisions in the 
military regulation and operated with the principle o f civilian request as the only legal 
basis for the army arction. Thus, for fourteen years, the civil and military authorities 
had apparently operated on dissimilar legal bases. The fact that this had not been clear 
before allows two possible conclusions. Either the civil and military authorities 
operated with such a degree of mutual agreement that it was rare for a military 
commander to have to impose his will. Alternatively, it may also indicate that military 
commanders, in general, followed the will o f civilian authorities and interfered little in 
the realm of the civilian authority.
73 'Dienstvorschrift über den Waffengebrauch des Militärs' (1899) § 11,3 a.
74 Schoenbaum (1982) p.107.
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The second observation is that the indignation and violent reaction of the Reichstag 
and the public were strong enough to force the King to issue new service regulations in 
which this unfortunate paragraph was abolished. The fact that this ‘right’ could not 
survive public knowledge - and therefore only existed as long as it was not put into 
practice - implies that it would be wrong to attribute to it great practical importance. 
Finally, the public reaction to the transgressions of the military authority indicates, 
more generally, how well-established the principle of civil requisition was in German 
society by 1913. Similarly, concerning the position of the military in the German state 
system it indicates that although, the Zabem affair did not bring about a constitutional 
limitation on military authority - and in this respect it was a defeat for the attempts to 
impose civilian supremacy75 - it did, however, show the limits on what the military 
authority could do by the end eve of the First World War.76
3.4.3. The right to declare a state of siege: a resource for the military
com m ander?
A third important aspect of the powers of military commanders was their right to 
declare a state of siege. Interpretations of the German Imperial system have focused on 
the right of military commanders at all levels to declare a provisional state of siege 
independently of the civil authorities. As such, the declaration of a state of siege in 
cases of domestic unrest was not a specific Prussian or German phenomenon. In 
France as well, the possibility existed, and would have led to the subordination o f civil 
forces of order to the military commander, although the French army corps 
commander would then himself be subject to the prefect.77 However, since a 
declaration of state of siege could only be decided by law,78 and was thus beyond the 
powers of regional and local civil and military authorities, the question of state of siege 
did not in any way affect the relationship of French military commanders with the 
prefectoral authority.
75 Wehler (1970) pp.79-80; Deist (1991) p.48; Craig (1978) p.301.
76 This is the conclusion that Schoenbaum draws on the basis of the Zabem affair. Schoenbaum 
(1982) p.184.
77 Delaperriere (1902) vol.II p.404.
78 French law of 3 April 1878.
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In Prussia, by contrast, the question o f a declaration o f state of siege must be 
considered an important power resource for the military commander, even when it was 
not used in practice. In principle, the declaration of a  state o f siege had to be issued by 
the Prussian king. After 1871, Article 68 of the Imperial Constitution gave the Kaiser a 
similar right to declare a state of siege for the entire empire or for parts of it.79 
However, according to the law of 4 July 1851, the declaration of a provisional state of 
siege could - in cases of immediate urgency - also be made by a local military 
commander. Such a declaration would afterwards have to be confirmed by the Prussian 
State Ministry and the king. In the Imperial Constitution o f 1871, it is stated that the 
Prussian law concerning states of siege was going to be replaced by new legislation. 
This new legislation was never passed, however. Hence, the Prussian law from 1851, 
which granted extended powers to the military commander, stayed in force until 1918.
In domestic politics, particularly during the early Wilhelminian era, there were constant 
threats from the King and leading generals to declare a state of siege and close the 
Reichtag and other constitutional institutions. However, in reality, William II always 
refrained from declaring a state of siege. Similarly, no example exists where a military 
commander declared a provisional state o f siege without being explicitly asked to do 
so by civilian authorities. A provisional state o f siege was declared only twice in the 
entire period from 1871-1914,80 and in both cases at the request of the local civil 
authorities. Thus, the declaration of a state of siege in the two cases where it was used 
indicates civil-military co-operation on the basis o f civilian initiative rather than an 
enforcement o f military supremacy. The fact no military commander ever made use of 
his rights to declare a state of siege independently from the civil authorities is all the 
more surprising given that the war minister, von Verdy, after the abrogation of the 
anti-Social Democratic laws in 1890, directly invited the army corps commanders to
79 The question of the Kaiser’s right to declare a state of siege in non-Prussian areas was not settled 
until the eve of the First World War, when a constitutional specialist pointed out that a general state 
of siege for the entire German Empire could not be considered as legal unless it implied the formal 
acceptance of the kings of the non-Prussian states of the Empire. Chancellor von Bulow therefore took 
initiative, in 1908, to ask the monarchs of the non-Prussian states to provide a permanent formal 
acceptance of the declaration of a state of siege. Central Archive, Potsdam III, R 15.01/ 12215, *Der 
Kriegeszustand 1910-1913’
80 Kdngshiitten 1871 and Bielefeld 20 March to 4 April 1885. (Messerschmidt (1979) p.346).
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make use of this right in order to continue the official fight against Social Democratic 
activities.81
The Imperial German system has been described as a military state,82 with reference to 
three crucial areas: the extra-constitutional position of the army; important questions 
which proved to be difficult or impossible to regulate by updated legislation;83 84and, 
finally, the exemption from accountability for the actions of military commanders 
towards the civilians. It should, nevertheless, be emphasised that despite the extended 
powers of the military commanders and the difficulties of making the military 
establishment admit when officers had transgressed their powers and thus undertake 
appropriate prosecutions, the actions of the military were formally covered by law. 
Without entering into the debate about the Prussian state as a R ech ts ta a l in relation 
to the military, it is important to stress that the army was not in a position to act 
arbitrarily. Although Prussian commanders often expressed contempt for the formal 
limits around their sphere of action, and sometimes displayed a basic ignorance of the 
most basic legal principles, military commanders were still expected to justify their 
actions by reference to formal powers.85
81 Deist (1991) p.25.
82 Wehler (1970) p.79; Nipperdey (1992) p.201.
83 The difficulties concerning the new legislation on the formalities around states of siege and the 
long bargaining process concerning the implementation of a new military penal code around the turn 
o f the century, are well-known examples of this phenomenon.
84 The fundamental argument in Huber’s legal history (1963-1969) is that the Imperial system, with 
its fundamental basis as a Rechtstaat, could eventually have developed into a modem system with 
checks and balances between the different political institutions and with civilian control over the 
army. These considerations, however, go beyond the scope of this thesis.
85 The ignorance of the military commander about the legal boundaries around their actions came out 
quite clearly during the Zabem Affair.
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3.5. Concluding remarks: Similarities and differences in the French and 
Prussian Segisiation concerning domestic military intervention
In a comparative interpretation of the legal framework of requisition troops to assist 
civilian forces, three basic principles can be pointed out which were common to the 
French and Prussian cases, and which were increasingly important for comparing the 
legislation from the early nineteenth century with the decrees and regulations from the 
period preceding the First World War.
The first principle - which was formulated by the early laws of the 1790s - was that 
military troops could only be used for domestic peacekeeping on an explicit request 
from a civilian authority. Bismarck’s attempts to give military commanders the legal 
rights to intervene without civilian requisition went unheeded. Similarly, the provisions 
of the 1899 Service Regulations, which granted this right to the military commanders, 
could not be considered as legally valid. Ultimately a Prussian commander could 
declare a provisional state of siege and thereby take over the authority of maintaining 
order, even without consulting civilian authorities. However, the only two examples of 
the use of the right to declare a provisional state of siege took place at the explicit 
request of the civil authorities. During the early Wilhelminian period, certain 
commanding generals waited for a state of siege to be declared by the King, but 
refrained from taking this step by themselves.
The second principle, which appeared in both the Prussian and the French legislation 
after 1848, was the fundamental principle that military troops should only be requested 
in cases of ‘extreme urgency.’86 However, the legislation was ambiguous. The French 
decree of 1891 as well as the instructions of 1903 and 1907 emphasised that the 
military should be as separate as possible from civilian affairs, but, at the same time, 
underlined the obligation of the armed forces to ensure internal order and defend the
86 Article 36 of the Prussian Constitution 1851. This was still the attitude expressed by the Prussian 
ministry o f interior and the War Ministry after the great miner strike in Westphalia 1889. Saul (1974, 
p.274). Similarly, the French legislation from the late nineteenth century keeps repeating that the use 
of troops should be avoided.
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Republican institutions, whenever requested to do so.17 The Prussian regulations of 
1899 underline the obligation of officers to ensure internal order, but at the same time 
stress that military troops should not be misused by civil authorities as an extended 
police force.
The third principle was that the maintenance of public order was primarily the 
responsibility of the civil authorities and that contacts with the army should pass 
through the senior civil servants at the regional level (province governors in Prussia; 
prefects in France). According to the formal definitions in both the French and Prussian 
legislation, senior civil servants and military commanders were supposed to co-operate 
in the maintenance of order. The principle of co-operation, however, was carried into 
practice in two very dissimilar ways within the French and Prussian system. In the 
French case, the prefect was the key figure and authority responsible in the process of 
maintaining public order, whereas the legislators of the Third Republic refrained from 
granting the army corps commanders a formally predominant role. On the other hand, 
through this co-operation, the French army corps commanders acquired informal 
influence on maintenance of public order, from which they were formally excluded, and 
became far more involved in these matters than were their formally powerful Prussian 
counterparts. In Prussia, by contrast, the civil and military authorities faced a strict 
allocation of tasks and both was to take their responsibilities. The Prussian formal 
organisation increasingly affirms the position of the province governor as the main 
authority in the maintenance of public order. However, since the prerogatives of the 
Prussian army corps commander remained unchanged from the prc-constitutional 
period, the predominance of the provincial governor was only valid as long as troops 
were not requested, after which moment all authority over civil and military forces 
went over to the military authorities.
In terms of the organisational structures and allocation of powers, two main 
conclusions can be drawn. First, the institutional position of the French Ministry of the 
Interior and state administration placed these authorities in a significantly better *24
87 Decree of 4 October 1891 ‘Sur le service des places de guerre el de villes ouvertes’; Instructions of
24 June 1903 ‘Relative à la participation de l’année au maintien de l'ordre public’; Instructions of 20 
August 1907 ‘Relative à la participation de l’armée au maintien de l’ordre public.’
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position than their Prussian counterparts to undertake contacts to the military 
authorities at the governmental and regional levels. However, the formally strong 
position of the French Ministry of the Interior was not in itself sufficient to ensure the 
co-operation from the senior commanders, since the war minister who mediated the 
inter-ministerial communication held a rather weak position in relation to the army 
corps commanders. These senior commanders held a significant potential of 
obstruction to the functioning of civil-military co-operation at the regional level. 
Therefore, the high degree of inter-institutional co-operation between the French state 
administration and army corps commanders was not only a result of formal institutional 
arrangements. Similarly important were the bureaucratic practices which grew up 
around the civil-military co-operation through the repeated implementation of 
strategies to deal with public unrest that strongly involved the army.
Secondly, the findings of this section suggest that the dissimilarities between the 
French and Prussian case in the formal distribution of powers between civil and 
military authorities was of secondary importance in the functioning of civil-military co­
operation at the regional level, since a series of factors tended to modify the 
importance of the differences in the formal position o f the French and Prussian military 
commanders. Certainly, Prussian military commanders were empowered with rights 
that their French counterpart had not (rights to refuse a requisition, rights to declare a 
state of siege, rights to intervene without requisition from the civil authorities). 
However, these particular resources were almost never used, and it is worth noting 
that once called upon to assist civilian forces, Prussian commanders generally followed 
the wishes of the civil authorities as did their French counterparts: they sent troops 
when requested and called them back when the civilian authorities thought that it was 
time to do so. Accordingly, in Prussia, as in France, the military commanders in 
situations of domestic military intervention de facto  occupied the role of junior partner 
in relation to the civilian authorities.
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Chapter Four. Power constellations at the regional level: local 
elites, state administrators, and military commanders
In the literature on the German Empire, one of the fundamental assumptions is that 
close social ties between the members of the state bureaucracy and the military elite 
were of major importance for the internal role of the army and for the continued 
existence and operation of archaic social and political structures.1 Conversely, the 
literature on the French Republican system commonly emphasises the lack of cohesion 
between the two social groups which comprised the French state administration and 
officer corps, as one of the basic features for potential conflict within the French 
Republic.2 In French and German historiography, interpretations of the rise of the 
working class movement see the use of troops as ultimate evidence of the readiness of 
the civil and military elites governing the state apparatus to maintain their 
predominance over the emerging working class movement.3
In Prussia, close social ties between the senior members of the state administration and 
the military elite seem obvious since the same family names appear frequently among 
senior civil servants as well as among the senior generals.4 Moreover, many civil 
servants and military officers came from families which had been linked to the Prussian 
state for generations; either through the state administration or the army.5 Despite this 
apparent social closeness, recent research questions the degree to which these two 
bureaucratic elites were actually interlinked and suggests that behind the seemingly
1 This point has been particularly emphasised by the adherents of the Sonderweg thesis. Wehler 
(1973) p.237, ibid. (1995) pp.823-825, Stürmer (1970), and Berghahn (1994) p.257-258. This 
fundamental assumption can also be discerned, explicit or implicit, behind most of the interpretations 
of the German-Prussian system. Craig (1955), Messerschmidt (1979; 1980; 1994), Deist (1991), 
Lüdkte (1982), and Funk (1986).
2 Just to mention the most important works on the officer corps and their relationships with the 
prefectoral authority concerning maintenance of order: Ralston (1967) Serman (1982) 59-61; (1994) 
pp.213-216; Jauffret (1983) p.143; Hélie (1994) pp.246-247; Bmneteaux (1996) pp.45-47.
3 Agulhon (1990); Rebérioux (1975); Trempé (1995).
4 Family names such as von Armin, von Below, von Bonin, Bronsart von Schellendorff, von Bülow, 
von Horn, von Kleist, von Manteuffel, von Massow, von Moltke, von Schlichting, von Schlieffen, von 
Wether, von Winterfeld, and von Wolff appear frequently among senior officers, as well as civil 
servants.
5 These patterns are demonstrated by Preradovich (1955) for the senior civil servants and by Hughes 
(1987) concerning the general corps.
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close affiliations between the East Elbian landed nobility and the elites in the state 
administration and the army lay very complex elite structures with strong patterns of 
mutual exclusion. In fact, many of the civil servants and army officers who carried the 
same name belonged to different branches of large noble dynasties of which one 
section was linked to the state administration and another to the army, with little social 
connection between the two.
There can be no doubt about the commitment of civil servants and military 
commanders alike to defend the existing social and political order. It is also worth 
noting, however, that, even if the senior civil servants and the army corps commanders 
shared their commitment to the defence o f the existing order against the contesting 
social and political movements, they did not enter into much practical co-operation. In 
fact, civil-military relations in Westphalia were characterised by a remarkable lack of 
co-operation.6 As representatives of the Prussian state in Westphalia that had only 
been integrated in Prussia by the beginning of the nineteenth century after centuries of 
independence, the senior civil servants and the military commanders belonged to the 
same social milieu in the local community. The met at private parties and were often 
on friendly terms with eachother. However, the social acquaintance between 
successive province governors and army corps commanders did not manifest itself in 
much professional co-operation.
It is equally remarkable to observe that in France, there was a pattern of close co­
operation between the state administration and the army. This is surprising, given the 
fact that between senior civil servants and military commanders, there were few social 
connections, and, furthermore, the members of these bureaucratic elites were also split 
in their political sympathies and their commitment to the Republican regime. Given the 
lack of social link between senior civil servants and army corps commanders in France, 
as well as the latent conflicts between representatives of the state administration and 
the military establishment, one might expect a low degree o f practical interaction to 
have existed between the two. However, the frequent use of troops in Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais - and France generally - compared to the increasingly rare use of troops in
6 See Chapter Nine.
132
Prussia, indicates that the argument o f a direct relationship between social affiliation 
and professional behaviour cannot be sustained.
Scholars working on social conflicts and labour movements tend to see the senior state 
administrators and military commanders as simply belonging to the groups opposed to 
challenges to the existing social, political and economic order, thus including industrial 
elites and their political representatives at the local and national levels.7 The argument 
that the policies implemented by the state administrators were biased towards the 
interests of the industrial elites is true in the sense that any state intervention with state 
forces in labour conflicts was an advantage for the employers against labour 
movements, no matter how much the state authorities claimed to be a neutral agency 
solely concerned with defending public order. A similar logic applies to any state 
intervention in local protest movements which were turned against the elites 
traditionally in charge of local political institutions. However, impossible as it is to 
separate the state's actions from the interests of the local elites - whether political or 
industrial - it is nevertheless important to raise the question o f the extent to which the 
state actions were the result of pressure from these local elites.
This issue is by its very nature difficult to handle, because pressure on state 
representatives by these local elites does not necessarily appear in bureaucratic files, 
personal papers, or published memoirs. There are, however, a series of strong 
indicators, both in the cases of Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais, that point to the 
conclusion that, in both industrial areas, the state administrations had a rather wide 
sphere of discretion and were capable of implementing their policies of using or not 
using military assistance with little consideration to the wishes of local pressure 
groups. Although the policies pursued by the state representatives mostly supported 
the interests of local elites rather than those of the protest movements, it is important 
to note that the decisions taken by the civil servants seemed to be primarily guided by 
considerations of the interest of the state. In cases where these did not coincide with
7 Saul (1974), Tenfelde (1979), Tendfelde & Hohorst (1981), Boll (1989; 1992), Rebérioux (1975), 
Agulhon (1990), Trempé (1995).
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the wishes of local pressure groups, there were few means for the latter to influence 
the state administrators into taking a different course o f action.
This fourth chapter aims to separate the influence o f local pressure groups (private 
companies, elected authorities and deputies) from the policies pursued by the state's 
representatives at the local level (civil servants and military commanders). This analysis 
leads to three conclusions.
•  The first is that the local authorities, in Prussia as well as in France, were almost 
entirely excluded from the question o f use of troops for internal peacekeeping. This 
was a matter dealt with almost entirely by the senior state administrators in co­
operation with the military authorities.
• The second point is that there were almost no direct links between the local 
industrial elites and the military commanders. All practical connections between 
local elites and the military authorities went through the state administration.
• The third conclusion of this chapter is that, when looking at inter-institutional co­
operation, there appears to have been no direct correlation between, the social 
connections between the civil servants and the military commanders, on the one 
hand, and their ability to undertake practical co-operation, on the other.
i
134
4.1. Elite co-operation in Westphalia ?
The issue of elite structures and their impact on the state’s involvement in local 
conflicts has both social and political aspects. From the point of view of appointments, 
the question is whether the senior representatives of the central power were supposed 
to integrate the industrial elites of the Ruhr area into the nation. In the process of 
national integration, one of the functions of the representatives of the central power at 
the regional level was to mediate between Berlin and local forces. In this process, the 
social and geographic origins, as well as the religious affiliations of the representatives 
provide some indication of the degree to which the authorities in Berlin wanted their 
representatives to accommodate to local elites. By sending a certain type of civil 
servant to a certain area, the central authorities could either indicate their particular 
attention to a specific elite group in the province or, conversely, by sending an 
outsider, they could in turn emphasise the independence of the state representative 
from local influence.
The administrative integration of the territories that came to constitute the province of 
Westphalia into the Prussian kingdom was a relatively recent development that had 
taken place after 1815. The province was predominantly Catholic, although there was 
a considerable proportion of Protestants8 particularly among the urban middle class 
and upper bourgeoisie. In contrast, the socially exclusive Westphalian nobility was 
predominantly Catholic.9 Westphalia, as with the Rhineland, was a stronghold of the 
Catholic Centre Party, and had been particularly targeted by the anti-Catholic 
legislation of the years of the Kulturkampf10 Due to the reluctant acceptance by the 
Western provinces of Berlin’s hegemony, the relationship with the central power was 
potentially conflictual.
From this point of view, it is important in the first place to analyse whether the civil 
and military representatives of the central power were themselves part of local society 
or whether they were outsiders. Secondly, linked to the question of the independence
8 Forty-five per cent of the population in 1871. Flora ( 1975).
9 Reif (1979).
10 Blackboum (1993) p.84.
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of state representatives from the industrial elites* is the question of the degree to 
which the state representatives were supposed to match that particular social group.
4.1.1. The social and professional profile of senior state representatives in 
Westphalia
Before addressing the question of whether the province governors were appointed 
with specific regard to their social profile, it is important to stress that, by the end of 
the nineteenth century, the Prussian state administration was a highly professionalised 
corps and that prominent social status was not in itself a key to senior posts in the state 
bureaucracy. Three out of the five civil servants who held the post o f province 
governor in Westphalia between 1871 and 1914, were commoners by birth,11 whereas 
the last two province governors of the pre-war period belonged to the highest levels of 
the aristocracy.12 The civil servants holding the post o f province governor in 
Westphalia all held doctorates in law and pursued long periods of professional training 
and administrative careers before attaining this post. On the other hand, qualities such 
as the ability to establish a fruitful relationship with the local elites is often mentioned 
in the biographies and memoirs of civil servants as one of the reasons for their 
promotion.
Looking at the social and geographic origins, as well as the religious affiliations, of 
Westphalian province governors, it is not possible to single out any particular 
appointment policy. If efforts were made to match the social and religious profile of 
the civil servant to particular elite groups, this priority appears to have changed over 
time. All province governors had close links to the Prussian central authorities in 
Berlin. The first three province governors were the sons of Prussian civil servants, and 
thus belonged to families which were linked for generations to the Prussian state. 
Province Governor von der Recke von der Horst was a former Prussian government
11 Province Governor von Kuhlwetter (1871-1882) was ennobled in 1866; similarly, his successors, 
von Hagenmeister (1882-1889) and von Studt (1889-1899) were both commoners by birth, and the 
latter only obtained Prussian nobility in 1906 after having served six years as minister for 
ecclesiastical affairs and public instruction.
12 Baron von der Recke von der Horst was of ancient Westphalian nobility. Similarly, the last 
province governor before the war, Prince von Ratibor und Corvey, belonged to a royal dynasty and 
was linked by faimily to the Reichs Chancellor, Chlodowig, Prince of Hohenlohe-Schillingfiirst.
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minister and thereby closely linked to the authorities in Berlin, whilst the Province 
Governor von Ratibor und Corvey was linked by family ties to the Reichs Chancellor 
Prince von Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst.
The first province governor, von Kühlwetter (1871-1882) was the only one who came 
close to the profile of the industrial bourgeoisie. He was bom in Düsseldorf, the son of 
a minor civil servant, and was a commoner by birth. He was a Catholic and spent 
almost all his career in Westphalia.13 As a local and a Catholic, it is most likely that he 
was originally chosen for the post in an attempt to mediate between the authorities in 
Berlin and the Westphalian Catholics. How effective this mediation was is difficult to 
say. However, the very fact that he could remain at this post throughout the decade of 
the Kulturkampf - when many other senior civil servants of Catholic confession were 
sacked because of their reluctant implementation of anti-Catholic legislation14 - 
indicates that Kühlwetter belonged to the group of Catholic civil servants who were so 
zealous in showing their loyalty to the government in Berlin that they were prepared to 
estrange themselves from local society. At any rate, the policy of appointing a Catholic 
to Westphalia was abandoned thereafter, since all the province governors of 
Westphalia between 1882 and 1911 were Protestants.
The two following province governors, von Hagenmeister (1883-1889) and von Studt 
(1889-1899), were obviously not meant to fit into any of the local elite groups. Both 
were from the Eastern provinces, bom into families traditionally employed in the civü 
service, and their entire previous careers had been pursued in the Eastern provinces. 
They therefore had no immediate affiliation with the Westphalian industrial 
bourgeoisie.15 Moreover, being both Protestants and commoners by birth, von 
Hagenmeister and Studt were not of a social profile that would particularly ease 
relations with the socially-exclusive Westphalian nobility, although at least Studt was
13 Wegmann (1969) ‘Kühlwetter’.
14 The district governor of Amsberg was obliged to resign in 1875 whilst ten out of eighteen Catholic 
local governors were sacked during the Kulturkampf. Blackboum (1993) p.261.
15 Wegmann (1969) ‘Hagenmeister’ and ‘Studt*. Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin - Dahlem: Konrad 
von Studt ‘Nachlässe, geschäftliche und politische, 1868-1920.* E. Landmann ‘Konrad von Studt. ein 
preussischer Kultusminister. Darstellung seines Lebens und Wirkens' Berlin 1908.
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on very friendly terms with some of the most distinguished members of the 
Westphalian nobility.16
What the three first province governors lacked in terms of social standing, the last two 
province governors had in abundance. Baron von der Recke von der Horst (1899- 
1911), a former Prussian minister of the interior, although a Protestant, belonged to 
the highest Westphalian aristocracy. Similarly, von Ratibor und Corvey, Prince of 
Hohenlohe-Schillingfurst (1911-1918), was a Catholic and came from the western 
state of Baden; in terms of social standing, he was hardly inferior even to the most 
exclusive local nobility.17 It was, these two highly aristocratic province governors who 
were most responsible for implementing the policy of ‘de-militarising’ internal 
peacekeeping, and thus undertook close co-operation with local authorities in co­
ordinating the municipal police and civil state forces, in order to reduce the need for 
military assistance.
On the basis of the social profile of the province governors serving in Westphalia 
between 1871 and 1914, it appears that, after von Kiihlwetter’s death in 1882, there 
was little attempt to match the province governor socially with the Westphalian elites. 
The province governor was intended to be an outsider to local society and thereby an 
independent representative of the central power. After Ktihlwetter, only von der Recke 
von der Horst originated from Westphalia, but he was also a former Prussian 
government minister and, thus, was closely connected to Berlin. The appointment of 
Baron von der Recke von der Horst and Prince von Hohenlohe-Schillingfurst as 
province governor in Westphalia might have been an attempt to ease the relationships 
with the Westphalian nobility. However, it appears that there was no attempt by the 
central government to shape the social profile of senior state administration to fit in 
with that of the industrial magnates of the Ruhr area.
16 Konrad Studt (only ennobled in 1906) participated in the hunting parties of the most distinguished 
members of the Westphalian nobility and was a private friend of Baron von Landsberg-Velen. Both 
have left evidence of their private correspondence. Münster HaStA: Nachlass Landsberg-Velen; 
Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin - Dahlem : Persönliche Nachlässe : Konrad von Studt 1838-1921 (8) 
‘Wirken als Oberpräsident in Münster 1889-1899’ and (10) ‘Ernennung zum Kultusminister: 
Glückwünsche, Herbst 1899’.
17 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l - Rep.89 - No. 13723 ‘Der Oberpräsidenten der 
Provinz Westphalen 1825-1918’.
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4.1.2. The social profile of the army corps commanders compared to local elite 
groups
Having observed that the senior civil servants had no social similarities with the 
industrial magnates, in terms of social and geographical origins or religious affiliations, 
it is not surprising that this was even less the case for senior military commanders. Like 
their civil counterparts, they were outsiders in Westphalia. Among the army corps 
commanders serving in Westphalia between 1871 and 1914, none of them originated 
from the province itself and, although the post was the last promotion before 
retirement, General von Einem was the only one who settled in Westphalia after his 
retirement.18 Conversely, General von Kluck, who originated from Münster, became 
the army corps commander in Posen and later in Königsberg. A similar picture existed 
for religious affiliations. The only Catholic army corps commander in Westphalia was 
Count zu Stolberg-Wemigerode (1871-1882) who, like the Catholic province 
governor von Kühl wetter, served during the decade of unification and Kulturkampf.19 
All following army corps commanders in Westphalia were Lutherans.
As for the noble profile of the army corps commanders, it is worth noting that during 
the Wilhelminian period a significant number of the generals reaching this post were 
commoners by birth,20 although the members of the old Prussian nobility remained the 
single most important group. Among the army corps commanders serving in 
Westphalia, both General von Mikusch and General von Bemhardi were commoners 
by birth while General von Einem was of recent nobility. There does therefore not
18 General von Witzendorff (1882-1888) was bom in Lüneburg and died in Gottingen; von Albedyll 
(1888-1893) was bom in Brandenburg and retired to Potsdam; von Goetze (1893-1898) originated 
from Posen and retired to Hannover; von Mikusch-Buchberg (1898-1900) also originated from Posen 
but retired to Baden; General von Bülow (1900-1901) was bom in and retired to Hannover; von 
Bissing (1901-1907) originated from Silesia; Friedrich von Bemhardi (1907-1909), who spend his 
childhood in Russia, retired to Silesia. Only General von Einem (1909-1913) who originated from 
Braunschweig retired to Westphalia.
19 That they both concluded service in 1882 is a coincidence, as von Kühlwetter died in office.
20 Among the 137 army corps commanders who served between 1871 and 1914, at least twenty were 
commoners by birth; Friedrich von Bemhardi (ennobled in 1901), Karl von Blume (1881), Bethold 
von Deimling (1905), Herman von Eichhorn (1856), Karl von Elsa (1893), Otto von Emmich (1912), 
Eduard von Fransecky and Max von Goetze (1843), Karl von Hânisch (1871), Alexander von Kluck 
(1909), August von Lentze, Victor von Lignitz, von Linde, August von Mackensen (1899), Victor 
Mikusch-Buchberg (1869), Bruno von Mudra (1913), Reinhard von Scheffer-Boyadel, Friedrich von 
Scholtz, August Wilhelm Julius von Seebeck (1871), and Louis Stoetzer (who remained a commoner). 
Another twenty-one were of recent nobility.
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seem to have been attempts by the Mllitaiy Cabinet to appoint the most senior 
representative of the army who were socially similar to the exclusive Westphalian 
nobility.
After the failed policy of integration of the 1870 and 1880s, the Prussian military 
authorities seem to have given up any attempt to appoint general commanders 
according to the local elites. The army corps commanders were very senior 
bureaucrats who obtained this post at the very end of their careers, after having already 
occupied the most influential positions in the central institutions.21 Particularly under 
William II, the appointments of army corps commanders seem to have been conducted 
primarily with consideration to professional qualifications,22 or as a way of getting 
senior generals out o f leading posts in the central institutions in such a way that it 
would look like promotion. This was particularly clear during the attempts by the 
young William II in 1888-1890 to rejuvenate the corps o f generals who were 
occupying the leading military posts in Berlin. Thus, General von Albedyll, then head 
of the military cabinet, was ‘promoted’ to  army corps commander in 1889 in order to  
clear the way for the King’s candidate General von Hahnke.23
Thus, both the senior members of the state administration and the army constituted a 
group of outsiders in the local society in which they were positioned. Similarly, the 
appointment of senior generals to a particular area appears to have been the result of 
political horse-trading among the military leaders in Berlin, rather than due to 
consideration for their possible future relations with the local elites in the province to 
which they were sent.
21 General von Albedyll became army corps commander in 1889 after having occupied the post as 
chief of the military cabinet. General von Waldersee had been chief of the General Staff before being - 
unwillingly - promoted to the garrison in Altona 1892. Paul Bronsart von Schellendorff and Karl von 
Einem were promoted to army corps commander after having served for years as war minister. 
Moreover, nine of the army corps commanders serving between 1871 and 1914 belonged to the royal 
dynasties.
22 The appointment o f von Kluck to Posen and Königsberg can only be seen as an instance of this.
23 At least, this is how the transfer of General von Albedyll to Miinster was perceived by some of his 
colleagues. ‘Aus dem Briefwechsel des General-Feldmarschalls von Waldersee’ l.vol. 
(ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin, 1927 pp.229-230. Letter of 3 March 1889 from General von Loe to General 
von Waldersee. This was also how General von Waldersee saw his own transfer in 1892 from chief of 
the general staff to his new post as army corps commander in Altona. ( ‘Denkwürdigkeiten des 
Generat-Feldmarschalls von Waldersee’ (ed.H.O.Meisner) 1922. vol.2 1888-1900; p.177. Diary of 26 
January 1891.
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4.2. The exclusion of local authorities
The implementation in Prussia of the policy of ‘de-militarisation* of internal 
peacekeeping is in itself a strong indicator that the policy of maintaining public order 
was not primarily shaped according to the needs of the employers. This was despite the 
fact that the state administrators were up against quite powerful forces. The interests 
of heavy industry - in particular coal, iron and steel - were represented by the very 
powerful Central Association of German Manufacturers.24 These national associations 
of employers, established because of the impact of the industrial crisis 1873-1896,25 
were otherwise very successful in their lobbying efforts for state subventions and the 
construction of tariff barriers. Indeed, from the 1880s, they came to play a key role in 
the economic policies o f the German Empire.26 On the other hand, they were not very 
successful in asserting influence over questions concerning the mobilisation of military 
troops in case of major labour conflicts. During the 1889 strike, the powerful 
employers’ association appealed in vain to the government to declare a state of siege, 
although many of the strikebound mines - particularly those in the Saarland - were 
owned and run by the state.27
At the same time, individual mining companies addressed requests to the government 
describing in detail the type of military protection that they considered appropriate. 
After a meeting with representatives from the mining companies, von Baltz, the local 
governor in Gelsenkirchen, sent a letter to the minister of the interior forwarding the 
wishes of the mining companies about changing the previous military dispositions in 
order to obtain permanent military guards at the plants as well as frequent military
24 The Centralverband deutscher Industrieller was founded in 1876. It grew out of a number of 
smaller employers’ associations such as the Union of German Iron and Steel Industrialists (Verein 
Deutscher Eisen- und Stahlindustrieller) founded in 1874, the Union of Mining Interests ( Verein für 
die Bergbaulichen Interessen) founded in 1856, the Bochum Union (Der Bochumer Verein) founded 
in 1874, the Coal Union of the Rhineland and Westphalia (Das Rheinisch-Westfälische 
Kohlensyndikat) founded in 1893, and the Union for the Protection of Common Interests in the 
Rhineland and Westphalia ( Verein für die Wahrung der gemeinschaftlichen Interessen in Rheinland 
und Westfalen).
25 Between 1875 and 1914, the number of employers’ associations and cartels increased from eight to 
more than seven hundred. Wehler (1995) pp.632-633.
26 Wehler ( 1995) pp. 632-640.
27 Spencer (1992) pp.86-87.
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patrols.28 Nothing, however, came of this. Similarly, in 1905 and again in 1912, the 
mining companies appealed to the province governor of Westphalia and directly to the 
government to provide an impressive show of military force.29 Their requests were not 
fulfilled despite their attempts to present the problem of strikes in the mining sector as 
involving the interests and responsibility o f the state.30
4.2.1. Senior civil servants’ perceptions o f  local industrialists
Why did the industrial pressure groups have so little success in their attempts to 
persuade the province and district governors of needs to accommodate the wishes of 
heavy industry? In the first place it is important to note that the members of the 
Prussian administration generally showed a very self-assertive attitude towards local 
elites and locally elected authorities, particularly when these were bourgeois rather
28 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahl ein, H .A .l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2513, 1) Beiheft 2, ‘Die auf die 
Arbeitseinstellungen eingegangenen Telegramme, 1889.’ Letter of 13 May 1889 from the local 
govemor in Gelsenkirchen to the minister of the interior: “Schliesslich bitten die Anwesenden auf 
eine Abänderung der bisherigen militärischen Disposition dahin hinzuwirken, dass die einzelnen 
Zechen ständige Wachen erhalten und die Zugangswege der Arbeiter durch häufige Patrouillen 
gesichert werden, da die Art des bisher gewährten militärischen Schutzes zur Sicherung der zur 
Arbeit bereiten Bergleute nachweislich nicht genügt. Die Zechen sind bereit, die Kosten der 
Quartierung für die ihnen zugewiesenen militärischen Wachen zu übernehmen.”
29 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A 1 - Rep.77 - Titel 2523, 1), ‘Die Arbeitseinstellung in 
den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen 
in dem Jahren 1889-1912’ vol.ll (documents 129-133). Telegram of 19 January 1905 from the 
mining Companies tZechencentrum, to the Ministry of the Interior: “(After a long list of violent 
attacks on plants, strike breakers, and public forces)...wenn solche Zustände nicht für Heranziehung 
von Militär reichen, wissen wir nicht, wann solches überhaupt nötig sein soll.”
Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2523, 1), ‘Die Arbeitseinstellung in 
den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen 
in dem Jahren 1889-1912’ vol.ll (documents 213-214). Letter of 18 January 1905 from the District 
govemor in Münster to the minister of the interior: “Dagegen macht sich bei den 
Bergwerksgesellschaften teilweise eine starke nervöse Erregung bemerkbar. Landral und Erster 
Bürgermeister zu Recklinghausen erhalten briefliche, telefonische und telegraphische Eingaben 
wegen angeblich ungenügenden Schutzes. Mehrere Zechen verlangten militärischen Schutz. Das 
gleiche Ersuchen ist von der Gewerkschaft König Ludwig an den Herrn Oberpräsident und an mich 
gerichtet. Auch die fiskalischen Schächte in Bottrop haben den Amtmann um Requisition von Militär 
angegangen.”
30 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H .A .l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2523, 1), 'Die Arbeitseinstellung in 
den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen 
in dem Jahren 1889-1912’ vol.12 (documents 17-18». Letter of 21 January 1905 from the mining 
Company ‘König Ludwig’ to the district govemor in Münster: “Von dem ablehnenden Bescheid auf 
unser Telegramm vom 17.Januar, nach dem Militär zum Schutze der Arbeitswilligen nicht 
herangezogen werden soll, haben wir mit grossem Bedauern Kenntniss genommen. (...) Wir sind der 
Überzeugung, dass der Staat durch die ungenügende Machtentfaltung im Streikrevier seine eigenen 
vitalsten Interessen schädigt, von den ungeheueren wirtschaftlichen Schäden und dem Elend der 
Arbeiterbevölkerung - auch bei den Arbeitswilligen - was die Folge des Streikes sein wird, nicht zu 
reden."
142
than traditional landed nobility.31 As civil servants appointed by the minister of the 
interior and only responsible to the government in Berlin, Prussian civil servants were 
generally very conscious and jealous in guarding their positions and wished to 
demonstrate that they were independent from private, and in particular, capital 
interests. Thus senior civil servants usually showed a reluctant attitude towards direct 
pressure from business and industrial elites or horn local authorities controlled by these 
notables.32
Moreover, when comparing the attitude of the senior civil servants of the years before 
the great miners’ strike of 1889 with the attitude of bureaucrats from the period after 
the turn of the century, it appears that the state administration tended to increasingly 
distinguish its views from the claims of industrialists. In 1889, the predominant attitude 
among the civil servants was that strikes were unacceptable and that a forceful 
response to any form of public disturbance was the only appropriate way of dealing 
with them. On the other hand, the 1889 strike was also the first conflict in which 
certain civil servants began to doubt the justification of the employers’ continued 
refusal to negotiate with workers. For instance, the district governor in Düsseldorf, 
von Berlepsch, expressed his frustration about the intransigent attitude of mine- 
owners,33 even if such civil servants constituted a minority among the Westphalian 
senior civil servants. It was not that the rejection of anything that smacked of Social 
Democratism or even unionisation became less vigorous. It was rather that an element 
o f criticism developed of the private companies for being irresponsible in their 
provocation of labour confrontations. Similarly, a certain bittemess can be discerned in 
von Berlepsch’s account of private companies and their pursuit o f particular interests 
that put public order at risk and exposed the entire community to the threat of violent 
clashes.34
31 Bom talks about the professional arrogance of the state bureaucrats, who served the king compared 
to self-interested ‘merchants’. Bom (19S7) p.82.
32 About the self-perception of the Prussian civil servants, see Bom (1957) p.82-84 and Henning 
(1987) p.141-144.
33 Dr. Hans Freiherr von Berlepsch *Sozialpolitische Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen’ Mönchen- 
Gladbach: Volksvereins-Verlag, 1925, pp. 19-20.
34 Dr. Hans Freiherr von Berlepsch ‘Sozialpolitische Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen' Mönchen- 
Gladbach: Volksvereins-Verlag, 1925, p.25.
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Similar considerations emerged on the occasion of the miners* strike of 1905, when 
reports from the province and district governors to the Ministry of the Interior showed 
the exasperation with companies whose actions deliberately obstructed the police 
measures that were being taken by the state administration.35 Confronted with 
demands for military intervention in 1905, the state administration was not impressed, 
and decided that it intended to keep the use of troops under its strict control.36 In their 
justifications to the Ministry of the Interior for not yielding to the pressure from the 
mining companies, senior civil servants indicated that they were not duped about the 
motives behind the descriptions of widespread violence and riots put forward by the 
mining companies.37 Moreover, the state administrators bluntly described the claims of
35 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H .A .l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2523, 1), ‘Die Arbeitseinstellung in 
den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen 
in dem Jahren 1889-1912’ vol.12 (documents 2-3). Letter of 23 January 1905 from the district 
govemor in Münster to the minister of the interior: “Dass in diesem Vorgehen System liegt, bitte ich 
aus der folgenden, mit allerdings nur vertraulich übermittelten Äusserung eines Werkdirektors zu 
entnehmen: Auf die ihnen gemeldeten zahlreichen Ausschreitungen hin, müssten die Behörden zur 
Feststellung des Tatbestandes einen Teil ihrer Sicherheitsmannschaften verwenden. Dadurch würden 
diese ihrem Dienste entzogen und es reiche dann, wenn etwas vorkomme, die Sicherheitsmannschaft 
nicht aus und das erbringe dann naturgemäss den Beweis der Notwendigkeit militärischer Schutzes.”
36 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H .A .l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2523, 1), ‘Die Arbeitseinstellung in 
den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunmhen 
in dem Jahren 1889-1912’ vol.12 (documents 19-20). Letter of 23 January 1905 from the district 
govemor in Münster to the mining Company König Ludwig: “Bei dieser Sachlage vermag ich aus 
Ihrer Eingabe keine genügende Veranlassung zu entnehmen, eine so überaus schwerwiegende, 
äusserste Massregel wie sie die Heranziehung militärischer Kräfte bedeuten würde, an massgebender 
Stelle anzuregen. Auf die allgemeinen Ausführungen über die Aufgaben und die Wahrung der 
Interessen der Staatsregierung einzugehen, muss ich mir versagen.”
37 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H .A .l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2523, 1), ‘Die Arbeitseinstellung in 
den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen 
in dem Jahren 1889-1912’ vol.ll (documents 213-214). Letter of 18 January 1905 from the District 
govemor in Münster to the minister of the interior: “Die Schilderungen, die die Zechenbesitzer geben, 
um die Notwendigkeit der Heranziehung von Militär zu begründen, sind wie der Landrat durch 
sofortige Vernehmung dabei gewesener Polizeibeamten und Gendarmen feststellte, sehr übertrieben. 
(...) Das Betreben der Zechen, sofort Militär zu erhalten ist auch aus taktischen Gründen zu erklären. 
Ihre Lage im Streit mit den Arbeitern würde durch noch stärkeren (militärischen) Schutz sehr 
gestärkt werden. Aber auf der einen Seite würde man sehr grosse Aufgebote von Truppen nötig 
haben, um das durchzusetzen und ausserdem würde die Stimmung der Arbeiter vorzeitig erbittert, 
während sie das jetzt noch nicht zu sein scheint. Es kann nicht fehlen dass die Massen in der 
Herbeiholung von Truppen eine Parteinahme für die Zechen sehen würden.”
Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H .A.l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2523, 1), ‘Die Arbeitseinstellung in 
den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen 
in dem Jahren 1889-1912’ vol.ll (document 185). Telegram of 19 January 1905 from the district 
govemor in Düsseldorf to the minister of the interior: “Nach den bisher angestellten Ermittelungen 
sind die nach den Angaben des Bergbaulichen Vereins im hiesigen Bezirk vorgekommenen 
Ausschreitungen und Misshandlungen unerheblicher Natur gewesen, so dass aus ihnen das Bedürfnis 
der Heranziehung von Militär nicht hergeleitet werden kann.”
Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2523, 1), ‘Die Arbeitseinstellung in 
den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen 
in dem Jahren 1889-1912’ vol.ll (documents 269-271). Letter of 20 February 1905 from the district
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the mining companies as irresponsible and their demands for forces as highly 
unrealistic.38 At the same time, senior civil servants, in contrast to the mining 
companies, accepted the authority of the trade unions over workers and the possibility 
that the strike could pass without incidents of serious unrest.39
The state administrators had several reasons for ensuring a certain distance between 
themselves and the pressures by the industrialists and their associations for crackdowns 
on workers whenever they went on strike. A certain sympathy and understanding of 
the workers* complaints can be traced in the correspondence between the state 
administrators and the Ministry of the Interior. The claims of workers were sometimes 
recognised as reasonable and justified, despite the strong aversion of the state 
administration to the Social Democratic movement. Similarly, a certain recognition of 
workers’ organisations developed, especially of those who held a mandate from 
workers to negotiate on their behalf. At the same time, the state administration once 
again insisted that it was primarily the responsibility of the private companies to 
finance private security forces and to pay for expenses in the case of a military 
intervention.40
govemor in Münster to the minister of the intcrior: “Als charakteristisches Beispiel, wie einzelne 
Zechendirektoren das Heranziehen von Militär zu erzwingen suchen , teilte der Landrat mir folgendes 
mit: In der gestrigen (19.Jan.) Versammlung wurde die Frage erörtert, ob und wieweit an den 
demnächstigen Lohnzahlungstagen die Wirtschaften zu schliessen seien. Da habe ein Zechendirektor 
unumwunden erklärt an sich sei es ja  vemüftiger, die Kneipen zu schliessen. Er sei aber für 
Nichtschliessen. Dann ‘besoffen sich die Kerle’ und beginnen Ausschreitungen, es flösse vielleicht 
auch Blut. Dann müsste das Militär kommen.”
38 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2523, 1), ‘Die Arbeitseinstellung in 
den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen 
in dem Jahren 1889-1912’ vol.l 1 (documents 269-271). Letter of 20 February 1905 from the district 
govemor in Münster to the minister of the interior: “Bei diesen Erörterungen, ist in der Versammlung 
auch die Frage aufgeworfen, wie sich die Zechen dann eigentlich das Heranziehen von Militär 
dächten und in welcher Stärke es nach ihrer Meinung nötig sei. Darauf wurde übereinstimmend 
geantwortet, dass für jede Schachtanlage eine Kompagnie für unbedingt erforderlich erachtet und 
beansprucht werde. Bei 23 ausständigen Anlagen wurde das allein im Landkreise Recklinghausen 2 
Regimenter Infanterie ausmachen und wenn man berücksichtigt, dass die Rekruten bei dieser 
Gelegenheit nicht wohl verwendet werden dürfen käme man auf drei bis vier Regimenter.“
39 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2523,1), ‘Die Arbeitseinstellung in 
den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen 
in dem Jahren 1889-1912’ vol.l 1 (documents 269-271). Letter of 20 February 1905 from the district 
govemor in Münster to the minister of the interior: “Die mir heute zahlreich vorliegenden 
Versammlungsberichte zeigen übereinstimmend von allen Rednern aller Parteien die strenge 
Mahnung an die Versammelten, sich von Ausschreitungen femzuhalten; sie dürften den Gendarmen 
und der Polizei nichts zu tun geben insbesondere aber dürfe es unter keinen Umständen dazu 
kommen, dass Militär herangezogen werde.”
40 Jessen (1991) pp. 142-144.
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It is important to emphasise that, no matter how inclined the state authorities were to 
support the interests of the employers against the workers, the state administration saw 
itself as a neutral force in labour disputes. Similarly, in order to perform a role as 
arbitrator between the employers and employees, it was crucial that the state 
administration appeared as a relatively neutral force to the workers and not the 
instrument of capital.41
4.2.2. The administrative abolition o f the local authorities’ right to requisition
Prussian civil servants, as well as their French counterparts, had a tradition of 
underlining their independence from the military authorities. During the reform era at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Prussian state administration had claimed 
its independence by contesting military commanders* right to interfere in civilian 
affairs.42 43Throughout the first half o f the nineteenth century, the state administration 
complained that the military authorities were functioning as a co-executive 
{Mitregiment).^ The tendency of the military to interfere in civilian matters changed 
during the Imperial period as the army became increasingly isolationist and the 
distinction between the civil and military administrations became more clear-cut and 
respected by both sides.
From the point of view of the military commanders, relationships with the state 
administration had two main features. On the one hand, the attitude of the military 
commanders towards the state administrators at the lower ranks was arrogant and 
dismissive, in particular when it came to demands concerning military assistance.44
41 For a further analysis of the attempted neutrality of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior and stale 
administration during the 1905 sinke, see Bom (1957) pp. 184-185.
42 Funk (1986) p.30.
43 Lüdtke (1982) pp.291-293; Funk (1986) p.47.
44 During the great miners’ strike 1889, General von Albedyll wrote to Waldersee: “In Berlin müssen 
sich durch das Geschrei der zum grossen Teil elenden Zivilbehörden und der Industriellen 
Auffassungen zur Geltung gebracht haben, die in der Tat nur der Angst der Betreffenden, keineswegs 
aber der wirklichen Sachlage entsprechen. Ich bekomme fast alle zehn Minuten ein Telegramm, 
worin der Umsturz aller Dinge erklärt wird, wenn nicht sofort militärische Hilfe komme, und es ist 
noch absolut gar nichts geschehen, was einer Eigentumsbeschädigung auch nur ähnlich sähe.(...) 
Wohl aber habe ich einen Landrat in Gelsenkirchen gesehen, der ein solches Rindvieh ist, dass er 
allein eine Revolution herbeiführen kann.(...) Ich kann allerdings nicht jedem Regierungspräsidenten
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Military commanders typically complained that the civil authorities were too soft,45 
obsessed with concerns for citizens’ rights and inhibited by questions of the legality of 
their actions.46 Although the requisitions were grudingly followed, the remarks from 
the military commanders were often that the state administration exaggerated problems 
and that there was no real threat of serious trouble.47
The province and district governors never succeeded in obtaining formal recognition 
that requisitions for military assistance were to pass through them. However, if the 
state administration in Westphalia failed in its attempt to formally concentrate decision 
making at the regional level, the military authority did the job. During the conflicts of 
the 1890s, there are still examples of mayors addressing their requisitions directly to a 
local commander instead of passing through the province or district governor.48 This 
procedure was effectively stopped by army corps commanders who increasingly 
insisted on their authority to command, and forbade their subordinate commanders 
from mobilising troops without an explicit order from a higher military authority.
und jedem Zechenbesitzer Ruhe in seinen Grenzen versprechen, denn dazu würde eine Kompagnie 
vor jeder Schlafstubentür noch nicht ausreichen.” Letter of 11 March 1889 from General von Albedyll 
to General von Waldersee ‘Aus dem Briefwechsel des General-Feldmarschalls von Waldersee’ 1 vol. 
(ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin, 1927 pp.288-289.
45 Thus, General von Deimling, in his justification of the Zabern affair in 1913, also refers to the 
incompetence and lack of energy of the state administration in Zabem, since they failed to provide 
sufficient police and gendarmerie to deal with the anti-military demonstrations. Berthold von 
Deimling ‘Aus der Alten in die neue Zeit’ Berlin: Im Verlag Ullstein, 1930 p.I47. The word 
‘energetic’ was a favourite term in the military correspondence and is closely linked to the importance 
of impressing and asserting respect for the public authorities and for the army in particular.
46 Moreover, certain generals expressed very little respect for the legal distribution of authority 
between the state administration and military authorities. Most famously, General von Waldersee, in 
his capacity as army corps commander in Altona, declared his willingness to take action against the 
Social Democrats into his own hands, with or without the consent of the Hamburg civil 
administration: “Ich will mich nunmehr gründlicher mit dem Treiben der Sozialdemokratie befassen. 
Wie mir scheint, macht es den Zivilbehörden wenig Freude, wenn der Kommandierende General sich 
um so etwas kümmert. Es soll mir dies aber gleichgültig sein; ich tue meine Pflicht. Wird es Ernst, so 
liegt doch alles in meiner Hand...” ‘Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls von Waldersee’ 
(ed. H.O.Meisner) vol.2, 1922. p.200. Diary of 15 March 1891. Similarly, the Zabern affair of 1913 
demonstrated several examples of the complete disregard shown by certain officers to the civil 
authorities. (See Chapter Three). The tense relationship between the army and the local 
administrarion in Alsace-Lorraine, however, was notorious and cannot be taken as being 
representative of civil-military relations within the Prussian territory.
47 On the occasion of the May Day demonstrations in 1890, General von Loe, army corps commander 
in Koblenz and thus responsible for parts of the industrial area around the River Ruhr, complained to 
General Waldersee about being misused by the state administration and by the mayors of the larger 
cities, who al) requested military protection. Letter of 24 April 1890 ‘Aus dem Briefwechsel des 
General-Feldmarschalls von Waldersee* vol.l (ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin, 1927 pp.367-368.
48 Jessen (1991) pp. 133-134.
147
If the state administration and the military command did agree about one thing, it was 
to keep the locally elected authorities out of matters concerning the use of military 
troops. Both General von Albedyll and, in particular, General von Bissing, were 
disinclined to let local police commissioners have access to requisition of military 
troops. In a letter to General von Waldersee during the miners* strike of 1889, General 
von Albedyll repeatedly expressed his doubts about the ability of the local authorities 
to judge the seriousness of a situation, and complained about the inaccurate and 
exaggerated descriptions he received from anxious mayors and police masters.49 
General von Bissing also made this point when, in 1904, the province governor 
suggested they should decide in advance to which garrison commander a local 
governor or police chief should address his requisitions in the case of an extreme 
urgency.50 General von Bissing objected that allowing local authorities to address 
requisition directly to a garrison commander was a blow to the authority of the army 
corps commander.51 It became then the general procedure that, if a local military 
commander received a requisition from a local authority, he then needed to ask the 
army corps commander for permission to mobilise. The army corps commander would 
then contact the province governor to check the seriousness of the case and the 
appropriateness of intervening with military troops.
The second aspect of the administrative exclusion of local authorities was through the 
definition of powers. Although the elected mayors and local police authorities had 
previously been considered legally empowered to issue a requisition, these rights 
became the object of some discussion within the state administration in 1904-1905. 
The argument put forward was that the local authorities could not be trusted to call for 
military assistance, because it was feared that in a situation where many strikes broke
49 ‘Aus dem Briefwechsel des General-Feldmarschalls von Waldersee’ 1 vol. (ed.H.O.Meisner) 
Berlin, 1927 pp.288-289. Letter of 11 May 1889.
50 See Chapter Nine.
51 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und 
Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’ (document 71). Letter of 6 April 1906 from General 
von Bissing to the Province Governor of Westphalia: “Abgesehen davon, dass gegen die praktische 
Durchführbarkeit des Vorschlags erhebliche Bedenken bestehen, widerspricht der Gedanke auch 
durchaus meinen Grundsätzen, wonach ich als kommandierender General jederzeit die Verfügung 
über die Truppen des Armeekorps in der Hand behalten muss, um sie nach meinem Willen dort 
einzusetzen, wo es im einzelnen Falle erforderlich werden sollte.”
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out in different localities, such a procedure of requisitioning could only lead to chaos. 
Thus, requisitions needed to be co-ordinated by higher authorities. Accordingly, the 
municipal police authorities were stripped of their right to call for troops, by defining 
the ‘county police authorities’ (Kreispolizeibehôrden) not as the individual police 
organisation but as their superior authority, that is either a mayor or the local 
governor.52 Furthermore, this interpretation also stated that the right of mayors and 
local governors to call for troops would have to be restricted to cases of extreme 
urgency.53 In this view, the state administration was fully supported by the military 
authorities.54
The result of these administrative adjustments was a de facto transfer of authority from 
the local to the regional level. Only during the short periods when there was a general 
mobilisation of troops within a county or district was there direct communication 
between the local authorities and the military commander sent to the area. Increasingly 
after the turn of the century, communication between the civil authorities at all levels 
and the military authorities went through the province governor and the senior military 
commander.
4.2.3. The question of financial responsibility
During the first half of the century, when local authorities were most often under the 
control of the same notables who were object of popular protest movements, this had a 
significant influence on the measures taken against public disorder, including the 
requisition of military troops.55 Until the early 1890s, there was strong pressure from 
local authorities and private citizens to call for military assistance in order to put down
52 Münster HaStA, OP 6896. Letter of 4 October 1904 from the district governor in Arnsberg to the 
province governor in Münster (documents 46-50): “...unter dem Ausdrucke ‘die einzelnen 
Kreispolizei-behörden* nicht die einzelnen Polizeibehörden der Kreise, sondern die Landrätc und die 
Bürgermeister zu verstehen”
53 Münster HaStA, OP 6896. Letter of 4 October 1904 from the district governor in Arnsberg to the 
province governor in Münster (documents 46-50): “Aber auch das Recht der Landrate und der 
Bürgermeister der Stadtkreise auf selbständige Requisition muss auf den Fall der äussersten Not 
beschränkt bleiben.”
54 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und 
Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929.’ Letter of 6 April 1906 from General von Bissing to 
the prxovince governor in Münster.
55 Lüdtke (1982) p.285, Spencer (1985) pp.305-306.
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strikes and public disorder. However, when labour conflicts became more extended, 
more organised and more effective, the pressure on the state administration and the 
military authorities to provide a significant display of force against strikers and public 
unrest became much less direct. The most obvious reason for this change was the 
question of financing military interventions.
In principle, the expenses of a militaiy intervention were to be covered by the local 
community or private person who had asked for protection. Of course, the 
management of a factory or a mining company could not itself issue a requisition, but, 
when asking any authority to call for police or military forces from outside the local 
community, the private company took upon itself the responsibility for covering the 
expenses incurred. In times when instances of public disorder could be managed with a 
limited number of men mobilised for a few days, these calls for military assistance were 
still within the financial reach of smaller communities, as well as of small and medium­
sized industries. However, as labour conflicts became more extended and thus required 
a considerable number of forces for a conflict that could last for weeks or months, 
costs could soon exceed the financial capacities of smaller and medium-sized 
industries. Therefore, after 1889, the call for military intervention was seldom directly 
expressed by private companies, except for industries supported by financially 
powerful organisations, such as mining and heavy industry. Smaller private companies 
generally addressed their demands for protection to local authorities without specifying 
the type of force that they needed, whilst stressing that the potential for violence 
among the strikers was great and that the situation was uncontrollable, thus trying to 
influence the local authority to request military assistance at its own expense.
The local authorities were in a similar situation. If they issued a requisition, the 
community would then have to carry the costs of military intervention. Any mayor who 
wanted to be re-elected would think twice before taking a step that would weigh 
heavily on the municipal budget for years to come, especially if it was only an issue 
that concerned a minority of the electorate. If, on the other hand, a requisition for 
military intervention was finally issued by the state administration, there was always the 
possibility of negotiating for the state to take over at least some of the costs. As an
alternative to military intervention, the municipal police forces were extended at the 
expense of the local communities, whilst private companies built up their own security 
corps to protect material against attacks in case of a strike.56 However, as shown 
above, the civil forces were permanently understaffed and faced difficulties of 
preventing violent actions and attacks on material to take place.
For the state administration, this meant that, after 1889, requisitions from private 
companies and local authorities for it to call for military intervention became less 
frequent, and generally more hesitant than they had been previously.57 Pressure 
remained, however, for military intervention in conflicts in the mining industry, partly 
because it was the sector with the greatest potential for violence, partly because the 
mining industry was in a position to carry the costs - if necessary - o f a longer military 
intervention.
4.3. The social acquaintances of senior administrators and military 
commanders and the exclusion of industrial magnates
4.3.1. Who associated with whom? Patterns of social acquaintance
In addition to the prejudices of civil servants against private companies, industrialists 
seemed to have had little informal access to senior civil servants or to senior military 
commanders. The question of informal connections between senior civil servants and 
industrial elites is difficult to demonstrate. However, within local society, the province 
and district governors, just like the senior military commanders, belonged to a social 
milieu from which the industrial bourgeoisie was virtually excluded. At the same time, 
studies of Rhineland-Westphalian industrialists all emphasise the social separation of
56 Sec Chapter Two.
57 On 12 March 1912, the day before the military intervention, the Westphalian Diet, under the 
presidency of Frhr.von Landsberg-Velen, sent a petition to the minister of the interior, urging the 
government to intervene in order to protect employers and employees from being threatened to stop 
working. However, instead of directly mentioning military intervention, the Diet simply asked that all 
necessary measures were taken to protect the strike breakers. The hint was hardly to be 
misunderstood. Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l - Rep,77 - Titel 2523, 1), ‘Die 
Arbeitseinstellung in den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westphalen und die daraus 
hervorgegangenen Arbeitemnruhen in dem Jahren 1889-1912’ vol. 17 (document 14),
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the industrial magnates and wealthy businessmen from the other local elite groups.58 
Kaudelka-Hanisch’s recent study reaches the same conclusion in relation to 
businessmen holding a semi-official status.59 Apart from the Krupp family, hardly any 
of the heavy industrialists o f the Rhineland-Westphalia area enjoyed persona] 
friendships with civil servants or military officers.60 A similar degree of separation 
appears to have existed between the industrialists and the landed nobility,61 whereas 
among themselves businessmen and industrialists seemed to have very close social 
ties.62
In principle, the province governor belonged to the stratum where senior state officials, 
members of the royal houses and the noble elites could all meet at dinner parties, 
private balls and other celebrations 63 On the basis of the available memoirs on these 
milieus, it is easier to defme who was considered an appropriate social acquaintance
58 Toni Pierenkemper ‘Die westfälischen Schwerindustriellen 1852-1913: Soziale Struktur und 
unternehmerischer Erfolg’ Göttingen 1979; Hans-Jürgen Teuteberg 'Westfälische Textiluntemehmer 
in der Industrialisierung. Sozialer Status und betriebliches Verhalten im 19Jahrhundert' Dortmund 
1980; Friedrich Zunkel ‘Der Rheinisch-Westfälische Unternehmer' Köln 1962.
59 Kaudelka-Hanisch (1993) pp.89-90.
60 Augustine (1993) p.69.
61 The other munitions manufacturing magnat, Heinrich Ehrhardt, received frequent visits from the 
Duke of Saxe-Coburg Gotha, but such social contacts with the landed nobility were highly exceptional 
among the Rheinish-Westphalian heavy industrialists. (Augustine (1993) p.72). Members of the 
Rhineland nobility was often invited by the Krupps to the balls at Villa Hügel, but such invitations 
were normally declined. Augustine (1993) p.69.
62 Kaudelka-Hanisch (1993) p.89; Augustine (1993) p.69.
63 Province or district governors and army corps commanders - by virtue of their capacity as 
representatives of the Prussian state in the province - were considered to be socially appropriate 
acquaintances for even the highest local nobility, and, if relevant, for social interchange with members 
of the minor royal houses. The degree to which this was accepted by the local noble families seem to 
have varied greatly from one province to another. The distinction was particularly significant between 
the nobility in the Eastern and Western provinces, and even varying between the Westphalian nobility 
and the noble elites of the neighbour provinces. Nevertheless, guest lists, table plans, and 
congratulation cards show that even in areas with the most socially exclusive local nobility, there was 
some degree of social interchange between the province governor, the army corps commander and the 
members of the local aristocracy. A particularly illustrating example of social acceptance by an 
otherwise exclusive noble elite is the well documented case of General von Kluck, during his 
command in the Eastern provinces of Silesia (Breslau), Posen and East-Prussia (Königsberg). Even 
before being ennobled, General (von) Kluck frequented the houses of the Prince of Saxe-Meiningen, 
with whom he used to play whist. He joined in the private birthday parties of members of the Silesian 
noble class and, in Königsberg, he received guests such as Prince Dohna, Count Dönhoff- 
Friedrichstein and Count Dohna-Waldburg. Among the guests at the same dinner parties also appear 
the senior members of the state administration. Alexander von Kluck 'Wanderjahre - Kriege - 
Gestalten' Berlin: Verlag R.Eisenschmidt 1929 p.105; Dr. Eugen Wölbe 'Alexander von Kluck' 
Verlag Otto Spanier, Leipzig 1917; pp.71-72. Military Archive, Freiburg, N/550, Personal Papers of 
General von Kluck.
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for militaiy commanders, than it is for senior civil servants, who were supposed to 
have professional contact with several important groups. However, the social 
boundaries around military commanders give a good indication of the inclusion and 
exclusion of social groups within these particular milieus at the provincial level.
4.3.2. Military commanders and the local ‘milieus*
Like the state administration, the military authorities - not surprisingly given the 
general condescending attitude of the Prussian officer corps towards civilians - 
displayed a dismissive attitude towards the interests of local authorities and 
industrialists as a ‘bunch of bourgeois merchants*. The militaiy commanders tended to 
be isolationists in the local community. In particular, the generals of the older 
generation who served under William I were very reluctant about appearing in public, 
o r even addressing, a non-military public,64 although conventions obliged the general 
commander to participate in the public celebrations of the regime, as the representative 
o f the army and of the monarch.65
In principle, the general commanders were given - or at least took upon themselves - 
the task of making contact with local elites and other influential groups in order to 
persuade these groups to accept the Imperial regime. Many army corps commanders 
seemed to attribute a great deal of importance to the so-called ‘cultural mission* which 
was being pursued with different degrees of success from the foundation of the 
German Empire up to the out-break of the First World War. Thus, relations with local 
elites are a general theme in the memoirs and biographies of general commanders.66 
Similar attempts can be observed in the case of Westphalia.
64 Demeter (1965) p.168.
65 At the King’s birthday and at the Sedan Day, the general commander would appear in public 
together with the other representatives of the state and of the local authorities (the province governor, 
the senior magistrate, the mayor).
66 This also relates to Genral von Kluck when he was promoted to headmaster at the Military 
Academy in Baden in 1888. “Dieser neuen Anstalt konnte er den Stempel seines Geistes aufdrücken. 
‘Sie haben eine Kulturaufgabe zu lösen’, so hatte der ritterliche Grossherzog Friedrich 1 von Baden 
bei einer ihm in Karlsruhe gewährten Vorstellung die Bedeutung dieses neuen Amtes gekennzeichnet. 
In der Tat: die Anstalt sollte inmitten einer vielfach noch französisch denkenden und französisch 
empfindenden Bevölkerung einen Hort des Deutschtums darstellen." Similarly, when he was moved 
to Ostmark in 1898. “Hier wie dort (Baden) galt es, eine Kulturmission zu erfüllen: der Offizier, 
zumal der Kommandeur eines Regiments, bedeutet in der Ostmark einen Bannerträger des 
Deutschtums inmitten einer Bevölkerung vielfach slavischen Stammens.” Dr.Eugen Wölbe
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In 1889, General von Albedyll, who had just been moved to the post of army corps 
commander in Münster, endeavoured to create a good relationship with the 
predominantly Catholic nobility in Westphalia, whose enthusiasm for the Prussians was 
particularly limited. On the other hand, he saw the industrial magnates as people who 
were to be carefully watched and tamed.* 67 Later, General von Bemhardi68 and General 
von Einem indicated similar patterns of social links in Münster.69
The ‘cultural mission* and ‘duty of military representation’ could only take place 
within the boundaries of strong conventions surrounding the social acquaintance of a 
senior military commander and the strict rules for appropriate behaviour in public.70 
From the descriptions in the generals' memoirs, it appears that the groups which the 
military commanders perceived as the ‘local elites' and who were appropriate for his 
acquaintance, primarily consisted of three categories. In the first place, social 
acquaintances with the province governor were almost compulsory and were attributed
‘Alexander von Kluck' Verlag Otto Spamer, Leipzig 1917 p.48; pp.66-67. Similarly, General von 
Deimling mention bis frustrated attempts to establish contacts to the local elites in Mulhouse. Bertold 
von Deimling ‘Aus der Alten in die neue Zeit ’ Berlin : Im Verlag Ullstein, 1930 p.130.
67 “(About General von Albedyll, army corps commander in Münster)... Er ist höchst zufrieden in 
seiner Stellung und hat es verstanden, dieselbe in der Stadt und der Provinz, ganz besonders dem 
westfälischen Adel gegenüber, zu einer ausnahmsweise vortrefflichen zu machen.(...) Er macht mit 
den bockbeinigsten Magnaten was er will. Davon habe ich mich bei meinem kurzen Aufenhalte 
überzeugt." Alfred von Waldersee ‘Aus dem Briefwechsel des Ceneral-Feldmarschalls von 
Watdersee’ 1 vol. (ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin, 1927 pp.229-230. Letter of 3 March 1889 from General 
Loe to General von Waldersee.
68 General von Bemhardi 'Denkwürdigkeiten aus meinem Leben ’ Berlin 1912 Berlin : E.S.Miltler & 
Sohn, 1927 p.299.
69 “Neben dieser rein militärischen Tätigkeit hatte der Kommandierende General sodan die Pflicht 
die Garnisonen seines Korpsbereiches kennezulemen, sich über die Bevölkerung zu unterrichten und 
für ein reibungsloses Zusammenarbeiten der Militär- und Zivilbehörden Sorge zu tragen...Für den 
Kommandierende General spielte die Geselligkeit eine grosse Rolle, denn er musste repräsentieren. In 
Münster nahm die Repräsentation einen breiten Raum ein, einmal, weil es eine grosse Garnison und 
viele Behörden hatte, Daneben trat gänzlich der sogenante Damenklub hervor, der den ganzen 
westfälischen und einen Teil des rheinischen Adels umfasste. Wir haben uns mit grosser Freude 
dieser Pflicht hingegeben. Die schönen Feste des Damenklubs stehen bei mir in der angenehmsten 
Erinnerung" General von Einem ‘Erinnerungen eines Soldaten 1853-1933’ Leipzig, Verlag von 
K.F.Koehler 1933 pp. 167-168.
70 For instance, the unconventional and eccentric General von der Goltz shocked better society simply 
by going shopping with his wife in Königsberg: “Bereits sein erstes Auftreten in Königsberg lenkte 
die Aufmerksamkeit auf ihn. War es den Königsbergem schon ein völlig ungewohnter Anblick, den 
Kommandierenden (General) mit seiner Gemahlin am Arm in der Stadt Einkäufe machen zu sehen, 
so steigerte sich die Beliebtheit, als er sofort Beziehungen zu den besten Kreisen der Stadt aufnahm.” 
Georg Körting (Unpublished memoirs about General von der Goltz in Königsberg) p.4, Military 
Archive, Freiburg, N 80/18, personal papers of Colmar von der Goltz.
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a great deal of importance. Similarly, the military commanders of the smaller garrisons 
were expected to have social links with the senior civil servant in the area.71 In the 
memoirs and biographies of former army corps commanders, the excellent relationship 
with the province governor is a theme which is very often dwelt upon. The province 
governor, who is almost invariably described as an excellent and highly cultivated man, 
is often the only member of the local community who enjoys a separate mention in the 
generals* autobiographies.72
In the wider circle of acquaintances figured the most important members of the local 
nobility,73 and - if relevant - members of the royal dynasties.74 At the same level,
71 “Interessant durch ihre Vielseitigkeit erschien die Strassburger Gesellschaft. Sie setzte sich nicht, 
wie in andern Garnisonen, nur aus Offiziers- und Beamtenkreisen zusammen, auch die Professoren 
der neu aufgeblühten Kaiser-Wilhelms-Universität mit ihren Damen nahmen daran Teil, und 
manchen leuchtenden Stern der Wissenschaft durfte man in der Nähe bewundern." Walther von 
Bremen ‘Denkwürdigkeiten des Preussischen Generals der Infanterie Eduard von Fransecky’ 
Bielefeld, Leipzig: Velhagen & Klasig, 1901 p.571.
72 “Mit dem Oberpräsident, Wirklichen Gcheimesn Rat Dr.von Nasse, verkehrte er (General von 
Deines) als kommandierender General in Koblenz in freundlichster und freundschaftlichster Weise" 
E.von Witzleben ‘Adolf von Deines. Lebensbild 1845-1911' Berlin: Verlag der Liebelschen 
Buchhandelung, 1913 p.264.
"Oberpräsident war Seiner Exzellenz Graf von Zedlitz und Trützscher, ein herrlicher Mann, ein 
Oberpräsident, wie ihn Schlesien lange nicht gehabt hat. Es wareine Freude, gleichzeitig mit ihm in 
oberster Stellung zu stehen." Bruno Clemenz ‘General-Feldmarschal von Woyrsch und seine 
Schlesier. Eigenhändige Auszüge aus seinem Kriegestagebuch’ Berlin: Carl Flemming, 1919, p.40. 
“Mit dem Oberpräsidenten Prinz Karl von Ratibor und Corvey ergab sich eine vortreffliche 
Zusammenarbeit. Wir sind bis zu seinem Tode im Jahre 1931 Freunde gewesen. (...) Prinz Ratibor 
war ein edler Mensch, den jeder gern hatte, seine Untergebenen, die ganze Münsteraner Gesellschaft 
und alle Kreise der grossen, so wichtigen Provinz. Wo er helfen konnte, tat er es mit ehrlicher Freude 
und grösstem Wohlwollen. Seine hervorstechendste Charaktereigenschaft war nicht die Energie, 
sondern die Hilfsbereitschaft." Karl von Einem 'Erinnerungen eines Soldaten 1853-1933' Leipzig, 
Verlag von K.F.Koeh!er 1933 pp. 165-168.
“Übrigens befinde ich mich mit dem Oberpräsidenten, der ein energischer, ruhiger, klarer Mann ist 
und die Provinz kennt, in vollster Ansichtsübereinstimmung.” Letter of 24 April 1890 from General 
von Loe ‘Aus dem Briefwechsel des General-Feldmarschalls von Waldersee' 1 vol. (ed.H.O.Meisner) 
Berlin, 1927 pp.367-368.
73“Er (General von Albedyll) ist höchst zufrieden in seiner Stelllung und hat es verstanden, dieselbe 
in der Stadt und der Provinz, ganz besonders dem westfalischen Adel gegenüber, zu einer 
ausnahmsweise vortrefflichen zu machen. Hierin wird er von seiner Frau, der die erfolgreiche Lösung 
der Aufgabe Freunde macht, auf das wirksamste unterstützt.” ‘Aus dem Briefwechsel des General- 
Feldmarschalls von Waldersee’ 1 vol. (ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin, 1927 pp.229-230.
“Für den Kommandierenden General spielte die Geselligkeit eine grosse Rolle, denn er musste 
repräsentieren. In Münster nahm die Repräsentation einen breiten Raum ein, einmal, weil es eine 
grosse Garnison und viele Behörden hatte. Daneben trat gänzlich der sogenante Damenklub hervor, 
der den ganzen westfälischen und einen Teil des rheinischen Adels umfasste." Karl von Einem 
‘Erinnerungen eines Soldaten 1853-1933' Leipzig, Verlag von K.F.Koehler 1933 pp. 165-168.
"Am 8.Januar 1909 fuhr ich wieder nach Münster, und es fingen nun die offiziellen Festlichkeiten 
an...In Münster sah ich den Bischof, die Spitzen der Behörden und einen Teil des westphalischen 
Adels bei mir und lernte auch das dortige Volk einigermassen kennen.” General von Bemhardi 
‘Denkwürdigkeiten aus meinem Leben’ Berlin : E.S.Mittler & Sohn, 1927 p.299.
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although depending upon the personal inclination of the individual army corps 
commander, ranked social relations with senior members of the clergy - both 
Protestant and Catholic.74 5 In the widest circle of acquaintances came senior members 
of the magistrature and university professors, as well as representatives of locally 
elected bodies (city mayors, members of the upper chamber of the Prussian Diet, and 
perhaps certain distinguished members o f the local assembly).76
A feature which appears quite clearly from the generals’ memoirs is that the industrial 
and business elites were not a part of this milieu. One notorious exception, which in 
itself was significant, was the Krupp family. Alfred and Fritz Krupp enjoyed privileged 
relations with several senior commanders, as well as with the King, who were all 
private guests at the Krupp residence ‘Villa Hiiger in Essen.77 However, the direct 
access of Krupp to the military leaders was - as General von Deimling explained in his
74 On General von Fransecky in Strasburg: “Wie verstand er es, in dem reizenden kleinen Palais am 
Broglie in Strassburg, dem ehemaligen Zweibrücker Hof, im Verein mit Gemahlin und Tochter, 
entzückende Feste zu veranstalten, eine auserlesene Gesellschaft um sich zu sammeln und in seiner 
hohen Stellung in jeder Weise glänzend, liebenswürdig und anziehend zu repräsentieren. Zu 
verschiedenen Malen waren Fürstlichkeiten und gekrönte Häupter seine Gäste." Walther von Bremen 
'Denkwürdigkeiten des Preussischen Generals der Infanterie Eduard von Fransecky* Bielefeld, 
Leipzig: Velhagen & Klasig, 1901 p.571.
“Den Elsässern musste imponiert werden durch eine vornehme, energische Verwaltung und 
womöglich durch eine glänzende Hofhaltung. Ein schöner, reicher und kluger Fürst oder Prinz 
gehörte hierher als Statthalter.” Oberst von Hoffmann 'Lebenserinnerungen des Kgl. Preussischen 
Generalleutnants Otto von Hoffmann, nach eigenen Aufzeichnungen* Oldenburg, Leipzig: 
Schulzesche Hof-Buchhandlung und Hof-Buchdrückerei,1907 p.228-229.
75 “Mit besonderer Freude erinnere ich mich an den Bischof von Münster, späteren Erzbischof von 
Köln, von Hartmann. Er war ein Aristokrat vom Scheitel bis zur Sohle, ein treuer preussischer 
Monarchist im Gewände des katholischen Geistlichen.” Karl von Einem 'Erinnerungen eines 
Soldaten 1853-1933 * Leipzig, Verlag von KF.Koehler 1933 p.165.
About General von Deines in Koblenz: “Seine besondere Verehrung brachte er dem 1912 
verstorbenen Kardinal-Erzbischof von Köln, Dr.Fischer, entgegen.” E. von Witzleben 'Adolf von 
Deines. Lebensbild ¡845-1911' Berlin: Verlag der Liebelschen Buchhandelung, 1913 p.264.
“Der gesellige Verkehr innerhalb der Hauptstadt und mit den Gutsbesitzern war rege und angenehm. 
(...) Dem Erzbischof von Stablewski bin ich wegen seiner tödlichen Krankheit nicht begegnet, 
wiederholt aber dem liebenswürdigen und verständigen Weihbischof. (...) Er war auch im 
Generalkommando und Oberpräsidium gern gesehen.” Generaloberst Alexander von Kluck 
'Wanderjahre - Kriege - Gestalten’ Berlin: Verlag R.Eisenschmidt 1929 p.105.
76 The local representatives appear on table plans only for larger banquets held by the army corps 
commander, generally those comprising above seventy-five guests.
77 “Mitte Juli musste ich auf Einladung des Kolonialvereins in Essen die Weihe seine Fahne 
vornehmen, die ihm sein Schutzherr, HerT Krupp von Bohlen und Haibach gestiftet hatte. Wärend 
meines Besuchs war ich Gast der Familie Krupp auf Villa Hügel.” General Bertold von Deimling 
‘Aus der Alten in die neue Zeit ’ Berlin : Im Verlag Ullstein, 1930 p. 141; Similarly the private papers 
of General von Kluck Military Archive, Freiburg, N 550, Dossier 6. Undemeath a photograph of 
‘Villa Hügel,* the daughter of General von Kluck wrote: “Wo mein Vater eines Tages zum Diner 
eingeladen war und Frau Krupp von Bohlen und Haibach zu Tisch führte !”
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memoirs - entirely due to Krupp being the main provider of modem weaponry to the 
army.78 Nevertheless, despite the direct access of the Krupps to top generals and to 
senior civil servants such as the province governor von Studt,79 and despite the Krupp 
firm financing six local gendarmes between 1870 and 1910,80 their industry never 
obtained military protection during labour conflicts.
4 .4 . Patterns of co-operation and exclusion concerning maintenance of 
public order in Westphalia
It is important to note that it was the Prussian local authorities who were in charge of 
the maintenance of public order through the municipal police forces. The state 
administration’s role was to co-ordinate the different municipal police organisations 
within a larger territory, in co-operation with the local authorities. Secondly, the state 
authorities were in charge of co-ordinating the state forces (Royal Guards and the 
gendarmerie). The co-operation that took place between the district governor and 
local authorities on the issue of maintenance of order allowed the state administration 
to influence the strategies applied by the municipal police forces, but without making 
the state the financially responsible. On the other hand, co-operation between the state 
administration and the local authorities in maintenance o f public order did not cover 
the question of military involvement. With the effective exclusion of the local 
authorities from the issue of military intervention, this latter question became a matter 
entirely dealt with between province or district governors and the army corps 
commanders.
78 Bertold von Deimling ‘Aus der Alten in die neue Zeit' Berlin : Im Verlag Ullstein, 1930 p. 141; 
Augustine (1993) p.69.
79 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin - Dahlem, Persönliche Nachlässe Konrad von Studt /8.
80 Jessen (1991) p. 120.
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4.5. The policy of using of troops in Nord-Pas-de-Calais: the prefects 
and pressure from iocai society
4.5.1. M ayors and the problems of requisitioning m ilitary assistance 
In 1891. in the wake of the bloody incidents at Fourmies, Henri Vel-Durand, prefect of 
département Nord, argued that the responsibilities of the mayors and the prefects in 
terms of maintenance of public order were becoming increasingly difficult, since they 
were constantly being exposed to criticism from local society.81
In comparison with Westphalia, the position of the prefect differed from that of the 
Prussian senior civil servants in two significant ways. First, the Westphalian province 
and district governors could acquire a significant degree of influence over the measures 
used against public unrest by organising close co-operation between the various 
municipal police organisations. This was possible in Prussia because all the local 
authorities - as a result of the three-class voting system - were controlled by the 
wealthy middle class whose basic attitude and interests in matters of maintenance of 
order were the same in all the local communities.82 In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, it was not 
possible to establish an organisation at the departmental level of all the municipal 
police forces because policies towards public disorder varied from one municipality to 
another, depending on the political composition of each community.
The second problem was that, in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the mayors with their different 
policies and sympathies were mutually divided over the issue o f military presence. In 
October 1902, for instance, when the miners from the entire region went on strike, the 
mayor of Bethune and the surrounding suburban municipalities urged the prefect of 
Pas-de-Calais to request military assistance. On the other hand, the mayor of Avion,
81 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12525, ‘Evénements de Fourmies.’ Report of 6 May 1891 from the 
prefect of département Nord to the Ministry of the Interior: “Il faut considérer que le rôle de 
l'administration, maires et fonctionnaires, s’est singulièrement modifié depuis quelque temps. Il ne 
suffit plus d’être intelligent et bon administrateur; il faut être prêt à tous les dangers, de quelque 
nature qu'ils soient, les prévenir, si possible, être la première victime pour qu’on vous pardonne de 
vous défendre.”
82 Spencer (1992) p.162. The élection in the Amsberg district of Social Démocratie mayors it gave 
rise to serious discussions about turning the municipal police in these areas into State police. Jessen 
(1991) pp.93-94.
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who was from the French Labour Party, as well as the Socialist mayors of Lens and 
Denain, protested vigorously against the idea of military intervention and threatened to 
resign if troops were called upon.83 For the prefects, it was the mayors who 
sympathised with the striking workers who caused problems for the coherent 
management of order in the region. The immediate solution to the problem was to strip 
the mayors of their authority over the municipal police while a major conflict was 
taking place.84
Within their constituencies, the mayors were in a particularly difficult position. No 
matter what decision a mayor might take, the municipality risked ending up with a 
huge bill. The 1884 law on local government made the communities financially 
responsible for damage to public and private property if the local authorities had not 
used all their legal resources to ensure the maintenance of public order.85 On the other 
hand, the expense of a requisition for supplementary gendarmerie forces or military 
troops would also fall upon the local community unless these were explicitly sent for 
on the prefect's initiative.86 There are many examples where mayors complained about 
bearing expenses for forces that they had not called for.87 Similarly, one mayor called 
for supplementary forces only at the moment when he knew that the prefect could 
hardly spare any more gendarmes. The reason for this was bluntly admitted. By taking
83 Cooper-Richet (1987) p.409.
84 Haupt (1986) p.246; Cooper-Richet (1987) p.409.
85 Law of 5 April 1884 on municipal powers, Articles 106 and 108.
86 Berlière (1996) p.83.
87 Departmental Archives, Arras, M.4865, ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houillers 1891. Documents 
divers.’ Minutes from the session of 20 November 1891 of the municipal council of Beuvry: 
“Considérant que les troupes cantonnées à Beuvry (100 chasseurs à cheval et 4 officiers) n’ont pas été 
demandées par le maire pour le maintien de l’ordre; Que par suite, il paraît légitime et équitable que 
la commune de Beuvry ne subisse aucune charge à propos de la présence de ces troupes; Qu’enfin la 
présence de ces militaire à Beuvry paraît inutile; Décide à l’unanimité, que dans le cas où ce retrait 
serait jugé impossible par l’autorité supérieure, la commune ne soit, en aucune mainère, obligé de 
supporter la moindre part des frais du cantonnement, et que les habitants où sont logés les militaires 
soient indemnisées de leurs frais et débours et pertes occasionnés par la présence des militaires dans 
leur habitation.” Similarly, a letter of 22 November 1891 from the mayor Avion to the prefect of Pas- 
de-Calais,
Departmental Archives, Arras, M.4865 ’Grève générale dans le bassin houillers 1891. Documents 
divers’, and a letter of 13 September 1893 from the mayor of Lens to the prefect of Pas-de-Calais, 
Departmental Archives, Arras, M.4862 ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houiller 1893. 
Renseignements, Instructions, correspondance*. The question over the financial responsibility became 
a way of sustaining politically motivated protests against the presence of military troops. 
Departmental Archives, Lille, M.625 /9, ‘Grèves de textiles: Armentières, requisition de troupes, 
1903.’ Letter of 8 October 1903 from the mayor of Houpline to the prefect of département Nord.
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this step and calculating that the prefect would refuse, the local community was 
discharged from its financial responsibility for private property damaged by rioters or 
striking workers.88 Politically, mayors often faced strong pressures from mine and 
factory owners to call for larger military forces. The mayors were also constantly at 
risk of facing criticism for not having done enough if a situation went out of control.89 
At the same time, striking workers, as well as the groups who were not involved in the 
conflict, would complain about the expense of troops and consider this to be a costly 
and exaggerated measure.
During the early days of a conflict, both the local military commanders and the sub­
prefects and prefects would receive a large number of requisitions issued by the 
municipalities, some of which were meant to be taken seriously, often followed by 
vastly exaggerated descriptions of the situation in the local area, and others which 
were merely issued in order to discharge the municipality from its legal obligations. 
This provided a very unclear picture of the seriousness of events and made it very 
difficult to co-ordinate the management of public order. Moreover, a miners’ strike or 
a major strike in the textile industry would cover a great number of companies or 
factories within a wide territory covering several municipalities, many of which were 
not directly affected by the strike. Groups of striking workers would often move from 
one area to another trying to make the workers of other mines or factories join the 
conflict. A major strike would therefore directly or indirectly affect the majority of 
municipalities within the district.
It is within this patchwork of administrative units, with opposing sympathies towards 
labour conflicts and dissimilar policies towards public unrest, that one has to 
understand the impossibility of relying heavily on municipal police forces in Nord-Pas- 
de-Calais. It also explains why the prefects were not immediately vulnerable to 
pressures from local groups. From the early 1890s, when conflicts became more
88 Departmental Archives, Anas, M.1231 ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houillers 1889. Documents 
divers'. Letter of 8 November 1889 from the mayor in Leforest in the arrondissement of Béthune, to 
the prefect of Pas-de-Calais.
89 In 1903, a textile factory in Armentière considered talcing legal action against the municipality that 
it accused of not taking all the measures necessary to prevent violent attacks on private property. 
Departmental Archives, Lille, M.625 /4 ‘Grèves de textiles de 1903 - correspondance du préfet avec le 
ministre.’ Letter of 3 December 1903 from the minister of the interior to the prefect in Lille.
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extended and the political make-ups between the municipalities became increasingly 
complicated, the only way of ensuring coherent management of a major conflict was 
for the prefect to take over responsibility from the local authorities.
4.5.2. The prefectoral take-over of control
Examination of the degree to which the policies pursued by the prefects were 
influenced by pressure from local groups or individuals is very difficult to handle, since 
such issues are likely not to appear among the official documents. Only occasionally 
does evidence appear among the prefectoral correspondence of attempts to persuade 
the prefect either to call upon the army or to refrain from doing so. It is also impossible 
to demonstrate the extent to which this type of pressure actually shaped a prefect’s 
decisions. It is well known that the prefects of the early Third Republic were exposed 
to pressure from local representatives: deputies, senators, mayors, and members of the 
regional council, (conseillers généraux).90 In order to perform efficiently as the 
government’s executive representative in a département, it was essential for the prefect 
to have a reasonable degree of goodwill among the members of locally elected 
bodies.91 Moreover, due to governmental instability of the Third Republic and because 
o f the ever-changing and fragile alliances in the National Assembly, the deputies - who 
were often also mayors in the most important towns - sometimes put pressure on 
prefects by threatening to withdraw their support for the government.92 There are,
90 Wright (1994) pp.298-299; Siweck-Pouydesseau (1969) pp.35-38; Chapman (1955) pp.49-54.
91 There does not seem to have been any direct interference by the conseil général in the policy of 
mobilising the army for internal peacekeeping. The minutes from the Conseil Général in Lille show 
that the issue was only raised three times between 1891 and 1913, and that the complaints from the 
elected representatives attracted little interest and had scarcely any effect. In 1893, when three 
members proposed a resolution inviting the government to refrain from mobilising the army for 
labour conflicts, the prefect simply asked the council not to discuss an issue which fell outside its 
competence. “M. le Préfet: - J ’ai le regret d'avoir à demander au Conseil Général de vouloir bien 
écarter par la question préalable le voeu qui vient d’être déposé par M. Carette. Il me paraît que la 
discussion d’un voeu semblable - qui ne pourrait d ’ailleurs, j ’en suis convaincu, aboutir qu’à un rejet, 
- pourrait avoir de graves conséquences. Il se rapporte à une question de politique et échappe à la 
compétence du Conseil Général.” (Session of 11 April 1893). A similar resolution was presented to 
the Conseil Général in April 1904 and again in May 1905. These resolutions were briefly discussed, 
one motion failed, the other passed. However, this resolution from the Conseil Général was of no 
political consequence. Departmental Archives, Lille, l.N.135-158, ’Délibérations du Conseil 
Général, 1891-1913’.
92 Siweck-Pouydesseau (1969) pp.35-38; Chapman (1955) pp.49-54.
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however, three indicators that point against the idea of public order policy being 
strongly shaped by pressure from local representatives.
In the first place, if the posts of prefect in the two départements of Nord and Pas-de- 
Calais were put at stake over the issue o f the policy towards public unrest, this should 
be discernible through a high degree of prefectoral instability. This, however, was not 
the case. The départements Nord and Pas-de-Calais had, together with the 
département Seine, the highest degree o f prefectoral stability between 1877 and 
1958.93 Despite a national average of fewer than four years in service for prefects in 
the period 1876-1918, of the prefects who served in Pas-de-Calais between 1883 and 
1918, all but one served seven years o r more.94 Apart from the years 1897-1899, a 
similar pattern of prefectoral stability can be observed in the département Nord.95 
Moreover, one can observe that the same prefects served first in Pas-de-Calais and 
were then promoted to the particularly difficult département Nord. Thus, Vel-Durand 
served fourteen years altogether in the region, Alapetite and Trépont served for a total 
of ten years each, and Louis Vincent remained prefect in Nord during the twelve most 
turbulent years o f the recent history of this département between 1899 and 1911. The 
remarkable degree of prefectoral stability indicates that successive ministers of the 
interior were more inclined to maintain a strong prefect, someone who could impose 
himself in a difficult region, rather than to sacrifice him for the sake of political 
alliances in the National Assembly.96
Secondly, in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the political make-ups were polarised between 
traditionally strong groups of conservatives, supported by the industrial elites, and an 
increasingly influential group of Radicals and Socialists, supported by the increasing
93 The départements Nord and Pas-de-Calais had respectively eighteen and nineteen prefects between 
1877 and 1958. This had to be compared to an average number of prefects in a French département at 
30.6. The most unstable départements (Corse and Tarn) both had 45 prefects between 1877 and 1958. 
Siwek-Pouydesseau (1969) pp.60-64.
94 Vel-Durand (1883-1890), Alapetite (1890-1900), Duréauit (1900-1907), Trépont (1907-1910), and 
Briens (1911-1918).
95 Vel-Durand (1890-1897), Lauranceau (1897-1898), Vatin (1898-1899), Vincent (1899-1911), and 
Trépont(1911-1918).
96 Vincent Wright observes a similar pattern of ‘isles of stability’ in relation to the difficult post of 
prefect of the Seine, which was occupied for fifteen years between 1896 and 1911 by Justin de Selves, 
and the post of police prefect of Paris, held by Louis Lépine from 1899 to 1913. Wright (1994) p.299.
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number of industrial workers.97 Accordingly, the potential pressure from local mayors 
and deputies would have been divided between those in favour and those against 
military intervention. If the policy towards public unrest were heavily influenced by 
pressure from local representatives, one would expect a pattern where the measures 
which were implemented changed significantly from one conflict to another, depending 
on the strength of the government and the political alliances within the National 
Assembly. This was not the case. On the contrary, a highly stable pattern in the policy 
pursued can be observed over the entire period.
Thirdly, the number of military interventions virtually exploded under the Waldeck- 
Rousseau, Combes and Clemenceau administrations. These governments depended 
more than any previous government on the support of political groups who were the 
most likely to oppose military intervention. This indicates that in questions concerning 
the maintenance of public order, the policies pursued by the prefects were not a 
reflection of horse-trading in regard to national politics, but that the prefects had the 
power to impose their policies with little regard to local pressure groups or individuals.
While the municipal authorities pulled in opposite directions, depending on the political 
majority within each community, the only way of avoiding total chaos when a conflict 
was extended over several municipalities was for the prefect to take charge of all the 
measures to be implemented. Increasingly, therefore, decisions about maintenance of 
order were moved from the municipal to the prefectoral level, thus marginalising local 
authorities. In cases where the military was asked to intervene, requisitions would 
come to the army corps commander through the prefect, who had received information 
about the situation on the spot from sources independent of the local authorities: the 
sub-prefect, the gendarmerìe or the agent of the state rail-police (commissaire 
spécial).
97 These definitions were used by Francois Goguel 'Géographie des élections françaises sous la 
Troisième et Quatrième République’ Paris: Armand Colin, 1970.
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4.53. The attitude of prefects tow ards local authorities and  private companies
Within the state administration, there was also a considerable degree of suspicion 
regarding the willingness and capacity o f the municipal authorities to fulfil their 
responsibilities in maintaining public order.98 Prefects and military authorities alike had 
many prejudices against the municipal police and the capacity of these local forces to 
perform adequately in sensitive situations. Municipal police organisations remained 
notoriously understaffed in many areas. The policemen were badly trained and lacked 
authority with the local population.99 Moreover, the prefects did not trust the 
neutrality of the local authorities and suspected the mayors of being either too 
repressive or too indulgent, depending on their political sympathies.100
Like the Prussian state administration, the prefects were hardly fooled by the fact that 
the municipal police were the extended arm of the industrialists in local communities 
dominated by a wealthy middle class. Prefects had no illusions about the attempts by 
private companies to exaggerate the descriptions of violence and riots in order to make 
the mayor or prefect provide the maximum display of force. In this respect, the self­
perception of prefects as neutral arbitrators should not be underestimated. Like in 
Westphalia, it was of major importance for the prefect to appear disinterested and not 
a prisoner of the interests of the mine and factory owners, in order to be a credible 
arbitrator in labour conflicts. In the early 1890s, the prefects in Lille often complained 
about companies who seemed to regard the public forces - including the army - as their 
private security service.101 The irritation of the prefects over private companies was
98 Bruneteaux (1996) p.43.
99 Berlière (1996) pp.22-23.
100 Berlière (1996) pp.85-86.
101 In the early 1890s it was not uncommon for mining companies to send requests to the prefect 
stating how many soldiers they needed for the protection of their plants. The requests from the 
miners’ strike of September 1893 were numerous and the demand for soldiers abundant “Comme 
vous le savez, une grève est imminente pour le 16 courant, la lettre du syndicat ne permettant pas aux 
compagnies d’y donner une réponse favorable. Voici à peu près les postes que je vous serai obligé de 
faire garder par la troupe: 1) La fosse No.l où 30 hommes d’infanterie pourraient être logé et 20 
cavaliers; 2) Ateliers Centraux, ancienne fosse No.2. 50 hommes; 3) Salle de gymnastique, co­
operative; 50 hommes avec logement; 4) Fosse No.3; 60 hommes d’infanterie et 15 cavaliers; 5) Fosse 
No.4; 100 hommes et 30 cavaliers; 6) Fosse No.5; 25 hommes; 7) Bureau généraux; 21 hommes. On 
peut y loger une centaine au besoin.” Departmental Archives, Arras, M.4862 ‘Grève générale dans le 
bassin houiller 1893. Renseignements, Instructions, Correspondance’. Letter of 13 Setember 1893 
from the director of the ‘Mines de Bruay’ to the preferct of Pas-de-Calais. Similar requests were sent 
to the prefect of Pas-de-Calais from the company ‘Vicoigne & Noeux’ (Letter of 17 September 1893), 
from the mining company *Vendin-Lez-Béthune’ (Letter of 17 September 1893), and from ‘La
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reinforced by frequent battles over bills, and the problems of making the private 
companies, who claimed that their property had been insufficiently protected, cover 
their share of expenses.102
The suspicion and irritation of the prefects over local industrialists using the public 
forces for their own particular interests emerge quite strongly in the accounts provided 
to the Ministry of the Interior about the events at Fourmies in 1891, when fourteen 
striking workers were killed by military troops. In a report from the special 
commission that had been investigating the incident for the Ministry of the Interior, 
accusations against the local authorities and the industrialists were numerous.103 The 
blame for the disorder that had broken out during the May Day demonstrations was, 
according to the special commission, caused by the intransigent attitude of local 
industrialists towards their employees.104 Secondly, the mayor and local counsellors - 
most of whom were mine or factory owners - were criticised for using public forces to 
ensure their own property, while displaying only a semblance of consideration for the 
maintenance of public order within the rest of the community.105
compagnie des mines de Drocouri' (Lctier of 18 September 1893). Departmental Archives, Arras, 
M.4862 ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houiller 1893. Renseignements, Instructions, correspondance.’
102 Departmental Archives, Arras, M.1231 ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houiller 1889. Documents 
divers’. Letter of 22 October 1889 from the prefect of Pas-de-Calais to the senior manager of ‘La 
Compagnies de Béthune’: “Sans discuter plus que vous les causes de la grève, je ne puis accepter le 
reproche que contient, à l’adresse de l’Autorité, la lettre que vous m’avez fait l’honneur de m'écrire. 
Il me suffit de constater que, depuis le 16 de ce mois, des patrouilles ont été faites, à l’heure de la 
descente, autour de vos fosses les plus voisines du terrain de la grève, par dix-huit gendarmes à cheval 
et que, dès le 18 sur votre demande, un détachement de 220 hommes du génie a été mis à votre 
disposition pour la garde de vos fosses et la protection des ouvriers qui auraient désiré continuer le 
travail. L’autorité militaire à qui depuis les réquisitions que je lui ai adressées, incombe le soin de 
maintenir l’ordre, d’assurer la liberté du travail et la sécurité des biens et des personnes déclare, 
qu’étant données les circonstances, aucune disposition plus favorable ne pouvait être prise.*’
103 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12527, ‘4e Bureau de la Sûreté Générale: Evénement de Fourmies le 
1er mai 1891.’ Report of 14 June 1891 by the Commission spéciale adjoint to the Ministry of the 
Interior.
104 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12527, ‘4e Bureau de la Sûreté Générale: Evénements de Fourmies 
le 1er mai 1891.’ Report of 14 June 1891 by the Commission spéciale adjoint to the Ministry of the 
Interior: “Les patrons n’ont rien fait pour calmer les esprits et en étudiant leur conduite on est porté à 
croire qu’ils cherchaient à provoquer la grève... Ils disaient à qui voulait l’entendre: ‘Quand les 
ouvriers auront faim ils reviendront, nous ne sommes pas pressés et nous serions bien bons de ne pas 
profiter de la circonstance qui met tous les atouts dans notre jeu’. Ces paroles m’ont été dites 
textuellement par M. Hiroux, grand industriel et maire de Sains-du-Nord.... Dès le premier mai les six 
patrons avaient pris l’engagement d’honneur de ne reprendre le travail qu’aux anciennes conditions; 
ils refusèrent même de recevoir les délégués ouvriers et ne voulaient entendre parler d’aucune 
revendication sous prétexte ‘qu’ils sont maîtres chez nous’...’’
105 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12527, ‘4e Bureau de la Sûreté Générale: Evénements de Fourmies 
le 1er mai 1891.’ Report of 14 June 1891 by the Commission spéciale adjointe to the Ministry of the
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A similar account was given by the prefect of département Nord, Vel-Durand, who 
saw the call for troops and the escalation of an otherwise peaceful demonstration into 
violent encounters between the armed forces and the strikers as the result of pressure 
from local industrialists to protect their particular interests.106 To the sub-prefect, he 
stressed that demands for protection coming from private companies were often 
exaggerated.107 In his report to the ministry concerning the incidents, Vel-Durand was 
obviously keen to persuade his superiors in Paris that he had no hand in the matter and 
that the unfortunate incident was the result of irresponsible local authorities and an 
inexperienced sub-prefect.108 Apparently, he managed to avoid responsibility, because 
he remained in office until 1897. However, prefects in subsequent periods in the 
départements Nord and Pas-de-Calais were generally very keen on remaining in charge 
of the maintenance of public order when military troops were involved and, indeed, 
sought to closely supervise the requisitions issued by mayors and sub-prefects.
If the prefects became increasingly suspicious about the neutrality of the mayors who 
were closely connected to mine and factory owners, a similar attitude was apparent in 
relation to mayors whose sympathies lay with the labour movement. Among
Interior: “Le Maire, M. Bemier, étant industriel et la presque totalité du conseil, composé de patrons. 
Mais, (la réquisition) devait avoir pour but, dans l’esprit de la municipalité, la protection des 
propriétés particulières et des établissements industriels. Le maintien de l’ordre était mis au second 
plan."
106 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12525, ‘Evénements de Fourmies’. Report of 6 May 1891 by lhe 
prefect of département Nord: “...je ne pressentais pas de désordre sérieux et (estimais) que le concours 
de la gendarmerie serait probablement suffisant pour le maintien de l’ordre. Cependant le sous-préfet 
pressé par le maire et les industriels, notamment par M. Boussus, grand industriel à Wignehies, 
conseiller général, M. Bélin, président de l’association industrielle, tous deux républicains, me 
demanda de vouloir bien solliciter, pour le 1er mai, l’envoi dans les environs de la ville d ’un escadron 
de cavalerie.(...) Le 28, (le sous-préfet) me transmettait le voeu des industriels plus inquiets, qu’une 
manifestation militaire eût lieu le matin même du 1er mai. Sans partager leur avis, il me faisait 
connaître qu’à défaut de cavalerie, il (le sous-préfet) dirigerait dès le matin des compagnies 
d’infanterie.”
107 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12525, ‘Evénements de Fourmies’ Reoort of 6 May 1891 by the 
prefect of département Nord: “Il faut considérer que la force publique doit être employée qu’au 
maintien et au rétablissement de l’ordre s’il est menacé et non à des m olestations qui passeraient à 
bon droit pour puériles et abusives; qu’elle doit dans tous les cas être mise à la disposition du maire 
sur une demande écrite et non à celle des industriels qui sont souvent portés à réclamer une garnison à 
leur profit personnel.”
108 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12525, ‘Evénements de Fourmies’ Report of 6 May 1891 by the 
prefect of département Nord to the Ministry of the Interior: “Je ne pouvais d ’ailleurs m ’opposer aux 
mesures d’ordre que le sous-préfet pouvait juger nécessaires, et c’est dans ces conditions que, dès le 
matin du 1er mai, deux compagnies d’infanterie étaient envoyées à Fourmies."
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administrators, there was little sympathy for trade unionism, which was about to 
establish itself outside the control of the politicians in the National Assembly. In 
particular, the communist Confédération Générale du Travail, with its revolutionary 
tendencies, was considered with much suspicion.109 The prefects therefore saw 
attempts by Socialist mayors to protect strikers from police intervention - and 
ultimately from military intervention - as an irresponsible policy that put public order 
seriously at risk.110
4.5.4. The prefects and local authorities: patterns of co-operation and exclusion
As was the case in Westphalia, decision making concerning the use of military troops 
in Nord-Pas-de-Calais was moved from the local to the regional level. There were still 
cases in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the First World War of 
mayors requesting troops directly by the local military authorities. This, however, was 
only in minor cases, such as maintaining order for visits of VIPs or during peaceful 
gatherings of large numbers of people. In these cases, a local commander would be 
directly requested by a mayor or - in the case of Dunkerque - by the civil governor. In 
these minor cases, the local commander would order his troops to mobilise, and only 
afterwards inform the army corps commander through the ordinary bureaucratic 
channels. It normally took four days for such a message to pass from a local 
commander through the commander of the section, the commander of the sub-division, 
and the division commander, before it landed on the army corps commander’s desk in 
Lille. If the local commander was uncertain about the measures to be taken or about 
the potential for trouble, he sometimes warned the army corps commander by telegram 
in order to obtain his informal approval.
However, these local requisitions always took place under close supervision from the 
prefectoral authority. No decision could be taken without the prefect’s knowledge.
109 Sorlin (1966) pp.470-471; Agulhon (1990) p.219.
110 This became particularly appearent during the turbulent spring of 1906. when Socialist mayors - 
in particular Basly, mayor of Lens - joined the demonstrations against the military intervention. 
Wormser (1961) p.210-214; Reb6rioux (1975) p.113. Similarly, the trouble South France over the 
summer 1907, showed the opposition from mayors who were sympathetic to the protest movement of 
the wine growers, and who resigned in great numbers in protest against the military intervention.
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Thus, directly or indirectly, the prefect was always in charge o f the conflicts involving 
the army. During the years between 1890 and 1914, the prefect became the single most 
important authority of any decision concerning the use of troops within his 
département. The moment a conflict became slightly controversial, prefects preferred 
to take over its management themselves, thus bypassing attempts by local groups in 
favour or against the measures implemented.
In Westphalia, where the state administration entered into close co-operation with the 
local authorities in organising independent municipal police forces, the Prussian state 
administration gained some degree of control over this organisation without assuming 
financial responsibilities. The French prefects, in contrast, wanted to remain entirely in 
charge and accepted the financial responsibility that followed from this control. The 
result was that municipal forces were not included in plans for protection and remained 
on the sidelines. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, there was no coherent planning for municipal 
police forces. In cases of major unrest, their use was decided on the spot, depending 
on the situation. As for the gendarmerie, like the army, there were detailed plans for 
their distribution and their subsequent tasks in this type of situation. Thus, the mayor 
of the main towns of Nord-Pas-de-Calais never played a key role in the process of 
managing larger cases of unrest.
In Westphalia, the mayors, in particular those in the larger towns such as Dortmund, 
Essen, and Düsseldorf, became very important figures in the process of maintaining 
public order as long as military troops were not called upon. Since the strategies 
developed by the state authorities mainly relied on civil forces - in particular municipal 
police forces - the chief mayor of the major cities played a key role in the preparation 
and execution of measures to maintain order, before troops were called for. As for 
questions concerning requisition of military troops, the local authorities of the main 
towns in Westphalia became as marginalised in decision making as were the local 
authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais.
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4.6. Prefects and army corps commanders: Co-operation and conflicts
4.6.1. Attitudes of military commanders towards local authorities and 
industrialists
In their prejudices against both Conservative and Socialist mayors, the prefects were 
joined by the military authorities, who, in turn, did not think much of the municipal 
police forces* capacity to deal with unrest o f any significance.111 The military’s 
prejudices became all the stronger when it came to the industrialists and their claims 
for protection. Their attitude towards private companies is another element that 
changed radically between 1890 and 1914. During the labour confrontations of the 
1880s, the private companies treated the public forces - including the army - as their 
private agents, and simply expected them to perform according to the needs and 
wishes of the factory and mine owners. As in Prussia, there were many of examples of 
private companies suggesting to pay extra bonuses for the gendarmes or soldiers 
mobilised.112 The military authorities were increasingly irritated about the exaggerated 
reports emanating from the private companies, and felt particularly abused when 
rushing to communities where private companies had described widespread violence 
and riots and found the situation much calmer than described.113
More seriously, the military authorities, were reluctant to become an extended police 
force. They were therefore very careful not to perform as a private security force for 
local industrialists.114 After the military interventions in Anzin in 1880 and again in 
1884, the mining companies were supposed to pay for the expenses incurred, such as
111 Bruneteaux (1996) pp.45-47. See also Chapter Five.
112 This was a widespread phenomenon during the mining conflicts of the 1880s and early 1890s. See 
note 105.
113 Departmental Archives, Arras, M.1231, ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houillers 1889. Documents 
divers’. Letter of 25 October 1889 from the general commander in Lens to the prefect of Pas-de- 
Calais. “J’ai demandé à général division l’envoi de deux compagnies à Bruay, mais je vous demande 
instannément de calmer le maire qui me semble ne pas se rendre compte des forces mises déjà à la 
disposition du commandant des troupes dans sa commune." Particularly during the great mineres’ 
strike of 1901, complaints were expressed through the War Ministry about exaggerated use of military 
troops long time after the strike had officially ended. Archives Nationales, F.7.12779, ‘4ème Bureau 
de la sûreté générale: Grève générale des mineurs 1901-1914’ Letters of 11 January and 16 May 1902 
from the war minister to the minister of the interior. Similarly, the letter of 20 June 1902 from the 
General Staff to the minister of the interior.
114 This point was made particularly clear by General de France in his instructions of 15 February 
1893 to the first army corps 'Intruction en cas de grève ou de troubles. '
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accommodation, food and supplies for officers, soldiers and horses. However, the 
military authorities vigorously refused the idea that a supplementary payment to the 
officers and soldiers should be paid by the private companies, thus employing the 
troops virtually like a private security corps.115
Similarly, in the few cases in which mining companies addressed their plea for military 
protection directly to the army corps commander, the request was returned to the civil 
administration which had been bypassed.116 Apart from the slightly derogative tone 
with which the general refers to ‘un sieur Portier’, thus indicating that no previous 
connections had existed between the mining director and the military commander, 
General Jamont preferred to send the question to be investigated by the prefect in 
whose judgement he obviously had more confidence.
Finally, throughout the period examined, the military authorities constantly complained 
about the private companies not providing appropriate accommodation and food for 
the men and horses mobilised.117 This type of deliberate obstruction happened fairly 
often. In general, it was a protest aimed at the prefectoral authority rather than turned
115 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C72.I.331, ‘Intervention militaire aux grèves’. Letter of 28 
October 1880 from the division commander to the army corps commander: “Les (compagnies 
minières) d’ordinaires sont très riches. Elles peuvent et doivent supporter toutes les augmentations de 
pain et de légumes données aux hommes. Quant aux officiers, il me paraît peu convenable qu’ils 
vivent complètement aux frais de la Compagnie. C ’est une affaire de dignité, si je peux m’exprimer 
ainsi. Ils ont d’ailleurs des allocations accordées par le Ministre.”
Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C/2.I.331, ‘Intervention militare aux grèves’. Letter of 11 April 
1884 from the army corps commander in Lille to the commander of the first division: "D’autre part, il 
est un point qui fait l’objet de mes préoccupations et qui a sans doute aussi attiré votre attention dans 
cette question de l’installation des troupes...C’est qu’il importe essentiellement que l’autorité militaire 
conserve la plus stricte neutralité et n’accepte le concours matériel de la compagnie des mines que 
dans la limite des droits conférés par la loi sur les réquisitions. Si donc il y avait lieu de faire des 
réquisitions, celle-ci devraient être adressées aux municipalités, qui demanderaient désormais le 
concours de la Compagnies.”
116 Departmental Archives, Arras, M.1231, ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houiller 1889’. Letter of 
16 October 1889 from the army coips commander to the prefect of Nord-Pas-de-Calais: “Je reçois 
d’un sieur Portier, directeur des Mines de Courrières, une dépêche (...) me disant que les troupes qui y 
sont envoyées sont insuffisantes et me priant avec instance d’envoyer des renforts qu’il me dit très 
urgents. Je télégraphie au général Mathelin de se concerter avec vous pour les mesures qu’il aura à 
prendre.”
117 The mayor of Hazebrouck - who was against military intervention to enforce the anti-Catholic 
legislation in March 1906 and again in November the same year - used the question of provisions and 
accomodation for the troops mobilised as a way of demonstrating his discontent. Military Archive, 
Vincennes, 1.A.C./2.I.335, ‘Inventaires des Eglises, 1906.’ Similar obstructions was shown by 
Socialist mayors protesting against the prefect sending troops into their municipalities during labour 
conflicts.
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against the army. However, it just added to the annoyance of the military authorities 
against local authorities and private companies. In the years following the great strikes 
of the spring of 1906, the military authorities complained particularly about the 
companies being unwilling to follow the suggestions made jointly by the prefect and 
the general staff about how to make their factory or mine easier to protect during 
strikes.118 In subsequent years, the military authorities repeatedly complained that the 
private companies had done nothing to make their sites less exposed to invasion or 
sabotage from striking workers.119 The private companies, on their part, claimed that 
the improvements demanded by the state authorities were too costly.120
4.6,2. French military commanders in the garrison towns
If contacts between the army corps commanders and the local authorities in Westphalia 
went through the senior state administration, this was even truer in Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais. As a result of a deliberate appointments policy, the French military commanders 
were almost always outsiders in the region in which they served.121 Moreover, the 
French military elite was to a large degree separated from local society and the 
informal rules of appropriate social acquaintance in the garrison town were extremely 
strict. In Paris, where the restrictions on the social acquaintances of senior military 
officers seem to have been less tight, a senior general could get away with having
118 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12912, ‘Rapport de la commission chargée d’étudier la révision de 
l’exercice du droit de réquisition de la force armée par les autorités civiles et du plan de protection 
établi pour le cas de grèves dans les départements’ 10 October 1907. In contrast to the previous 
protection plans elaborated by an inter-ministerial commission since 1901, the 1907 plan has a whole 
section entitled ‘Rôle des compagnies industrielles ou minières’ suggesting the construction of walls 
around the plant or factory, investments in electric lighting during the night, and the organisation of 
private security corps to ensure entry to the site and the protection of strikebreakers. These provisions 
were later repeated in a secret circular letter of 20 July 1909 from the Ministry of the Interior. 
National Archives, Paris, F.7.12779, ‘4ème Bureau de la Sûreté Générale. Grève générale des mineurs 
1901-1914.’ Circular letter of 26 July 1909 from the minister of the interior on strikes in the mining 
sector. National Archives, Paris, F.7.12912, ‘Projets de lois: Mesures de protection 1884-1907’.
119 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12779, ‘4eme Bureau de la Sûreté Générale. Grève générale des 
mineurs, 1901-1914.’ Letters of 27 July 1911 and 17 January 1912 from the war minister to the 
minister of the interior.
120 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12779, ‘4ème Bureau de la Sûreté Générale. Grève générale des 
mineurs, 1901-1914.’ This dossier contains several complaints from the mining companies about 
costs imposed on them by the prefect’s suggestions in 1909 to improve their measures of defence.
121 General Billot was bom in Corrèze; General Jamont in Loi re-Inférieure while General dc France 
was from Indre-et-Loire; General Jeannerod was bom in Doubs; General Crémer in Moselle, and the 
Generals Loizillon, Lebon and Davignon were all from Paris.
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social acquaintances with politicians and political salons which were not in favour of 
the Republican system.122
In small provincial towns, however, the political and religious sympathies of senior 
military commanders were under constant scrutiny from all sides. In principle, self- 
imposed social isolation was well regarded and, after the Affaire des Fiches of 1904, 
considered as the only safe way to avoid trouble. Thus, even for the most senior 
commanders, there were considerable restrictions concerning appropriate social 
acquaintances, who comprised primarily the other members of the officer corps and 
their families.123 A certain degree of social relationship with the prefect was almost 
compulsory, but the degree to which it was actually kept up depended on the 
individual general officer.124 Depending on the position of power of an individual 
general, he could allow himself acquaintances who carried some degree of political 
sensitivity, in particular connections with the senior clergy of the Catholic Church.125 
To pay ones respects to the local bishop was just about acceptable, but to accept a 
dinner invitation from the bishop was controversial. Formally, all public appearances 
had to be approved by the prefect, but this does not appear to have led to significant 
problems.
For Nord-Pas-de-Calais, a collection o f correspondence between the army corps 
commander in Lille with the prefects and mayors gives an insight into the type of social
122 General Brugière, who was a very moderate Republican, undertook private entcounters with far- 
right political movements where he met Deroulède, while he was at the same time chief of the 
military staff at the Elysée Palais under Jules Grévy.
123 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.CV2.I.333 ‘Grèves des Chemins de Fer 1910.’ Report of 12 June 
1910 from General Bixard, commandant in Cambrai, to the army corps commander. After being 
accused of being indiscreet in his acquaintances. General Bixard declared: “...En ce qui me concerne 
personnellement, je ne vois ici absolument personne; en dehors de mon service, de mes promenades à 
cheval, je  vais de temps à autre au cercle militaire, où je ne parle qu’à des officiers...”
124 According to his diary, General Chanzy, army corps commander in Châlon 1882-1883, had 
regular dinners with the prefect. National Archives, Paris, personal papers, AP 270. Similarly, dinner 
invitations from the prefect have been found among the papers from the army corps commanders in 
Lille. Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.CY2.I.2I1, ‘Correspondance du 1er C.A. 1891-1920’. 
Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C./2.I.217, ‘Correspondance avec les Préfets et les maires 1905- 
1912’. Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C7227, ‘Correspondance générale, Général Jeannerod’ 
August 1898 to June 1900.
125 General Millet, commander in Orléans, speaks of his excellent relationship with the local bishop. 
(Archives de Vincennes: 1 K mi 9/ General Millet ‘Souvenirs' unpublished memoirs; ca.1912-1913). 
Being a Protestant, his acquaintance with the Catholic clergy did not immediately expose him to 
accusations of being *clérical. ’
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event which was considered appropriate for a senior commander.126 As the head of the 
local military organisation, the army corps commanders were involved in a 
considerable number o f associations with some links to the military, mainly charitable 
societies, sports clubs, or veterans* associations. In contrast, members of the officer 
corps were formally prohibited from participating in civil organisations and private 
clubs, but could - if invited - attend at certain local events such as music associations, 
cultural societies, or charity organisations. A certain degree of co-operation with the 
local university could also involve the army corps commander as the authority who 
allowed officers to give public lectures on topics such as natural science or geography. 
More surprisingly, the senior commanders often accepted invitations to preside over 
the distribution of school prizes at the local lycée. This probably has to be seen as a 
way of demonstrating their sympathy for the Republican school system. On the other 
hand, a military officer would be strongly criticised, and even risked ruining his career, 
if he accepted an invitation to preside over a similar event in a Catholic educational 
institution.
In general, invitations to preside over civil associations or events of commercial or 
industrial interest were politely refused by referring to the impossibility of a military 
commander being publicly involved in non-military business. Even very senior 
commanders had to be extremely careful about not being seen with local industrialists, 
because this would put them under immediate suspicion of favouring private interests, 
something which was incompatible with the demands for political neutrality from a 
military commander. Army corps commanders occasionally accepted the distribution of 
the official Médaille Agricole. This seemed to be acceptable as long as the medal was 
issued by a state agency and not by a private society. At any rate, the correspondence 
of army corps commanders shows very few direct links with locals involved in business 
or industry.
126 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.CV2.I.217, ‘Correspondance entre le commandant du corps 
d ’armée et préfets et maires, 1905-1912’.
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4.6 J . Civil and military authorities: the potential for conflict
Given the frequent mobilisation of military troops for internal purposes in France, as 
well as the professional contacts which this inevitably created between senior civil 
servants and military commanders, it is worth noting that the members of these two 
bureaucratic corps were not socially closely linked. The two groups were even strongly 
opposed in terms of their commitment to the Republican regime, as well as their 
affiliations with the Catholic Church.
In contrast to the prefectoral corps o f the Imperial era from 1852 to 1870,127 the 
families of the prefects serving between 1890 and 1914 hardly ever overlapped with 
those of the senior military commanders. A scrutiny of Barge ton’s biographical 
dictionary of French prefects shows that, among 224 prefects serving between 1890 
and 1914, only thirteen had a father in the army or the navy.128 Among the 1,985 
prefects who comprise Bargeton’s biographical reference book, only one case of family 
relations with the generals who served as army corps commanders between 1871 and 
1914 can be established.129 The only family appearing among both prefects and army 
corps commanders were the Jeannerods.130 Among the sample o f 224 prefects serving 
between 1890 and 1914, the largest group were those with a father in the civil service 
or the liberal professions (lawyers, doctors, university professors). A significant 
number had a very humble background, with fathers who were peasants, shopkeepers, 
craftsmen, coachmen, or even labourers.
127 Out of the 220 prefects who served under the Second Empire, more than one in five had a father 
serving in the army: fifteen general officers, twenty-four lower ranking officers, five employed in the 
military administration, and two senior gendarmerie officers. Le Clfcre & Wright (1973) pp.315-334.
128 This meant six senior officers and six lower ranking officers, out of whom four came from the 
artillery and the engineers and one from the navy. One prefect had a father in the gendarmerie.
129 A comparison between the biographical data of the prefects provided by Bargeton and the 
generals’ dossiers show that no close family relation can be established. Most of the twenty-seven 
names appearing for both prefects and army corps commanders are indeed very common surnames: 
Amade, Colomb, Decharme, Douay, Dubois, Dumont, Fabre, Ferron, Gamier, Grasset, Jeannerod, 
Kesseler, Lacroix, Lallemand, Lefebvre, Lefort, Legrand, Meunier, Michel, Pelletier, Peloux, 
Picquart, Renouard, Robert, Thomassin, Toumier and Wolff.
130 Father Claude Charles Georges Jeannerod (1832-1879) left the army with the rank of captain in 
1868 and joined the civil service. He was one of the seven prefects between 1870 and 1918 whose 
professional background was the army. Siwek-Pouydesseau (1969) p.33. Both his sons, Francois 
Alexandre and Gaspard, became division generals.
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Although the proportion of nobles among the general corps declined markedly from 
thirty-seven per cent in 187013' to twenty-five and thirteen per cent in 1895 and 1909 
respectively,13 32 almost forty per cent of generals were recruited from among the 
families who were linked to the army or to the landed elites - either noble or non­
noble. Twenty-one per cent of generals had a father in the army, whilst more than 
eighteen per cent of generals had a father who was a large landowner.'33 If not bom 
into these groups, one could of course always marry. Accordingly, almost half of the 
generals - forty-nine per cent - married a woman whose father was either in the army 
or a landowner.134 In comparison, only ten per cent of the French generals (forty-three 
out of 427) had a father who was a public employee with no further specification of 
function.135 Similarly, only fifteen per cent married a woman whose farther was a 
public employee.136
Thus, from a purely professional definition of social affiliations, the majority of 
generals were recruited from groups which were not closely linked to the state 
administration. Moreover, military officers were often recruited from traditionally 
Catholic milieus, although any precise evidence of proportions is difficult to 
establish.137 Without the French officer corps being ever characterised by their 
religious zeal, the profession of Catholic sympathies nevertheless became a widespread 
political statement among military officers and one of the clearest divisions that existed 
between the army and the other branches of the French state.138
131 Serman (1970) p.1325.
132 Barge (1982) p,14.
133 Barge (1982) p.51.
134 Barge (1982) p.263.
135 Twenty-one working for local government, nineteen for the national government, and three were 
employed by a departmental government. Barge (1982) p.51.
136 Seven per cent of the generals’ wives had a father working for the national government, less than 
six per cent were employed by local government, and hardly two per cent of the generals’ wives had a 
father employed by a departmental government. Barge (1982) p.263.
137 Barge notices a disproportionate attendance of generals at the Catholic secondary schools when 
compared to the entire proportions of pupils attending secondary schools. However, this disproportion 
may also have been influenced by the fact that two thirds of generals were recruited from small towns 
and rural areas, where Catholic educational institutions were often the only secondary schools 
available. (1982 p.41).
138 Serman (1982) pp.101-108; Ralston (1953) pp.257-266.
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As was the case with the prefects, the army corps commanders were outsiders to local 
society, but, in contrast to the Westphalian case, this seemed to be the result o f a 
deliberate appointments policy. The French army corps commanders tended to stay in 
their posts for a much shorter period than did their Prussian counterparts, in many 
cases only for one year,139 Accordingly, there were little opportunity to become an 
integrated part of local society. It is worth noting, however, that the post as army 
corps commanders of the first military region, covering Nord-Pas-de-Calais, tended to 
be rather more stable, with commanders usually remaining in office for three years or 
more.140 This stability, as was the case with the prefectoral stability, appears to have 
been due to the needs of the central authorities to have representatives who were well 
acquainted with the particular difficulties linked to the region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais.
4.6.4. The difficult relationship between the military elite and prefectoral 
authorities
After 1871, the relationship between the French officer corps and the Republic rested 
on a fragile mutual acceptance. With the Dreyfus affair and the following electoral 
victory of the Bloc des Gauches, the relationship between the army and the Republican 
regime was as bad as ever. By taking over the War Ministry in the middle of the 
Dreyfus affair, General Galliffet put all his enormous prestige within the military 
establishment behind a reconciliation of the officer corps with the Republic, and once 
again, repeated the obligation of military commanders to co-operate with the state 
administration.141 However, if the army began to reconcile itself with the Republic 
under the Waldeck-Rousseau administration (1899-1902), suspicion remained manifest
139 See Chapter Three.
140 Apart from General Jamont, who only stayed two years (1888-1890), all the commanders stayed at 
least three years: General Billot (1884-1888), General Loizillon (1890-1893), General de France was 
in charge for five years (1893-1898), General Jeannerod (1901-1904), General Lebon (1904-1907) 
and General Davignon for four years (1907-1911). The last army corps commander before the war, 
General Crémer, took early retirement in March 1914.
141 Military Archive, Vincennes, 5 N 5, ‘Cabinet du Ministre: Correspondance Générale 1878-1914’. 
Letter of 25 November 1899 from the war minister to the army corps commanders and military 
governors: “L’intérêt bien entendu des services de l'Etat exige, de la part des authorités civiles et 
militaires, une entente constante dont rétablissement et le maintien reposent, en grande partie, sur le 
caractère dont sont empreintes les relations échangées entre leurs divers représentants. L’intérêt de 
l'armée, en particulier, ne peut que gagner à ce que les officiers apportent, en toute circonstance, dans 
ces relations, la plus entière cordialité. Vous voudrez bien inviter les officiers sous vos ordres à tenir 
le plus grand compte de cette recommandation, à laquelle j'attache un prix tout spécial.”
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on both sides. Ralston puts it very well when he talks of the impossibility of the officer 
corps to be reconciled with anxious governments committed to breaking the autonomy 
of the army.142 Within the army organisation, it was well known that successive war 
ministers attempted to promote Republican officers and to pass over officers who were 
considered politically suspect or who appeared to be affiliated with the Catholic 
Church. Similarly, many officers complained about being under observation by the 
prefectoral and sub-prefectoral authorities who would take note of their appearances in 
public and their social acquaintances.
In November 1904, it became publicly known that the war minister, General André, 
one of the few fervent Republicans amongst senior generals, had built up secret files 
comprising data about thousands of military officers, stating their presumed political 
sympathies, their religious practices, as well as those of their close families. In his 
attempt to Republicanise the army elite, these pieces of information were to be used as 
the basis for promoting politically reliable officers, while ‘suspect* officers were to be 
passed by. General André himself claimed that the information came primarily from 
civil servants,143 and, indeed, certain prefects and sub-prefects had been involved as 
informers in their capacity as freemasons. The affair obviously had a veiy negative 
impact on relations between members of the state administration and the military 
officers, who saw that their suspicions towards the representatives of the Republican 
regime were being confirmed. The secret files of General André were destroyed and 
the government was forced to refrain from this type of informing on the officer corps.
However, the idea of using the prefects and sub-prefects as informers concerning the 
actions and acquaintances of army personnel was not entirely abandoned. As late as 
1911, War Minister Messimy issued a circular to the prefects in which he asked them 
to establish a report twice a year with information about the officers in the main 
garrisons of the département who had shown themselves openly disloyal to the 
regime.144 After two months, however, these special reports on the loyalty of the
142 Ralston (1967) pp.250-25I.
143 General André ‘Cinq ans de ministère ’ Paris: Louis Michaud, 1906 p.311.
144 Military Archive, Vincennes, 5.N.6, ‘Cabinet du Ministre, Bureau de la Correspondance Générale 
1905-1906; troisième bureau, 1886-1914’. Circular letter of 11 December 1911: “...un rapport 
circonstancié sur les officiers en garnison dans votre département qui, par des actes publics ou une
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officer corps were abolished by Messimy’s successor, Millerand, with the argument 
that the prefects already had another task of informing the minister of the interior 
about cases where any public official displayed a lack of loyalty.145 No matter the 
degree to which civil servants were actually involved in reporting about the army 
officers, there can be little doubt that many members of the military establishment 
regarded the prefects with a great deal of suspicion.
The generally tense relationship between the military establishment and the Republican 
regime, as well as the bitter feeling among military officers of not being sufficiently 
recognised by the state, were further confirmed by the revision in 1907 of the official 
protocol for honours and ranks. The Napoleonic rules for * Honneurs et Préséances’ 
from 24 Messidor Year XII were replaced with a new official ranking in which the 
military commanders and the clergy were significantly down graded, while the 
representatives of the political institutions of the state and elected representatives at all 
levels were upgraded.146 Given that French army corps commanders were high-ranking 
officers at the end of a very successful career - in several cases former war ministers147 
- their rank in the revised official protocol was perceived as an intolerable degradation 
for them as officers, and as a general attack on the prestige of the army within wider 
society. Gone were the days when a prefect could be forced to leave his post after 
having committed the blunder of stepping out in front of a division commander.148 The
attitude générale notoirement connue, auraient manqué à la correction politique et au loyalisme que le 
gouvernement de la République est en droit d'exiger d’eux."
145 Military Archive, Vincennes, 5.N.6, 'Cabinet du Ministre, Bureau de la Correspondance Générale 
1905-1906; troisième bureau 1886-1914.’ Letter of 25 January 1912 from the war minister Millerand 
to the prefects.
146 According to former rules, the army corps commanders were placed at number six, only preceded 
by (he President of the Republic, the cardinals, the ministers, the field marshals and admirals, and by 
the state counsellors. Division generals were placed at number eleven and the prefects were only at 
number twelve. According to the 1907 revision, the general governor of Paris was moved to rank 
number seventeen, after the prefect who was at number fifteen. At the departmental level, the prefect 
occupied the highest rank, followed by senators, deputies and members of the local government 
(conseillers généraux). The general army inspectors and the army corps commanders were placed at 
ranks four and five, and division commanders at number eight. In addition, the formerly public 
ceremony which was linked to the entry of a military commander in his office, was reduced to a 
purely military ceremony that took place discretely within the garrison.
147 General Billot was war minister 1882-1883, army corps commander 1884-1888. General 
Zurlinden. who was war minister in 1895 only became army corps commander in 1896. Similarly, 
General Lewal was war minister in 1885, and was only promoted to army corps commander ten years 
after he had been war minister. Boulanger was war minister 1886-1887, and was then promoted to 
army corps commander when he became politically too controversial.
148 Le Clèrc & Wright (1973) p.88.
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revised official protocol was received with a great deal of resentment in the military 
establishment. General Jourdy probably spoke for many of his peers when he bitterly 
noted his inferior status when compared to a young prefect ‘owing his position to the 
favours of some politician in Paris.*149
In addition to the bitterness about political interference in promotions within the 
military hierarchy, the governments under Combes (1902-1905) and his successors 
Rouvier (1905-1906) and Clemenceau (1906-1909) all pursued policies which were 
bound to annoy the military establishment. During the years 1902-1906, the military 
establishment was repeatedly involved in the implementation of the laws concerning 
the separation of the French state from the Catholic Church, all of which provoked 
nation-wide demonstrations. The army was called upon to put down demonstrations, 
to expel monks from illegal religious orders, or to break their way through barricaded 
church doors. In particular, military assistance in the establishment of inventories for 
the property of the Catholic Church150 was unpopular among army officers. Some local 
commanders tried to obstruct the requisitions issued by the civil administration by 
making difficulties out of details in the formalities, or by following the requests with 
the minimum degree of enthusiasm and efficiency.151 Criticism o f the role of the army 
during the implementation of the anti-Catholic legislation clearly reveals the potential 
for conflict within the military establishment against the government and the bitterness 
with which senior commanders perceived the prefectoral authority as the executive 
representatives of the government’s policy.152
149 Général Jourdy 'Mes Souvenir’ (unpublished manuscript, ca.1913). Military Archive, Vincennes, 
392 /GD /3 pp.607-608. Complaints about the new status of the military commanders was a frequent 
topic in the pro-military press and literature right up until the outbreak of the First World War. 
Several episodes were reported in La France militaire concerning the embarrassing position of senior 
generals and about the devastating impact that this was having on the authority of army commanders 
in the eyes of their subordinate officers and soldiers, as well as the prestige of the army in wider 
society. Similarly, Thilo gives a series of examples about the resentment in the army against the 
revised official protocol. Lucien Thilo ‘Pouvoir civil et pouvoir militaire’ Paris: Rousseau, mars 1914 
pp. 148-149.
150 Law of 9 December 1905.
151 For a more thorough analysis of these events, see Chapters Seven and Eight.
152 Even a Protestant general commander such as General Millet took it out on the prefect when he 
was accused in the local press of being pro-Catholic: "Cette fois je me fâchai et après une explication 
assez chaude avec le préfet et le député Rabier dont ce journal était l ’organe, je m'adressai 
directement par la voie du Ministre de la Guerre André au Président du Conseil Combes et je 
demandai une enquête sur mon cléricalisme et mon bonapartisme. Ces messieurs avaient mal choisi 
leur terrain, car j ’étais absolument sûr et maître du mien étant complètment insoupçonnable sur la
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On this background, it is remarkable to note that the dissimilar social attachments and 
political sympathies of the French state administrators and senior officers, as well as 
the mutual irritation and suspicion which existed between the two groups, did not 
prevent the prefects and the army corps commanders from undertaking close practical 
co-operation concerning control of public disorder. In principle, strong and conflicting 
interests were at stake for the prefects and the military commanders concerning this 
issue. At the same time, protests were frequently made by individual officers against 
the use of the army as an extended police force.153 The opposition of individual officers 
during the implementation the anti-Catholic laws (1902-1906) is only the most 
notorious example of this.
Yet, looking specifically at the prefectoral and the military authorities in Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais, it appears that co-operation concerning the maintenance of public order was 
not turned into a battlefield between the two groups. Civil-military co-operation was 
not restricted to the army corps commanders following the letter of a requisition from 
the civil authorities because they were obliged to do so. In fact, senior military 
commanders - in particular those in charge of Nord-Pas-de-Calais - participated very 
actively in the development, improvement and implementation of strategies that greatly 
involved the army.154 Nor does the practical civil-military co-operation seem to be 
characterised by suspicion or fears of usurpation. Despite the constant rumours in Paris 
about a military conspiracy against the Republic, added to the occasional demands 
from Paris for the prefects to provide information about the loyalty of the military 
officers in their départements, the prefects in Lille and Arras were not apparently 
worried about granting the military authorities a significant degree of influence in 
decisions over public order, matters from which they were formally excluded.
faute qu’on me reprochait.” Similarly, when he protested against the use of troops to break into 
churches in February-March 1906 : "J'allai trouver le Préfet, M. Trépont, et je lui déclarai que si, 
comme il en avait le droit, il requérait les troupes pour maintenir l'ordre dans la rue, je donnerais les 
ordres en conséquence, mais que l'armée n’était pas faite pour crocheter des portes, même d’églises et 
que par conséquent je le priais de faire faire cette besogne par les électeurs, les radicaux-socialistes ne 
manquaient pas à Orléans." General Millet 'Souvenirs* unpublished manuscript circa 1913. Military 
Archive, Vincennes, 1 K mi 9.
153 See Chapter Five.
154 See Chapter Eight.
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The paradox of civil-military cooperation concerning maintaining public order in 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais is precisely that it runs counter to expectations that one might 
otherwise have in the light of the wider social and political context of the relationship 
between civil and military elites in Prussia and France.
1S1
4.7. Conclusion: Elite co-operation or exclusion in Westphalia and 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais?
The analysis in this chapter offers two main conclusions. Firstly, in both Westphalia 
and Nord-Pas-de-Calais, a transfer of authority and influence from the local to the 
regional level can be observed. In the case of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, as in Westphalia, the 
senior state administrators appear to have occupied a position which was largely 
independent from local pressures to call for military assistance, or not. Similarly, from 
the early 1890s, both the French and Prussian state administrations, together with their 
respective military counterparts, increasingly excluded local authorities (mayors and 
municipal police authorities) from using their formal right to request military 
assistance. By this concentration of authority, all decisions concerning the mobilisation 
of troops were exclusively dealt with by the senior state administrators (the prefect in 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais and the province and district governors in Westphalia) and the 
army corps commander.
The second main point of this chapter is that, despite the apparently close social ties 
and the amicable informal acquaintances between the senior civil servants and army 
corps commanders in Westphalia, and despite their common unqualified commitment 
to the existing regime, their degree of practical co-operation in maintaining public 
order was quite limited. Conversely, in spite of the high potential for conflict between 
French civil servants and military commanders, and despite the fact that the majority of 
senior commanders had little sympathy with the Republican regime, civil-military co­
operation regarding maintaining public order was greatly intensified between the early 
1890s and the outbreak of the First World War.
Seen from the perspective of the emerging working class movement as well as from 
the Socialist or Social Democrat opposition which was most often the target of state 
interventions, there was indeed a certain degree of co-operation between the local 
elites controlling the industries - and sometimes the local authorities too - and the state 
administration and army that intervened against any protest movement. However, to 
understand how the two systems worked and why remarkably dissimilar policies were
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pursued to deal with similar problems of public disorder, it is important to stress that 
the decisions taken by the state adminsitration and the army were not aimed at 
favouring the intersts of the local notables or indutrialists.
The findings presented in this first part of thesis indicate that the three main 
explanatory frameworks which have previously been put forward (dissimilar challenges 
in the two countries, dissimilar institutional organisations of civil-military relation, and 
dissimilar elite structures) have to be moved to a secondary level in the causal 
hierarchy. It was the perception of threat, rather than the actual challenge from public 
unrest, that made the French authorities - civil and military - develop a more forceful 
response to public unrest compared to the policies pursued by their Prussian 
counterparts. It was the Prussian military commanders’ right to refuse to provide 
military assistance, rather than his actual use of this right, which made the Prussian 
administration more cautious about depending upon assistance from the army than 
were their French counterparts. Finally, the socially and politically closely connected 
civil servants and military commanders in Prussia undertook less professional co­
operated than did their French counterparts.
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Part II. The debates, the priorities and the policies 
implemented in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
concerning the role of the army in domestic peacekeeping
The measures taken in response to mass unrest in Westphalia and in Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais were developed on the basis of a series of strategies adopted by the central 
power in Berlin and Paris in the 1890s. The strategies adopted emerged out of a series 
o f different forces within and outside the state apparatus, some of which pointed 
towards the ‘de-militarisation’ o f the internal peacekeeping, whilst others envisaged 
solving imminent problems of disorder by making extensive use of military force. In the 
literature on the growth of civil policing, there is a tendency to consider ‘de­
militarisation’ as a logical consequence of modernising forces within the state 
bureaucracy as well as in the officer corps.1 It is therefore important to stress that in 
neither of the countries could developments towards one of the two types of response 
be regarded as straight forward, and instead the path taken went through many twists 
and turns. In a second but similar approach of ‘modernisation*, historians have claimed 
that the ‘de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping was due to increasing problems of 
legitimising domestic military intervention.2 However, the policies pursued in Prussia 
and France between 1889 and 1914 clearly show that these considerations are not 
sufficient as an explanation of policies aiming at the ‘de-militarisation* of the 
maintenance of public order, since they do not explain why the French bureaucrats and 
ministers failed to leave the soldiers in their barracks.
1 Liidtke (1982), Funk (1986) and Jessen (1991) pp.21-25. Behind the argument in the French 
literature of a structural problem of 'de-militari sing’ the internal peacekeeping, there is a similar 
rationale that such a developemenl ought to have taken place along with the process of 
démocratisation of the political institutions. Serman (1982) pp.58-63, Berlière (1996) pp. 17-18, and 
Bruneteaux (1993) p.32 ibid. (1996) pp.21-22. Although, Jauffret (1983) and Carrot (1984) p.653) see 
the problem as a predominantly political issue, their attempt to rationalise this development is also 
based on the assumption that the increasing frequency of domestic military interventions was an 
'abnormal’ development in a modernising political system.
2 Hobsbawn The Age o f  Empire ’ (1987) p.305 “Governments, especially those which had to worry 
about public opinion and their electors, were usually careful about facing troops with the risk of 
shooting down their fellow citizens; the political consequences of soldiers firing on civilians were apt 
to be bad, and those of their refusal to be do so were apt to be worse, as demonstrated in Petrograd in 
1917.”
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The second part of this thesis will show that the policies adopted by the French and 
Prussian Ministries of the Interior and their respective administrations to deal with 
public unrest were linked to a series of consideration among which the arguments 
about the pernicious effects of domestic military intervention were of minor 
importance.
The main point of chapter five is that, when the problem of mass protest movements 
arose in France and Prussia, similar arguments were put forward in both countries for 
and against the continuous use of military troops for internal purposes. However, 
although the same options existed, very different strategies were adopted in the early 
1890s, and came to dominate the area o f maintenance of internal order until the First 
World War. In chapter six, an analysis will be undertaken to explain why the policy of 
‘de-militarisation’ was adopted in Prussia and came to prevail after 1889, despite 
attempts from powerful forces within the military establishment, who, with support 
from the King, endeavoured to provide the army with a more active role in the struggle 
against the Social Democracy. Chapter Seven is an analysis of how the French 
authorities involved in the maintenance of order - the Ministry of the Interior, the 
ministry of war, the prefectoral and sub-prefectoral authorities and the army corps 
commanders progressively from the early 1890s onwards - reached a basic agreement 
about the necessity of extended use of troops particular in turbulent areas, such as 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais.
Three key factors can be pointed out in order to explain why the Prussian and the 
French authorities came to adopt very dissimilar policies towards public disorder. One 
was a dissimilar degree of acceptance by the French and Prussian state administrations 
of getting involved in local disputes. The second was linked to dissimilar expectations 
as to the potential of violence, and to a different degree of trust in the capacity of the 
army to ultimately put down major unrest. The third was that in both Westphalia and 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the policy adopted by the civil administration was to a large 
degree accepted and sometimes actively supported by the army corps commanders at 
the regional level.
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The main conclusion of this second part is that in both France and Prussia, the Ministry 
o f the Interior, the state administration at the regional level, and the army corps 
commanders in charge over this period had similar priorities in terms of maintenance of 
internal order. Together they were capable of withstanding forces working towards 





Chapter five. The debate about the ‘de-militarisation’ of 
internal peacekeeping in Prussia and France
As shown in chapter three, internal peacekeeping was a traditional part of the tasks of 
the military organisation. It was only during the 1870s that a debate started, in both 
Prussia and France, about the future role of the national army. The discussions, which 
took place at the ministerial level, in legislative assemblies, as well as in the press, 
involved three main issues. In the First place, there was the question of the role of the 
army as the defender of the existing social, political and economic order. Secondly the 
debate touched upon the issue of the relationship between the state and society, 
fundamentally addressing the question as to whether the national army could be turned 
against the nation, or at least groups within the nation. Finally, a series of objections of 
a practical and professional nature was raised against the domestic use of troops, from 
the side of the military establishment and from groups closely connected to the army. 
In the following a comparative analysis will be undertaken on three aspects:
•  the public debate in France and Prussia after 1871 over the role of the army; (5.2);
•  the debate concerning the relationship between ‘the army o f the nation* and French 
and Prussian citizens (5.3);
•  the military objections in Prussia and France to the use of troops for maintenance of 
public order (5.4).
The purpose of the chapter is to point out the similarities between the arguments raised 
in the French and Prussian debates. The main argument is that the objections raised in 
the debate cannot in themselves explain why the French and Prussian systems adopted 
strategies in which the army played a very dissimilar role.
5.1. Existing explanations
Two types of interpretations have been put forward to explain the move in Prussia 
towards ‘de-militarisation* of the internal peacekeeping. In the first place, scholars on
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the policing and policy of enforcement of discipline in Prussia have limited themselves 
to the arguments raised in these debates in explaining why the Prussian state 
administration after 1889 pursued - and carried through - its policy of ‘de-militarising’ 
internal peacekeeping.1 This argument, however, is unsatisfactory, given that the same 
arguments were put forward in France with no particular consequence for the policies 
pursued by the state administration, since the French Ministry of the Interior, in 
contrast to their Prussian counterparts, still adopted strategies that relied heavily on 
military assistance. This also raises the question how the Prussian administration could 
be persuaded to pursue a policy of ‘de-militarisation’ of the internal peacekeeping, if 
the same arguments could not make the French administration refrain from calling 
upon the army. Moreover, in both systems, whilst legislation stipulated the right of the 
administration to call for military assistance, the main recommendation from the 
Ministry of the Interior was to use the army only in cases of extreme necessity.2 
However, the law as well as the notion of ‘extreme urgency’ were interpreted in quite 
dissimilar ways. Accordingly, between 1890 and 1914, the concept of ‘necessity’ came 
to mean something very different within the French and Prussian system.
In addition to the argument that ‘de-militarisation’ of the internal peacekeeping in 
Prussia was a direct consequence of the arguments raised in the Prussian debate, there 
is the observation that members of the Prussian military establishment began argue that 
maintenance of public order was not the task of the army. This change of attitude has 
been linked to the increasingly degree of professionalisation of Prussian officers. There 
can be little doubt that the rise of the idea after 1870 that the army was an organisation 
exclusively aimed at foreign defence was linked to the increasing professionalisation of 
the officer corps with its more narrow definition of the role of the army.3 In a
1 Funk (1986) pp.155-156, lessen (1991) pp.40-43, Henning (1987).
2 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, ‘Instructions ministérielles; plans de protection; jurisprudence; 
emploi des troupes; usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914’ Confidential circular 
letter of 27 February 1884 from Waldeck-Rousseau, minister of the interior to the prefects. Similar 
principles were repeatedly stated in the instructions from the Prussian Ministry of the Interior after 
1889. Henning (1987).
3 This is Huntington’s fundamental thesis, with particular reference to the Prussian general corps of 
the Imperial period (1957) pp.98-139. This thesis constitutes a central element in his argument about 
the development of civilian supremacy in Western European states. The argument is shared by 
scholars working the military professionals in twentieth century third world countries. Janowitz 
(1975) p.3, Abrahamsson (1972) p.41. Despite his critique of Huntington’s use of the notion of
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comparative perspective, however, the dissimilar degree of professionalisation is 
difficult to apply as an explanation for the attitude of French and Prussian military 
commanders towards using their troops for internal purposes: among both military 
elites there was an increasing aversion against the use of troops for internal 
peacekeeping, while at the same time there was a clear readiness, if necessary, to 
defend the existing social and political order through military means. The disagreement 
between these two attitudes can be observed among Prussian and French senior 
commanders alike. These attitudes not only opposed the generals to one another, but 
appear as a fundamental dilemma within individual generals.
5.2. The role of the army as defender of the existing order.
After the Revolution of 1848, the Prussian army was seen by Liberal constitutionalists 
as the key instrument used by traditional forces to maintain their own position. 
Similarly in France, the spectre of the army as a politicised Praetorian guard haunted 
the Liberals and the Republicans after the end of the Second Republic. Detaching the 
army from domestic conflicts was hoped to be a way of ‘domesticating' the anti- 
Republican forces within the army.* 4 In both countries, the removal of the army from 
the realm of domestic peacekeeping was thus closely connected to the idea of 
establishing a truly civil parliamentary system. Unsurprisingly, the wish to avoid using 
the army against strikers or demonstrators was also advanced by politicians supporting 
the cause of the workers and who protested against the repression conducted by the 
‘ruling classes’ against strikers and demonstrators.5 In Prussian, the critique of the 
army not only came from the Social Democrats, but also from other groups who saw 
themselves as being bullied by the Prussian authorities.6
professionalisation, Finer admits the seeming link between professionalisation of officer corps in 
Western European states and their involvement in domestic politics. Finer (1988) pp.2I-22.
4 Girardet (1953) pp.42-43; Jauffret (1983) pp.99; 106-111; Krumeich (1994) pp.142-143;
5 Jauffret (1983) p i 14; Krumeich (1994) p.142;
6 This was particularly true for the German Catholics during the Kulturkampf of the 1870s. 
Blackboum (1993; 1997) provides many examples of the Catholic critique of the military response to 
peaceful gatherings in Marpingen 1876-1877. Similarly in Alsace-Lorraine, there were continuous 
complaints about the behaviour of the military commander and individual officers throughout the 
period.
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At the other end of the political spectrum, people with conservative and traditionalist 
political views tended to perceive the requisition of troops as a necessary show x  
force to defend the existing social, political and economic order. Pressure for the 
efficient defence of persons and private property against criminality and public unrest 
continued throughout the period in France as well as in Prussia. At the same time, 
however, the prestige of the army increased within these conservative groups. With 
rising national competition between the European states, broad groups in both France 
and Germany with political sympathies towards patriotic conservatism came to adopt 
the point of view that national independence and expansion could only be ensured by 
allowing the army to devote its attention exclusively to the defence of the national 
borders and to the protection of the interests and the prestige of the nation at the 
international level.7 From this opposite starting point, even conservative groups joined 
those in favour of ‘de-militarisation* of the internal peacekeeping.
5.3, The problem of the Army of the Nation versus the Nation
If a certain degree of consensus existed between various groups concerning the 
advantages of the ‘de-militarisation* of internal peacekeeping, then politically opposing 
groups could also join the principle of the army as ‘the nation in arms.’8 The idea of 
the army as an organisation comprising all male citizens o f the nation and exclusively 
committed to the defence of the national borders originated from the French 
Revolution,9 but was taken up by Gneisenau and Schamhorst in their reorganisation of
7 Ralston (1967) pp.9-10; Azéma & Winock (1970) pp.91-92; Bruneteaux (1993) p.32; Berghahn 
(1994) pp.93; 257-258;
8 In Prussia as in France, there was a considerable split on the political Left between those who saw 
the Nation in Arms as a way of achieving some degree of popular control over the armed forces, and 
those who saw the abolition of the permanent army organisation as the only way to prevent the ‘ruling 
classes* from using armed forces against popular protest. Krumeich 1994 pp. 142-143. Typical of that 
attitude was the declaration of Jaurès: ‘Tant qu’il y aura une armée, ce sera un crime contre le génie 
de la France et contre l’armée elle-même de la séparer de la nation.” Jaurès (1915). A similar 
opposition can be observed among the German Social Democrats of the early days of the Imperial era, 
which grew to a strong anti-militarist tendecy by the eve of the First World War. Krumeich (1980) 
p.135. In France, Radical and Socialist politicians also saw universal military service as a way of 
imposing equal duties on all French men, with no regards to their social origin or status. Challener 
(1955) pp.141-150, Krumeich (1980) p.142.
9 Montheillet (1932); Challenger (1955).
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the Prussian army 1807-1815 and towards the end of the century further developed by 
the influential work of General von der Goltz.10
However, certain conservative and liberal voices expressed doubts about the rationality 
o f  legitimising the army on the basis of the idea of the nation. There were both 
practical and ideological reasons for this. In the first place, both liberals and 
conservatives, fearing an armed revolt, felt uncomfortable about the idea of training 
peasants and workers in the use of weapons and military operations.11 After the French 
Commune, the National Guard had been dissolved for the very same reasons.12 The 
other main argument against the principle of the Nation in Arms addressed the problem 
o f justifying military interventions in domestic conflicts, that is to sent the ‘Army of the 
Nation* against the ‘Nation’, or at least groups belonging to the ‘Nation.*13
These considerations were raised in the Prussian as well as in the French debate.14 The 
implications, however, of continuous requisition of military troops were far more 
damaging in France than in Prussia. During the French Third Republic, the problem of 
mobilising military troops against French citizens contained the potentially dangerous 
element of undermining the legitimacy o f the regime. Thus the aversion to military 
involvement in civil conflicts was felt even by Republicans with very little sympathy for 
striking workers or political demonstrators. The army was also supposed to be one of 
the main integrational institutions of citizens into the Republic. However, this project 
was damaged by frequent confrontations between the army and groups of citizens. In 
particular, events such as the Commune, or the shooting at Fourmies in 1891 of 
fourteen striking workers, hindered the national unity that the army was supposed to 
provide. The debate in the wake of the events at Fourmies showed that the Republican 
regime could not allow such violent confrontations to take place between the Army of 
the Nation and French citizens. Finally, many leading French social groups feared that
10 Colmar von der Goltz ‘Das Volk im Waffen. Ein buch über das Heerwesen ’ Berlin: E.S.Mittler & 
Sohn, 1890
11 This was also the main obejction from Thiers during the debate about the reorganisation of the 
French army 1871-1873. Jauffret (1983) pp. 100-101; Krumeich (1994) p.141.
12 Azema & Winock (1970) p.80; Carrot (1984) p.640.
13 Jauffret (1983) p.100; Bruneteaux (1996) p.32.
14 Krumeich (1980) 134-135.
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the workers in uniform might turn their weapons against the established authorities and 
join an armed conflict.15
Thus, in France, the requisition of military troops was an instrument to be handled with 
care. The measures implemented towards public unrest was a balance between the 
need to control unrest, and, on the other hand, the risk that these means of control 
could escalate confrontations with strikers or demonstrators. The army was an 
instrument by which the authorities could control a situation up to a certain point, but 
the presence o f military troops could also trigger a revolt that could ultimately threaten 
the regime.
Although, in Prussia, similar arguments were put forward about the devastating effect 
that a violent confrontation between the army and civilians could have on the prestige 
of the army and the loyalty of the conscript soldiers, the problem was less serious here 
than in France. The Prussian army was committed to the defence of the Prussian State 
and of the territory under the rule o f the Prussian king and to the defence of public 
order. Since any disturbance of the public order could be defined as a rebellion against 
the public authorities, the fact of sending the army against individuals who challenged 
the existing social and political order did not constitute any ideological problem for the 
Prussian authorities. Thus, a violent confrontation between public forces and civilians 
did not in itself damage the legitimacy of the regime.
Furthermore, the role of the Imperial army as an integrational institution was not 
damaged to the same degree as the French army by violent confrontations with
15 During these decades, there were several infamous incidents of soldiers refusing to obey when 
ordered to use weapon against strikers and demonstrators. The earliest cases of refusal appeared in the 
press in relation to the incidents at Fourmies on the May Day of 1891, when it was reported in the 
press that a soldier had refused to shoot on the grounds that he was himself from Fourmies. (Agulhon 
(1990) pp. 100-101 and Bruneteaux (1996) p.35) Most famous are the mutiny among conscript 
soldiers, during the great strikes and demonstrations taking place during the spring 1906. In Langres, 
a battalion of the 21 infantry allegedly refused to mobilise to Paris to maintain public order on May 
Day. Officers responsible for the maintenance of order after the mining catastrophy at Courrifcres in 
March 1906 reported a mutiny about to break out. Most famously, during the revolts in the South of 
France over the summer of 1907, there were two cases of soldiers from the 17th and the 100th 
infantry regiments refusing to use force against demonstrators. There were similar incidents in Nancy 
in June 1907, and in Dunkerque on the May Day of 1908. (Bruneteaux (1996) p.36). Reports of such 
incidents were obviously popular in the socialist press, although the incidents reported often appear as 
rumours and annecdotes.
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civilians. Whereas the French army was supposed to act as an integrational institution 
for all citizens» the Prussian army was deliberately very selective in its administration 
o f general conscription. Even the recruitment of rank-and-file soldiers was restricted to 
‘safe and trustworthy* social groups» including the middle class and the Germans from 
the rural areas east of the river Elbe, whilst excluding more dubious elements such as 
Catholics and Jews, non-Germans and, in particular, industrial workers.
Thus, the advantages and the problems linked to the domestic use of troops were 
equally acknowledged in France and Prussia. In France, however, the political 
implications of domestic military intervention were considerably more serious than in 
Prussia.
5 .4 . Military resistance to the domestic use of troops
In addition to the public debate on the issue, it is worthwhile to examine the views 
expressed by members of the French and Prussian military establishment, in order to 
show that the dissimilar policies adopted were not primarily linked to very dissimilar 
attitudes among military officers to the domestic role of the army. There are two 
reasons for this: in both countries, the wish for ‘de-militarisation* of the internal 
peacekeeping was shared by many members of the military establishment, while on the 
other hand there was also a strong commitment among both French and Prussian 
officers to defend the existing social and political order against a ‘social revolution*. 
Similarly, it is very difficult to link the arguments put forward by members of the 
French and Prussian military establishment to a dissimilar degree of professionalisation 
o f the two officers corps.
5.4.1. The official ambiguity of the Prussian military establishment
The Prussian generals did not take part in any public debate about the domestic role of 
the army, since this would be an unacceptable attack on the monarch’s authority of 
command. From the 1890s, however, Prussian generals were increasingly clear that the
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task of the army should be the foreign defence of the interests of the nation, and not 
policing striking workers or disorderly mobs.
Officially, the attitude of the Prussian military establishment was ambiguous. From the 
1890s to the Zabem Affair, successive war ministers repeated that the mobilisation of 
troops for internal purposes was a disagreeable duty. In 1898, when, in the Reichstags 
Bebel sharply criticised the decree o f 20 March 1890 which had been leaked to the 
press,16 the war minister, Bronsart von Schellendorff immediately replied that the army 
would prefer to leave the burdensome task of fighting with workers in the street to the 
police.17 In 1910, a General Staff study on repression of internal unrest with military 
means became public, as well as an order from the army corps commander in 
Westphalia, General von Bissing, that violated several principles of basic citizens’ 
rights.18 These internal military instructions raised serious protests in the Reichstag. 
However, these were met by a declaration by the war minister that the army had no 
taste for domestic intervention. Despite these public declarations, military leaders kept 
affirming their readiness to intervene with military force, if the Social Democratic 
activities ‘made such a step necessary.’19 As late as 1914, in the wake of the Zabem 
affair, the war minister, General von Falkenheyn, declared in the Reichstag that the 
role of the army was ‘the secure defence of peace at home and abroad.*20
16 Minutes from the Reichstag, 15 December 1898. Cit. Harald Klückmann (1978) p.23
17 “Die Armee hat die ehrenvolle Aufgabe, den Feind an den Grenzen des Reiches zu schlagen. Der 
Lorbeer, der die Fahnen der Armee schmückt, wächst nicht auf den Strassen, auf denen zuchtlose 
Pöbelmassen zu Paaren getrieben werden! Die Armee betrachtet es als eine angenehme Pflicht, dies 
der Polizei und der Feuerwehr zu überlassen!” Priisdorff (1942) Article on Walther Bronsart von 
Schellendorff, No.2676.
18 The General Staff Study and the order from General von Bissing will be further analysed in 
Chapters Six and Nine.
19 Central Archive Potsdam III, R43 / Film signature 12425-12426, ‘Militärische Massnahmen im 
Falle von Unruhen. Belagerungszustand 1890-1918’ War Minister von Heering in the Reichstag, 23 
January 1911: “Die jetzige deutsche Armee hat ja  - Gott sei Dank - gar keine Praxis für ein Verhalten 
im Strassenkampf. Wir sehnen uns nach einer solchen Tätigkeit auch nicht. Schon einmal habe ich 
hier im Reichstag ausgesprochen, dass selbst der tatendurstigste Mann im Heere weiss, dass auf der 
Strasse kein Lorbeer blühe. Andrerseits aber wäre es eine grobe Pflichtverletzung Angesichts der nach 
der Verfassung unter Umständen ganz plötzlich an die einzelnen Militär-Befehlshaber herantretenden 
ernsten Entschlüsse einfach die Augen zuzumachen und sich nicht die dann erforderlichen 
Massnahmen in ruhigen Zeiten genau zu überlegen - wie dies für den Fall eines Krieges geschieht.”
20 Craig (1955) p.254.
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In Prussia, there seemed to be a clear inconsistency between, on the one hand, the role 
attributed to the army at the drawing-board in the War Ministry, the General Staff and 
the regional general commands, and, on the other hand, the inclination of the army 
corps commanders not to get involved in concrete cases o f unrest. Due to the 
fundamental ambiguity in the military's attitude, even those who tended to be ‘hawks* 
when occupying leading positions by the central military institutions had no problem in 
accommodating to the policy o f 'de-militarisation* o f the internal peacekeeping 
pursued by the state administration, once they performed as commanding generals.21
5.4.2. The French military debate
A similar ambiguous attitude towards the domestic role of the army can be observed 
among French officers at all levels. On the one hand, the issue was the object of a long 
on-going debate within the French military establishment, and many were the reasons 
for senior commanders to prefer withdrawing from civilian conflicts and concentrate 
on the defence of the national borders. On the other hand, open protests against 
interfering in domestic conflicts were never made by the War Ministry, and when 
confronted with actual cases of internal disorder, French commanders tended to 
accommodate to this policy of intervention, and enter into efficient co-operation with 
the civil authorities.
From  the early days of the Third Republic, senior members of the officer corps 
participated in the debate about the future role of the national army. During the debate 
about the reorganisation of the French army after 1871, no fewer than three different 
projects were written by senior officers - one by General Faidherbe, another by
21 General von Albedyll, a former chief of the Military Cabinet and a commander of the old school 
who had no professional or ethical inhibitions about domestic military intervention, was nevertheless 
the first commander to point out, during the great Westphalian strike of 1889, that it was not the role 
o f the army to settle conflicts between employers and employees. General von Waldersee, a former 
chief of the General Staff who was a strong supporter of the idea of a military coup against the 
Reichstag and the establishment of direct rule of William II. As army corps commander responsible 
during the great strike among Hamburg dock workers 1896-1897, he was very reluctant about miltiary 
intervention. General von Einem, known as a ‘hawk’ when he served as war minister between 1903 
and 1909, was quite keen on limiting the military intervention when in 1912 he was the army corps 
commander responsible in Westphalia.
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General Charenton, and a third by General Davout, duke of Auerstædt.22 Although 
suggesting various solutions to the problem of public forces ensuring the internal order 
of the Republic, the common aim o f these projects was to  detach the regular army 
from its traditional role in domestic peacekeeping. Serious criticisms of the domestic 
role of the army re-appeared during the 1890s, particularly in the wake of the killing of 
fourteen demonstrators in Fourmies (département Nord) on May Day 1891. A former 
war minister, General Lewal clearly expressed the view that, although the army was 
responsible for domestic order as well as for national security, the current conflicts 
between employers and employees were not matters for the armed forces to be drawn 
into.23 Apart this clear statement from General Lewal, critical voices mainly came from 
officers at the lower level of the military hierarchy, namely those in command in the 
actual situation o f disorder.24 In particular, the famous article of the later Marshal 
Lyautey argued strongly in favour o f concentrating the attention of the military on the 
defence of the French borders.25
Similarly, during the 1890s, different branches of the military apparatus put a great 
deal of effort into developing reorganisation projects o f the public forces, and in 
particular the creation of a mobile force of gendarmes.26 Despite these efforts, there 
was still much disagreement within the military establishment about the domestic role 
of the army. The General Staff, the cavalry department, the general commander, and 
individual officers were split between the supporters of various projects of a mobile
22 General Failherbe, ‘Bases d ’un projet de réorganisation d ’une armée nationale’, (1871); General 
Charenton, ‘Projet motivé de réorganisation de l'état militaire de la France', (1871); General 
Davout, Duc d’Auerstædt, 'Projet de réorganisation militaire (1871).
23 General Lewal Les troupes coloniales' Paris 1894. “On voudrait que les soldats ne fussent plus 
obligés d’intervenir dans les conflits entre patrons et grévistes. Ce n’est pas le rôle de Tannée. Elle y 
subit des injures, elle y reçoit des coups et des blessures, on l’outrage quand elle se défend. C ’est du 
sang français et du meilleur que Ton perd (...) on n’a pas le droit de le répandre pour la protection 
d’intérêts privés. Il importerait donc d’avoir des agents spéciaux pour ce service de police, des 
volontaires rétribués ‘constables’ à pied et à cheval pour contenir et apaiser les conflits industriels.” 
Cit. Jauffret ( 1983) p. 114.
24 Anonymous ‘L'armée et l'ordre public* Paris 1891; anonymous ‘L'armée sous le régime civil et 
les questions militaires pendantes' Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, 1894; Commandant Francfort 
‘Les Corps d'officiers des principales armées européennes ' Paris 1895; Commandant Sila ‘Une vie 
infernale. Mémoires d'un officier de cavalerie ' Paris 1907; Le lieutenant Z. 'L'armée aux grèves, 
grèves générale des mineurs, oct~nov 1902’ Paris 1904.
25 Hubert Lyautey ‘Le rôle social de l’officier* in Révue des Deux Mondes March 1891.
26 Jauffret (1983).
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force of gendarmes,27 and those in favour of a status quo with the army as a central 
factor in the maintenance of public order. The latter pointed out that the municipal 
police forces were in general unfit and too understaffed to undertake the task of crowd 
management, even with the help from a mobile gendarmerie force.28 The result of 
these internal conflicts and the mutually competing projects was that the lobbying from 
various sections within the War Ministry against the domestic use of troops was weak 
and ineffective.29
Individual officers also made suggestions for reforms that would allow the army to 
withdraw from internal peacekeeping. Between 1899 and 1906 no fewer than twenty- 
two articles were published in La France Militaire on the maintenance of order and 
the question concerning a mobile force to relief the army from this task. Given that La 
France Militaire was the semi-official mouthpiece of the War Ministry, this also shows 
how unsettled the issue was within the military establishment, as Bruneteaux very 
rightly points out. 30
The most common military arguments against the domestic use of troops were that 
frequent use of the army broke up the military schedule and damaged the training of 
the recruits. Secondly, there was great concern for the negative effects of long-lasting 
mobilisations on the discipline and health of soldiers and horses. These problems 
became particularly serious after 1905, when the period of military service was 
reduced from three to two years. Protests reached an unprecedented level during the 
enforcement of the laws separating the French state and the Catholic Church during 
the years 1902 to 1906. In February-March 1906, the reluctance of individual officers 
and local commanders was so manifest that it developed into serious problems of 
military discipline. At this occasion, General Lamiraux, a retired commanding officer,
27 Within the War Ministry, the General Staff and the cavalry department, formally in charge of the 
gendarmerie, had internal conflicts on the question, because the cavalry department was not inclined 
to hand over the command of a part of the gendarmerie. The cavalry was the arm most heavily 
charged with the task of maintaining internal order, but at the same time striving to legitimise its 
existence in fromt of a General Staff that considered the cavalry to be an outdated arm unfit for 
modem warfare. Jauffret 1983 p.130-131.
28 Bruneteaux (1996) pp.45-47.
29 Jauffret (1983) pp. 137-138.
30 Bruneteaux (1996) p.48
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engaged in the debate against the administrators* use of military assistance.31 However, 
General Lamiraux did not argue against the principle o f army*s involvement in 
domestic conflict as such, but complained that the military commander was not 
allowed to use his troops as a military force and respond vigorously to the attacks from 
the demonstrators.32
It is, however, important to distinguish between the on-going debates in La France 
Militaire, pleading against the principle o f using the army for internal purposes, and 
the professional performance of the general commanders who were responsible for the 
maintenance of internal order. The opinions expressed in La France Militaire, a 
newspaper with close links to - and sometimes the mouthpiece of - the War Ministry, 
were generally liberal and Republican when compared to the major part of the military 
establishment. Thus, to plead against the internal use of the military troops with 
reference to the bad image it created of the army and the damage it did to the 
relationship between the nation and its army can be regarded as the ‘politically correct* 
attitude within the army establishment that was not being an official opposition against 
the administrative practice of the Ministry of the Interior and the civil administration.
What the officers in favour of serious reforms lacked was a clear military point of 
view. The officer corps and the military elite were very split in their opinion about 
whether the solution was a reorganisation of the civil forces, or whether, confronted 
with mass protest movements only the army was capable o f facing the challenge of 
crisis management.33 During the parliamentary debates on the projects for a mobile 
force of gendarmes, the military establishment had used all the well-known arguments 
as to why the army should not be involved in maintenance of order. Detaching the 
army from internal peacekeeping was arguably the long-term wish of the military
31 La France Militaire, 12 May 1906, front page article ‘L’armée contre l’anarchie’.
32 The same complaint was put forward in an anonymous front page article in La Franc Militaire of 
28 April 1906: “Maintenant que l’émeute a pris fin dans le Nord et que le calme sinon le travail 
paraissent renaître, nous pouvons en pleine liberté juger les événements qui viennent de s'accomplir 
et en particulier les moyens qui ont été employés pour reprimer le desordre. Disons tout d’abord que 
ceux-ci ont été détestables. S’ils ont permis d’admirer le sang-froid de la troupe, son impassibilité 
d’en face des attaques dont elle a été l’objet, son abnégation, ils ont, par contre, démontré jusqu'à 
l’évidence que l’hésitation et la faiblesse devant l’emeute rendent celle-ci plus violente et plus 
audacieuse et font plus de victimes qu’une répression énergique”.
33 Berlière (1996) pp.46-47, and Jauffret (1983) p.141.
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establishment. A united military statement in favour of a reform of the policy on 
internal peace keeping that would allow the requisition of the military troops to 
become the ultima ratio solution, might have forced the government to look seriously 
for alternative forces, or to reconsider the whole concept of defending public order. In 
this situation, however, where the military establishment was unclear about its position, 
the administrative procedures and the repeated implementation of the same measures 
became all the more important.
5.4.3. Impact of rising professionalisation, a valid explanation ?
The protests put forward by the military establishment have been linked to the 
increasing professionalisation of the officer corps. Professionalisation, as defined by 
Huntington, is a combination of two elements: the level of education and the degree to 
which the generals were full-time officers with a long, progressive career in the 
professional hierarchy; the professional ethic within the corps, characterised by 
political neutrality, implying total submission to the will of the political executive.34
Although the level of professional training at the Prussian Kriegsakademie was 
superior to that obtained at the French Ecole supérieure de guerre, it would be 
inappropriate to suggest that the French general commanders were more prepared to 
use the army for internal purposes than their Prussian counterparts because of this 
dissimilar level of professional training. Like their Prussian counterparts, the French 
commanding generals of the late nineteenth century were full time career officers, with 
a highly specialised formal education. As for professional ethics, the French generals 
were more politically neutral and inclined to submit under the political executive than 
were the Prussian commanders, who were often very politicised.35 In that respect, the 
French military could be said to display a more professional attitude than did their 
Prussian counterparts. Linked to the notion of ‘professional ethos’ is also the idea that
34 Huntington (1957) pp.8-18.
35 The a-political nature of the French military elite is generally seen as one of its main features, in 
particular for the Republican period. Girardet (1953) 252-256; Serman (1982; 1994 p.212); Hélie 
(1994) p.242. Conversely, the Prussian senior commanders were notoriously involved in political 
issues concerning the interests of the army as well as in foreign policy. Craig (1965); Ritter (1965); 
Deist (1990).
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‘professionalism* should dispose the officer corps to be reluctant in intervening with 
military force against unarmed protesters in street fights. Indeed, the argument was put 
forward in France, as well as in Prussia, that officers preferred a noble combat against 
another army, estimating this the only type of encounter appropriate for a militaiy 
officer.36 Similarly, the French literature often talks about the domestic military 
intervention constituting a problem of professional conscience for the French 
officers.37
Neither of these two elements of professionalisation, however, are very useful in 
explaining the attitudes among French and Prussian generals, or to rationalise the 
development of dissimilar strategies within the two systems. Reluctance towards the 
internal mobilisation of troops is an element that can be found equally in France and 
Prussia, with varying intensity depending on the individual general. In addition, the 
military commanders in both countries were also prepared at any moment to use their 
troops to defend the regime as well as the existing social and economic order. A 
particular problem with the notion of ‘professionalism* is that arguments about 
‘professionalism* were also put forward to justify an interventionist attitude. If officers 
protested in the name of their professional pride against the use of the army in labour 
conflicts and political demonstrations, they also insisted that the defence of public 
order and the apprehension of disturbers and criminals were integrated parts of their 
professional duties.38 In France, moreover, military officers would claim that their
36 See above noie 20. Similarly Waldersee declared when justifying his reluctance about the King’s 
demand for military intervention in the Hamburg dock strike of 1896-1897: “Ich wäre sehr froh, wenn 
die Polizei bei etwaigen Auschreitungen genügen würde; gegen hungrige Arbeiter mit Waffengewalt 
einschreiten, ist wahrlich kein Genuss.” General von Waldersee ‘Denkwürdigkeiten des Generalfeld- 
Marchalls Alfred von Waldersee’ (ed.H.O.Meisner)1922. vol.2 1888-1900; Diary of 2 December 
1896.
37 Girardet (1953) pp.262-264; Serman (1982) pp.59-63; Jauffret (1983);
38 “Bei eventuelen Streiks jedoch, namentlich wenn die Zivilbehörden sich zu schwach fühlten, mit 
ihren eigenen Mitteln die Ordnung aufrechtzuerhalten, hatte der Kommandierende General das Recht 
und die Pflicht, diese Sorge unter gleichzeitiger Meldung an den Kaiser und das Kriegsministerium 
zu übernehmen.” General von Einem ‘Erinnerungen eines Soldaten 1853-1933' Leipzig, Verlag von 
K.F.Koehler 1933 p.167. The professional duty of the military officer to repress disorder was also 
stressed by General Lamiraux in his article in ’La France militaire’ of 12 May 1906 entitled ‘L ’armée 
contre l ’anarchie. ’ Similarly, statement in an anonymous front page article in ‘La France militaire’ 
of 28 April 1906 entitled ’Faiblesse et energie “Le texte du règlement est formel à cet égard, et de 
plus il est sage. Le droit de repousser la force par ta force est un droit absolu au point de vue de la 
défense personnelle, et dans le cas particulier du désordre dans la rue, il se double de l’obligation de 
garantir la sécurité des citoyens et leurs propriétés.”
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professional ethos forced them to follow blindly the requisitions from the civil 
authorities. It was therefore also in the name of professionalism that the French army 
became increasingly involved in the maintenance of public order.
Although, in a very general sense, there seems to be a connection between 
professionalisation of the officer corps and the attitude of the military leaders towards 
use of troops against internal conflicts, this tendency is too vague to be considered the 
key element shaping the policy of the military establishment. Factors such as codes of 
honour, or the practical elements of training programs were only one reason for the 
attitudes expressed by the military establishment. Moreover, the arguments which were 
made in the name of professionalism did not lead unequivocally to military opposition 
to  the internal mobilisation of troops. The arguments made in the name of 
professionalisation could thus be used to justify both a non-interventionist policy and a 
highly interventionist strategy. It is therefore difficult to argue that the degree of 
professionalisation as such explains much about the dissimilar degree of domestic 
military intervention in France and Prussia. The notion of professionalism can, at most, 
serve as a rationalisation of the views expressed by French and Prussian officers, but 
cannot in itself explain the difference between the policies pursued in the two 
countries.
The comparison of the arguments put forward in France and Prussia for and against 
the use of military troops in domestic peacekeeping shows a remarkable degree of 
similarity, not only in the arguments put forward, but also the ways in which these 
arguments were linked to particular groups. The similarities of the debate seriously call 
into question the causal relationship between the arguments put forward against the 
internal use of troops in the two countries, and the policies pursued. The arguments 
had little effect unless these were sustained by a serious determination within the state 
apparatus actually to change their strategies to deal with public unrest.
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5.5. Concluding remarks: similar arguments, dissimilar outcomes
In a comparative perspective, it is difficult to draw a direct link between the objections 
raised in the public debates and within the military establishment against the use of 
military troops to maintain public order and the specific strategy adopted by the French 
and Prussian system to deal with greater unrest with or without military assistance.
The findings of the present study point to two main conclusions. First, that the same 
arguments were raised in the France and Prussia against the use of troops for domestic 
peacekeeping, and in both countries specific arguments were linked to similar political 
or professional groups. Secondly, that the pernicious effect of continuous use of 
military troops was potentially more damaging for the French Republican regime than 
it was for the Prussian. This, however, was not sufficient argument to persuade the 
French Ministry of the Interior and state administration to refrain from extended use of 
military troops to control instances of public unrest.
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Chapter six. The Prussian ‘Kampfinstrument nach Innen’ 
revised: The successful implementation of the 'de­
militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping
Even if the policy by the Prussian Ministry of the Interior concerning ‘de-militarisation’ 
of the internal peacekeeping was sustained by the arguments described above, these 
arguments are insufficient on their own to explain the policy pursued by the Prussian 
Ministry of the Interior. This chapter sets out the initial formation of strategies in 
Prussia in the 1890s. Two aspects will be analysed linked to the adoption of the police 
of ‘de-militarisation* of the internal peacekeeping. In the first place, recognising that 
the available civil forces remained too weak to deal with riots and violent actions of 
any significance, the Prussian Ministry of the Interior and the state administration, right 
up till the eve of the First World War, kept operating with the idea of military 
assistance, although this step was very rarely taken. Secondly, it is important to stress 
that the policy of ‘de-militarisation* was implemented by the Ministry of the Interior 
against powerful forces within the military establishment - supported by the King - 
who worked towards attributing a more active internal role to the army.
The function of the chapter is
• to set out the powerful forces within the Prussian system that worked for greater 
use of the army to deal with public unrest and control o f ‘subversive elements’;
•  to indicate the gap between the rhetoric and the bureaucratic practices;
•  to show which groups within the Prussian state opposed the use of military troops 
and begin to explain why and how these views were followed in practice;
Within the German historiography, both general interpretations o f various tendencies1 
as well as the military historians2 stress the commitment of the Prussia War Ministry, 
the General Staff and the individual commanders to the struggle against the Social 
Democrats. Among the military historians, only Deist argues along the same lines as
1 WehJer (1973, 1995), Berghahn (1994), Saul (1981), Nipperdey (1992).
2 Craig (1955), Ritter (1965), Messerschmidt (1970; 1980).
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the recent research on Prussian policing, pointing to the discrepancy between the 
initiatives from the central military institutions and the general commands, and the 
measures implemented in concrete cases of strikes and unrest.3
Looking at ministerial initiatives, circulars, and memoirs o f generals, the declarations 
show clear intentions to launch a military crack-down on anything that smacked of 
Social Democratism, trade unionism, or other types of organised labour activities. On 
the other hand, the authoritarian surface is deceptive. In fact, the issue about the 
domestic role of the amiy remained in dispute throughout the Imperial period in the 
sense that the Prussian state did not operate as a coherent entity, and spoke with many 
voices.
The successful implementation of the ‘de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping 
therefore has to be seen against the forces that endeavoured to attribute a more active 
role to the army against the forces in the German society striving for social and 
political change. On the one hand there was the strategies adopted and pursued by the 
Ministry of the Interior and the senior state administrators at the regional after 1889 
towards strengthening the civil forces and waiting as long as possible before calling in 
military troops. On the other hand, there were the highly interventionist strategies 
developed by the War Ministry and the General Staff, which were strongly supported 
by the King, whenever he was in that frame of mind.
Within the two groups, however, there seems to be a split between the central, the 
regional and the local authorities over the strategies to be implemented in order to deal 
with public disturbance in particular during strikes. Within the state administration, 
there was a split between the regional and the local level. In contrast to the province 
and district governors, the local governors, being closer to the conflicts taking place, 
were more ready to prefer the highest degree of security. Within the military 
establishment, there appears to  be a certain opposition between the initiatives from the 
central military authorities in Berlin, and the army corps commanders who tended to be
3 Deist (1991) pp.27-28, Funk (1986) p.351, lessen (1991) pp.40-41, Spencer (1985) p.311, ibid. 
(1992) pp.86-87.
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more hesitant towards military involvement in local conflicts. The policy of ‘de­
militarisation’ was therefore often supported by the army corps commanders.
This chapter shows that the Prussian state was not monolithic but was characterised by 
important divisions between the different sections of the state, both between the civil 
and military branches of the state, and within the military establishment itself.
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6.1. Attempts by the central military authorities to provide the army with 
a more active domestic roie
Knowledge about the details of the policy of the central military institutions - War 
Ministry and General Staff - towards the internal role of the army is limited due to the 
destruction of the military archive in Berlin in 1945. Despite these difficulties, three 
important features can be discerned from of the projects and decrees emanating over 
the years 1890-1914.
• In the 1890s after the abolishment of the anti-Socialist legislation, the War Ministry 
attempted to give the army a more active role in the control and repression of Social 
Democratic activities, both within the army and in wider local society.
• The role attributed to the army in 1890 as a key actor in the struggle against the 
Social Democracy continued to be the basis of the policies pursued in the War 
Ministry as is evidenced as late as 1912.
• The plans developed in the War Ministry were not concerned with the type of 
labour conflicts and political demonstrations which actually took place, but deal 
only with hypothetical situations o f open revolt and street fights. The plans which 
were established and recommended by the War Ministry therefore had no relation to 
the actual problems of maintaining public order.
Analysis of the policy of the Prussian War Ministry must rely on the decrees and 
projects which emanated or were recommended by the W ar Ministry during this 
period. After the Westphalian strike, the first important initiative from the War 
Ministry was the ministerial decree o f 20 March 1890.4 It was inspired partly by the 
great Westphalian miners* strike of 1889, and partly by the abolition of the Anti- 
Socialist laws in the spring of 1890. The aim of the decree was to strengthen the role 
of the army in the repression of internal disorder in general, and against Social 
Democratic activities in particular.
4 Central Archive, Potsdam III, R.43 film signature 12425-12426 ‘Militärische Massnahmen im Fall 
von Unruhen. Belagerungszustand, 1890-1918’ or Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2/466, 
‘Bekämpfung socialdemokratischer Bestrebungen, 1890-1892: Verbot und Bestrafung der Teilnahme 
an geheimen Verbindungen, Öffentlichen Versammlungen und politischen Vereinen zur Zeit des 
Sozialistengesetzes ’
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The war minister Verdy du Vemois made it quite explicit that in the future the general 
commanders bore the burdensome responsibility of the maintenance of domestic order. 
His definition of that duty comprised five main points: First, the general commander in 
each military region was supposed to inform himself currently about the organisation, 
publications, activities and leaders of the Social Democratic party in his region and 
report back to the King.5 Secondly, the army corps commander, having formal powers 
to declare a military state of siege, was directly invited to make use of this resource, if 
he considered this appropriate. The declaration of a state of siege would mean that the 
provisions in the Prussian Constitution concerning fundamental civil rights were 
suspended, as well as the limitations on the authority of the military commander, and it 
was understood that the military commanders were supposed to use this freedom to 
launch a crack down on suspect persons and organisations. This becomes obvious, 
with the third key element of the decree, which ordered the arrest of all the leaders of 
the Social Democracy, including members of the Reichstag with no regard to their 
parliamentary immunity, as well as confiscation of dangerous publications. Fourth, the 
general commanders were supposed to prepare his troops for this type of action,6 and 
to make sure that any revolt was stopped whilst still in its embryonic stages through a 
convincing display of force.7 Finally, Verdy du Vemois informed the minister of the 
interior that each general commander was held responsible for ensuring that Social 
Democrats did not enter the army as reservists or conscript soldiers.8 This was not 
only a measure to keep the Social Democratic ‘poison’ away from the ranks, but, as 
Deist rightly points out, must also be seen as a preparation of the aimy for repressive 
actions internally, for which loyal recruits were an absolute necessity.9 The provisions
5 Decree of 20 March 1890 “Das Generalkommando selbst muss über die bczeichncten Verhältnisse 
des gesammten Korpsbezirks orientiert sein“, “dauernd auf dem laufenden."
6 Decree of 20 March 1890 “ Neben den Vorbereitungen für lokale und polizeiliche Massnahmen, 
haben die Generalkommandos ein etwa erforderliches Einschreiten der Truppe dahin 
vorzubereiten..."
7 Decree of 20 March 1890 "... dass durch genügende Kraft-Entfaltung und energisches Auftreten 
jeder Aufruhr im Keime erstickt wird. Wird hierbei von der Waffe Gebrauch gemacht, so erwarten 
Seine Majestät der Kaiser, dass dieser Gebrauch ein dem Ernst der Lage entsprechender ist.”
8 Decree of 31 March 1890 from the minister of the intcrior to the provincc govenors. Rcf.Dcist 
(1991) p.34.
9 Deist (1991) p.25.
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from this decree kept haunting the imagination o f succeeding war ministers, and 
recommendations to implement these measures can be found as late as 1912.10
The determination of the War Ministry to use the army actively in the repression of the 
Social Democracy also emerges clearly in the service regulation of the military use of 
weapons from 1899, issued by the War Ministry. The first chapter concerned the 
situation in which a soldier or an officer had an absolute duty to intervene, with no 
consideration to whether they had been formally requested from a civil authority (pp.l- 
7). These provisions could easily be applied to strikes and demonstrations, when stone 
throwing and armed attacks were not uncommon. The second chapter (pp.7*I5) 
established the conditions under which military troops could be requested, stipulating 
that military troops could only be requested when order could no longer be ensured 
with the available civil force. The third and largest chapter concerned the conditions 
under which a military state of siege could be declared (pp. 15-27).
In comparison with previous summaries of the existing rules, which were mainly 
concerned with the description of the limitations surrounding the use of weapons,11 it 
is worth noting the emphasis placed in the 1899 Service Regulations on two particular 
elements. One is the absolute duty of the soldier to intervene with weapons when being 
attacked by armed civilians. The second key element is the attention paid to the rights 
of the military commander to take over supreme authority, even without consulting the 
civil authorities. As was the case with the decree of 20 March 1890, the service 
regulations of 1899 constituted the basis of the official policy of the War Ministry, and 
was constantly referred to in recommendations to the general commanders right up 
until the eve of the First World War.12
10 Münster HaStA, OP 6095 (documents 206-215), instructions from the war minister to the 
commanding generals of 8 February 1912. Similaliy, Bayerische HStA AbUV-Kriegsarchiv, MKR 
2497. Decree of 9 November 1908.
11 Central Archive, Potsdam III, R43, film signature 12403-12404, ‘Stenographische Berichte. 
Militärsachen in Allgemein, 1886-1899’, ‘Erläuterung der Bestimmungen über das Einschreiten und 
den Waffengebrauch der Wachtposten* (1886); ‘Zusammenfassung der im Reich und in den Bunddes­
staaten geltenden Bestimmungen über den Waffengebrauch der Wachtposten’ (1892).
12 Military Archive, Freiburg, K 02-5/2, (ref. Deist (1991) p.26). Decree of 17 November 1910 from 
the War Ministry. Münster HaStA, OP 6095, (documents 206-215). Instructions of 8 February 1912 
from the war minister to the commanding generals.
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In addition to the decrees and service regulations emanating directly from the War 
Ministry, three other studies were recommended by the War Ministry as examples to 
be followed. The General Staff study from 1907 entitled ‘Fighting in Insurgent Towns’ 
provided the guiding principles of how to repress armed revolts in urban areas. The 
study was sent to all the regional general commanders. During the following years, the 
suggestions of the General Staff study were taken up and developed by at least two 
army corps commanders: General von Bissing, army corps commander in Westphalia, 
issued an order to his subordinate commanders entitled ‘Conduct in case of internal 
unrest,’13 whilst General von Hindenburg, army corps commander in Magdeburg, 
developed a series of instructions which were implemented during the Mansfelder 
strike of 1909.14
The decrees and recommendations from the War Ministry leave little doubt about the 
continuous attempts to use the army to repress social unrest and political opposition 
with military means. Due to the public consternation in November 1910 when 
Bissing’s order became publicly known, the War Ministry formally dissociated itself 
from these instructions.15 However, the General Staff study from 1907 remained the 
basis of the War Ministry’s policy. Less than one month before the last great 
Westphalian miners’ strike, the war minister, von Heering, issued a decree to the army 
corps commander which again referred to this General Staff study as well as 
Hindenburg’s instructions as examples to be followed.16
With direct reference to the decree of 20 March 1890, von Heeringen yet again 
adviced the general commanders to prepare themselves for internal mobilisation and to
13 Central Archive, Potsdam III, R43, film signature 12425-12426, ‘Militärische Massnahmen im Fall 
von Unruhen. Belagerungszustand, 1890-1918.’ Order of 30 April 1907 ‘Verhalten bei inneren 
Unruhen.*
14 Bayersiche HStA Abteilung IV-Kriegsarchiv, MKR 2497. Order of 4 February 1908 
‘Bestimmungen über die Verwendung von Truppen zur Unterdrückung innerer Unruhen.’
15 Military Archive, Freiburg, K 02-5/2. (Ref. Deist (1991) p.26). Decree of 17 November 1910 from 
the War Ministry to the commanding generals.
16 Münster HaStA, OP 6095 (documents 206-215). Instructions of 8 February 1912 from the war 
minister to the commanding generals, ‘Verwendung von Truppen zur Unterdrückung innerer 
Unruhen.’: “Es darf hierbei auf die während des Mansfelder Aussstandes erprobten und auf Grund der 
damaligen Erfahrungen ergänzten ‘Bestimmungen über die Verwendung von Truppen zur 
Unterdrückung innerer Unruhen* des IV Armeekorps und die Generalstabsstudie aus dem Jahre 1907 
‘Der Kampf in insurgierten Städten’ hingewiesen werden”
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get detailed information about the growth of the working population in the industrial 
areas, their political sympathies as well as keeping an eye on the Social Democratic 
activities in the area. The aim was to provide an immediate and forceful repression of 
disorder.17 In this decree von Heeringen recognised the policy of the Ministry of the 
Interior, and clearly stated that it was in the interests of the army to avoid 
intervention.18 It is worth noting, however, that in contrast to the civil authorities who 
only talked about military intervention in relation to major strikes in the mining sector, 
the war minister operated with such undefined terms as ‘innerer Unruhen\  
* Ruhestörungen* or *Störung der öffentlichen Sicherheit,* a wording applicable to 
even the smallest instance of unrest. In the light of the increasing political influence of 
the Social Democracy, it was hardly unintentional that such wide wording was used, 
leaving plenty of discretion for the army to be used in many other situations than 
strikes in the mining sector.
The projects and decrees from the War Ministry thus continued to attribute an active 
role to the army, not only to maintain and restore public order, but also to provide 
information and to establish plans for protection independently from the civil 
authorities. By 1912, the War Ministry still saw the army as an instrument for internal 
warfare, irrespective of the policy of ‘de-militarisation* o f internal peacekeeping that 
had been pursued by the Ministry of the Interior for more than two decades.
6.2. The army corps commanders: Lions in Speech, Lambs in Action
Whilst the War Ministry pursued a policy of using the army as an ‘instrument for 
internal warfare’, developments outside the walls of the War Ministry and the General 
Staff moved in a different direction. Not only did war ministers seem to become
17 Münster HaStA, OP 6095 (documents 206-215), instructions from the war minister to the 
commanding generals of February 8 1912, ‘Verwendung von Truppen zur Unterdrückung innerer 
Unruhen’: “Sofortiges Eingreifen mit hinreichenden Kräften kann für die schnelle und erfolgreich 
Unterdrückung von Ruhestörungen enscheidend sein."
18 Münster HaStA, OP 6095 (documents 206-215), instructions of 8 February 1912 from the war 
minister to the commanding generals, ‘Verwendung von Truppen zur Unterdrückung innerer 
Unruhen’: “Für die Zivilbehörden wird bei Truppenanforderungen der Standpunkt des Ministers des 
Innen massgebend sein...Auch nach diesseitigem Erachten muss das Heranziehen der Truppe im 
Interesse der Armee nach Möglichkeit vermieden werden."
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increasingly isolated within government19 but the attitude of the army corps 
commanders, although in principle in favour of repressive measures against Social 
Democratic activities, proved to be reluctant to military intervention when it came to 
concrete instances of strike or demonstration. Thus the gap between the instructions 
from the War Ministry and the Great General Staff, and the actual course of the 
military interventions at the regional level, more than anything shows the disparity 
between, on the one hand, the political designs of the military establishment, as 
developed in the Great General Staff and professed by the War Ministry, and, on the 
other hand, the rationale of general commanders facing concrete situations of unrest to 
which they needed to find appropriate responses.
During the major strikes in Westphalia, the state administration’s attempts to avoid 
military intervention were supported by the army corps commanders. The commanding 
generals referred to the interests of the army organisation, and claimed that the 
problem of maintaining internal order was the responsibility of the civil authorities, at 
least until a very advanced stage of the conflict when riots and violent actions became 
too widespread for the civil forces to control.20 At the same time, given that the civil 
administration made serious efforts to manage the situations with their own forces, the 
general commanders rarely questioned the need for military assistance if eventually 
military troops were requested. Moreover, in pursuing their inclinations to moderate 
any military engagement, the general commanders had no qualms about by-passing the 
recommendations from the War Ministry as well as the orders issued by the King. In 
concrete cases o f unrest, the general commanders always chose to follow strictly the 
instructions from the civil authorities.
The gap between the rhetoric and reality of military intervention can be seen by 
looking at the decisions of five prominent commanders, three of whom served in 
Westphalia. In 1889, from the very beginning of the military intervention in the great 
Westphalian miners* strike, the army corps commander, General von Albedyll,
19 Henning (1987) p.160.
20 Alfred Graf von Waldersee 4 A us dem Briejwechsel des General-Feldmarschalls Graf von 
Waldersee* (ed.H.O.Meisner) vol.l, Berlin, E.S.Mitller & Sohn, 1927, pp.288-289. Letter of 11 May 
1889 from General von Albedyll to General von Waldersee. Similarly General von Loë to Waldersee 
in a letter of 24 April 1890, (pp.367-368).
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complained about the requisitions from the civil authorities demanding protection from 
important contingents of soldiers. This brought him into opposition, not only with the 
civil administration, but also with the War Ministry and the King.21 Although he 
described the reaction of the civil authorities as wildly exaggerated,22 he did not deny 
the appropriateness of military intervention. His objection to the mobilisation of 10,000 
soldiers was that he could deal with the problem with many fewer men, if only he had 
his hands free to repress the disturbance with traditional military means.23 Realising 
that he would not be allowed to implement such measures, he became a vigorous 
supporter of ‘de-militarisation* of internal peacekeeping. In his account to the King 
after the end o f the strike, Albedyll expressed his deepest concern about the prospect 
of frequent military assistance to the civil forces in the future, unless the police and the 
gendarmerie forces were strengthened significantly.24
21 “Wir schiessen hier wirklich mit der Kanone nach dem Sperling, wenn der durch den 
Kriegsminister mir zugegangene Befehl wirklich ausgeführt wird (...) Ganz besonders aber möchte 
ich wenigstens die Artillerie zu Hause lassen dürfen, die den äusseren Anschein des Martialischen so 
sehr erhöht und die doch bei solcher Sache unmöglich verwendbar ist. Wir kennzeichnen doch auch 
die Sache nach aussen in meines Erachtens sehr wenig wünschenswerter Weise durch solchen 
Apparat. Ich kann den ganzen Befehl nur als einen aus dem Staatsministerium hervorgegangenen 
ansehen, welches der hiesigen Heulmeierei und seinen trottlichen Beamten glaubt und dem 
Hilfegeschrei der Zechen folgt. Dem Sinn des Kaisers, der doch so sehr und so hoch soldatisch ist, 
kann (...) nur gegenteilig wirken.” Letter of 11 May 1889 from General von Albedyll to General von 
Waldersee 'Aus dem Briefwechsel des General-Feldmarschalls A.Graf von Waldersee’ vol.l, 
(ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin, 1927 pp.288-289
22 “In Berlin müssen sich durch das Geschrei der zum grossen Teil elenden Zivilbehörden und der 
Industriellen Auffanssungen zur Geltung gebracht haben, die in der Tat nur der Angst der 
Betreffenden, keineswegs aber der wirklichen Sachlage entsprechen. Ich bekomme fast alle zehn 
Minuten ein Telegrammem, worin der Umsturz aller Dinge erklärt wird, wenn nicht sofort 
militärische Hilfe komme, und es ist noch absolut gar nichts geschehen, was einer 
Eigentumsbeschädigung auch nur ähnlich sähe.” Letter of 11 May 1889 from General von Albedyll to 
General von Waldersee 'Aus dem Briefwechsel des General-Feldmarschalls A.Graf von Waldersee' 
vol.l, (ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin, 1927 p.288.
23 “Militärisch ist auf die Frage des Endes gar kein Einfluss möglich, namentlich dann nicht, wenn es 
nicht zum Belagerungszustand kommt. Wir können nur die Ordnung erhalten und Exzesse verhüten. 
Das ist bis jetzt geschehen und das wird zuversichtlich auch ferner gesehenen, wenn man mir nur 
freie Hand lässt. (...) Dass gegen die Arbeiter bei jeder Veranlassung schonungslos und fest 
eingeschritten wird, ist bisher schon gezeigt und das wird auch sicherlich ferner geschehen.” Letter of 
11 May 1889 from General von Albedyll to General von Waldersee, ‘Aus dem Briefwechsel des 
General-Feldmarschalls A. Graf von Waldersee’ vol.l, (ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin, 1927 p.289
24 Münster HaStA, OP 2847b, ‘Berichte des Generalkommandos des VII Armeekorps betreffs den 
Bergarbeiterstreik, 1889; 1897’ (documents 7-9), letter of 11 June 1889 from general von Albedyll to 
the King: "Das aber spreche ich mit Bestimmtheit aus, dass es in der bisherigen Weise nicht 
fortgehen kann, wenn nicht viel emstene Gefahren eintreten sollen, wie es die gegenwärtige war, und 
wenn nicht ins besondere die bisjetzt noch gut gesinnte und zuverlässige Mehrzahl der Bergleute 
immer mehr dem sozialdemokratischen Gift zugängig werden soll. Ich glaube nur das hervorhaben zu 
müssen, dass ein sehr häufiges und wiederholtes Einschreiten mit dem Militär hier eine sehr 
bedenkliche Massnahme sein würde, und dass es mir dringend erforderlich erscheint, bei den zu 
treffenden Einrichtungen als einen wesentlichen Punkt festzuhalten, dass die Aufsichtsbehörden über
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It is important to stress that Albedyll was not opposed to the idea of domestic military 
intervention as such, but that he wanted to be in charge of when and how the troops 
were used, A similar attitude can be found by other general commanders. In 1890, 
General Loe declared to Waldersee that he tried to prevent the civil authorities from 
calling for military assistance for the occasion of the May Day.* 25 Similarly, Waldersee 
declared in 1897 in an account to the King of the Hamburg dockers’ strike, that it was 
best to postpone the military repression of the workers’ movements. Interfering in a 
great strike would be a way of letting the Social Democracy decide the time and place 
for the big battle. Instead it was better to take action against the Social Democrats 
when the workers were not already mobilised for a strike movement.26
Like Albedyll, Genera] von Bissing had no taste for getting involved in domestic 
conflicts, unless it was an open revolt against which a state of siege could be declared, 
thus allowing him to repress any resistance with military means. His infamous order of 
1907 leaves little doubt about his readiness to repress internal unrest with military 
means. However, in his correspondence with the civil authorities during his service as 
army corps commander in Münster, he showed very little inclination to co-operate with 
the civil authorities, and insisted on his own authority to take all relevant decisions 
concerning military intervention.27
die so grossen Arbeiteranhäufungen wenigstens soviel Gendarmen, Schutzleute oder Polizisten zu 
ihrer Verfügung haben, dass die Hülfe des Militärs nur in ernsten Fällen nur bei wirklich 
aufrührerischen Bewegungen in Anspruch genommen zu werden braucht.”
25 ‘Aus dem Briefwechsel des General-feldmarschalls A. Graf von Waldersee’ vol.l. 
(ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin, 1927 pp.367-368. Letter of 24 April 1890 from General von Loe to General 
von Waldersee.
26 Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2/14, ‘Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von 
Unruhen 1889-1914’ (documents 176-183). Letter of 22 January 1897 from General von Waldersee to 
the King: “Ich meine, dass es im Interesse des Staates liegt, nicht den socialdemokratischen Führern 
die Bestimmung des Zeitpunktes für den Beginn der grossen Abrechnung zu überlassen sondern 
diesen nach Möglichkeit zu beschleunigen. Noch ist der Staat mit Sicherheit in der Lage, jeden 
Aufstand niederzuschlagen !**
27 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und 
Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929.’ (document 71) “Abgesehen davon, dass gegen die 
praktische Durchführbarkeit des Vorschlags (close civil-military co-operation) erhebliche Bedenken 
bestehen, widerspricht der Gedanke auch durchaus meinen Grundsätzen, wonach ich als 
kommandierender General jederzeit die Verfügung über die Truppen der Armeekorps in der Hand 
behalten muss, um sie nach meinem Willen dort einzusetzen, wo es im einzelnen Falle erforderlich 
werden sollte"
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As a war minister (1903-1909), General von Einem was perceived as a hard-liner, a 
reputation due above all to his recommendation o f the Genera] Staff study entitled 
‘Fighting in Insurgent Towns* and the Hindenburg instructions. However, later in his 
capacity as army corps commander in Westphalia during the 1912 strike, he showed 
himself rather co-operative and attentive to the wishes o f the civil authorities. In his 
account of the events written in 1927, he insists on his right and duty to interfere in 
strikes and to provide a forceful response.28 The tone is meant to impress, but it 
appears from the correspondence from the district governors in Münster and Arnsberg 
that the military authorities implemented only what the civil authorities asked them to 
do.29 It is remarkable to see how both Bissing and Einem, like Albedyll previously, lost 
their taste for active military intervention once they occupied the post of army corps 
commander. As general commanders in Munster, both showed themselves rather 
prudent when it came to sending troops to ordinary labour conflicts, and in the cases 
where troops were in fact mobilised, they very carefully followed the wishes of the 
civil authorities, about when to send troops, where and how many. It was not that the 
Prussian generals - as the professionalisation theory suggests - were too 
professionalised to be involved in politics. Prussian generals were very politicised, both 
when it came to foreign and domestic issues. But in practice they found that the Social 
Democratic movement and other types of protest movements were unsuitable for 
suppression by military means.
28 »Bei eventuellen Streiks jedoch, namentlich wenn die Zivilbehörden sich zu schwach fühlten, mit 
ihren eigenen Mitteln die Ordnung aufrechtzuerhalten, hatte der Kommandierende General das Recht 
und die Pflicht, diese Sorge unter gleichzeitiger Meldung an den Kaiser und das Kriegsministerium 
zu übernehmen. Dieser Fall trat für mich 1912 ein, als der grosse Streik im Ruhrgebiet ausbrach. Er 
nahm einen so erheblichen Umfang an, dass mir schliesslich der Oberpräsident von Westfalen, Prinz 
von Ratibor und Corvey, sowie der Regierungspräsident von Arnsberg erklärten, mit den eigenen 
Mitteln nicht mehr auskommen zu können. So übernahm ich denn die vollziehende Macht und sandte 
in die bedrohten Gegenden starke Truppen verbände aller Waffen.” Karl von Einem ‘Erinnerungen 
eines Soldaten 1853-1933’ Leipzig, Verlag von K.F.Koehler 1933 pp. 165-168.
29 Münster HaStA, Regierung Münster, V IM 4 vol.l /32-1, ‘Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912’ 
(document 5-10): Report of 20 May 1912 from the district govemor of Münster county io the minister 
of the interior. “...Das Zusammenwirken zwischen Militär- und Zivilbehörden vollzog sich glatt. 
Gesetzlich stand zwar die Leistung den Militärbehörden zu, in Wirklichkeit geschah sie durch die 
Polizei-Behörden. Den Militär-Patrouillen war vielfach zur örtlichen Führung ein Gendarm oder 
Polizeibeamter beigegeben, was sich als sehr zweckmässig erwies.“
Münster HaStA, Regierung Münster, V II-14 Vol.3 /37-1, ‘Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912’ 
(documents 102-103): Letter of 14 March 1912 from the district govemor of Münster not only 
indicates in detaiis where to send the troops, but also how many. Similarly, for the county of 
Arnsberg. Münster HaStA, Regierung Arnsberg, 14325, ‘Bergarbeiterausstand im Ruhrkohlenrevier 
1912.’
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6.3. The marginalisation of the supreme commander
The position of the army corps commanders is central in understanding the contrast 
between the declarations of the ‘Supreme Commander’ and the measures implemented 
in situations of major unrest. After a brief period of liberalism in 1889, the King 
adopted Bismarck’s view that the struggle against the Social Democracy was not a 
question of legal measures, but of warfare.30 Throughout the rest of his reign, the King 
showed a readiness to launch a crack down with military assistance on any social or 
political unrest. In 1891, he famously declared to a group of recruits that he might ask 
them to shoot on their parents and brothers,31 and throughout his reign, William II 
became known for his forceful declarations of intent.32 Accordingly, the orders coming 
from the King, as the head of the executive, were unequivocally in favour of a coercive 
policy towards any political or social opposition threatening the existing order.
However, the influence of the King on the domestic use of troops - in particular the 
cases in Westphalia - was limited in practice. There were two reasons for this. In the 
first place, all questions concerning when and how to use troops were determined at 
the regional level, with the King’s approval being merely a rubber-stamp. In 1889 
during the great Westphalian miners’ strike, General von Albedyll informed the King
30 Höhn (1969) pp.66-67.
31 “...Bei den jetzigen sozialistischen Umtrieben kann es Vorkommen, dass ich euch befehle, Eure 
eigenen Verwandten, Brüder und Eltern niederzuschiessen. Aber auch dann müsst ihr meinen Befehl 
ohne Murren befolgen." cit. Funk. (1986) p.351.
32 The examples are many. In 1903, the King began to talk about the forceful repression of the Social 
Democrats in terms of a ‘revenge’ for the Revolution of 1848. Berghahn (1994) p.255. Similarly, 
Waldersee reports several strong declarations of William II. In 1896, the King asked Waldersee to 
intervene with military troops in the strike among Hamburg dock workers, even without being 
requested from the Hamburg Senat: "Sehr viel wurde von dem unlängst hier ausgebrochenen 
Ausstand der Hafenarbeiter gesprochen. Der Kaiser wünscht energisches Einschreiten, es ist dazu 
aber nicht die geringste Gelegenheit, da die Leute sich völlig ruhig verhalten. Noch auf dem 
Bahnhofe beim Abschied sagte er mir: 'Fassen Sie nur ordenlich zu, und auch ohne anzufragen.”’ 
Legal and constituional details were not one of William’s preoccupations. Waldersee also reports that, 
at this particular occasion, William was about to commit a blunder because, at his arrival in Hamburg, 
he had forgot that Hamburg was a sovereign state within the German Empire and not a part of 
Prussia. Alfred Graf von Waldersee 'Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Alfred von 
Waldersee' Vol.2 (ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin: E.S.Mittler & Sohn, 1922. Diary 29 November 1896. In 
1905, William II shocked the Reich Chancelor von Bülow by declaring: ‘First shoot, behead and get 
rid of the Social Democrats, by a bloodbath if need be, and then fight a war outside...* von Bülow 
'Denkwürdigkeiten' II, p.198. (cit. Kitchen (1968) p. 162)
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on 5 May that he had already sent troops to Gelsenkirchen.33 In his reply, the King 
ordered Albedyll to use all troops available.34 The King’s instructions were not 
followed, since General von Albedyll never mobilised his full potential of manpower 
and, moreover, tried to limit the number of forces. However, at no moment did the 
King intervene to enforce his initial order, and the final decision about the size of the 
military intervention was therefore left to Albedyll’s discretion. A similar procedure 
can be observed in 1896 during the Hamburger dock workers’ strike, when Waldersee 
refrained from military intervention against the explicit orders from the King.35 
Although known as a hard-liner, in particular concerning measures against the labour 
movement, General von Waldersee replied to the King that a military intervention was 
not possible since no unrest had taken place.
In his papers left in the military archive in Freiburg, General von Einem has left the 
formal order from the King to intervene with military troops in the miners’ strike of 
March 1912. The King’s order was to repress any resistance with the most radical 
measures possible.36 As was the case with Waldersee in 1896, general von Einem later 
openly and clearly distances himself from the measures proposed by the King. In a 
hand-written note on the reverse side of the telegram, he indicates his caution over the 
wording of this telegram,37 and in the account in his memoirs, he declares with pride 
that no violent confrontations took place.38
33 Telegram from General von Hahnke, the cheif of the military cabinett in Berlin to the war 
minister, Verdy du Vemois. May 5 1889. Potsdam III R43 Filmsignature 11971-11972 ‘Handel und 
Gewerbe: Arbeitseinstellung’ (document 2).
34 Letter from the war minister to the army corps commander in Westphalen May 5 1889 ‘Seine 
Majestät der Kaiser und König befehlen jedoch, dass, falls die Beilegung der Sache nicht in Aussicht 
stehen sollte, Eure Excellenz sofort unter grösstmöglicher Enthaltung von Truppen weiterem 
Umgreifen der Bewegung und Excesse Vorbeugen.’ Potsdam III R43 Filmsignature 11971-11972 
‘Handel und Gewerbe: Arbeitseinstellung’
35 See footnote 32.
36 ‘Wo eingegriffen werden muss, Scharfschiessen, ohne Gnade! Maschinengewehre und auch 
Artillerie! kein langes Postenstehen oder Parlamentiren! Füsilieren. Wilhelm R.’ Freiburg: N 324 /64 
Personal Papers of general von Einem.
37 ‘Dieses Telegrammem ist die Antwort auf meine Meldung vom 13.3.12. abends 11 Uhr, als ich 
befohlen hatte, Truppen in des Streikgebiet zu schicken. Ein höherer Telegrafenbeamter brachte es 
mir ins Schloss, aufregend, und gab mir die Versicherung ab, dass nur der aufnehmende Beamte...von 
dem Inhalt Kenntnis hätte. Eine Antwort habe ich Seiner Majestät nicht gegeben.’ Military Archive, 
Freiburg, N 324 /64, Personal Papers of general von Einem.
38 “So übernahm ich denn die vollziehende Macht und sandte in die bedrohten Gegenden starke 
Truppenverbände aller Waffen. Die Wirkung war durchschlagend: kein Schuss fiel, alles verlif völlig 
unblutig, und der Streik nahm bald ein Ende. Die Truppe war in fester Disziplin.” Karl von Einem 
*Erinnerungen eines Soldaten 1853-1933’ Leipzig, Verlag von KF.Koehler 1933 pp. 166-167.
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Not only did army corps commanders turn down explicit orders from the King, but it 
appears from all the cases of mobilisation of troops in Westphalia that the original 
initiative for the intervention did not come from Berlin, but followed action by the 
senior state administrators and the army corps commander. By the 1889 intervention, 
the King was informed on the 6 May that troops had been mobilised the day before.39 
In Heme 1899, it was the army corps commander, von Mikusch Buckberg, who in the 
early hours of 28 June, informed the King by telegram about the riots in Heme and 
that, on the request of the province governor, he had sent one battalion infantry to the 
town.40 It was only after having received the news about troops having been sent to 
Heme, that William replied by an order in his usual dramatic style by which he made 
the commanding general personally responsible for the re-establishment of order.41 
During the strike of 1912, civil servants at all levels declared for several days that they 
would do their best to manage without military assistance.42 Only after a few days did 
they begin seriously to discuss the possibility of military intervention. When the 
military authorities were contacted, the procedure was the same as in 1889 and 1899: 
in the evening of 13 March, the province governor requested military assistance 
directly from the army corps commander, who gave the order to mobilise the troops, 
and only afterwards, at 11 p.m., did he inform the King of the intervention. But it was
39 This appears from a telegram sent from the Military Cabinel to the W ar Ministry on 6 May 1889. 
Central Archive, Potsdam III, R 43, film signature 11971-11972, ‘Arbeitseinstellung 1889-1896 in 
der Rheinprovinz, Westfalen und Schlesien’ (document 2).
40 ‘In Herne, Kreis Bochum, sind grobe Ausschreitungen von streikenden Bergleuten 
vorgekommen...Auf Ansuchen der Oberpräsidenten habe ich soeben ein Bataillon angewiesen sofort 
mit Eisenbahn nach Herne zu fahren, um erforderlichenfalls zur Aufrecherhaltung der Ruhe und 
Ordnung einzuschreiten.’ Telegramme of June 28 1899 from general von Mikusch-Buchberg to 
William II. Freiburg PH2 /I4  ‘Eingreifen der bewaffneten Mach bei Unterdrückung von Unruhen 
1889-1914’ document 188-189.
41 Telegramme from William II to general von Mikusch ‘Ich befehle Sie (...) dass die Ordnung 
energisch und gründlich von Ihnen sofort wiederhergestellt wird. Meldung vom wesentlichsten an 
mich.’; Telegramme from William II to the military Cabinett ‘Ich habe auf die Meldung von den 
Bergarbeiter-ausschreitungen in Heme in Westfalen, zu deren Unterdrückung Polizei nicht ausreichte 
und ein Bataillon requiriert war, den kommandierende General von Mikusch persönlich für die 
sofortige, energische, gründliche Wiederherstellung der Ordnung verantwortlich gemacht.’ Freiburg 
PH2/14 ‘Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von Unruhen 1889-1914.’ document 
185 and 187.
42 Münster HaStA, Regierungsbezirk Arnsberg, 14325, ‘Bergarbeiterausstand im Ruhrkohlenreveir 
1912’ Telegrammes from the local govemors and munnicipal police officers to the district govemor in 
Arnsberg, 10-13 March 1912.
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only the following morning at 8.25 a.m. that General von Einem received the formal 
‘order* from His Majesty.43
6.4. The Prussian Ministry of the interior and state administration: new 
challenges, new policies
In contrast to the official policy of the War Ministry, the predominant policy of the 
Prussian Ministry of the Interior after 1889 was to avoid military involvement in 
domestic conflicts, and to make the civil administration manage mass protest 
movements with their own forces.44 On the other hand, the idea of calling for military 
intervention remained very present in the calculations of Prussian bureaucrats right 
until the end of the Imperial period, with constant references made to the possible 
declaration o f a state of siege being continuously discussed.45 The transition from 
procedures that still rested heavily on military assistance to a ‘de-militarisation’ of 
internal peacekeeping took place over a long period of time. Attempts to ‘de­
militarise’ the internal peacekeeping began already in the early years of the Imperial 
period,46 however, in the 1870s, this was to be considered as a declaration of intent 
rather than as an actual policy to be implemented immediately. Thus, during the years 
1870-1889, the Prussian army - like the French - was still involved in maintenance of 
order whenever gatherings took place that involved a significant number of participants 
- several hundreds or thousands.
During the 1889 strike and immediately after, two strategies were developed over how 
to use the army in domestic conflicts. One supported by certain senior state 
administrators and military commanders was to reinforce civil forces and limit the role 
of the army to extreme situations when the civil forces had lost control over a situation 
deteriorating into riot and violence.47 The other strategy was developed during the
43 Military Archive, Freiburg, N 324 /64 Personal Papers o f General von Einem.
44 Funk (1986) pp.203, Henning (1987) pp. 139-141.
45 Funk (1986) p.351.
46 Funk (1986) p.155.
47 See Chapter Two.
220
1889 crisis by the local governor in Gelsenkirchen.48 He defined the function of the 
military troops as consisting of three elements:
•  An important number of soldiers were to be present at the place of disorder to 
discourage people from violent actions, and in the case of labour conflicts, to 
ensure, by their mere presence, that strikebreakers were not prevented from going 
to work.
• The main function of the troops was to cover the rear of the civil forces. Only the 
police and gendarmerie should be in the front line, in direct contact with the 
demonstrators.
• The troops should stand by, ready to intervene in the event of riots or violent 
actions taking place.
During the 1890s, the first strategy was adopted by the Prussian authorities, whilst the 
French authorities adopted a strategy very close to that developed by the local 
governor in Gelsenkirchen.
How did the policy of developing civil forces instead of military intervention come to 
prevail in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior? Reading the main analyses of the policy 
towards internal disturbance, one might have the impression that the policy of 
removing the army from internal peacekeeping was a settled and continuous policy 
after 1889.49 However, rather than renouncing the access to military assistance, the 
‘de-militarisation* of the internal peacekeeping took place as a continuous process 
whereby the progressive strengthening of the civil forces allowed the civil authorities 
increasingly to delay the moment when military assistance was requested. On the other 
hand, whilst recommending that public disturbance was dealt with by the available civil 
forces, the possibility of requesting military troops remained explicit in the 
correspondence of the Ministry of the Interior throughout the period.50
48 Circular Letter of 7 May 1889 from the local governor in Gelsenkirchen, cit. Henning (1987) 
p.146.
49 Funk (1986) and Jessen (1991). Only Heening (1987) pp. 168-170 enters a discussion about the 
diifcullies of carrying this policy into practice.
30 Münster Ha.StA, Regierung Münster VII - 57 Bd.l 1890-1905. Letter of 31 August 1904 From the 
minister of the interior to the province governor of Westphalia, (document 197). Similarly the debate 
between the minsitry of the interior and the province governors of Westphalia and the Rhine Province 
about establishing protection plans in co-operation with the military authorities. Münster HaStA, OP 
6095 ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 
1876-1929’ (documents 37; 41-49). See also below chapter 7. Münster HaStA, OP 6889
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Moreover, the dominant approach followed by the Ministry of the Interior after 1889 
was restricted by influential forces within the government, in particular the War 
Ministry, that preferred a hard line against social and political agitation. Similarly, the 
line of the Ministry of the Interior was not totally clear-cut. One of the joint initiatives 
of the King and the Ministry of the Interior from the 1890s was the idea of emergency 
power legislation. Believing that the existing criminal laws and the legislation on high 
treason were not sufficiently efficient to break the backbone of the Social Democracy 
in a situation of revolt, they wanted to provide the army with legal means to undertake 
searches, confiscations and imprisonments in the case of a general revolt.51
After 1889, the minister of Trade and Commerce from 1890 to 1896, von Berlepsch, 
was the most prominent member of government in favour of social welfare 
programmes. However, within the Prussian government, there was conflict between 
von Berlepsch, who was in favour of social reforms to meet the challenge from Social 
Democracy, and the ministers of the interior von Roller (1894-1895) and von der 
Recke (1895-1899), who had a more confrontational attitude towards the working- 
class movement, wanting to attack it through legislation. With the departure of von 
Berlepsch in 1897, his social welfare programme was abandoned, and a more 
confrontational line was adopted by the Prussian government.52 K.E.Bom sees the 
changes in the Prussian government in 1896-1897, with the dismissal o f von Berlepsch 
and the appointment of hard-liners such as Count Posadowsky-Wehner to the Interior, 
von Btilow to the Foreign Affairs and von Miquel as deputy prime minister and 
minister of finance, as influenced by the attempts of the war minister von Gossler to 
pursue a more confrontational policy towards Social Democracy, a policy that greatly 
involved the army.53 Nevertheless, if this change of direction within the government 
had a devastating effect on social reforms, it had no apparent influence on the policy of
‘Verstärkerung der Polizei im Ruhrgebiet bei Arbeiterunruhen’ (1912-19) (document 46). Letter of 12 
March 1912 fron) the minister of the interior to the district govemors in Düsseldorf, Münster and 
Arnsberg. “...Sollte dies wider Erwarten mit den jetzt dort vorhandenen Polizeikräften nicht möglich 
sein, so würde äusserstenfalls die Heranziehung von Militär erfolgen müssen.”
51 K.E.Bom (1957) pp.135-136.
52 K.E.Bom (1957) p.141.
53 K.E.Bom (1957) p.140.
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the Ministry of the Interior in matters of management of public unrest - it remained in 
favour of the ‘de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping.
One of the main reasons was probably the difficulties of co-operating with the War 
Ministry. In general, the Ministry of the Interior and the state administration at the 
regional level were suspicious of the army which they feared was prepared to take 
steps independent of them and thereby thwart the more forthcoming policy pursued by 
the Ministry of the Interior towards the workers.54 Another important factor, which 
made the Ministry of the Interior want to take over all responsibility for the 
maintenance of order, was that the War Ministry was not a very reliable partner, 
because it lacked authority within the military establishment. This was vital since the 
military establishment was split over the domestic role of the army, and hence 
agreements between the two ministries were likely to run into opposition from other 
branches of the military, and so the War Ministry might face difficulties forcing 
through unpopular measures.55
In this light, it is hardly surprising that the Ministry of the Interior continuously made 
recommendations to the state administration to manage unrest for as long as it could 
without calling for military troops. Forced to concentrate on the management of public 
unrest with the forces under civil command, the Ministry of the Interior asked the state 
administration to enter into close co-operation with the local authorities and municipal 
police forces. The aim was to improve the efficiency of the civil forces by elaborating 
detailed plans as to how to move the municipal police forces from calm areas to the 
points of turbulence, as well as deciding the distribution of the local gendarmes in case 
of major labour conflicts.56 This type of co-operation, initiated immediately after the 
events of 1889, resulted in nation-wide designation lists which were regularly updated 
throughout the later period until the end of the Imperial era.
54 Henning (1987) pp. 172-174.
55 For the rivalries between the central military institutions, see Craig (1955) p.230ff.
56 Düsseldorf HaStA, Regierung Düsseldorf 15.904. Circular letter of 11 April 1890 from the 
Ministry of the Interior. Cit.Henning (1987) p.168.
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A second significant change in the role of the Ministiy o f the Interior after 1889 was 
the increasing involvement of the state administration in the negotiations of labour 
conflicts. The Prussian state administrators thereby functioned both as arbitrators 
between the employers and employees and as responsible for the public order.57 To 
appear credible as an arbitrator, the state administration also had to control the forces 
of order. Given that the Ministry of the Interior could not prevent the military 
authorities from taking independent steps once the army had been involved, attempts 
by the state administration to end the conflicts through negotiations were at risk of 
being destroyed by the actions of the military authorities.
The successful handling of the Westphalian miners* strike of 1905 with civil forces 
alone seems to have had important effects on the policy of ‘de-militarising’ internal 
peacekeeping. In the first place, it confirmed the policy o f the Ministry of the Interior, 
in the sense that it proved that even a situation with very large mass gatherings could 
be managed without military assistance. It gave the state administration a great deal of 
confidence in its capacity to handle this type of conflict with its own forces. Given the 
uneasiness of working with a strong-headed military commander, this option seemed 
attractive. Indeed, shortly afterwards, the Prussian government adopted the strategy of 
the Ministry o f the Interior. Thus, in January 1906, when the Social Democrats 
announced nation-wide demonstrations in favour o f a reform of the electoral system to 
the Prussian Diet, the government stressed that troops were not to be mobilised except 
for the case of extreme urgency.58 In all larger towns, the troops were kept in their 
garrisons ready to intervene,59 but despite the great tension and clashes between the 
local police and demonstrators in many towns, no example has been found of 
mobilisation of troops. Thus, between 1905 and the outbreak of the First World War, 
there are only seven recorded incidents of domestic military intervention throughout 
the entire Empire, and these were only to restore order rather than prevent riots and 
violent actions from taking place.60
57 See Chapter Four.
58 Minutes from a meeting in the Prussian State Ministry on the 8 January 1906. Cit.Henning (1987) 
p.171
59 Military Archive, Freiburg, N 87 /43. General Otto von Below Unpublished memoirs, pp.507-508.
60 Worms, Brandenburg (June 1909); Karlsruhe, Baden (August 1909); Mansfelder coal area near 
Magdeburg (October-November 1909); Neumunster (February 1910); Schwerts near Danzig and 
Mariewerder (January 1912); Westphalia (March 1912); Zabem, Alcase (November 1913).
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6.5. The Westphalian state administration and the new responses to 
mass unrest after 1889
The success of the policy pursued by the Ministry of the Interior depended greatly on 
the support of the governors at the provincial and district level, and their capacity to 
withstand pressure from the local authorities to provide a powerful show of force 
against disturbers o f public order.
At the local level, one of the most important fault lines lay within the state 
administration, between the higher authorities - province and district governors - who 
became increasingly reluctant to involve the army, and the local governors, who were 
more inclined to call for military assistance. Funk stresses that the reluctance of the 
senior administrators was financial as well as political.61 In his analysis of the 
recommendations from the Prussian Ministry of the Interior and the attempts made by 
the senior state administrators to calm local officials, mayors and employers, 
Hansjoachim Henning argues against the claims put forward by Klaus Saul and 
K.E.Bom62 that the main objective for the civil authorities was to support the 
employers by putting down strikes with all available means.63 Similarly, he considers 
Tenfelde’s description of the army as the willing instrument of coercion in the hands of 
the capital interests as misunderstood and lacking empirical evidence.64
These points of criticism seem justified, given that at no time did the army appear to 
have played a decisive role in the outcome of any of the Westphalian miners* strikes. 
Ever since 1872, the use of public forces in situations of labour conflicts was, from the 
viewpoint of the Ministry of the Interior, considered as an issue to be resolved between 
the employers and the employees. The role of the state was originally only to interfere 
in case of violations of the law. Similarly, if the presence of troops could be seen as a 
step in favour of the interests of the mining companies, this was not intended by the
61 Funk (1986) p.351 and note 307.
62 Saul (1981) and K.E.Bom’s "Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des Deutschen Kariserreich 1867- 
1871 * Stuttgart: Deutsch Verlag-Anstalt, 1985.
63 Henning (1987) p.140.
64 Klaus Tenfelde ‘Sozialgeschichte der Bergarbeiterschaft an der Ruhr im 19.Jahrhundert', Bonn- 
Bad Godesbers, 1977.
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military commanders who would at any moment have refused to see themselves as 
instruments of private capital.
It is necessary to distinguish between the attempts of the Prussian state to encourage 
and sustain the interests of the heavy industries in the Ruhr, and the question of 
maintenance of order. The Prussian state, to a greater degree than the French state, 
could permit itself to discriminate between the conflicts in which it wanted to interfere, 
and the conflicts that it preferred not to get involved in and in which the Prussian state 
did not guarantee the safety of the property of its citizens. The conflicts between 
employers and employees were considered as a private matter, unless and until the 
state administration believed that it directly concerned the State. Similarly, unrest and 
riots during labour conflicts were primarily private matters, that only concerned the 
state when they extended beyond a local community and began to threaten the public 
order of wider areas. The continuous semi-privatisation of problems concerning 
security and maintenance of order in Prussia should be seen in this light.65
The district governor in Düsseldorf, von Berlepsch, who, in 1889, led the negotiations 
between employers and employees, wrote many years later in his memoirs about how 
these events convinced him that labour conflicts could no longer be repressed with 
force but had to be solved through negotiations.66 In his own district, he managed the 
situation with municipal police forces and gendarmerie, without requisitioning military 
assistance. When 7,000 coal miners went on strike the 15 May 1889, von Berlepsch as 
well as the district governor in Aachen were the only district governors who had no 
troops mobilise in their district.67 Von Berlepsch asked the local military authorities to 
prepare themselves for a requisition, but kept hesitating about calling in the army, so 
that the crisis eventually passed without further steps being necessary. It emerges from 
his correspondence with the Ministry of the Interior, both during the crisis and 
afterwards, that he was very proud of his own manoeuvres.68
65 See Chapter Two.
66 Dr. Hans Freiherr von Berlepsch ‘Sozialpolitische Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen’ Mönchen- 
Gladbach: Volksvereins-Verlag, 1925. p.24.
67 Spencer (1992) pp.86-87.
68 Similarly, von Berlepsch was strongly opposed to the idea of declaring a state of siege during the 
great Westphalian miners’ strike of 1889. Central Archive, Potsdam III, R 43, film signature 11971- 
11972 ’Handel und Gewerbe: Arbeitseinstellung 1889-1896 in der Rheinprovinz, Westfalen und
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The aftermath of the crisis similarly shows that the governmental authorities in Berlin 
appreciated von Berlepsch* dexterity, and his attempts to integrate the working 
population through social reform rather than through repression. The Westphalian 
province governor, von Hagenmeister, who was responsible for military intervention 
and persistently worked for a declaration of a state of siege, was sacked in the middle 
of the crisis. In contrast, von Berlepsch was promoted province governor of the 
Rhineland less than six months after the strike and was then called to Berlin four 
months later to occupy the newly established post as minister of Trade and Industry. 
The documents examined do not reveal whether the different use of force was the 
reason for these reshufflings among the senior civil servants, but it may have been 
understood as a lesson for others.
As was the case for the Ministry of the Interior, the 1905 strike was a turning point for 
the civil administration in Westphalia because it confirmed that it was possible to avoid 
military assistance even to a miners* strike with over 200,000 participants. However 
there was a price. The first was to operate with a degree of risk that the crisis might 
get out of control and degenerate into violence and riots. Secondly, to avoid the 
military intervention, the civil authorities had to modify their security objectives. 
Realising that they could not ensure the security of the strikebreakers against attacks 
from individual strikers, the civil forces were to deal only with actions committed by 
the strikers collectively, but not the confrontations between individuals.69
In 1905, it was the senior civil servants who refused to call for military assistance, 
although a good number of the local governors as well as mayors and the local police 
authorities claimed that their forces were largely insufficient to ensure the public order. 
The policy of the senior state administrators to avoid military involvement became 
more pronounced as they became increasingly confident in their own ability to deal
Schlesien’ (documents 71-90). Minutes from a meeting in Dortmund of 10 May 1889 between the 
Minister of the Interior, von Hcnrfurt, and the province and district governors concerned with the 
miners’ strike of May 1889.
69 “...gemeinsame Gewalttätigkeiten bedrohlicher Art durch eine grössere Zahl von Ausständigen zu 
verhindern.” Cit.Henning (1987) p.150.
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with major unrest and, during later periods, the measures taken in 1905 were cited as 
the example to follow.70
The policy of avoiding a military intervention remained throughout the period 
examined. However, the correspondence from the Prussian civil administrators show 
that the state administrators were painfully aware o f the dangers linked to their 
insistence on mobilising civil forces only, since these were hopelessly in adequate to 
deal with serious confrontations.71 In 1912, when the military authorities carefully 
followed the instructions from the civil authorities, the strategy remained very much 
similar to that of 1889: small contingents of soldiers compared to the number of 
strikers, measures taken ad hoc, and a lack of overall co-ordination of the movements 
of the troops within the area. The events of March 1912 indicated the limit to how far 
the Prussian authorities thought they could go before calling the army 72 lessen and 
Funk sustain the view that the military intervention of March 1912 was a reasonable 
response to a conflict with a high potential of violence, and note the reluctant attitude 
of the civil authorities towards requisition of military assistance.73
Whilst in 1889 the response in Westphalia was quite similar to that in Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais during the early 1890s, the French authorities during the following decades 
adapted their response to the size of the challenge. In Prussia, the insufficiency of the 
civil forces remained. The successful ‘de-militarisation* o f the maintenance o f order in
70 Münster Ha.St.A, OP 6681, (documents 131-132). Letter of 9 November 1909 from the district 
govenor in Arnsberg to the province govemor of Westphalia.“Ohne die Überweisung einer 
beträchtlichen Anzahl berittener Schutzmänner würde sich bei einem ausgedehnten Streik der 
Bergarbeiter, bei dem ich die Heranziehung von Militär möglichst vermeiden möchte, die 
Aufrechterhaltung der öffentliche Ruhe, Sicherheit und Ordnung äusserst schwierig gestalten. Haben 
doch die Erfahrungen des Streikes im Jahre 1905 gezeigt, einen wie viel grösseren Wert gerade ein 
berittemer Sicherheitsbeamter gegenüber einem nicht berittenen für die Aufrechterhaltung der 
öffentlichen Ordnung besitzt.”
Münster Ha.St.A. OP 6681 document 215. Letter of 2 December 1910. “...Wie schon früher so ist 
auch jetzt Wert darauf zu legen, dass es gelingt, die Aufrechterhaltung der Ruhe und Sicherheit mit 
Polizei und Gendarmen durchzuführen und militärisch Hilfe unnötig zu machen.”
71 This was made clear by local police authorities as well as the province and district govemors of all 
the areas concemed, even if there was also general agreement about avoiding military assistance. 
Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, Rep.77, Titel 2523, Nr.l anhang 1. vol.20 ‘Die Erfahrungen 
aus den Bergarbeiterstreik im Ruhrgebiet im März 1912.’ Minutes from a meeting by the local 
govemor in Essen, 1 June 1912.
72 Henning (1987) pp. 139-141.
73 Henning (1987) pp. 139-141; Jessen (1991) p.137.
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Prussia has to be seen against the background that the Prussian civil administration 
took great risks in operating with largely insufficient forces. Inevitably, the civil 
authorities at the local level felt uncomfortable about this policy, which operated with 
forces that were obviously inadequate to handle a situation developing into riots and 
violence.74 The general attitude among civil administrators in Westphalia seemed to be 
to live with the risk, to wait and see - and only in the event of the civil forces losing 
control, to believe that troops should be requested.
6.6. Concluding remarks: alliances of forces against the domestic use 
of troops
The Prussian civil administration never gave up their right to request military troops, 
but became increasingly confident of the capacity of the civil forces to deal with the 
management of order insofar as violence and riots did not get out of control. Due to 
this wait-and-see attitude during the 1890s, the civil administration became surer of its 
capacity to manage without military troops. On their side, the policy of the trade 
unions and the Social Democrats to ensure that strikers were disciplined increased the 
likelihood of major strikes taking place without military intervention, as happened in 
Hamburg 1896-1897 and in Westphalia in 1905.
On the other hand, the military authorities never gave up the idea of ultimately 
launching a forceful crack down on the Social Democrats. However, whilst the military 
authorities elaborated wild plans for a military coup or civil war, they were unprepared 
for the type of conflicts which actually occurred. As Sauer and Deist both point out,75 
there was a vast grey zone between a situation of great strike and a civil war. As long 
as a conflict could not clearly be defined as a revolt, the military commanders preferred 
leaving responsibility for dealing with it to the civil authorities.
Whilst both civil and military authorities waited for a major conflict to break out, the 
civil administration increasingly managed to deal with minor conflicts, and to delay the
74 Henning (1987) p.158.
75 Sauer (1970) p.433 and Deist (1991) p.26.
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moment when a military intervention became necessary. During each situation of great 
tension, the senior state administrators and the army corps commander closely 
observed the development of the crisis, whilst trying to appease the forces within the 
military establishment and in the local communities calling for a military intervention.
The success of the policy of ‘de-militarisation* of the internal peacekeeping must 
therefore be seen as the result of the Ministry o f the Interior and the senior state 
administrators and on the other hand individual military commanders working 
persistently - though not jointly - in the same direction. Given that, within the 
boundaries of the law and with the support from the King, the military authorities had 
plenty of opportunities to operate coercively against internal unrest, the 
implementation of a non-military response to strikes and public disorder was strongly 
influenced by the reluctant attitude of the army corps commanders, once they faced 
concrete situations of unrest. Against the tacit coalition favouring the use of civil 
forces rather than military intervention, the attempts by the military authorities in 
Berlin and the occasional initiatives from the King to display significant military force 
against public unrest had little impact.
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Chapter seven. The French army and public unrest: changes of 
policy
If the policy of not calling upon the army was successfully implemented in Prussia, why 
did a similar development not take place in France, where the regime, based as it was 
on Republican ideal of government being legitimised and reflecting the ‘French 
Nation’, had all the more reason to avoid sending the Army of the Nation against 
groups that belonged to the ‘Nation’? In this chapter, two factors will be analysed that 
were central to the choices made by successive French ministers of the interior of 
dealing with public unrest by calling upon the army. The first was linked to the types of 
strategies adopted in the 1890s to deal with crowds and public disorder. The second 
factor was a fundamental consensus of successive government, the prefectoral 
authorities and military commanders about the necessity of responding to mass protest 
movements by mobilising a high number of soldiers in order to avoid a conflict of 
deteriorating into violence and riots.
As shown in Chapter Six, the Prussian authorities by the early 1890s adopted the 
policy of ‘de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping, whilst turning down the 
suggestions from the local governor in Recklinghausen of solving the problem of 
internal unrest by a tactical and conscious use of the army. During the same years, the 
French authorities were about the make the choice between two similar strategies. The 
option which fitted Republican ideals was to strengthen and improving the civil forces, 
thereby allowing the army to intervene only in situations of extreme urgency. The other 
strategy was to improve the efficiency of military intervention and integrate the army 
within the measures to be implemented to deal with at least certain types of disorder. 
In France, a combination of the two strategies was adopted in practice. Projects to 
strengthen the civil forces were presented and discussed in the National Assembly, 
whilst measures involving the army were developed in the Ministry of the Interior in 
close co-operation with the War Ministry and with the civil and military authorities at 
the regional level. Thus, the civil forces were reinforced, but the result was not a 
decrease in the frequency of the military interventions, on the contrary: Whilst the
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number of policemen and gendarmerie officers increased, the army also became 
increasingly integrated in the task of maintaining public order.
From the 1890s, three features emerged which became predominant in the 
management of mass mobilisation after 1901. In the first place, in many cases, calling 
for military assistance in many cases became an administrative practice rather than a 
political choice. Within the government it was decided that certain types o f conflict 
would lead to the mobilisation of troops, no matter whether the conflicts were of a 
violent character or not. Secondly, the requisition of the army moved from being a 
repressive measure to preventive one. Thirdly, it became the practice to mobilise a 
significant number of men compared to the potential number of protesters.
Chapter Seven constitutes of three parts. The purpose of section 7.1. is to set out the 
development of policies in the 1890s (7.1.1), to look at attempts to alter these away 
from the use of the army (7.1.2), and to look at why these attempts failed by examining 
the plans and strategies behind the use of troops for larger instances of unrest (7.1.3). 
The sections 7.2. analyse the position of prefects in order to show why the policy of 
successive ministers of the interior was adopted by prefects, and the section (7.3). 
analyses the position of the army corps commanders in order to show that these, to a 
large extent supported the use of military troops as a means of preventing instances of 
public unrest to develop into riots or revolt. It ends with a comparative analysis of the 
political and social background against which the French and Prussian systems adopted 
dissimilar strategies.
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7.1. Governmental policies toward the use of troops after 1890
7.1.1. The rise o f new strategies: the preventive mobilisation o f troops*
As in Prussia, where the miners* strike o f 1889 marked the break through in the 
recognition of labour claims as an essential item on the governmental agenda, the 
miners* strikes in Anzin (1884) and in Decazeville (1886) sharpened the sensitivity of 
leading politicians such as Freycinet and Waldeck-Rousseau towards the issues 
affecting industrial workers.1 After the strike in Anzin, Waldeck-Rousseau supported 
legislation that recognised the right of workers to organise themselves in trade unions.2 
In 1901, as prime minister, Waldeck-Rousseau made similar efforts to liberalise the 
legislation and to allow workers to form labour actions.3
In terms of the maintenance of order, however, the increasing organisation of the 
labour movements in the 1890s and the rise of predictable conflicts made ministerial 
executive change strategy. Thus, the engagement of Freycinet and of Waldeck- 
Rousseau in reforming the conditions for labour action was paralleled by measures to 
maintain public order, so that the control of the state over civil unrest was greatly 
strengthened. In 1886, as head of the Cabinet, Freycinet was responsible for the 
requisition of troops to the strike in Décazeville. As war minister, between 1888 and 
1893, he was responsible for the security measures taken during the Boulanger crisis, 
and from 1890, he developed the strategies to deal with May Day demonstrations.
1 “Un autre point sur lequel j ’insistais (1886), parce qu’il n’avait pas cessé de me préoccuper, est celui 
des conflits du travail avec le capital. Les grèves de Decazeville, notamment, s’étaient à plusieurs 
reprises, imposées à mes reflexions: Les conditions du travail, dis-je, se sont modifiées. Nous ne 
sommes plus dans l’état où nous nous trouvions il y a un demi-siècle. 11 faut que la République étudie 
les moyens de rendre moins précaire le sort des ouvriers et de faire cesser cet antagonisme qui n’est 
autre chose que le sentiment inconscient, mais profond, d’un problème non encore résolu.” Charles de 
Freycinet ‘Souvenirs' vol.II (1878-1893) Paris Ch. Delagrave, 1913 p.355
(Waldeck-Rousseau 1884) “Le facteur le plus important de la prospérité du travail, s’est la paix 
sociale, le respect de tous les intérêts”. “La majorité des travailleurs est intéressée à l’ordre, parce que, 
étant partie intégrante de la société, elle est nécessairement intéressée à sa conservation” cit. Pierre 
Sorlin ' Waldeck-Rousseau * Paris: Armand Colin, 1966p.264.
2 Lawof21 March 1884.
3 Sorlin (1966) pp.477-479.
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Whereas in Prussia, the measures involving the army were taken entirely by civil and 
military authorities at the regional level,4 in France, the initiative to use such measures 
often came directly from the government.5 In France, this nation-wide preparation for 
military intervention was a break with previous practice and was closely linked to the 
increasing organisation of labour action. Since many labour actions were no longer 
spontaneous, but declared in advance, Freycinet turned to implement preventive 
measures by keeping the troops in a state of preparedness, ready to intervene at short 
notice. A similar development can be seen in relation to potential political unrest, in 
particular to electoral campaigns or political meetings.
In the first place, it was merely a question of keeping the troops ready to intervene, 
without actually mobilising them. This was the strategy adopted for the May Day 
celebrations in 1890 when this occasion was celebrated for the first time. The 
requisition o f troops to Fourmies on May Day 1891 was not only the overreaction of a 
local mayor in panic and a young incompetent sub-prefect. The call for troops also has 
to be seen in relation to the fact that troops were kept in a state of preparedness in 
their garrisons all over France, and that mayors and prefects had carte blanche from 
Paris to call for troops when they considered this necessary.6 Despite the protests 
against the use of troops after Fourmies, Freycinet showed no intention of changing 
this strategy. In November 1891, during a strike among the gas workers in Le Havre, 
the minister of the interior asked the war minister Freycinet whether the military 
authorities could be contacted, just to prepare themselves for the possible outbreak of 
a strike. The war minister answered in the affirmative.7 In his reply to the minister of 
the interior, Freycinet stressed that the troops were not to be called out before the
4 See Chapter Four.
5 In April 1891, Freycinet, war minister and head of Cabinet, asked the commanding generals to 
make preparations for military mobilisation at any location within the national territory.
Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.CJ2.I.328, ‘Grèves, rassemblement de la troupe, 1906-1909.’ For 
each of the following years, the preventive measures for the 1st May were discussed between the 
government and the prefectoral and miltiary authorities. Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.CJ2.1.331, 
‘Grèves: Intervention des militaires suite aux grèves.’
6 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C72.I.328, ‘Grèves, rassemblement de la troupe, 1906-1909.’ 
Letter of 26 April 1891 from Freycinet to the army corps commanders.
7National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, ‘Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection, jurisprudence; 
emploi des troupes, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914’. Letter of 9 
November 1891 from the war minister Freycinet to the minister of the interior.
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strike had actually broken out.8 He seemed to make a delicate distinction between the 
declaration of a strike, and the moment when the workers stopped turning up at work. 
The fact that, until the outbreak of the First World War, military troops were kept in a 
state of preparedness every year for the occasion of May Day similarly indicates that 
Freycinet and succeeding ministers of the interior had no intention of changing this 
strategy, despite the incidents at Fourmies.9
As a response to the criticism of the use of the army after the incidents at Fourmies, 
Freycinet presented a project in November 1891 suggesting the organisation of a 
mobile force of gendarmes, with the specific task of ensuring public order. Jauffret 
probably has a point when he expresses doubts about how seriously Freycinet 
considered ‘de-militarising’ internal peacekeeping. Given the number of men who had 
previously been mobilised to assist at larger strikes, Freycinet’s suggestion to ensure 
public order of the entire French territory with a force of one hundred mounted 
gendarmes was not realistic.10 Moreover, in November 1891, whilst presenting to the 
National Assembly this project, which was supposed to allow local authorities to deal 
with public unrest without calling for military assistance, he was also busy assuring the 
prefect of Pas-de-Calais that there would be no restriction on the right of the prefects 
and sub-prefects to request military troops.11 The Freycinet project was never realised,
8 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, ‘Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection, jurisprudence; 
emploi des troupes, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914’. Letter of 14 
November 1891: “Il est désirable, dans l’intérêt de votre Département comme dans celui du mien que 
les autorités, parfois d’ordre inférieur, qui sont appelées à adresser des réquisitions, ne réclament pas 
les troupes prématurément, par exemple, quand les grèves n’ont pas encore éclaté, qu’aucun désordre 
ne s’est encore produit ou n’est immédiatement, et qu’il existe seulement des appréhensions de grève 
par suite de pourparlers entre ouvriers et patrons, qui ne paraissent pas en voie d’aboutir. L’arrivée 
des troupes, en pareil cas, produit souvent un effet contraire à celui qu'on en attend; elle est mal 
interprétée et précipite les événements. Si elle n’a pas cet inconvénient elle a alors celui de prolonger 
la présence des troupes au-delà du temps nécessaire, ce qui est fâcheux à divers points de vue.”
9 This appears from the documents from the Ministry of the Interior on the préparation of measures to 
maintain order for the occasion of May Day between 1890 and 1911. National Archives, Paris, 
F.7.12528, ‘Premier mai 1898-1911’.
10 Jauffret (1983) pp.112-113.
11 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773: “Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection, jurisprudence; 
emploi des troupes, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914. Letter of 14 
November 1891 from Freycinet, to the minister of the interior. “Ainsi que vous me l’aviez annoncé, 
j ’ai reçu hier la visite du Préfet du Pas-de-Calais. L’entretien que nous avons eu ensemble a dû 
dissiper tout doute dans son esprit. Il ne saurait être question, comme je me suis plu à le lui répéter, de 
limiter en quoi que ce soit l’exercice du droit de réquisition de la force armée, que l ’autorité civile 
tient des lois et règlements en vigueur. L’autorité militaire obtempérera en toute circonstance, avec 
empressement et dans la limite des moyens dont elle dispose, aux demandes régulières qui lui seront 
adressées par l’autorité civile ou par la Gendarmerie
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and no other governmental initiative was taken on the subject until after the turn of the 
century.
Apart from the strategy of keeping troops in a state o f preparedness, a second key 
element in the policy developed under Freycinet was the mobilisation of a significant 
number of men compared to the number of protesters. Although the French authorities 
had previously mobilised considerable number of men for particularly sensitive 
conflicts, this strategy also became generalised during the 1890s. In the public debate, 
one of the key arguments about ‘what went wrong at Fourmies’ was that the problem 
was the presence of military troops. The opposite lesson was drawn by the responsible 
authorities - Freycinet as war minister and head of Cabinet, the prefect Vel-Durand, 
and the army corps commander General Loizillon: if troops were to be called, they had 
to appear in great number because insufficient military force might provoke the 
population to violent attacks whilst the troops would unable to prevent violent actions 
from taking place. The instructions from Freycinet from the years following Fourmies 
clearly stress this point.12 The conflicts that Freycinet referred to only involved a 
couple of thousand demonstrators. In the 1880s, the rate o f soldiers per striker would 
normally be between one soldier per ten or fifteen actual participants in the protest 
movement. During the 1890s, the rate of what was considered a sufficient number of 
soldiers for internal conflicts went up markedly, to reach a number of one soldier per 
six or eight protesters.13 The first plans for protection from 1897 operated with 8,000 
soldiers to be mobilised in case of a general strike among the rail personnel, which was 
about one soldier for every ten employees in the rail companies.14
12 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, ‘Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection, jurisprudence; 
emploi des troupes, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914’. Letter of 14 
November 1891 from Freycinet, war minister and head of cabinet, to the minister of the interior. “Il 
faut éviter d’envoyer des détachements peu nombreux au milieu de masses considérables de 
population. II est préférable de recourir à la cavalerie plutôt qu’à l’infanterie.” Military Archive, 
Vincennes, 5 N 2, ‘Cabinet du Ministre : documents de principe et réglementation 1890-1895’. Letter 
of 19 April 1892 from Freycinet, war minister and head of cabinet, to the military govemors and army 
corps commandes: “Il faut éviter d’envoyer des détachements de faible effectif au milieu de masses 
considérables de population. Il est toujours préférable, lorsque les circonstances le permettent, de faire 
intervenir la cavalerie plutôt que l'infanterie. 11 est désirable, partout où cela est possible, que la 
troupe doit précédée par de la gendarmerie
13 Calculations based on the figures from the miners* strikes in Nord-Pas-de-Calais 1889, 1891, and 
1893.
14 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774, ‘Grèves: Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemins de 
fer’. The plans opérâtes with 80 companies. In principle, a company comprised 100 men, however, 
between 1903 and 1909, the size of a company was reduced to 75 men and in the winter term to 38.
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Under Waldeck-Rousseau, 1899-1902, the strategies initiated by Freycinet were 
developed and formalised in terms of detailed plans of protection to be implemented in 
case of certain types of strike.15 The strategy of keeping the troops in a state of 
preparedness when unrest was expected, was eventually developed into the preventive 
mobilisation of troops to ensure the security of persons and property during labour 
conflicts. Similarly, the requisition of a very large number of men was formalised under 
Waldeck-Rousseau, most significantly through the increase in the contingents to be 
mobilised in case of certain types of strike. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais alone, the number of 
troops designated to be mobilised in case of a nation-wide strike among the rail 
personnel were increased from lOVz companies in the plans of 1897, to 27 in the 
revision from 1902, or from 1,000 to 2,700 soldiers.16
The development of Waldeck-Rousseau*s policy merits attention. In terms of 
maintenance of order, Waldeck-Rousseau started with the best intentions. In February 
1884, as minister of the interior during the miners* strike in Anzin, he stressed, in a 
circular letter to the prefects, that no troops were to be mobilised unless violence or 
riots had actually taken place.17 Eventually, troops were called to restore order in 
Anzin, but only after more than one month of strike, at a moment when serious riots 
were about to break out. Later that year, Waldeck-Rousseau repeated this principle 
and added that troops were only to be used in case of extreme urgency.18 However, 
the expression ‘extreme urgency’ that Waldeck-Rousseau used in 1884 in his 
recommendations to the prefects had undergone a certain transformation when this 
wording reappeared in the ministerial correspondence in 1893. By then, it was only in 
cases of extreme urgency that troops were to be requested directly from a local
The companies of the plans from 1898, however, operated with 100 men per company which therefore 
consisted of 8,000 soldiers in total.
15 A further analysis of the plans for protection will be undertaken in Chapter Eight.
16 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774, ‘Grèves: Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemin de 
fer*.
17 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, ‘Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection, jurisprudence; 
emploi des troupes, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914'. Confidential circular 
of 27 February 1884 from Waldeck-Rousseau, minister of the interior, to the prefects.
18 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.CV2.I.331, ‘Intervention militaire aux grèves* Note of 28 
October 1884 concerning the strikes taking place in Anzin: “Le 27 février, une nouvelle requisition 
(pour gendarmes) du Préfet du Nord, qui a reçu du gouvernement l’ordre de ne requérir la troupe qu’à 
la dernière extrémité.”
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garrison, otherwise the requisitions were supposed to pass through the prefect to the 
army corps commander.19 Hence, the question was no longer whether troops could be 
used, but rather an attempt to control this use.
A further move towards the extensive use of troops took place during the great 
miners’ strike o f 1901. In his biography on Waldeck-Rousseau, Pierre Sorlin describes 
the attitude of Waldeck-Rousseau towards this nation-wide miners’ strike in 1901 as 
far more liberal and relaxed compared to his handling o f the miners’ strike in Anzin 
1884. If Waldeck-Rousseau in 1901 had become more confident as to the possibility of 
negotiating social peace with the representatives of the labour organisations, it is 
difficult to accept Pierre Sorlin’s description of him becoming less alarmist in his 
handling of internal peacekeeping.20
In contrast to the reluctance shown in 1884 towards the question of military presence 
in Anzin, the Waldeck-Rousseau administration in 1901 took the initiative to prepare a 
forceful response when rumours began to circulate in June 1901 that a nation-wide 
strike in the mining sector was about to break out.21 In early October 1901, Waldeck- 
Rousseau told the prefect in Macon not to request the troops until violent action had 
actually taken place.22 However, his attitude changed with the development of the 
crisis. By the beginning of November, the prefect of Pas-de-Calais was severely 
criticised for hesitating about calling for troops. The message was clear: if miners did 
not turn up at work, it was time to call the army.23 Similar instructions were given to 
the prefects in the other departments affected by the miners’ strike.24
19 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, ‘Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection, jurisprudence; 
emploi des troupes, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914*. Letter of 1 
September 1893 from the minister of the interior to the prefects.
20 Sorlin (1966) p.473.
21 Emile Combes 'Mon Ministère, Mémoires 1902-1905' Paris: Plon, 1956 p.56-57.
22 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778, ‘Grèves*. Telegram of l.October 1901 from the minister of 
the interior, Waldeck-Rousseau, to the prefect in Maçon. “J’estime qu’il est excessif d’appeler de la 
troupe à Montceau-les-Mines sans qu’aucun incident se soit produit.(...) Quant aux troupes, elles 
viennent d’être placées à portée, aussi loin que possible cependant de Montceau.”
National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778, ‘Grèves*. Letter of 5 November 1901 from the minister of the 
interior to the prefect in Saint Etienne, “En l’état d’incertitude dans lequel nous nous trouvons sur le 
point de savoir et si la grève éclatera et dans ce cas à quelle date, j'estime qu’il est prématuré de 
donner des instructions fermes pour faire réunir les troupes à Saint Etienne dimanche prochain."
23 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778, ‘Grèves*. Letter of 9 November 1901 from the minsiter of the
interior to the prefect of Pas-de-Calais: “Je ne comprends pas vos hésitations. Vous avez des
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Not only did the Waldeck-Rousseau administration sanction the preventive use of 
troops, a certain degree of automatically was also introduced in handling of the 
maintenance of order during labour conflicts. In the plans for protection which were 
developed by the Waldeck-Rousseau administration, the measures to be implemented 
were linked to the nature of the strike (strike among rail workers, miners, dock 
workers) rather than to considerations of the degree of violence, real or expected: If a 
local strike was declared or broke out spontaneously, local police would be send, if it 
prolonged and spread to other professions or areas, the gendarmerie would be send. If 
a strike was organised that was expected to comprise a significant number of people 
over a widespread territory, the army would be contacted.
Whereas the use of troops in Prussia was increasingly restricted to situations in which 
violence or riots had already taken place, the preventive calling for troops in France 
became one of the key feature of the strategies implemented after 1901, and the 
qualifications expressed by Waldeck-Rousseau in 1884 and by Freycinet in 1891 about 
not calling troops preventively were sacrificed in the name of efficiency and security.
7.1.2. The ‘Bloc des Gauches’ and attempts to change strategies
Following the great electoral victory of the Bloc des Gauches in July 1902, there were 
expectations of a change of strategy towards labour conflicts, not least to a refrain 
from the extensive use of military troops. Indeed, the new government under Combes 
was in favour of avoiding displays of military force. However, the first months of this 
government were marked by a miners’ strike in Nord-Pas-de-Calais of unprecedented 
size. Over the entire year of 1901, the strikes in the mining sector - including the great 
strike in October-November - had only mobilised 19,454 miners on a national scale. In *24
instructions précises. Toutes les réquisitions à l’autorité militaire lui étant remises, elle doit les 
exécuter sur dépêche de vous, sans me consulter. Vous devez donc réaliser partout où un 
commencement de grève se manifeste toutes les mesures arrêtées d’avance. En pareil cas, il n'y a pas 
une minute à perdre. Si le mouvement paraît se généraliser, vous devez exécuter le plan arrêté pour 
tout votre département.”
24 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778, ‘Grèves’* Letterof 9 November 1901 from the minister of the 
interior to the prefects: “En cas de grève partielle, vous devez réaliser les dispositions concernant 
l’exploitation intérieur sans me consulter. Si vous avez des raisons de penser que la grève peut se 
généraliser dans votre département, vous devez du moins réaliser tout l’ensemble du plan arrêté.”
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contrast, during the 1902 strike movement more than 119,000 workers went on strike 
all over France.25
In 1907, Combes described the measures implemented in October 1901 by Waldeck- 
Rousseau as vastly exaggerated.26 However, confronted with the over 100,000 striking 
miners in October 1902, Combes’ original intentions o f avoiding military requisition 
came to nothing. In his political speeches, as well as in his memoirs written in 1907, 
Combes plays down the display of force during these strikes.
(In October 1902) Cette agitation s’étant localisée à certaines régions, nous n’utilisâmes le plan que là 
et seulement dans la mesure qui nous sembla nécessaire. Sauf un meutre accidentel dans la Loire, la 
grève se passa partout sans accidents fâcheux ou peu s’en faut. Le gouvernement put maintenir l’ordre 
sans se livrer à des rigueurs et même sans opérer un très notable déploiement des forces. 27
To describe the measures implemented during the miners’ strike of October 1902 as 
not being an important display of forces is sadly contradicted by the figures of forces 
mobilised: in addition to the police and gendarmerie forces, 15,948 soldiers and 767 
officers were mobilised in Nord-Pas-de-Calais alone. Given that the number of 
registered miners in Nord-Pas-de-Calais in 1901 was 87,000 this makes one soldier for 
every seven potential strikers.28
In 1904, in a circular to the French prefects, Combes repeated the principle of avoiding 
call outs of public forces at all in labour conflicts.29 The letter states that it was the 
primary duty o f the departmental administration to avoid labour conflicts degenerating 
to a point where repressive intervention became necessary. The occasion of the
25 Statistique des Grèves 1901 & 1902.
26 “En prévision de ce très dangereux conflit, Waldeck-Rousseau, qui n’avait rien voulu négliger pour 
y parer, avait concu, d'accord avec l’autorité militaire, un plan complet de mobilisation, qui 
descendait dans les moindres détails. Le plan surabondait même en précautions. Il mettait en 
mouvement des forces si formidables qu’il nous parut à mon fils et à moi dépasser démesurément les 
besoins à pourvoir.” Emile Combes ‘Mon Ministère, Mémoires 1902-1905' Paris: Plon, 1956 p.56-57.
27 Emile Combes 'Mon Ministère, Mémoires 1902-1905’ Paris: Plon, 1956 p.56-57.
28 Figure provided by Cooper-Richet (1987) p.402. See also figures of the mining population in Nord- 
Pas-de-Calais in Chapter Two.
29NationaI Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, ‘Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection; jurisprudence; 
emploi des troupes; usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914'. Govemmental 
Circular of 4 August 1904.
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circular was serious strikes among agricultural workers in the South of France. At first, 
Combes famously declared before the National Assembly that this movement was a 
role model for a social protest.30 However, only a few weeks later he asked the 
prefects in the départements concerned to make all preparations for a military 
intervention.31 The situation seemed to get out of control, and the administrative* 
military apparatus was there ready to ensure that the public order would be maintained.
A similar retreat from previous declarations to avoid military intervention took place 
under Clemenceau. Historians and admirers of Gemenceau have had great difficulties 
explaining why he developed from being a life-long Radical opponent of military 
intervention in strikes before entering the Ministry of the Interior, into one of the most 
notorious users o f the military apparatus in his struggle against the trade unions.32 In 
March 1906, Clemenceau, as the newly appointed minister of the interior, made a 
promise in front of 33,000 striking miners in Lens to refrain from sending the army if 
they avoided riots and violence.
“Je vous assure qu’à place Beauvau je m’efforcerai d’appliquer ce que j ’ai préconisé dans le journal. 
Je suis et je reste contre l’envoi préventif des soldats dans les grèves. J’espère que les socialistes 
auront à coeur de faciliter ma tâche pacificatrice.** 33
“La grève est un droit, nous n’entendons pas vous le contester, mais aussi nous vous demandons de ne 
pas oublier vos devoirs...Je m’engage à ne pas mettre la troupe en contact avec les 
grévistes...Montrez-vous dignes de cette mesure qui est pour la première fois appliquée.” 34
By addressing the miners in these terms, Clemenceau put the responsibility for military 
intervention on those leaders of the strike who were in favour of ‘direct action* as a
30 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, ‘Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection, jurisprudence; 
emploi des troupes, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914’. Intervention before 
the National Assembly of 11 July 1904.
31 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, ‘Instructions ministerielles; plan de protection; jurisprudence; 
emploi des troupes; usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914’. Govememental 
Circular of 4 August 1904.
32 Clemenceau’s biographers - Wormser (1961), Erlanger (1968), Monnerville (1968) - all spend 
much time explaining the necessity of his political turns. Even a hard-core Marxist such as Maurice 
Agulhon tries to rehabilitate his hero. Agulhon (1990) pp.217-219. In contrast, Azéma and Winock 
argue that the Republic was never really threatened from the left, since the political branch of S.F.I.O. 
and the trade union C.G.T. were in permanent mutual conflict. Azéma & Winock (1970) pp. 167-168.
33 Cit. Wormser (1961) p.224.
34 Cit. Erlanger (1968) p.356-157.
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means to obtain reforms. However, by doing so, he also committed the government to 
send in troops if the violent faction among the leaders of the strike took over. Between 
the 17 and the 19 March 1906, Basly, Socialist deputy and mayor of Lens, lost control 
over the strikers and on the 20 March troops were mobilised to an extent never 
previously seen in France. The figure mentioned in the secondary literature is 20,000 in 
Lens on the 20 March, whereas the ministerial documents mention that, at the peak of 
the crisis, 52,000 soldiers were mobilised in the region, whilst the military records from 
the commandature in Lille reach a figure of over 38,000.35 While this strike in Nord- 
Pas-de-Calais was still in full swing, measures were taken to ensure order in Paris on 
May Day 1906, involving the mobilisation of 45,000 soldiers from the whole of 
France.36
At first, Clemenceau was reluctant about involving the army and, in April 1906, he sent 
a circular letter to the prefects in which he explicitly forbade them to use troops 
preventively and to mobilise soldiers on the simple grounds of a declaration of strike.37 
If Clemenceau, in the spring of 1906 declared himself against the preventive 
mobilisation of troops, he had lost these inhibitions by the end of the year. In relation 
to the problems of enforcing the legislation concerning the separation of the French 
state from the Catholic Church, Clemenceau declared that it was essential for the 
government to enforce respect of the law, and made it clear to the prefects that they 
had the authority to use military force if there was no other way of forcing through the 
policy of the government.38 The crisis of the spring of 1906 was followed by a major 
strike among Parisian electricians in March 1907, and later the same year, the revolt 
among wine growers in the South, as well as the first joint strike of postal workers and 
rail personnel. The government’s response to these conflicts was equally forceful, and
35 See Chapter Two.
36 Monnerville (1968) p.296.
37 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, ‘Instructions ministérielles; plans de protection; 
jurisprudence; emploi des troupes; usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves 1849-1914’. 
Circular of 16 April 1906 from Clemenceau, minister of the interior, to the prefects.
38 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12399, ‘Culte Catholique: Inventaires 1905-1907’. Letter of 11 
November 1906 from Clemenceau, minister of the interior, to the prefects: “Si l’exécution de la loi 
vous impose de recourir à la force publique, vous en ferez usage en conformant votre conduite à mes 
instructions sur l’emploi de la force armée dans les grèves. Ce n’est qu’après avoir épuisé toutes les 
mesures dictées par le souci d’éviter les conflits, et si l’ordre est troublé, que les troupes seront mises 
en action.(...) Autant vous vous serez montré prudent et conciliant, autant devant l’insuccès de vos 
efforts, vous aurez le devoir d’agir avec fermeté.”
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Clemenceau made no bones about excusing his extensive use o f the army to maintain 
public order. Famously declaring himself to be *le premier flic  de France', Clemenceau 
made no other justification for his extensive use of military troops other than referring 
to the necessity to defend the Republic against elements in the French society who 
attempted to overthrow the existing regime.
Not only did Combes and Clemenceau make extensive use of the army in politically 
tense situations, but they also seem to continue the refusal of Freycinet and Waldeck- 
Rousseau to establish a police or gendarmerie force that could take over the task of 
ensuring internal order. Confronted with initiatives and projects developed by deputies 
or senators or by different sections of the War Ministry, the successive government 
reacted by anticipating them with their own projects, only to shelve them and 
eventually to forget them.39 Between 1902 and 1907, a series of projects was 
presented to the National Assembly by Senator de Montfort concerning a mobile force 
o f state police comprising 2,000-3,000 specially trained policemen. In 1905, when he 
tried a second time to push forward his project, Senator de Montfort was anticipated 
by a governmental initiative on the same issue. The government’s project did not result 
in any organisation of the existing civil forces, and during the following years they 
were only called into memory by the opposition, who still waited for the government 
to take action.40
The Sarrien cabinet, which came to power in the middle of the mass strike of the 
spring 1906, immediately took the initiative to establish a mobile force of gendarmes. 
The force was supposed to ensure public order during mass gatherings, strikes, and 
‘the application of certain laws* - no doubt with reference to the confrontation which 
had taken place only three months before over the establishment of inventories of the 
possessions of the Catholic institutions in French territory. One might suspect - as does 
Jauffret - that the Clemenceau project of April 1906 was merely a manoeuvre to 
anticipate the ‘Montfort project’, with the intention of shelving further initiatives.41
39 This is the main argument in Jauffret’s article on the debate about special troops for maintenance 
of public order between 1870 and 1919. Jauffret (1983).
40 Jauffret (1983) p.117.
41 Jauffret (1983) p.123.
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After February 1907, there was no more talk about organising a mobile force of 
gendarmes to take over the responsibility for the maintenance of internal order.42 
Jauffret does not venture any explanation as to the reason why the ‘Montfort project’ 
was discretely shelved by the government, nor why the Sairien administration 
abandoned the project which it enthusiastically defended in April 1906. However, 
comparing at the various plans concerning a mobile force of gendarmes with the 
existing plans for protection with military assistance, it becomes obvious how 
unattractive the gendarmerie alternative was, both because such a force would be 
quite expensive and because the degree of security it could possibly provide was much 
lower than the military solution.
7.1.3. Reasons for the government’s policy
If the disparity between words and action in the case of Freycinet and Waldeck- 
Rousseau can be explained by the impossibility of admitting in public the Realpolitik of 
the government beneath the surface of declarations and rhetoric, the inconsistencies of 
Combes and Clemenceau call for an explanation. Both had spent their entire political 
careers arguing against the use of troops, and both changed their mind strikingly 
quickly after having resumed at the Ministry of the Interior. One obvious explanation 
which is often put forward is political necessity, in a situation where the government 
was pressed from extreme left-wing groups, both within and outside parliament. 
Moreover, the fact that the Communist C.G.T. trade union advocated ‘direct action’ 
during labour conflicts - that is sabotage of material and physical obstruction in order 
to prevent strikebreakers from entering a mine or a factory - and ‘Revolutionary 
Socialism’, seems to justify the measures taken by government. On the other hand, the 
C.G.T. only adopted its revolutionary programme by the Congress in Amiens in 
October 1906. Moreover, the majority of strikes to which the army was called were 
not organised by the C.G.T. and had no particular aims of overturning the Republican 
regime.
42 Jauffret (1983) p.l 18.
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It seems that both Combes and Clemenceau, when taking over the post as minister of 
the interior, imagined that the policy of using the army was a purely political matter 
that could be changed by simply not calling for military troops. However, a new 
minister of the interior faced a system in which the maintenance o f order for years had 
relied heavily on military assistance, and a change in this strategy would have required 
a complete rethinking and restructuring of the forces involved in the maintenance of 
public order. When Clemenceau in Lens promised that troops would not be mobilised 
if the strikers refrained from violent action, the army had already been in a general state 
of preparedness for more than a week. It was only a matter of a telegram, and the 
entire area could be under strict military control. Faced with a tense political situation 
that was at risk of getting out of control, a change of strategy would probably not be at 
the top of the agenda of a new minister.
In order to understand the measures implemented during the first turbulent decade of 
the century, it is important to note that the ministers and the prefects operated within a 
system in which the requisition of troops was an integrated part of the strategies 
available immediately. During these years, the strategies which were originally 
developed in order to deal with a possible situation of nation-wide strike within certain 
professions had proved to be extremely efficient when applied to other types of internal 
unrest. It was therefore difficult to abandon these strategies, in particular during 
periods of high political tension. On the other hand, the plans for protection were not 
very flexible when it came to adapting their measures to conflicts of various sizes. In 
order effectively to prevent a conflict from deteriorating into violence and riots, troops 
had to be mobilised preventively, or at least at a very early stage of the conflict, and 
soldiers could only be mobilised in great numbers.
The great efficiency of the strategy of requesting military troops was another reason 
why successive governments, right until the end of the First World War, were very 
reluctant about reforming policy towards internal unrest.43 Given the fragile position of 
governments in conflicts with labour movements and political opponents, it becomes
43 A radical change of the policies towards public disorder was only undertaken in the early 1920s.
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understandable why successive governments were not keen on ‘de-militarising* internal 
peacekeeping.
If the regular army were really to be detached from domestic peacekeeping, this would 
have meant abandoning a set of strategies that allowed the state administration and 
Ministry of the Interior to remain in control of almost any instance of public disorder. 
To replace the military organisation with a force of a couple of thousand men would 
have required a reconsideration o f the degree to which the state could protect 
individuals and private property against attacks during social or political protest 
movements. Given the fragile political compromise upon which the Third Republic was 
created, it was essential for the regime to show the influential groups who feared a 
social revolution that the Republican regime was capable of repressing threatening 
forces and guaranteeing law and order. In this political context, there was little room 
for experiments which were at risk o f allowing situations to get out of control.
The secondary literature is split between the biographies on Waldeck-Rousseau and 
Clemenceau, who defend the measures taken by referring to the necessity of a forceful 
response to the challenge from the increasingly revolutionary unions,44 and the more 
general interpretations which often dismiss the governments policy by suggesting that 
Waldeck-Rousseau was insincere, that Combes was slightly stupid and that 
Clemenceau was corrupted by power.45 However, it is important to note that, as 
ministers of the interior, Waldeck-Rousseau as well as Combes and Clemenceau, 
operated within an system in which the use of troops since the early 1890s was a 
widespread and increasing practice, and in which the majority of requisitions did not 
involve the government, because they were a matter dealt with entirely at the regional 
level - and sometimes even at the local level. Moreover, for cases of a size that 
involved the central power, the administrative machinery was geared to mobilise a vast 
number of soldiers quickly and efficiently. After the elaboration in 1901 of plans for
44 Pierre Sorlin 'Waldeck-Rousseau' Paris: Armand Colin, 1966 pp.470-471, Wormser (1961) p.224, 
Erlanger (1968) p.292.
45 This view seems to lie behind the analysis of scholars as different as Rebérioux (1975) and Trempé 
(1995) who support the thesis of exaggreated and unreasonable measures against the workers* 
justified protests, and Serman (1982), Jauffret (1983), and Berbère (1993) who analyse the issue from 
the perspective of the problems presented for the forces of order by the strategies enforced by 
Waldeck-Rousseau, Combes and Clemenceau.
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protection in case of a nation-wide miners' strike, it would have required a complete 
rethinking of the civil-military planning in order to send smaller contingents and to use 
military forces only at the location where violence or riots were actually taking place.
In addition, a series of political reasons can be identified to explain why French 
governments, despite a certain goodwill towards the workers' complaints, put on such 
enormous amounts of force during labour conflicts. The Radical and Socialist members 
of government after 1899 distrusted the trade unions, and knew that they had no way 
of influencing the course of labour movements. The government could lead 
negotiations between the employers and the employees, but they could not prevent the 
trade unions from turning the blame for a failure onto the government, and accusing 
the government of taking the side of capital. At the same time, the workers were one 
of the main constituencies of the parliamentary majority supporting the government. 
The attacks from the trade unions were politically damaging, and there was always the 
risk of the workers turning their backs on their representatives in parliament and 
moving towards revolutionary and anarchist movements on the extreme left o f the 
political spectrum.
With the establishment of the Waldeck-Rousseau government in 1899 and the victory 
of the Bloc des Gauches in 1902, there were great expectations from the workers of a 
change in the balance of power in labour conflicts now that the government was on the 
side of the workers.46 With increasingly radical demands from the trade unions and 
these expectations of a change in social policy, Waldeck-Rousseau as well as Combes 
and Clemenceau were bound to disappoint the workers. At the same time, confronted 
with opposition from the right, the governments after 1899 had to prove that they 
were not under the influence of the trade unions, as claimed the Conservative press.47 
In the wake o f the Dreyfus affair, it was obvious that a government had to reassure 
potentially anti-Republican forces about its capacity to defend effectively the existing 
social and economic order against the pressure from the extreme left within and 
outside parliament. From a political point of view, the main priorities were to make
46 Sorlin (1966) p.470.
47 Sorlin (1966) p.47I.
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sure that the government at no moment lost control over the situation. A badly 
managed crisis would allow the political right to describe the Republic as anarchy by 
pointing to the government’s lack of authority and will to defend the existing social 
order. Similarly, a loss of control over the maintenance of order in a situation of crisis 
could be fatal to the government’s authority in the eyes of the workers, and strengthen 
the position of extra-parliamentary movements at the extreme left.
Finally, a Republican regime could not allow major violent confrontations to take 
place. The Commune and the more recent events at Fourmies in 1891 were still fresh in 
the collective memory, and another violent confrontation would risk adding fuel to the 
fire that might destroy the fragile consensus among the different groups supporting the 
Republican institutions. Against the background of the strikewave of 1899-1901, the 
expectations of the workers and the reluctant acceptance of the Republic by important 
groups within the French society, the main priority of successive ministers of the 
interior was to keep protest actions under strict control. If public order was to be 
ensured effectively, the army was the only organisation that had sufficient resources to 
provide a reassuring response to the challenge. Notwithstanding the arguments that 
could be made against the use of troops against French citizens, and in spite of the 
criticisms from the left-wing opposition in the National Assembly against the 
government’s use of troops, this was a lesser evil than the prospect of losing control 
over these often very sensitive conflicts.
7.2. Prefectoral authority: prudence and contro/
As shown above, the correspondence from the years 1899-1901 between Waldeck- 
Rousseau, as minister of the interior and the prefects still shows some hesitation by the 
prefects about whether to use troops. The message from Waldeck-Rousseau, on the 
contrary, was clear: not to take any chances, to use the troops preventively and to 
mobilise a sufficient number of soldiers to be sure to keep events under control. At the 
same time, despite the many negative effects which were linked to frequent
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mobilisations of troops, a series of factors existed that made the French senior civil 
servants more inclined to call for military troops than were their Prussian counterparts.
The French prefects of the early Third Republic were in a very delicate position and 
always at risk of being dismissed from their post. As long as a prefect was backed by 
the ministry of interior, he was not at the immediate risk of being criticised for the 
excessive use of troops, whereas bad management of a crisis with insufficient forces 
which ended in riots or bloody confrontations could easily cost the prefect his post. 
The primary interest of a French prefect was therefore to ensure that any disturbance 
of the public order was kept under strict control. Moreover, experience showed that a 
preventive display of significant force was less damaging than a bloody confrontation 
when a situation had gone out of control. The prefects, in particular those 
administering turbulent industrial areas, were therefore inclined to call for military 
assistance whenever there was the slightest risk of a conflict deteriorating into riots or 
violence, with no regard to the wider political reasons speaking against the use of 
troops.
Secondly, it was very difficult for the French administration not to get involved in local 
conflicts. The French state made several guarantees towards its citizens which were 
not always compatible. On the one hand, the state guaranteed the protection of persons 
and property. In labour conflicts, this meant protecting strikebreakers as well as plants 
and other types of material belonging to the mine or factory concerned. In the light of 
the national compromise on which the Third Republic was built, it was essential to 
show that the Republic was capable of ensuring the protection of private property. On 
the other hand, the law guaranteed the rights of the workers to strike and to organise 
in trade unions. From 1893 onwards, French prefects became increasingly involved 
both in the negotiations between employers and employees - with a rate of 
interventions from the side of the prefects and the sub-prefects as arbitrators 
surpassing thirty per cent between 1890 and 191448 Given that the local police 
authorities were often controlled by local notables, in particular before the turn of the
48 Tilly & Shorter (1974) p.41. In comparison, the rate of involvement of the French government in 
labour conflicts never went beyond five per cent between 1890 and 1914. (ibid, p.41).
249
century, the municipal police was generally seen as supporting the interests of the 
employers and of the local notables. The attempts o f the state administration to 
function as an arbitrator in labour conflicts could be stifled by clumsy actions of 
municipal police forces. The prefects therefore often also took over the responsibility 
for the maintenance of order, whereby they acquired a double task o f presiding over 
the negotiations between employers and employees and of managing measures to 
maintain public order. Because the prefect had to appear credible, both in the eyes of 
the employers and the workers, it was important to keep incidents o f disorder under 
strict control with a minimum of violent confrontation between strikers and public 
forces.
In the light o f the strong need to keep disturbance of public order under strict control, 
the requisition of military troops was an effective solution, since the army could 
provide a very large number of men who could be quickly mobilised from a local 
garrison. Moreover, mobilisation of a significant number of soldiers was a relatively 
cheap solution compared to a major mobilisation o f gendarmes.49 The long-term 
damages to the reputation of the army in wider society or the problems of training and 
discipline among recruits were mainly a concern for the military establishment, but not 
for the prefect.
It is important to note, however, that there appeared to be a basic understanding 
between the civil and military authorities on the question of maintenance of order. As 
noted above,50 for the military authorities, internal peacekeeping was a disagreeable,
49 The costs connected with the call for gendarmes from other regions was greater than calling out a 
couple of hundred soldiers. Rank-and-file soldiers would not receive extra pay during periods of 
mobilisation, so only the commanding officers would require extra pay. In 1906 the extra pay would 
be 5 Francs per day for officers below the rank of colonel, and 7 Francs for senior officers. The price 
for a gendarme was 2.5 Francs aday and 3 Francs for a commander (Maréchal des logis). When 
troops were called out, only a limited number of officers would be needed, approximately one for 
every unit of twenty-five soldiers, whereas all of the gendarmes had to be paid extra, and if they were 
mobilised from other areas, there would also be transport costs. When mobilising many men, the 
difference could be considerable. For instance, in the law of finances of 1907, the War Ministry 
received an extra sum of 645.000 Francs to cover the expenses from the turbulent year of 1906. In 
comparison, a sum of 1.125.000 Francs were allocated to the gendarmerie to cover the supplementary 
expenses linked to the many transfers of gendarmes to locations of conflict during 1906. ( ‘Journal 
Officier 1907, session of 7 March 1907). The extra pay to the gendarmerie was almost twice the sum 
allocated to cover the supplementary expenses of the army, despite the fact that the number of 
gendarmes present at the scene of conflict was only a tenth of the number of troops.
50 See Chapter Five.
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time consuming and costly task, that broke up the training of recruits. On the other 
hand, looking at the military documents, it is clear that, in the majority of cases, the 
predominantly conservative-minded officer corps was inclined to agree with the 
government and the state administration about the serious challenge presented by 
public unrest and the necessity in certain situations for the state to maintain control of 
the situation at any price. One major reason for the acceptance by the French military 
authorities of the need for o f occasional requests for the army must be linked to the 
higher degree of alarmism among French authorities, military as well as civil, compared 
to their Prussian counterparts. French political history during the nineteenth century 
had shown that the army was not always capable of putting down a full-scale revolt 
with military force. The military authorities therefore recognised that even small cases 
of public unrest constituted a potential threat to the existing social and political order. 
Given the difficult balance between peaceful control and violent coercion, the French 
general commanders seemed ready to accept the argument of the necessity of 
mobilising troops preventively and in great numbers, rather than having to repress a 
revolt later through military means.
Confronted with similar issues concerning measures to maintain and restore public 
order, the Prussian province and district governors were in a stronger position than 
their French counterparts. In the first place, the Prussian state administrators could 
better allow a situation to deteriorate up to a certain point, before mobilising all 
available forces to restore order. In contrast to the French Republic, the Prussian state 
did not guarantee the security of persons and property, and could leave minor cases to 
be private or local conflicts. Labour disputes and unrest were basically considered 
private and local matters until they reached a size that these senior civil servants saw as 
threatening the interests of the state or the existing social and political order. The 
Prussian district or province governor could therefore allow himself to maintain a wait- 
and-see-attitude for much longer than the French prefect. If a situation developed into 
riots and violence, the Prussian authorities could respond with heavy measures. 
Secondly, in contrast to the French authorities, the Prussian authorities in the 1890 still 
had absolute confidence in the capacity of the army to put down a revolt. In Prussia, 
the strikers and demonstrators knew that the public forces - the military troops as well
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as the police - were prepared to use weapons. Strikers and demonstrators knew that 
that a violent response from the public forces could come without warning. This turned 
the army into an unspoken, but permanently present, threat.
7.3. French army corps commanders: consensus or submission ?
In the literature on the French army, two aspects are generally underlined to explain 
how it was possible for the Republican prefects to use - or misuse - the national army 
to such an extent without a major confrontation with the military establishment.
In the first place, the attitude of the French military establishment towards the 
domestic role of the army is commonly described as ‘submission under protest.’51 The 
rationalisation of the attitude of the French military elite, as described by Girardet, 
relied on two fundamental principles: the complete subordination of military power to 
the authority of legal government, and, the principle that the army must never interfere 
in politics.52 This was the principle, as described in legal-administrative interpretations 
as well as in the text books used at the military academy.53 However, the reference to a 
principle - which was undoubtedly strong throughout the nineteenth century - is a 
rationalisation rather than an explanation, and it leaves unanswered the question why 
these principles became increasingly predominant among the senior officers during the 
Third Republic, despite widespread lack of sympathy towards the Republican 
institutions.
Another factor is the balance of power between the civil and the military branches of 
the state apparatus. During the years when the domestic use of the army reached its
51 Girardet (1953) pp.262-264, Ralston (1967) pp.281-282. Carrot (1984) pp.657-658, Serman (1982) 
pp.58-63.
52 Raoul Girardet ‘Civil and Military Power in the Fourth Republic* in (Samuel Huntington ed.) 
Changing Patterns o f Military Politics Glencoe: Free Press, 1962 p. 121.
53 J.de Soto ‘Pouvoir civil et pouvoir militaire’ in La Défense nationale, Centre de Sciences Politiques 
de l'Institut d’Etudes juridiques de Nice (Paris 1958) “The military must be a passive tool in the 
hands of government. The latter can only fulfill its mission if it has the miltiary completely at its 
disposal, so that the government may use it as an unconscious material force. This excludes all 
possiblity of military leaders in any way refusing to comply with governmental orders... The State 
would no longer exist if military leaders were allowed to question its order. The ideal armed force 
would be one that government could activate simply by pressing a button.” Cit. Girardet (1962) p.121.
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peak, the position of the military establishment was particularly weak after the Dreyfus 
affair, and the army had little moral authority to oppose the civil institutions.54 Thus, in 
contrast to the situation in Prussia, where one of the driving forces in the policy of the 
Ministry of the Interior and the state administration was the urge to distinguish itself 
from a powerful army, the constellation of power in France was inverted.
These factors are often given as sufficient justification for the loyalty of the military 
leaders to the civil government. However, the emphasis on the sullen, but professional 
submission of the army to the civil authorities, fails to recognise the potential of the 
military leaders to obstruct the effective use of the army, and to stifle the strategies 
adopted by the civil authorities through bureaucratic resistance. In order to understand 
the development of the domestic role of the French army, it is important to recognise 
the willingness with which many senior commanders co-operated with the civil 
authorities on ensuring public order. As Carrot rightly points out,55 the legislation and 
formal definition of powers left plenty of issues open to discussion and thus to 
potential conflicts between civil and military authorities. Thus, the low degree of 
conflict between the prefectoral authority and the senior commanders indicates more a 
positive accommodation from the side of the military commanders than simply 
‘submission under protest/
Looking at the accounts written by senior commanders, there is no doubt that they 
were perfectly aware of their potential to create nuisance, and confident that the civil 
authorities heavily depended on the general commanders being well disposed to them. 
The remark by General Millet about the relationship between authorities is revealing in 
this respect: “Un ordre à un subordonné est un ordre. Un ordre à un pair est une 
négociation. ”56 Moreover, the not very respectful description provided as late as 1913 
by General Jourdy of the civil authorities indicates that the submission of French 
generals was a highly delicate matter, resting more on the individual commander than
54 Ralston (1967) pp.250-251, Hélie (1994) pp.227-229,
55 Carrot (1984) p.647.
56 General Millet ‘Souvenirs' unpublished manuscript (ca.1913), no pagination. Military Archive, 
Vincennes, 1 K mi 9.
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on legal-constitutional arrangements or text-book definitions of the obligation of the 
officer to submit to civil authorities.57
Despite the widespread lack of mutual goodwill between the military commanders and 
the representatives of the Republican administration, and despite justified suspicion by 
the military commanders towards the new administration after 1902,58 the documents 
from Nord-Pas-de-Calais show a remarkably low degree of conflict on practical 
matters, and a generally good understanding between the prefects and the army corps 
commander about the need for efficient responses to public disorder.
That the principal attitude among many officers was unfavourable towards the task of 
keeping order and enforcing the law is too obvious to be overlooked. On the other 
hand, senior officers also tended to be politically conservative and highly 
unsympathetic to social unrest. Given the frequent cases of major unrest, it is hardly 
surprising that the senior commanders in many situations agreed with the civil 
authorities about the appropriateness of providing military assistance to defend the 
existing political and social order.59 In the period before 1899, when the civil 
institutions were led by moderate Republicans with views on the French society which 
were not entirely different to those of the military leaders, the accommodation to the 
demands for protection issued by the civil authorities did not seem to present any 
problem by the military commanders. Accordingly, General Brugière, military governor 
in Paris 1898-1900, expressed no qualms about co-operating with police prefect 
Lepine to deal with demonstrations and far right extremists during the Dreyfus affair. 
Like other moderately Republican generals of the time, Brugière also insists very 
strongly on his commitments to the defence of the existing social and political order. If 
the senior commanders in many situations agreed with the civil administration about 
the deplorable necessity of mobilising troops, this was also due to the strong prejudice 
among the military leaders against the municipal police forces.60 They considered that 
these forces were incompetent, violent and lacked neutrality in politically sensitive
57 General Emile Jourdy ‘Souvenirs’ unpublished memoirs (ca.1913), no pagination. Military 
Archive, Vincennes, 392/GD/3.
58 See Chapter Four.
59 Bruneteaux (1996) p.45.
60 Bruneteaux (1996) pp.45-46.
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situations, the gendarmerìe and ultimately the army were the only forces that could 
effectively ensure the social peace without triggering a popular revolt.
Moreover, despite the more tense relationship between the Republic and the military 
establishment o f the years after 1899, it is important to stress that the civil authorities 
could hardly have developed and implemented measures that depended so heavily on 
the army, during the decades between 1890 and 1914, without a significant degree of 
acceptance and co-operation from the side of the senior commanders responsible. As 
we shall see later, the commanding generals did not contravene the policies of the civil 
authorities by insisting on their formal right to determine the number of men to be 
mobilised or the strategies to be used when the army was involved. On the contrary, 
the senior military commanders participated in the detailed planning that determined 
the types of conflicts in which the army was to be used as well as the number of men to 
be mobilised.61 The administrative correspondence, the plans and the minutes from the 
meetings between civil and military authorities at the ministerial level and in Nord-Pas- 
de-Calais, show that the commanding generals were prepared to co-operate with the 
civil authorities in the planning of measures and the execution of military interventions. 
This was done in the name of professionalism, efficiency and military discipline. 
Moreover, after the 1890s, the general commanders were involved in the developing 
the idea initiated by the Ministry of the Interior of using conscript soldiers to undertake 
strike-bound work in sectors which were seen as essential for the functioning of wider 
society.62
It is similarly important to note that the military obstruction in February-March 1906 
to deliver protection against demonstrations at the occasion of the establishment of 
inventories of the possessions of Catholic institutions was exceptional to the way in 
which the army otherwise followed the requisition from the civil authorities. The army 
had participated in the implementation of anti-Catholic laws before, most famously in 
1880, when the government closed down mainly Jesuit institutions.63 The crisis around
61 See Chapter Eight.
62 The first plans concerned the use of soldiers whose civil profession was baker for a possible 
situation of a general strike among bakers. Between 1900 and 1910, similar lists were established of 
conscript soldiers whose civil professions were electrician, telegraphist, rail worker, or dock worker.
63 Military Archive, Vincennes, MR 2172 or REC 2172 ‘Application des lois des congrégations’.
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the establishment the Catholic Church inventories in February-March 1906 shows a 
generalised exasperated reaction from the military establishment towards their role as 
executors o f policies to which many officers were strongly opposed. At the same time, 
the incidents indicate another important aspect about the relationship between the civil 
authorities and the military establishment, namely the capacity of the army to obstruct 
requisitions from the civil authorities. Indeed, if the full potential of blocking was not 
put into practice, this was because o f a division within the military hierarchy, as the 
obstructions came from officers and commanders at the lower level of the militaiy 
hierarchy who were not backed by the senior commanders. Most general commanders 
were undoubtedly sympathetic to the resentment of the officers against the task with 
which they had been charged, as the rather mild disciplinary sanctions enforced by the 
military courts indicate. However, the senior commanders were above all concerned 
with the problem of keeping discipline among the officers and of avoiding giving the 
impression to the French public and the foreign powers that the French army was 
about to disintegrate under weak leadership. When the inventories were ultimately 
accomplished in November 1906, again with military troops being mobilised to prevent 
obstruction, the army corps commanders in all French military regions were informed 
in advance, and asked for their advice on how to use troops most effectively.64
The main concern for the French general commanders in internal peacekeeping appears 
to be the question of discipline. The successive army corps commanders repeated again 
and again to their subordinate commanders, officers and soldiers that the decrees and 
service regulations65 were to be strictly observed.66 Jauffret probably has a point when 
he argues that, to some officers, the turbulence of the first decade of the century was 
merely a situation of crisis that would cease after a couple of years, and that it was
64 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C./2.L335, ‘Inventaires des Eglises 1906’ Requisitions and 
correspondence between the prefect and the army corps commander in Lille, 11-18 november 1906. 
The inventories were completed int he days between 20 and 22 November 1906 without further 
incidents. Similalry National Archives, Paris, F.7.12399 ‘Culte Catholique: Inventaires 1905-1907’.
65 Law of 27 July - 3 August 1791 'sur la réquisition et l ’action de la force p u b l iq u e Decree of 4 
October 1891 ‘sur le service des places de guerre et de villes ouvertes’. Instructions of 24 June 1903 
‘relative à la participation de l ’armée au maintien de l ’ordre public’. Instructions of 20 August 1907 
‘relative à la participation de l ’armée au maintien de l ’ordre public’.
66 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1 .A.C./2.I.328, Order of 18 September 1903 from general Jeannerod.
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better to live with the difficult situation rather than reforming the military 
organisation.67
On the whole, the efficiency of civil-military co-operation during the entire period is a 
valid indicator o f a high degree of consensus among the responsible commanders about 
the appropriateness of mobilising the army, at least in the majority of cases. The 
documents from the army corps commander in Lille - which is for the most part 
internal military correspondence - suggest that the conflicts with the civil authorities 
were rare and all concerned minor issues. The most salient type of conflict is 
commanders complaining about the poor quality of the accommodation and food 
supply provided by local communities during a period of mobilisation.
67 Jauffrel ( 1983) p. M l.
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Conclusions of Part II
Why did ‘de-militarisation* of internal peacekeeping not occur in France? Attempts to 
limit the internal role of the aimy failed at three levels: in the National Assembly, in the 
government, and at the departmental level, where the prefects continued to call for 
troops, with little regard to the desires from many sides to change strategy.
Despite criticisms of the use of the army, and despite the attempts of several ministers 
of the interior to limit the use of troops for internal peacekeeping, at least during their 
first weeks on that post, the path taken in the 1890s continued throughout the period. 
After 1900, three observations can be made:
• successive ministers (Waldeck-Rousseau, Combes, Clemenceau), although trying to 
limit the use of military troops, soon renounced their initial intentions;
• the prefects in the turbulent areas questioned the absolute necessity to call for 
military assistance if the public order were to be ensured, even less than the 
ministers of the interior;
• finally, although many officers felt unhappy about the extensive use of the army, the 
general commanders did not reject the need mobilise the army in the majority of 
situations which occurred.
To return to the fundamental problematic of this thesis: how can one explain the 
development of dissimilar policies towards public unrest in Westphalia and Nord-Pas- 
de-Calais between the early 1890s and the outbreak of the First World War? It is often 
argued that the mere presence of military troops - because perceived by strikers or 
demonstrators as a provocation from the side of the authorities - would escalate the 
potential of violence and thereby increase the likelihood of bloodshed. This argument 
was put forward by the French opposition, as well as by the Prussian state 
administration, to justify their policy of ‘de-militarisation* of internal peacekeeping. 
However, there was another logic o f simple crowd management, which was equally 
common among both French and Prussian administrators, namely that, confronted with 
thousands of demonstrators, the only way to avoid violent confrontations was to meet 
the crowd with sufficient forces to prevent attacks on persons and property effectively.
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Given the permanent understaffing o f the police and gendarmerie forces in Prussia as 
well as in France, there was only one force capable of providing the number of forces 
required to implement this type of strategy, and that was the army.
In the interpretation of the use of troops towards collective action, a second general 
assumption follows from the first, namely that the tendency of governments to use 
military troops in civilian conflicts was linked to the degree of stability of the regime, 
so that the governments who worried most about public opinion would be more 
disinclined to mobilise military troops against civilians. The present study indicates that 
there was indeed a connection between the stability of the regime and the tendency of 
adopting measures that implied the army to control public disorder. However, the 
connection in the case of France and Prussia appears to be the opposite to that 
generally assumed. It was the liberal but unstable French Third Republic that 
developed a strong tendency to mobilise the army for crowd management, whereas the 
reputedly authoritarian and militaristic Prussian system made increasingly seldom use 
of the army for internal peacekeeping. The reasons for which the general assumption of 
the importance of public opinion proves to be inaccurate are not difficult to trace from 
the French and Prussian examples.
The Republican regime in France - being established on fragile popular consensus - 
could hardly afford violent confrontations to take place, or to lose control over a minor 
conflict that might easily deteriorate into a revolt. For the French authorities the choice 
of strategy towards public disorder was a question of the lesser evil. Mobilising the 
army would upset public opinion, but provided a high degree of security against losing 
control over a sensitive situation. Avoiding military intervention would please public 
opinion in the first place, but at the serious risk of upsetting public opinion when - as 
was probable - the police and gendarmerie forces lost control and began to shoot in 
desperation or self-defence. In fact, in both France and Prussia, incidents of people 
being killed during confrontations with public forces most often took place when 
policemen or soldiers felt they were losing control. Accordingly, the French Ministry 
of the Interior persistently pursued strategies that implied the mobilisation of military 
troops, despite widespread protests from the opposition and sometimes also from the
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army. Some attempts were made - particularly by Combes and Clemenceau - to change 
this policy. However, successive governments* public declarations of ‘de-militarising* 
the internal peacekeeping, were never seriously followed up.
The Prussian authorities were aware of the inability o f the civil forces to deal with 
situations which degenerated into violence or riots of any significance. However, the 
Prussian administration could better afford to adopt measures that implied a higher 
degree of risk and a lower degree o f control, than the French administration. There 
were two reasons for this. In the first place, the legitimisation of the Prussian regime 
was not based on popular consent, but on the authority of established state institutions. 
Rebelling against the established order gave the state sufficient legitimate reasons to 
launch a major crack-down, and a substantial part of the authority of the Prussian state 
derived precisely from its self-created image of being tough on any opposition to the 
existing order. The political implications of a violent encounter between the army and 
the civil population did not have the same devastating consequences for the Prussian 
regime as it would have for the French Republican regime. Secondly, the Prussian state 
administration and military elite believed that the army was still capable of putting 
down a popular revolt by military means. The Prussian authorities could therefore 
leave the police and the gendarmerie to deal with even very sensitive conflicts with a 
high potential of violence. In contrast, in France, the experience since 1789 indicated 
the opposite.
In both countries, one can observe that the army corps commanders to a large degree 
supported the policy pursued by the Ministry of the Interior and the state 
administration, and together these three groups were capable of opposing other 
powerful forces working for a change in policy. To understand the lack of opposition 
from the side of the army corps commanders in both France and Prussia, and their de 
facto  support of the civil authorities when these called for military assistance, it is 
important to stress the ambivalent attitude of many senior commanders over using their 
power to defend efficiently the existing social and political order. In the French case, it 
is obvious that the senior commanders found the role of the army as a force for internal 
peacekeeping burdensome, and were seriously concerned about the damaging long­
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term effects on the training and discipline of the soldiers and officers. On the other 
hand, the majority o f French senior commanders, as with their Prussian counterparts, 
saw the existing social and political order as being seriously threatened by labour 
movements and by groups politically opposing the regime. Thus, when called upon, the 
army corps commanders in both countries loyally fulfilled their task. This degree of 
acceptance of the policies pursued by the French and Prussian state administrations by 
the military commanders was only possible because both the policy of ‘de­
militarisation* of the internal peacekeeping and requests for military assistance could be 
justified professionally in the eyes of the military commanders. Thus, in Prussia, the 
military commanders - content with being left out of civil disturbance - refrained from 
pursuing their own strategies in their military region. In France, the army corps 
commanders - recognising the incapacity of the civil forces to deal with serious cases 
of unrest - accepted participation in the development of strategies that attributed a 
central role to the army.
These political factors seem in themselves reasonable as explanations for the dissimilar 
response provided by the French and Prussian administration. However, looking 
closely at the decision-making process around the mobilisation of military troops, and 
the functioning of the civil-military co-operation in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais, it is clear that a large part of the explanation for the dissimilar policies is also 
linked to other pragmatic factors, notably the organisation of the forces available and 
the strategies developed by the administration to deal with greater unrest. The 
organisational aspect helps to understand the remarkable persistence in both France 
and Prussia of the policies adopted in the early 1890s. It also provides significant 
indicators as to why it proved so difficult in France to change the strategies, despite 
pressure and good intentions at least from some key figures in charge of the Ministry 
of the Interior between 1899 and 1914. The third part of this thesis will therefore go 
into the analysis of the organisation and functioning of civil-military co-operation 
linked to the issue of maintaining public order.
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Part III. Institutionalisation of the strategies adopted in France 
and Prussia, and the diverging trajectories of administrative 
practice
How do we explain that two dissimilar policies were pursued with remarkable 
consistency within each system during the period 1890-1914? In the following two 
chapters, the analysis of the dissimilar strategies adopted will focus on the decision­
making process, on the administrative procedures for the requisition of troops, and the 
pattern of inter-institutional civil-military co-operation. This part of the thesis argues 
that the dissimilar ways in which troops were used in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais largely derived from the different administrative procedures and practical 
organisation of civil-military co-operation that developed within the French and 
Prussian systems between 1890 and 1914.
Different unwritten rules and administrative procedures brought about dissimilar 
responses to the problem using military assistance to maintain public order in the two 
countries. In the first place, it is important to note that French and Prussian decision 
makers operated within two different types of bureaucratic mind-sets. Bureaucratic 
decision makers had to be confident that their superiors would consider their strategy 
appropriate. Efficent co-operation with the senior military commander was also of 
major importance for the successful management of a crisis with military assistance. 
This was most easily done by implementing the same measures that the military 
authorities had previously agreed to.
At the ministerial and regional levels, significant differences can be observed within the 
bureaucratic mind-sets of the French and Prussian systems. The main argument of this 
part of the thesis is that these dissimilarities - in terms of the expectations and the 
unwritten rules for appropriate professional behaviour of the bureaucrats - provided a 
strong tendency in the French system towards inter-institutional co-operation between 
the state bureaucracy and the army whilst in Prussia, the expectations and unwritten
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rules for appropriate behaviour pointed towards the lowest possible degree of inter- 
institutional co-operation between civil and military authorities.
Secondly, as a result of successful co-operation between civil and military authorities 
in France, the strategies adopted to deal with internal unrest increasingly involved the 
army. Conversely, in Prussia, the lack of inter-institutional connections between the 
state administration and the army forced the civil authorities to establish protection 
plans and to elaborate strategies that vised only civil forces. With increasing challenges 
from mass movements, planning and preparation for situations of major unrest became 
almost a precondition for successful management of a conflict. Thus the strategies 
implemented in practice were closely connected to the plans established in advance for 
major unrest. In France these plans implied the army, in the Prussian case, they did not. 
Moreover, due to organisational factors, it became increasingly difficult to implement 
policies radically different from those taken previously and planned for in case of 
future public order problems.
Thirdly, by successfully implementing a particular set o f measures, the likelihood 
increased that the same strategy would be adopted the next time a similar problem 
arose. In the present case, the Prussian administration discovered that it could manage 
even major cases of unrest with a significant potential for violence without calling for 
military assistance. In contrast, the French administration drew the lesson that civil- 
military co-operation functioned very well and that a military presence guaranteed 
controlling the situation, which the authorities responsible could not be sure of if they 
only mobilised police and gendarmerie forces.
In dealing with the problem of mass protest movements repeatedly, the question 
whether to call for military assistance moved increasingly away from being a political 
question to become predominantly an administrative question, so that it was the type 
of conflict that defined whether the military authorities would be asked to intervene, 
rather than the events of the individual conflict. Certain elements in the administrative 
procedures in the two countries thus appear to have had a self-sustaining dynamic.
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which strongly limited the number of options that the senior civil servants and the 
military commanders were likely to consider.
In the first place, the dissimilar administrative procedures helped to strengthen and 
perpetuate the policies adopted in the 1890s, even when the challenge of public unrest 
had changed markedly after the turn of the century. In the case of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, 
this led to increasingly frequent use of military intervention. Conversely, in the case of 
Westphalia, the administrative procedures made the mobilisation of military troops an 
increasingly difficult procedure which carried politically unforeseeable implications.
In Chapter Eight, three factors will be analysed that appear to have particular relevance 
for the present case in order to understand the development in the French system of a 
particularly strong tendency towards opting for strategies that involved the army. The 
elements of particular relevance are:
• the formalisation of strategies implying use of the army through the establishment of 
plans for protection and the development of standard operating procedures for 
calling for military assistance;
• the institutionalised integration of the military authorities into the planning of 
measures to manage public unrest and the establishment of day-to-day streams of 
information about the state of affairs in local communities;
• thirdly, the organisational linkage between the civil and military forces wheih made 
the state administration strongly depend on the army.
This led to the continuous and increasing use of strategies relying on the army, for 
military and non-military purposes. The cruicial point in this development is the 
observation that the path taken after 1890 - in particular around 1901-1902 - became a 
determining one for the strategies implemented for the rest of the period until the 
outbreak of the First World War.
In Chapter Nine, an analysis will be undertaken of the significance in Prussia of the 
absence of a basis for close continuous inter-institutional co-operation between the 
state administration and the army. The central argument is that the policy of the 
Prussian Ministry of the Interior to ‘de-militarise’ the internal peacekeeping was
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*4
sustained by the inability of the state administration and the military authorities to enter 
into inter-institutional co-operation. Thus, the success of the policy of ‘de­
militarisation' o f the internal peacekeeping was due in part to these institutional and 
organisational circumstances. At the same time, the lack of inter-institutional 
connections was a serious impediment to the attempts made by powerful forces within 
the Prussian system to provide the army with a more active internal role against 
organised labour movements and political opposition.
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Chapter Eight. The administrative procedures shaping 
institutional co-operation in Nord-Pas-de-Calais
8.1. Changes in the standard operating procedures, 1889-1914
The cases of mobilisation of military troops in Nord-Pas-de-Calais in the 1880s and the 
early 1890s show that the requisition and intervention of the army were characterised 
by the lack of a coherent strategy.1 The measures to be implemented (the role of the 
army, the locations to be protected, the number of soldiers to be mobilised) were 
established on the spot whilst the conflict developed. There was considerable 
confusion about the formal rules, and the strategies proposed to deal with problems 
were sometimes at the edge of legality or far beyond it.2 Conflicts were dealt with at 
the municipal level between mayors, local police authorities, and the commander of the 
nearest garrison. Even when sub-prefects and prefects were involved, operations took 
place independently within the municipalities concerned with little coherent 
management. Finally, there was a clear distinction between the civil and military 
authorities. As mentioned above, the civil authorities were empowered to request 
military assistance and to determine the end of the requisition, whereas the military 
commander alone determined the means and measures whenever troops were involved. 
Both civil and military authorities strongly insisted on their respective spheres of 
authority. Nevertheless, many details concerning the distribution of powers were 
ambiguous and open to interpretation, thus constituting areas of negotiation and 
potential conflict.
Comparing these patterns from the period 1880s-1890s, with the standard operating 
procedures in practice during the numerous cases of military intervention of the years
1 The description here is based on the cases appearing in the confidential correspondence of the army 
corps commander 1880-1888; and on the cases of intervention appearing during the strike wave 1889- 
1893. Departmental Archives, Lille, M 626/18 ‘Grève de Mineurs: Aniche, Vicoigne 1889’.
2 A similar confusion can be observed in Saône-et-Loire where the most notorious military 
interventions took place in the late 1860s and during the first decades of the Third Republic. In 1882, 
during the great miners' strike in Montceau-Ies-Mines, the prefect suggested that the local authorities 
should organise patrols which were entitled to interrogate suspects, to undertake searches in the 
homes of the strikers, and to arrest suspected leaders for twenty-four hours. National Archives, Paris, 
F.7.12526, *4e Sûreté générale. Evénements de Montceau-les Mines, 1882-1883’. Letter of 14 October 
1882 from the Prefect of Saône-et-Loire to the minister of the interior.
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between 1901 and 1914, four significant changes appear: As previously shown,3 the 
level of decision making moved from the municipal level to the senior authorities at the 
regional level (the prefect and the army corps commander). In the vast majority of 
cases, instead of requesting the troops directly, the local authorities went to the sub­
prefect and asked him to urge the prefect to call for military assistance. In some of the 
cases where there was a possibility of a major strike, the invitation to call for military 
assistance came to the prefeccts from the government. In the majority of cases, the 
formal requisition would therefore pass from the prefect to the army corps 
commander. Right until 1914, however, a certain number o f ‘panic* requisitions were 
still issued by sub-prefects or the mayors of the main towns4 where smaller incidents of 
unrest were frequent. In these cases, the sub-prefect played the executive role, 
together with the local general commander or military governor. Due to the frequency 
of intervention in these towns, the procedures for mobilising the army were laid out in 
detail, leaving few questions open for decision. Moreover, the behaviour of the sub­
prefects and senior commanders on the spot were subject to close supervision by the 
prefect and the army corps commander. The role of local authorities after the turn of 
the century was therefore rather restricted compared to their relatively extended 
freedom of action during the previous decade.
In addition, there was a change in the timing and the justification for military 
intervention. During the early 1890s, troops were only asked to intervene in a conflict 
at the moment when the civil forces could no longer maintain control with the available 
civil forces. Thus, the decision as to whether to call for troops was appropriate was 
taken on the basis of the development of the individual conflict - as was always the 
case in Prussia. However, after the turn of the century, the justification for the 
presence of military troops no longer depended on the course of the particular conflict, 
but on whether that conflict belonged to a category that was defined by the 
administration as appropriate for military involvement (particularly, strikes in the 
mining or transport sectors). In the case of a major strike comprising several
3 See Chapters Two and Four.
4 Most frequently in the ports of Dunkerque and Calais, but isolated cases were found where this type 
of requisition was undertaken by the local authorities of the main industrial towns such as Roubaix, 
Douai, Valenciennes, and Maubeuge.
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professional branches, the requisition of troops became a standard strategy to be 
implemented the moment the strike broke out. Similarly, in situations of possible 
unrest, such as the visit of a VIP or an election troops were routinely called out. In 
such situations, the administrative response would also be to ensure public order by 
calling for military assistance. Thus, apart from the cases of panic requisition, troops 
were most often called out preventively with no regard to whether riots and violence 
had taken place.
Thirdly, in contrast to the cases occurring in the 1880s and the early 1890s, a high 
degree of consistency can be observed after the turn of the century in the procedures 
followed and the strategies implemented. Each time troops were requested for a 
specific type of conflict in a particular area where this type o f conflict had previously 
taken place (for instance, a miners* strike in the industrial basin of Douai, a textile 
strike in Roubaix, or a dockers* strike in Dunkerque), the same measures were 
implemented as had been used before (for instance, the role of the troops, the number 
of soldiers mobilised, their transport, the locations to be protected, the provision of 
food and accommodation).
Finally, the distinction between the realms of the civil and military authorities, which 
was strongly emphasised in the earlier period, became less clear-cut after the turn of 
the century. This was due to three factors: a) the integration of the military authorities 
into the development of strategies; b) the increasing number of significant decisions 
which were to be taken jointly by the prefect and the army corps commander; and c) 
the penetration o f the military organisation into the realm of ordinary police tasks or 
strictly non-military functions. Together, these standard operating procedures 
facilitated the process of civil-military co-operation, and thereby strongly influenced 
the strategies used to deal with public disorder towards closer integration of the army.
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8.1.1 Formalisation of strategies implying the army: The establishment of plans 
for protection
What was behind these changes in the procedures for the requisition of military 
assistance? The first significant factor behind the development of these standard 
operating procedures was the establishment, from 1897 onwards, of nation-wide plans 
for protection. Between 1901 and 1914, these plans constituted the cornerstone of the 
French strategies to deal with major internal unrest. These plans were based on the 
participation of the army, and thereby significantly contributed to an increasing military 
involvement in the process of maintaining public order.
There are three reasons why the plans for protection were o f particular signifianced for 
the frequent use of the army. In the first place, the plans formalised an already existing 
practice. Secondly, the plans defined certain types o f conflicts for which it was 
recognised appropriate to call the army. Thirdly, the plans set a standard for the 
number of troops to be mobilised to maintain internal order. The planning thus helped 
to establish a set of standard operating procedures for the requisition of military troops 
by defining in detail the lines of communication and authority at each step o f the crises, 
by settling certain points of uncertainty, whereby they restricted the potential for 
misunderstanding and conflict. This was useful not only for the cases explicitly covered 
by the plans but also for any situations of civil-military co-operation in the maintenance 
of order. The provisions stated in the plans thus made the requisition and mobilisation 
of troops a far more efficient measure to implement than had previously been the case.
In a wider sense, the planning was important because o f the integration into the 
decision-making process of the army corps commanders and other representatives 
from the military establishment. The meetings between the representatives from 
various Ministries both in Paris and at the départmental level provided the senior 
commanders with an opportunity to express their concerns and to negotiate directly 
with the representatives from the Ministry o f the Interior about their particular 
problems and the needs o f the troops mobilised for this purpose. The process of 
developing plans for protection also provided a forum o f informal discussions between 
the civil and military authorities involved, both at the ministerial and the regional level.
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Finally, by establishing strategies for cases of internal unrest which assumed a military 
presence from the very beginning o f a conflict, the civil authorities came to depend 
heavily on the army. Henceforth, for organisational reasons, it became difficult to 
break away from previous strategies because this would have required a complete re­
thinking of the existing strategies and a total re-organisation o f the forces available.
These were the conditions behind the policies implemented by Combes and 
Clemenceau. Both men may have promised - and even wished - to avoid military 
intervention in labour conflicts. However, as ministers responsible for the internal 
security, they did not possess serious alternatives to the military option that had been 
developed and refined since 1897.
8.1.2. The early plans of 1897-1898: content and Intentions
The first step towards the co-ordination of the civil and military strategies was to 
determine the military commander to whom each civil authority was to address a 
requisition in cases of immediate crisis. Demands for the formalisation of this issue 
appeared for the first time in 1893.5 The second step was to determine, for each 
potentially troubled area, the locations to be protected and the number of solders to be 
mobilised, as well as defining the role o f the troops. This step was developed in the 
first plans for protection from 1897-1898, concerning a possible nation-wide strike 
among rail workers.
The idea of elaborating specific plans for labour conflicts within this professional 
sector emerged in the Ministry of the Interior. Initially, the reason given for the state 
interfering in labour issues between private rail companies and their employees, was 
the importance of the railway system for national defence. This was clearly stated in 
the first communication from the War Ministry to the army corps commanders which
5 Military Archive, Vincennes, 5 N 5, ‘Cabinet du Ministre: Correspondance Générale, 1878-1914’. 
Letter of 18 February 1893 from the minister of the interior to the prefects, and the letter of 23 
February from the war minister to the army corps commanders. “Dans tous les cas où l’extrême 
urgence ne rendra pas la chose impossible, les préfets se concertent au préalable avec les 
commandants des corps d’armée, lorsqu’il y a lieu de faire des réquisitions de troupes, afin de 
déterminer l’arme à laquelle on devra faire appel.”
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described the devastating effects such a strike could have for national defence.6 The 
first draft, elaborated by the War Ministry, was a list of locations which were 
particularly vulnerable to sabotage in the case of a serious conflict between the rail 
workers and the rail companies.7 By June-July 1897, the prefects and the army corps 
commanders were asked by their respective Ministries to make contact with one 
another, and with the chief engineer in the département as well as with representatives 
from the rail companies present in their region. The aim was to study the requirements 
for protection of the rail system within each département. These meetings between the 
prefects and the army corps commanders resulted in the first nation-wide plans.8
The increasing unrest among rail workers in 1897-1898 gave rise to a great deal of 
reflection in the Ministry of the Interior. The main problem in 1898 was not so much 
the maintenance of order or national defence, but the question of ensuring the 
continued functioning of rail services and main communication systems. The military 
authorities were therefore contacted again in order to determine how the rail 
personnel, if necessary, could be replaced by soldiers from the engineering corps.9 The 
provisions from these nation-wide plans were carried put action for the first time 
during the major strike among rail personnel in October 1898. The implementation of 
the plans was described by the civil and military authorities as a great success.10
Three years later, in July 1901, the first signs appeared o f a possible nation-wide strike 
in the French mining industry. With reference to the successful management o f the rail
6 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774, ‘Grèves : Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemins de 
fer’. Circular letter of 3 June 1897 from the war minister to lhe army corps commande«. “Le 
gouvernement a le devoir de se préoccuper de la possibilité de voir se produire des grèves partielles ou 
même une grève générale des ouvriers et employés des chemins de fer. (...) Si la mobilisation 
survenait à ce moment, les transports prévus se trouveraient donc conpromis ou tout au moins 
retardés. Il appartient aux pouvoirs publics de chercher à s'opposer par tous les moyens légaux à des 
événements qui pourraient porter une aussi grave atteinte à la sécurité et à la défense du pays."
7 Departmental Archives, Lille, M.622 /I ‘Grèves des Chemins de Fer. Circularies et instructions, 
1898-1901’. Letter of 25 July 1897 from the minister of the interior to the prefects.
8 A copy of this plan is to be found among the papers from the Ministry of the Interior. National 
Archives, Paris, F.7.12774, ‘Grèves : Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemins de fer*.
9 Military Archive, Vincennes, 7.N.127, ‘EMA, 1er Bureau: Grèves de Chemin de Fer. Mesures à 
prendre, avril-juin, 1898’. Notes elaborated for the war minister, 25 May 1898.
10 Departmental Archives, Lille, M.622 /2 ‘Grèves des Chemins de Fer. Révision du plan de 
protection en cas de grève, 1901-1907’. Letter of 12 December 1898 from the minister of the interior 
to the prefects.
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strike in 1898, the minister of the interior, WaJdeck-Rousseau, and the war minister. 
General André, took the initiative to revise the plans concerning the rail workers and 
to establish similar plans for the mining industry.11 In contrast to the previous plans, 
these new plans were concerned primarily with the issue of maintenance of order. 
Moreover, these plans for protection of individuals and material had no military 
justification. The plans were soon implemented in the first nation-wide strike in the 
mining sector of October-November 1901. When confronted with the prospect of 
renewed trouble in March 1902, the governmental authorities took the initiative to 
improve the plans which had been put into practice only six months before. This time, 
the plans also covered a possible strike among the dock workers in all the main ports.12 
Although these plans were developed with particular professional sectors in mind, it 
soon became clear that they were also applicable to strikes in other industrial branches, 
such as the metal or textile industries.13
After 1901-1902, these plans for protection were updated and improved several times. 
The updating in 1907 was particularly detailed,14 due to the unprecedented strikes 
during the spring of 1906 and the revolt among wine growers in the South of France 
over the summer of 1907. Moreover, the two-year conscription laws of 1905
11 Military Archive, Vincennes, 7.N.100, ‘Au sujet des mesures à prendre en cas de grève 1901’. Note 
of 27 july 1901 from the General Staff of the War Ministry: “M. le Président du Conseil. Ministre de 
l’Intérieur a appelé l ’attention du Ministre (de la guene) sur l’intérêt qu’il y aurait, en prévision de 
l’éventualité d'une grève générale des mineurs, à provoquer dès maintenant, ainsi que cela s’est fait 
en 1897 pour le cas d ’une grève générale des chemins de fer, des conférences entre les représentants 
des autorités administratives et militaires et les Ingénieurs des mines, dans le but de concerter les 
mesures à prendre pour assurer la liberté du travail et la sauvegarde des mines”. Military Archive, 
Vincennes, 7.N.100, ‘Au sujet des mesures à prendre en cas de grève 1901’. Lcttcr of 3 August 1901 
from the war minister to the army corps commandcrs. National Archives, Paris, F.7,12773, 
‘Instructions ministerielles, plan de protection, jurisprudence, emploi des troupes, usage d’armes, état 
chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914*. Letter of 16 October 1901 from the minister of the interior to 
the prefects.
12 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773 ‘Instructions ministérielles, plan de protection, jurisprudence, 
emploi des troupes, usages d’armes, état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914’. Lcttcr of 15 March 
1902 from the minister of the interior to the prefects.
13 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778, ‘Grèves: mesures à prendre en cas de grève générale des 
mineurs’. Letter of 5 March 1902 from the minister of the interior Waldeck-Rousseau to the prefects 
of Moulins, Rody, Nîmes, Grenoble, Saint Etienne, Le Puy, Lille, Arras, Clermont-Ferrand, Mâcon, 
Albi. “...si une grève partielle de mineurs et de métallurgistes se déclarait sur un point quelconque de 
votre département, vous réalisez tout de suite, dans tout votre département et sans attendre l’avis 
télégraphique (unreadabîe), toutes les mesures anêtées en vue de la gTève générale."
14 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774, ‘Grèves: Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemins de 
fer’ Confidential Instruction of 18 October 1907 conceming sccurity plans and the maintenance of 
domestic order in the rail System, the main ports, the mining districts and the industrial centres.
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significantly reduced the number of soldiers available and thus made a revision of the 
previous plans necessary. In the 1909 revision, a fifth professional group was added, 
namely the postal and telegraph w orkers.15 In the last revisions in 1911, 1913 and 
1914, the plans for particular professional groups were integrated into general plans 
for internal unrest and could be applied to strikes in any professional branch or any 
organised disturbance of public order.16
In the turbulent area of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, civil-military correspondence about these 
formal plans was particularly intense. In the wake o f each of the major strike 
movements* discussions took place between the civil administration and the military 
authority about the experiences gained and how to improve the measures to be taken 
for similar crises in the future. The civil-military correspondence - both at the 
ministerial level and in Nord-Pas-de-Calais - reveals the clear intentions of the prefects, 
as well as the military commanders involved, to improve and intensify the use of the 
army for these types of conflict.17 Thus, for example, rather than trying to restrict the 
domestic role of the army or questioning the justification for future requisitions, the 
report from general Lebon, army corps commander in Lille, after the mass strikes of 
March-May 1906, clearly reveals his concern for a more efficient management of the 
troops.18 In the 1907 revision of the plans for a major strike among rail workers, the 
government asked the regional authorities to limit the number of troops to be
15 During the 1908 revision of the plans, the participants discussed elaborating plans for protection 
particularly for the case of major strikes among metal or textile workers, which were among the most 
turbulent sectors. Eventually, the idea of formal planning was abandoned with the argument that it 
was too difficult to predict the course of this type of strike due to the large number of companies 
which could be involved and due to the extension of the areas which would need protection in such a 
conflict. National Archives, Paris, F.7.12913, ‘Commissions et sous-commissions instituées en vue 
d’examiner les mesures à prendre en cas de grèves 1908-1909’.
16 Military Archive, Vincennes, 7.N.115 ‘EMA: plan de protection en cas de grèves’. 1 February 
1911. ‘Instruction de 1913 sur les plans de protection et les mesures à prendre en cas de grèves’, 27 
June 1913.
17 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.CV2.I.333 ‘Grèves. Industrie textile, ouvriers détacheurs, 
éléctriciens, papetiers, tenassiers, chemin de fer. 1903-1910’; 1.A.C/2.I.334 'Grèves. Bassin 
houillers, briquetiers, dockers, charretiers, gagiers, 1910-1912’. These collections contain many 
documents on these discussions. Similarly the report from general Lebon, army corps commander in 
Lille, after the mass strikes of March-May 1906 entitled ‘Note concernant des questions ne se 
rattachant qu’indirectement à l’organisation des bassins industriels, mais réclamant une solution 
immédiate.
18 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C72.I.149. Report of 4 October 1906, 'Note concernant des 
questions ne se rattachant qu’indirectement à l’organisation des bassins industriels, mais réclamant 
une solution immédiate’.
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mobilised. This was particularly urgent because of the reduction in the effective o f the 
army after the introduction of two year military service instead of three year service. 
After having conferred with the rail authorities of 'Compagnie du Nord\ the prefect of 
département Nord followed the wishes of the rail company and wrote to the minister 
of the interior that it was impossible to make any reductions in the posts to be 
protected or in the number of troops to be mobilised.19 In a letter to the army corps 
commander, the prefect expressed his regret that he was unable to reduce the number 
of troops to be mobilised, but he could not take the responsibility for the maintenance 
of order with a reduced number of soldiers.20 Accordingly, the number of troops which 
figures in the plans from 1902 remained the same in all later revisions, despite the fact 
that labour actions, and thereby the challenge in terms of potential of violence, changed 
significantly between 1902 and 1914.
8.1.3, The role attributed to the army in the plans of protection
The aim of the planning, as expressed by Waldeck-Rousseau in 1901, was not to 
influence the outcome of labour disputes through intimidating the strikers.21 Similarly, 
in the first plans, the intervention of the public forces was not justified by the need to 
defend the right to accept or reject paid labour (la liberté du travail). The role of the 
army in the first protection plans was to protect the communication systems, 
(telephone and telegraphs, as well as rail services), and to ensure the basic functioning 
of these services. As such, the purpose was clearly related to national defence. Only in 
the plans of 1901 did the authorities being to define the purpose of military troops in 
terms of the protection of private property, (i.e. preventing sabotage of material), and 
of people (i.e. ensuring the security of strikebreakers).
With the revision of 1907, the role of the army was slightly extended. The new 
justification of its role in the protection plans was to prevent a general strike in vital
19 Departmental Archives, Lille, M 622 f l  ‘Grèves des Chemins de Fer. Révision du plan de 
protection en case de grève, 1901-1907'. Letter of 6 September 1907 from the prefect of the North to 
the minister of the interior.
20 Departmental Archives, Lille, M 622 /2, ‘Grèves des Chemins de Fer. Révision du plan de 
protection en cas de grève, 1901-1907’. Letter of 31 August 1907.
21 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12780, *4ème Bureau de la Sûreté Générale. Grève générale des 
Mineurs.’ Letter of 18 June 1901 from the minister of the interior to the minister of war.
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professions from affecting wider society. This meant the defence of the import of 
foreign coal to ensure the continuous functioning of other industrial sectors.22 It also 
meant ensuring basic provisions for ordinary people (dairies, water supply, electricity) 
when the personnel of vital sectors went on strike.
The revised plans of 1913 described their main objectives as the protection of the 
liberty of professions: ‘to ensure the circulation and communication/ ‘to protect 
persons and goods/ and ‘to protect the equipment o f the public utilities*.23 Thus, the 
mobilisation of the army in labour conflicts was justified not only with reference to the 
interests of national defence, but also in terms of the protection o f the interests of 
wider society.
The move from an entirely military-strategic justification of these plans of protection 
towards arguments concerning the protection of the interests of wider society is of 
particular importance. During the following decade, this became the justification for 
the increasing use of the army both when called upon to  undertake ordinary crowd 
management and when soldiers were mobilised in order to perform strictly non-military 
functions. The result was that the army, whilst remaining essentially an organisation of 
national defence, also turned into a public service that fulfilled strictly non-military 
functions.
8.1.4. The formalisation of the m easures implemented
The development of detailed strategies in the plans for protection was particularly 
significant because the plans thereby formalised at least two key existing practices. The 
first was the preventive use of troops, that is mobilisation of soldiers at the beginning 
of a conflict in order to prevent riots and violent actions from taking place. The other
22 Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 100, ‘Au sujet des mesures à prendre en cas de grève 1901’ Note 
from the General Staff of the War Ministry of 27 July 1901 concerning the measures to be taken in 
case of a general strike in the mining sector. Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 115, ‘EM A \ Circular 
letter from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, 1 February 1911.
23 Military Archive, Vincennes. 7 N 115 ‘Instructions de 1913 sur les plans de protection et les 
mesures à prendre en cas de grèves*. 27 June 1913; “Le premier devoir du Gouvernement en cas de 
grève est de garantir contre les entreprises des agitateurs et des saboteurs la liberté du travail, celle de 
la circulation et des communications, la sécurité des personnes et des biens, la sauvegarde du matériel 
d ’exploitation des services public et des industries privées. C’est l ’objet des plans de protection.”
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was the determination of the number o f forces which were to be mobilised for various 
types of conflict.
The question of whether troops could be requested preventively remained unsettled 
throughout the 1890s. In the early 1890s, there was a strong reluctance both by the 
militaiy authorities and by the government to allow the civil authorities at the regional 
and local level to call for troops preventively. Particularly in the debate following the 
bloody incidents at Fourmies in 1891, it was argued that it was the military presence 
that provoked the violent confrontation between the demonstrators and the public 
forces. The plans elaborated by various branches of the War Ministry during the early 
1890s, aimed at allowing the mobilisation of troops only at a late stage when civil 
forces lost control of over a situation.24 Similarly, in 1901, before the establishment of 
the plans for protection in case of a miners’ strike, the war minister, General André, 
preferred to operate with a graduated mobilisation. Minor measures were to be taken 
at the moment of the declaration of a strike. The further measures to be implemented 
should thereafter depend on the course of the conflict.25
In contrast, the prefects - sometimes backed by the Ministry o f the Interior - preferred 
a mobilisation of significant military forces from the very beginning of a conflict in 
order to prevent any trouble from taking place. In the decade between 1890 and 1900, 
only a few isolated examples of preventive mobilisation have been found.26 However, 
already the first plans concerning a nation-wide strike among rail workers were based 
on a strategy whereby troops were mobilised preventively. Therefore, the role of the 
army became to prevent riots and violence from taking place rather than restoring 
public order.27 In 1901-1902, this practice became the standard procedure. In the
24 See Chapter Six.
25 Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 100, ‘EM A \ Letter from General André to the army corps 
commanders of 3 August 1901.
26In 1900, the measures taken in Dunkerque were preventive rather than repressive, and it was only 
on the 11 September when ’complete calm’ was reponed for several days that the two squadrons 
mobilised (200 cavalry officers) were withdrawn, whilst the two bataillons infantry were maintained 
as guards until the 31 October.
Military Archive, Vincennes, 1 A.CV 2.1.330, ‘Grèves et interventions militaires.'
27 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774, ‘Grèves: Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemins de 
fer*. Circular letter of 3 June 1897 from the war minister to the army corps commanders. “Les troupes 
seront alors envoyées dans tous les cas prévus, quand bien même aucun symptôme suspect n’y aurait 
été signalé.”
277
general strike of October 1901, Waldeck-Rousseau was very clear about his 
priorities,28 and this principle was followed again in March 1902, when Waldeck- 
Rousseau asked his prefects to call for military assistance from the very moment of 
declaration of a general strike.29 The strategy o f all later plans for protection was based 
on the preventive mobilisation of troops. This meant a formalisation of a practice 
which was soon seen as a fully appropriate response to potential threats to public 
order.
Likewise, the protection plans set a standard for the number of soldiers considered 
appropriate to mobilise for various types of conflict The mobilisation of very large 
number of troops to deal with great strikes had been standard practice since the late 
1880s-early 1890s. The military plans for cases of major unrest - elaborated by General 
de France in April 1891 - operated with a force of 8,900 men and 1,538 horses to be 
sent to the industrial areas and main towns.30
28 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778. ‘Grèves : Mesures à prendre en cas de grève générale des 
mineurs.’ Circular letter from the minister of the interior to the prefects of 16 October 1901 : “Il y a de 
graves inconvénients à prévoir deux sortes de mesures: celles qui devront être mises à l’exécution dès 
que la grève générale éclatera et celles qui ne devront être appliquées que dans le cas où viendraient à 
se produire des complications. Il est indispensable de réunir dans toutes les régions intéressées, et cela 
dès le début, les forces nécessaires pour faire face à toutes les éventualités.”
29 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778, ‘Grèves : Mesures à prendre en cas de grève générale des 
mineurs*. Letter of 5 March 1902 from the minister of the interior Waldeck-Rousseau to the prefects 
of Moulins, Rody, Nîmes, Grenoble, Saint Etienne, Le Puy, Lille, Arras, Clermont-Ferrand, Mâcon, 
AIbi, “...Le congrès des mineurs vient de voter par 124 voix contre 105 la grève générale immédiate 
des mineurs. Bien qu’il ne s ’agit que d ’un vote de peuple, j ’estime qu’il y a lieu de prendre dès à 
présent les mesures prévues en octobre dernier en vue d’une semblable éventualité.”
- National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778, ‘Grèves: Mesures à prendre en cas de grève générale des 
mineurs.’ Letter of 6 March 1902 from the minister of the interior to the prefects of Moulins, Rodez, 
Nîmes, Grenoble, Saint Etienne, Le Puy, Lille, Arras, Clermont-Ferrand, Mâcon, Albi. “ Vous auriez 
à réaliser immédiatement les mesures prévues dans le plan de protection, non seulement si une grève 
partielle de mineurs ou de métaleurgistes éclatait effectivement sur un point queLonque de votre 
département, mais même dans le cas où il se manifesterait des symptômes pouvant faire prévoir 
l’imminence d ’un semblable mouvement gréviste, c’est-à-dire que si des renseignements sérieux vous 
permettent de croire qu’une grève va éclater, vous faites occuper, dans tout votre département, les 
points à garder sans attendre que la grève se soit produite."
30 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C./2.I.325 ‘Grèves 1902-1909’. Report of 23 April 1891 from the 
general commander in Lille entitled ‘Temps nécessaire pour réunir le matériel dans les lieux de 
garnison’. This report was sent to the local rail company as explains in details the amount of men, 
horses and materia! to be transported by train into the industrial basins and main towns.
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The first plans for a nation-wide strike among the rail personnel operated with the 
mobilisation of 10V6 companies (1,050 soldiers)31 to Nord-Pas-de-Calais out of the 
12,400 soldiers which were to be mobilised in the whole o f France.32 The plans from 
1901-1902 significantly increased this number to twenty companies (2,000 soldiers) for 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais,33 out o f the 260 companies (26,000 soldiers) that were to be 
mobilised within the entire French territory in case of a general strike among rail 
personnel.34 Despite the attempts in 1907 to bring down this number, there was only a 
reduction of Vi a company from 260 to 259V4 companies in the entire plan.35 In the 
1910 revision, the number of companies foreseen for the region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
remained the same as in 1902.36 With an estimated 250,000 to 300,000 rail employees 
around the turn of the century,37 this means that one soldier was to be deployed for 
every ten to twelve rail workers, strikers or non-strikers. The rate of soldiers per 
potential striker is rather similar to the number of soldiers foreseen in the plans 
elaborated for the main ports. The plans of 1901 specified a force of 1,600 infantry and 
artillery soldiers, 400 mounted men, and 266-320 gendarmes for the protection of the 
port of Dunkerque.38 Compared to the 4,500-5,000 dock workers employed in the 
port, this was almost one soldier for every two potential strikers. The provisions for 
other main ports show similar proportions.39 A comparison with the figures from the
31 It appears from the figures that the planning operated with companies of 100 men. The number of 
men per company could be reduced depending on the seriousness of the particular case of conflict. 
The figures are therefore a maximum estimation of the number of soldiers needed.
32 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774 ‘Grèves. Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemins de 
fer’ Figures stated in a General Staff report entitled ‘Révision 1902 du plan de protection des voies 
ferrées en cas de grève des employés des chemins de fer/
33 The number of troops for Nord-Pas-de-Calais are the third highest after the Parisian region (4,600 
soldiers) and the industrial basin around Lyons and Saint Etienne (2,700)
34 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12912 ‘Statistiques. Projets de lois. Mesures de protection 1884- 
1907’. Report of 15 May 1908 entitled ‘Modifications portées au plan de protection des voies ferrées 
approuvé en 1902 en cas de grève des employés des chemins de fer*.
35 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12912 ‘Statistiques. Projets de lois. Mesures de protection 1884- 
1907’. Report of 15 May 1908 entitled ‘Modifications portées au plan de protection des voies ferrées 
approuvé en 1902 en cas de grève des employés des chemins de fer’
36 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12776, ‘Grèves*. Revisions from June 1910 for each département 
foresee fifteen companies for the département Nord and five for Pas-de-Calais.
37 Desveaux (1899) p.100.
38 Departmental Archives, Lille, M 624 /7, ‘Ouvriers du port de Dunkerque. Réquisitions militaires, 
1901-1902’. Letter of 12 October 1901 from the prefect in Lille to the minister of the interior. 
National Archives, Paris, F.7.12777, ‘Plans de protection des ports en cas de grève des dockers ou des 
mineurs*. Note from the minister o f the interior, dated October 1901.
39 In Calais, the forces amounted to 939 infantry soldiers and 92 gendarmes. For the Port of Rouen 
the plans foresaw a force of 1075 men infantry and cavalry and thirty-five gendarmes. In addition, a
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1909 revision shows that only insignificant changes had been made compared to the 
forces designated in 1901.40
Thus, for both the rail workers and the dock workers, the plans of protection operated 
with the mobilisation of a rather high number o f soldiers compared to the number of 
potential strikers. It was, nevertheless, made clear from the beginning, that the figures 
stated in the plans were only to be considered a minimum that could always be 
increased depending on the circumstances.41 It is therefore not surprising that the 
number of soldiers mobilised during the greatest conflicts of the period (the great 
strikes of the spring 1906 and the wine growers revolt in the South of France during 
the summer 1907) mounted to almost astronomic figures. However, the designation of 
very large forces only formalised what was already practice, and in reality the 
provisions of the plans always lagged behind the actual state of affairs. Nevertheless, 
the existence of these plans, which had been negotiated between the civil and military 
authorities concerned, made it very difficult for the military authorities - when 
confronted with concrete cases of unrest * to question the appropriateness of these 
large numbers. Once settled, it also became extremely difficult to step down and 
change the practice of preventive mobilisation or to reduce the number of soldiers. The 
plans themselves were a recognition by both the civil and military authorities of the 
potential threat presented by popular unrest. Moreover, the plans created the basis for 
very specific expectations of the degree o f security provided by the army.
reserve of the same size was provided in case of need. The port of Marseilles would be guarded by 
1,500-2,000 infantry soldiers and 300 gendarmes in case o f a general strike.
40 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12777, ‘Plans de protection des ports en cas de grève des dockers ou 
des mineurs’ Revision 1910.
41 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774, ‘Grèves. Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemins de 
fer’. Letter of 3 June 1897 from the war minister to the army corps commanders “La liste que je vous 
adresse ne doit pas être considérée comme limitative, ni en ce qui concerne les points à garder, ni en 
ce qui concerne la force des détachements: c’est un minimum auquel il vous appartiendra de faire les 
additions qui vous paraîtraient nécessaires...”
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8.2. Towards integration of the military authorities in the decision­
making process
8.2.1. Constitution of the inter-m inisterial commissions in charge of planning 
From their beginning, the plans for protection were an inter-ministerial initiative 
between the Ministry of the Interior and the War Ministry. Throughout the period, 
these two Ministries remained the key actors who took initiatives, organised the 
meetings in the Ministry of the Interior, and co-ordinated the reports from the 
départements into national plans for protection. Between the first plans of 1897-1898 
and the extended plans of 1901, the relationship between the War Ministry and the 
Ministry of the Interior underwent important changes. This was above all due to the 
Dreyfus affair and to the establishment of successive governments after 1899 led by 
Radicals and Socialists. Thus, the plans for protection established between 1901 and 
1909 were elaborated during the years when the relationship between the government 
and the army was at its lowest point and at a time when the position of the military 
establishment was as weak as ever before. When, in 1901, the plans were extended 
beyond the railway sector, the Ministry of Public Works was involved (represented by 
the head of the department in the Ministry of Public Works responsible for the rail 
service along with their representatives at the départemental level, the regional chief 
inspector of mines).42 Between 1907 and 1913, the planning commissions comprised 
representatives from no less than five Ministries: The Ministry of the Interior, the War 
Ministry, the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Justice (responsible for the 
legal procedures against disturbers and rioters), and the Ministry of Finance 
(responsible for the supplementary expenses linked to major intervention of civil and 
military forces).
Accordingly, the meetings in the Ministry of the Interior involved an increasing number 
of representatives from various branches of the state. In the early meetings of October
42 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12779, ‘4e bureau de la Sûrété Générale. Grève générale des mineurs 
1901-1914’. Letter from the prefect of the North to the minister of the interior, 28 September 1901 
“...j’ai l’honneur de vous informer qu'au cours de plusieurs réunions auxquelles ont pris part les 
représentants de l’autorité militaire, M. l’Ingénieur en chef des mines et M. le Commandant de 
Gendarmerie....”
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1901, the inter-ministerial commission was comprised of only nine members.43 In 
1907, the number of members of the ministerial commission had increased to twenty- 
three.44 The 1907 protection plan initiated a standing inter-ministerial commission, 
with a series of sub-commissions, which also became deeply involved in the revision of 
the requisition laws later in 1907 45 Fifteen of the twenty-three members of the 1907 
commission were still in the commission in 1909.46 47Two other important developments 
can be noted between the composition of the ministerial commission of 1901 and the 
standing commission of 1907. In the latter there was direct participation by the 
regional authorities from the most turbulent areas: the prefects of the départements 
Nord, Pas-de-Calais, and Rhône. For the military authorities, the War Ministry in 1901 
was represented by a lieutenant colonel and a commanding officer from the General 
Staff. In 1907, the military members comprised two senior generals who were also 
members of the Conseil supérieur de la guerre *7 This indicates the increasing
43 Apart from Waldeck-Rousseau, in his capacity as head of the government, there were two 
representatives from the General Security department of the Ministry of the Interior, two from the 
War Ministry, three chief engineers from the Ministry of Public Works, and one representative from 
the Ministry of naval affairs.
44 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12913, ‘Commissions et sous-commissions instituées en vue 
d’examiner les mesures à prendre en cas de grèves 1907-1909’. Minutes from the meeting in the 
Ministry of the Interior the 5 February 1907. The Ministry of the Interior was represented by Hennion, 
head of the Department for General Security; by Lepine, police prefect of Paris; by Vincent, prefect of 
département Nord; Trépont, prefect of Pas-de-Calais; Luteaud, prefect of the départment Rhône; and 
two deputy directors from the Ministry of the Interior. The military authorities were represented by 
General Lebon, army corps commander in Lille and member of the Conseil supérieur de la guerre; by 
General Desoille, senior commander and military governor in Reims; two lieutenant colonels, one 
from the General Staff of the War Ministry and one from the department of the engineers, together 
with a senior administrator. From the Ministry of Public Works, there were three chief engineers 
responsible for the mining inspection and for the rail service. The Ministry of Naval Affairs was 
represented by a vice-admiral, a naval captain, and two senior administrators from the Ministry. 
Finally, the Ministry of Justice was represented by Coulon, vice-president of the State Council, 
together with a head of department from the Ministry and an attorney general from the Supreme 
Court of Appeal.
45 For the 1907 Instructions concerning requisition of the army for maintenance of public order, see 
Chapter Three.
46 Coulon, vice-president of the State Council; the General-Attorney Manoël-Saumane; the prefects 
Vincent, Trépont and Lutaud from the départements Nord, Pas-de-Calais, and Rhône. Hennion, head 
of the department of General Security of the Ministry of the Interior; police prefect Lepine; Grumbach 
and Capot, senior officials in the Ministry of the Interior; the Generals Lebon and Desoille; 
Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard and commander Fabia from the War Ministry; and two chief engineers 
from the Ministry of Public Works.
47 That some senior commanders through the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre, obtained a particular 
role in the development of policies towards internal unrest was already mentioned by contemporary 
observers in the 1890s. (Anonymous *Varmée sous le régime civil et les questions militaires 
pendantes’ Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, 1894, pp.84-85). This influence only increased with the 
establishment in 1907 of the inter-ministerial commission in charge of protection planning. A person 
such as General Lebon, who was at the same time army corps commander in Lille, member of the
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importance paid by the military authorities to this planning, and meant that the military 
representatives were equal in rank to the representatives sent by the Ministry of the 
Interior and the Ministry o f Justice.
8.2.2. Civil-military co-operation a t the departm ental level
Behind the meetings in the Ministry of the Interior was the information gathered from 
each département about the forces needed in a situation of crisis and the main locations 
to be protected. Already when establishing the first plans from 1897-1898 concerning a 
nation-wide strike among rail workers, the Ministries of the Interior and of War had 
asked their representatives at the regional level - prefects and army corps commanders 
- to hold meetings with the chief mining engineer who represented the Ministry of 
Public Works at the regional level. This procedure was repeated and developed in the 
1901 plans.48 In 1901, the aim of the talks between the prefects and the army corps 
commanders was a general discussion about how the mines and the shafts could be 
maintained during a long interruption of work and what could be done in order to 
defend the mines from sabotage. This was followed by a circular from the Ministry of 
the Interior to the prefects inviting them to contact the regional military authorities in 
order to determine precisely the locations to be protected and the forces to be used.49
The plans for protection stressed the regional level as being the centre of gravity in 
decision making about interna] peacekeeping. Accordingly, actors were involved at 
three levels. In the first place, there were the representatives directly involved in the 
elaboration of the protection plans, participating in the meetings in the Ministry of the 
Interior. These were all, in some form or other, representing a state body. Secondly, at 
the departmental level, a standing commission was in charge of establishing and 
regularly revising the list o f locations to be protected and the number of troops to be 
mobilised in cases of conflict. The prefect and the army corps commanders were
Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre and on the inter-ministcrial commission, had a tremendous influence 
on the strategies developed.
48National Archives, Paris, F.7.12780, *4ème Bureau de la Sûreté Générale. Grève générale des 
Mineurs.’ Letter of 18 June 1901 from the minister of the interior to the minister of war.
49National Archives, Paris, F.7.12780, *4ème Bureau de la Sûreté Générale. Grève générale des 
Mineurs.’ Circular of 23 August 1901 to the prefects.
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permanent members of these commissions, which would also comprise other state 
representatives (the senior gendarmerie commander, the mining inspector, the rail 
inspector, the port inspector) depending on the type o f plan. At a third level, mayors, 
local police authorities and representatives from industrial organisations were indirectly 
involved through the information they provided about social, economic and 
topographic conditions within the local communities. However, these local authorities 
were not members of the planning commission and therefore never became directly 
involved in the elaboration of the plans.
In 1911, the minister of the interior suggested that these local representatives could be 
allowed into the departmental commission.50 However, nothing came out of this, and 
the 1914 edition of the instructions concerning the participation of the army in the 
maintenance of public order repeated the wording from the 1907 instructions that the 
locations to be occupied and the number of troops to be mobilised were to be 
determined jointly between the prefect and the army corps commander.51
8.2.3. The commission for the revision of the 1907 Instructions on requisition o f  
military assistance
There is a remarkable similarity between the committee that elaborated 1907 plans for 
protection and the committee responsible for the revision of the law texts from 1791 
concerning the requisition of military troops for maintenance of public order. What is 
also striking about this inter-ministerial group is that is comprised several military 
members.52 The commission was chaired by General Lebon, who also participated in 
the establishment of protection plans in his capacity as army corps commander in Lille.
50 Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 115, ‘EMA’, Circular letter from the Ministry of the Interior to 
lhe prefects, 1 February 1911: “On pourra appeler également à participer à ses travaux toutes les 
personnalités susceptibles de fournir des indications utiles, par exemple les Sous-préfets, le 
Commandant de gendarmerie, les représentants des grandes industries, les Commissaires Spéciaux et 
Centraux, les Ingénieurs en Chef des Ponts et Chaussées et des Mines, l’Agent-Voyer en chef, les 
Inspecteurs des Forêts, les Directeurs des Postes et des Douanes, les Maires des principales villes, 
etc.”
51 Military Archive, Vincennes, 6 N 146, ‘Instruction du 18 octobre (mise à jour à la date du 15 avril 
1914) relative à l’emploi des troupes réquisitionnés pour le maintien de l’ordre public’.
52 Three out of the ten members of 'La commission chargée d'étudier la révision de l'exercice du 
droit de réquisition de la force armée par les autorités civiles et du plan de protection établi pour le 
cas de grèves dans les départements’ were senior commanders.
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The military establishment thus had direct influence on the new formal rules defining its 
own sphere of action in relation to the civil authorities. The strong military 
participation in this commission might be explained by the fact that by integrating 
senior commanders in the establishment of the text was a way of binding the military 
establishment to the new legislation.
The instructions of 20 August 1907 reaffirmed the principle of civil supremacy by 
stating which civil authorities were entitled to call for military assistance (Articles 2-6). 
Article 8 very briefly states that the civil authority alone was to determine the moment 
of intervention.53 However, five substantial paragraphs (Articles 8,9,10,11 and 14) that 
followed demanded civil-military co-operation. Article 18 repeated the right of the 
military authorities to determine the measures to be implemented, but the following 
Articles 19-22 made it clear that any important measure was to be taken in agreement 
with the civil authorities, thus leaving little room for independent military decision 
making.54
It thus appears that, despite the formal insistence on a strict separation of the civil and 
military authorities, the reality was a very powerful demand for mutual agreement and 
a continuous exchange of information. Similarly, the ministerial circular letter 
concerning the application of the 1907 instructions does not emphasise civilian 
supremacy over the military, but rather concentrated on stressing the importance of 
joint decision making between civil and military authorities. In contrast to the official 
text, the circular letter directly invited the military authorities to take the initiative of 
contacting the civil authorities and preparing themselves for intervention.55
53 “L’autorité civile est seule juge du moment où la force armée doit être requise” (article 8).
54 The war ministerial comment on the Article 21 about the obligation of the prefect and the army 
corps commander to meet and determine together the execution of the measures: “Je ne saurais trop 
insister sur les prescriptions de cet article. Il faut qu'à tous les degrés de la hiérarchie, chacun 
s’inspire du but à atteindre et qu'il y contribue de toutes ses forces en mettant de côté toute question 
d’amour-propre.” Military Archive, Vincennes, 5 N 6, ‘Cabinet du ministre, bureau de la 
Correspondance Générale, 1905-1906; trosième bureau 1886-1914’. Circular of 31 August 1907 
entitled ‘Circulaire pour l'application de l’instruction du 20 août 1907 relative à la participation de 
l’armée au maintien de l'ordre public’
55 Military Archive, Vincennes, 5 N 6 ‘Cabinet du ministre, bureau de la correspondance générale 
1905-1906; Trosième bureau 1886-1914’. Circulât letter of 31 August 1907 entitled ‘Circulaire pour 
l’appliction de l’instruction du 20 août 1907 relative à la participation de l’armée au maintien de 
l’ordre public’ Articles 8 and 9 “Dès que des troubles éclatent dans une localité ou dans une région, 
l’autorité civile doit se mettre en communication avec l’autorité militaire et la tenir au courant de la
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The 1907 instructions made some important adjustments to the legislation from 1791. 
These included transforming the former right of the military commander to determine 
all military measures56 into a new duty of the military authorities to prepare for the 
execution of the measures decided together with the civil authorities.57 General Lebon 
had ample opportunity to influence the legislation and plans for protection. However, 
the minutes from the meetings in the Ministry of the Interior reveal that General Lebon 
and the other military member o f the commission, Lieutenant-Colonel Bernhard were 
very keen on increasing the efficiency of military actions and at no time did they 
express any wish to limit the engagement of the army in the settlement of labour 
disputes or other types of public disorder.58
The planning and development of strategies to deal with public unrest was a de facto 
integration of the civil authorities into what had formerly been an entirely military 
matter. At the same time, the integration of important contingents from each army 
corps into a nation-wide organisation of civil and military forces provided the civil 
authorities with a continuous insight into the functioning of the army at the regional 
and local level. How significant this insight was as a form of ‘civilian control’ is 
difficult to know. However, being linked to the civil state administration at the central, 
regional, and local levels made it impossible for the French army to become a closed 
and self-sufficient entity within the state - as became the case in Prussia.
As for the acceptance and co-operation by the military authorities, the importance of 
pre-established plans can hardly be underestimated. Since these plans established the
situation. De son côté, l'autorité militaire ne doit pas hésiter à provoquer elle-même cet échange de 
vues afin d’être toujours prête à tout événement. Le concours absolu que doivent se prêter les deux 
autorités est la condition nécessaire de la rapidité d’exécution d’une réquisition.”
56 Law of 26 July - 3 August 1791. Article 23.
57 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12913, ‘Commissions et sous-commissions instituées en vue 
d’examiner les mesures à prendre en cas de grèves 1908-1909’. Minutes from a meeting of 13 April 
1907 in the ‘Commission pour révision de l’instruction relative à la participation de l’armée au 
maintien de l’ordre public’: “L’autorité militaire prépare les mesures d’exécution qui sont la 
conséquence de ces communications (avec l’autorité civile).”
58 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12913, ‘Commissions et sous-commissions instituées en vue 
d'examiner les mesures à prendre en cas de grèves 1908-1909*. Minutes from the meetings of the 
‘Commission pour la révision de l’instruction relative à la participation de l’armée au maintien de 
l’ordre public’ on 13 April, 8 June, 11 June, 22 June, and 30 October 1907; 3 June 1908 and 27 
February 1909.
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entire concept of military participation in dealing with internal disorder, the integration 
of senior military commanders in the elaboration of measures against internal unrest 
was an effective way of ensuring the consent and willing co-operation of the army. The 
minutes show that the military representatives, in particular General Lebon, 
participated actively in the discussions of how to respond efficiently to public disorder. 
Although he had frequent opportunities to object to the use of military troops, there 
did not seem to be any attempt on his part to reduce the involvement of the army in 
internal peacekeeping.
Through civil-military co-operation, the senior commanders acquired a degree of 
informal influence over issues such as the moment and the conditions for the 
mobilisation of troops, questions from which they were formally excluded. Given the 
important areas which were jointly determined by civil and military authorities, civilian 
supremacy was transformed more into a leading role in an inter-institutional 
relationship, where both the civil and military authorities were bound to operate within 
a sphere of mutual agreement. The ministerial plans for protection must therefore be 
seen not only as the practical organisation of available forces, but also as a form of 
agreement whereby the military leaders committed themselves to deliver troops for 
certain pre-defined types of conflict.
8.2.4. Towards a redistribution o f powers and responsibilities: joint, inter­
penetrating, or separate
One of the few analyses of the civil-military relations during military interventions of 
the beginning of the century insists on the importance of the military authorities being 
allowed to determine the means and measures in dealing with public unrest.59 This was 
certainly the principle as stated in the legislation. However, study the ministerial 
instructions from the first decade of the century and at the administrative practice, it 
shows that the functioning of civil-military relations at the regional level was not 
characterised by this strict separation of the civil and military authorities. During the 
decade between 1900 and 1910, when the army was increasingly integrated into the
59 Georges Canot 'Le maintien de l'ordre en France au XXe siècle' Paris: Veyrier, 1990 p.60.
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planning of measures against public disorder» a general move can be observed from 
strict separation of powers and responsibilities to an increasing fusion between the civil 
and the military authorities. Through protection planning, the military authorities 
acquired influence over decisions reserved for the civil authorities (i.e. deciding which 
conflicts required military intervention, the time of requisition as well as the ending of 
a requisition). At the same time, the civil authorities obtained influence over decisions 
formally reserved for military commanders. Gradually, the barriers which were 
established to ensure the separation of the military and civil authorities were overcome 
in the name of efficient co-operation.
The demand for joint decision making in the plans for protection appeared in the early 
1890s. With direct reference to the strike wave of the 1892 and early 1893, the 
minister o f the interior and the war minister instructed their respective authorities at 
the regional level, that the prefects and the army corps commanders were to  
communicate as early as possible in the course of a conflict about the possible 
requisition of military troops.60 During the following years, it became a requirement 
that the prefect and the army corps commander reached an agreement (se concerter) 
about all important decisions. At first, the idea of joint decision making faced stubborn 
resistance from military commanders who insisted on the right of the military 
authorities to determine means and measures whenever troops were involved. General 
de France in 1893 stressed the principle enshrined in legislation and in the decree of 4 
October 1891 was that when requested by a competent civil authority, the military 
authority alone determined the means and measures needed to maintain public order.61 
However, the ministerial instructions concerning the first protection plans from 1898
60 Military Archive, Vincennes, 5 N 5, ‘Cabinet du Ministre: Correspondance Générale, 1878-1914’. 
Letter of 18 February 1893 from the minister of the interior to the prefects, and the letter of 23 
February from the war minister to the army corps commanders: “Dans tous les cas où l’extrême 
urgence ne rendra pas la chose impossible, les préfets se concertent au préalable avec les 
commandants des corps d’armée, lorsqu’il y a lieu de faire des réquisitions de troupes, afin de 
déterminer l’arme à laquelle on devra faire appel.”
61 Decree o f 4 October 1891 ‘Portant règlement sur le service des places de guerre et de villes 
ouvertes’ Article 167 : “Le choix et l'execution des mesures à prendre appartiennent exclusivement à 
l’autorité militaire, dont la responsabilité à cet égard reste entière.” Military Archive, Vincennes, 
l.A.CV".L330, ‘Grèves diverses’: ‘Instructions en cas de grèves ou de troubles’ from General de 
France, army corps commander in Lille of 15 February 1893 ‘‘Le commandement des troupes sera 
toujours réglé et assuré par l’autorité militaire.”
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offered a new emphasis.62 On the one hand, it was again made clear that the military 
authority alone determined means and measures.63 64On the other hand, the instructions 
insisted that the military authority determined these only in so far as they were agreed 
with the civil administration. It was thus declared that all military measures were to  be 
undertaken by mutual agreement between the army corps commander and the 
prefectoral authority, so that the military right to determine means and measures no 
longer held in practice.
That Waldeck-Rousseau thought o f the plans for protection as a way of limiting the 
military commanders’ freedom of action appears clearly in his answer to some of his 
prefects who, in October 1901, wondered whether it was necessary to follow all the 
prescriptions of the protection plans:
“Les reglements en viguer portent qu’une fois réquisitionnés les chefs militaires sont seuls juges des 
mesures à employer et de ordres à donner en cas de contact de la troupe avec les attrouppements. 
C’est pour éviter qu’il en soit ainsi que j 'a i fait cette réserve (to ask the prefects to implement all
provisions from the moment of the declaration of the general miners’ strike.)”^
In December 1902, the war minister wrote to the army corps commander in Lille. The 
letter concerned the ending of the military intervention after the great miners* strike 
and the strike among the dock workers in Dunkerque and Calais, and stated that this
62 Departmental Archives, Lille, M 622 /2, ‘Grèves des Chemins de Fer. Révision du plan de 
protection en cas de grève, 1901-1907*. Instructions of 12 December 1898 from the minister of the 
interior to the prefects.
63 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774 ‘Grèves: Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemins de 
fer’. Circulai letter of November 1898 from the war minister to the army corps commanders. “Il 
appartient à l’autorité militaire de fixer les effectifs suivant l’objet des réquisitions qui lui sont 
adressées. Les autorités civiles ne peuvent qu’indiquer à titre de désideratum, la force qui paraît 
nécessaire; mais elles ne sauraient réclamer l’envoi d’un détachement ou l'établissement d’un poste 
présentant un effectif déterminé, l’autorité militaire étant seule juge de l’emploi des moyens dont elle 
dispose, sous la réserve de satisfaire rapidement et aussi complètement que possible aux demandes qui 
lui sont adressées.’’ The only point where the military authorilies in 1898 accepted joint decision 
making was the question of ending the military engagement. Departmental Archives, Lille, M 622/1, 
‘Grèves des Chemins de Fer. Circulaires et instructions, 1898-1901’. Circular letter of 6 July 1898 
from the war minster to the army corps commanders: “Il doit être bien entendu, toutefois, que 
d’accord avec l’autorité civile, il appartient à l’autorité militaire de retirer les troupes des points 
désignés, dès que les circonstances le permettent, pour les reporter, s ’il y a lieu, sur d ’autres points 
menacés ou les faire rentrer dans leur garnisons. Je vous rappelle que vous avez d'ailleurs toute 
latitude et toute initiative pour faire, après entente avec l’autorité militaire, les additions qui seraient 
jugées nécessaires à la liste des points à garder.”
64 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778, ‘Grèves’. Notes from the minister of the interior, 5 October 
1901.
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decision was to be taken jointly by the aimy corps commander and the prefect.65 It was 
not only the war minister who allowed his general commander to participate in such 
decisions. The message from the Ministry of the Interior was the same: co-operation, 
joint decision-making between the prefects and the military commander, and a demand 
for a continuous exchange of information. In the 1907 revision of the formal rules for 
military participation in internal peace keeping, the text strongly insisted on joint 
decision making, in contrast to the former laws o f 1791 which only stressed the 
separation of civil and military authorities. The practice, which had gradually built up 
since the early 1890s, was thereby formalised.
Another step towards closer civil-military co-operation at the regional level was the 
repeated demands from Paris that the prefect and the army corps commanders should 
solve the question of mobilisation of troops without passing through the authorities in 
Paris. The prefect’s involvement of the central authorities in questions of military 
intervention seems to be a new phenomenon that appeared in the general miners’ strike 
of 1893. During the large miners* strikes of 1889 and 1891 the troops were still 
requested and mobilised within rather restricted local areas. With strike movements 
tending to extend over several administrative units and involving an unprecedented 
number of forces, the prefects began to appeal to Paris for instructions with increasing 
frequency. The result was that in the nation-wide unrest of 1893, the mobilisation of 
troops became a decision made by the minister of the interior and the war minister. The 
reaction from Paris was to encourage the prefects and the army corps commanders to 
sort out these questions between themselves,66 a demand that was repeated many times 
during the following two decades.67
65 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.CJ2.L326, ‘Grèves, renseignements sur les troupes détachées 
aux grèves, 1901-1902’. Letter of 17 December 1902 from the war minister to the army corps 
commander in Lille.
66National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, ‘Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection, jurisprudence; 
emploi des troupes, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914*. Letter from the 
minister of the interior to the prefects, September 1893.
67 There are several examples among the papers from the Ministry of the Interior (National Archives, 
Paris, F.7.12773-12794) where prefects addressing themselves to the minister with suggestions or 
questions involving the army received a sharp answer from Paris to settle these issues together with 
the army corps commander. The demand for decision making at the regional level by the prefectoral 
authority and the army corps commander was finally formalised in the Instructions of 20 August 1907 
concerning the participation of the army in maintenance of public order : “Article 10: Afin d’éviter 
tout retard ou confusion, l’autorité civile ne fait connaître ses besoins qu’aux autorités militaires 
dénommées dans l’article 7. Elle ne doit s’adresser au ministre de la Guerre ni directement, ni par
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The pressure from Paris for closer integration of the civil and military authorities at the 
regional level was carried even further by the Clemenceau administration. In 1909, an 
initiative was taken by CMmenceau to put into practice an old project* 68 of granting one 
prefect in each French region extended powers in case o f major internal unrest or a 
break in communications with Paris.69 This project again insisted on co-operation 
between a series of state authorities at the regional level, of whom the army corps 
commander was the first to be mentioned.70 Moreover, the description of the role of 
the military authorities in this type of situation again stressed the principle of joint 
decision making between civil and military authorities in all important questions 
concerning the maintenance of order.71 It is important to note that this was not the civil 
authorities simply giving their orders to the military authority, rather it was a close 
integration of civil and military decision making that broke down the formal barrier 
between the two authorities. In April 1909 Clemenceau sent a circular letter to the 
prefects inviting them to act in the name of the minister in close co-operation with the 
military authorities.72 The project of establishing regional prefects was abandoned, but 
in terms of maintenance of order, one trace of it remained: in the inter-ministerial 
instructions of 1913 close co-operation between the prefects and the army corps
l’entremise du ministre de l'intérieur.” In the actua! functioning of the State administration this 
demand for régional co-operation was extended to cover most issues involving both the civil 
administration and the army.
68 The first project to establish régional prefects dates from 1815. It was taken up again in 1872, but 
rejecled by the National Assembly.
69 Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 115, ‘EMA’. Project of Régional Prefects (April 1909) “Lorsque 
les communications normales entre le Gouvernement et les Préfets sont entravées du fait d'une 
agitation intérieure, un agent régional doit pouvoir centraliser les relations avec le Gouverment et 
coordonner (...) les mesures nécessaires pour le maintien de l’ordre public, le rétablissement des 
communications et la solution des affaires administratives d ’une urgence absolue qui sont réservées 
habituellement à la décision des Ministres.”
70 Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 115, *EMA’. Project of Régional Prefects (April 1909) "Le préfet 
régional aura près de lui pour l’assister: Le général commandant le corps d’armée dont la résidence 
est la même ville que la sienne; Le Procureur Général près la Cour d ’Appel; Le Trésorier-Payeur 
Général; Le Directeur des Postes et Télégraphes.(...) Ainsi, les trois autorités: administrative, militaire 
et judiciaire, se trouveront groupées en un même point, avec la plénitude de leurs moyens d’action et 
dans les conditions les plus favorables pour faire face aux exigences de la situation.”
71 Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 115, ‘EMA*. Project of Régional Prefects (April 1909) “Les 
Commandants de Corps d* Armée ont été invités, par le Ministre de la Guerre, à collaborer étroitement 
avec les Préfets régionaux au maintien de l’ordre public. (...) Le Ministre de la Guerre ne devra pas 
être consulté durant la crise sur les applications de leur action concertée.”
72 Letter from Clémenceau of 19 April 1909: “Votre mission est suffisamment large, pour que vous 
puissiez prendre des décisions au nom des ministre (...) Vous saurez donner au gouvernement le 
concours intelligent, énergique et dévoué dont il aura besoin” Cit. Carrot (1984) p.649.
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commander to ensure the efficient maintenance of order in the event of general strikes 
within the transport and communication sectors was emphasised again.73
The deliberate overlapping and joint decision making concerning matters involving 
both the state administration and the military authority are in stark contrast to the 
situation in Prussia. Here such questions were often passed from one authority to 
another, and frequently both civil and militaiy authorities appeared unwilling to make a 
decision, fearing an intrusion into the field of authority o f the other.
Given the mutually suspicious relationship between civil and military authorities after 
the Dreyfus affair and the Affaire des Fiches o f 1904,74 the move towards negotiated 
plans and joint decision making on all important issues can hardly be underestimated. 
For the efficient execution of the governmental policies - in France generally and in the 
region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais in particular - it was o f major importance that politically 
sensitive decisions were taken jointly by the prefect and the army corps commander. 
This integration of the general commanders into the decision making process, one in 
which they had no formal right to participate, was an effective way of obviating 
opposition from the military establishment. On their side, the military commanders 
involved in this process had a good reasons for not opposing the close integration of 
the military organisation into the problems of maintaining internal order since it 
provided them with direct influence over matters from which they were formally 
excluded.
73 Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 115 *EMA\ ‘Instruction Inter-ministerielle sur les plans de 
protection et les mesures à prendre en cas de grève’ (1913) “(Dans le cas d’une grève des services 
postaux et télégraphiques coïncidant avec une grève des chemins de fer) les Préfets des départements 
compris dans la portion du territoire isolée, se tiendraient en contact permanent les uns avec les autres 
ainsi qu’avec le Général commandant le corps d’armée de façon à permettre la coordination des 
efforts destinés à assurer le maintien des communications entre eux, la défense de l'ordre public ainsi 
qu'une utilisation méthodique et adéquate des réserves de troupes dont dispose le Commandant de 
corps d’armée.” (Article 65).
74 See Chapter Four.
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8.3. The functioning of civil-military co-operation at the regional level
8.3.1. Lines o f communication and exchange of information between the prefects 
and the army corps commander
Formally, the demand for co-operation between civil and military authorities was 
stated in the legislation regarding the participation of the armed forces in maintaining 
public order. The nature of co-operation was not defined, but one of the cornerstones 
from the 1890s onwards was the mutual exchange of information between the civil and 
military authorities at the regional and local levels. Within the Ministry of the Interior75 
as well as the War Ministry,76 the prefects and army corps commanders were asked to 
communicate with each other rather than address themselves to their respective 
Ministries.
In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, it became standard procedure for the prefects and the army 
corps commander to send a copy of their correspondences to each other, when 
relevant. This provided both groups with an insight into the problems and complaints 
which were objects of communication between the authorities at the local level and 
their superiors within the other organisation. In addition to the direct communications 
between civil and military authorities, they shared an institutionalised source of 
information, namely the daily reports from the local gendarmerie units. These reports 
were sent simultaneously to the prefect, to the army corps commander, and to their 
respective Ministries, thus ensuring a regular flow of information about the state of 
affairs in local communities. By this means, the army corps commander was constantly 
informed of problems of public security, and was warned at an early state about the 
possible outbreak of trouble. Arguably, this day-to-day stream of information - rather 
than the sporadic information about isolated cases of trouble - helped to make the 
military authorities more susceptible to the needs of the civil authorities for military 
assistance.
75 Military Archive, Vincennes, 5 N 5, ‘Cabinet du Ministre: Correspondance Générale 1878-1914/ 
Circular of 15 May 1878 entitled ‘Communication entre les autorités militaires et les autorités 
préfectorales et municipales/ Letter of 14 June 1882 from the minister of the interior to the prefects.
76 Military Archive, Vincennes, 5 N 5 ‘Cabinet du Ministre: Correspondance Générale 1878-1914/ 
Circular of 15 May 1878 entitled ‘Communication entre les autorités militaires et les autorités 
préfectorales et municipales.' Letter of 29 January 1883 from the war minister to the army corps 
commanders.
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In addition to day-to-day information, the establishment and up-dating every two or 
three years between 1897 and 1914 of the protection plans required the prefects and 
the army corps commanders in each military region to work closely together in making 
their recommendations to the inter-ministerial commission about the problems of 
unrest and the troops available. This was a major administrative operation that allowed 
informal exchange views and facts on the organisation and needs of all forces within 
the region. It also provided mutual insight into the needs and intentions of the other 
authority. Arguably, the high degree of openness between the civil and military 
authorities limited mutual suspicion and the potential for conflict, although it is 
impossible to get an idea of exactly how significant this regular interaction and equal 
access to information were in the establishment o f mutual trust.
At the local level, similar patterns of co-operation took place between the 
representatives of state authorities. In the ports of Dunkerque, Calais and Saint Pol, 
the local military governor or garrison commander was in continuous communication 
with the sub-prefect, the head of the maritime authorities, and with the chief engineer. 
These local state officials were the first to recommend smaller changes or adjustments 
of the existing protection plans. More importantly, on the basis of the plans for major 
unrest, the state representatives on the spot developed measures to be implemented in 
case of smaller conflicts, so that when one-hundred dock workers or sailors went on 
strike in Dunkerque, a pre-defined number o f soldiers could be called to prevent 
sabotage of the most vulnerable parts of the port installations. When it came to 
protecting material against sabotage, it was never foreseen that the gendarmerie 
should perform such a task. The role of the gendarmerie was to police the individuals, 
but not to protect plants or port installations. Accordingly, the gendarmerie authorities 
were not involved in planning how to protect material from sabotage.
At the local level, examples from Dunkerque, Valencienne, Maubeuge and Cambrai 
show a similar co-operation between different civil and military authorities. The 
examples of significant co-operation between the military authorities and various 
civilian bodies were particularly frequent for Dunkerque, where the military governor
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and the sub-prefect frequently exchanged information concerning the movements of 
dock workers in the three main ports: Dunkerque, Calais and Boulogne-sur-Mer. In 
1902, during the major strike among the dock workers o f Dunkerque and Calais, the 
division commander and the prefect of Pas-de-Calais asked their subordinates in Calais 
to develop a set of measures to ensure public order. On the 23 October 1902, the sub­
prefect of the arrondissement of Boulogne-sur-Mer and the state police commissioner 
gathered at the garrison with the local commander to decide the measures to be 
implemented.77 These examples of local integration of the military authorities into the 
planning process were not confined to the ports ports. In June 1910, when the first 
rumours arose about a possible general strike among the rail workers, the commander 
of the garrison in Cambrai arranged a meeting in the local military headquarters with 
the deputy head of the sub-prefectural offices of Cambrai (Chef des Bureaux de la 
Sous-Prefecture) and the local state inspector of the railways.78 Similarly, in August 
1911, when the authorities feared large demonstrations against price increased, a 
meeting was held between the military governor of Maubeuge, the sub-prefect of 
Avesnes and the deputy mayor of Maubeuge at the office of the military governor.79 
The purpose was to decide the exact measures to be taken in case of mass 
demonstrations. These lines of communications can be seen in the voluminous 
correspondence between the different branches of the state at the regional and local 
level.80
Thus, lines of intense communication and co-operation existed both at the ministerial 
level, at the regional level between the prefects and the army corps commander, and at 
the local level between local commanders, the prefectoral and sub-prefectoral 
authorities, and a variety of specialists representatives various ministries. If the army 
was indeed under the control and authority of the prefects and the civilian government, 
the military authorities nevertheless had informal influence over matters that concerned
77 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1 .A.C72.I.326, ‘Grèves, renseignements sur les troupes détachées 
aux grèves, 1901-1902’. Report of 24 October 1902 from the commander of Calais.
78 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1 A.CV2.I.333, ‘Grèves des Chemins de Fer, 1910’. Letter of 12 June
1910 from the military commander in Cambrai to the army corps commander in Lille.
79 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1 .A.C72.L330, ‘Grèves diverses, 1908-1913*. Letter of 23 august
1911 from the military governor of Maubeuge to the army corps commander in Lille.
80 Departmental Archives, Lille, M 624 /7 ‘Ouvriers du port de Dunkerque. Réquisitions militaires, 
1901-1902*.
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the aimy. In addition, they were regularly informed about the state of affairs in local 
communities through the same type of information as was provided to the prefect. It is 
therefore not surprising that the military view of the seriousness o f a particular 
situation was quite close to that of the civil administration in the majority o f cases.
8.3.2. Knowledge and consensus about the formal and informal rules for 
procedures and appropriate bureaucratic behaviour
The standard operating procedures that arose from the protection plans and from the 
frequent implementation of the same measures brought about a particular bureaucratic 
mind-set that was shared by the succesive prefects and military commanders. This 
bureaucratic mind-set consisted of the common acceptance of the strategies adopted, 
the notions of appropriate response to public unrest, and the distribution of powers and 
responsibilities between the two institutions. These norms and expectations established 
strong limits on the professional behaviour of senior military commanders, since any 
deviation from the standard operating procedures would need to be justified.81 It was 
also difficult for the army corps commander to withdraw from the implementation o f 
plans that he himself or his predecessor had negotiated with the civil administration.
This helps to explain why military commanders actively participated in the 
implementation of policies that many of them were likely to strongly disapprove of. 
This is particularly relevant to military participation in the implementation of the anti- 
Catholic legislation of the years 1902 to 1906. It also helps to explain how military 
commanders could co-operate effectively with representatives of governments that 
appearently were attempting to break the power and the social standing of the army 
elite. It also helps to explain how a high degree of mutual confidence on matters 
concerning maintenance o f order could exist between the prefects and the army corps 
commander in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, despite the generally suspicious relationship
81 This seems clear when, shortly after the establishment of the first protection plans for the port of 
Dunkerque, the prefect in Lille complained to the minister of the interior about not having been 
informed about some minor changes made by the army corps commander: “J ’ai demandé au Général 
Jeannerod (army corps commander in Lille) de vouloir bien, pour l’avenir, m ’informer des 
modifications qu’il croirait devoir apporter à un travail concerté, et que l’administration préfectorale a 
le plus grand intérêt à ne pas l’ignorer.” Departmental Archives, Lille, M.624 Î7, ‘Ouvriers du port de 
Dunkerque. Réquisitions militaires, 1901-1902’ Letter of 10 October 1901.
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between the Republican regime and the French army. In particular, Louis Vincent, 
prefect in Lille 1899-1911, developed a self-assured but very courteous relationship 
with the successive army corps commander during his twelve years of service.82
Similarly, the fact that both civil and military authorities knew about and submitted to a 
set of standard operating procedures surrounding civil-military co-operation strongly 
limited the potential for conflict and misunderstandings. It is significant that among the 
mass of documentation on military interventions in France, the cases of conflict are 
quite rare, and those which have been found all fall into one of three categories: a) they 
occured in the period previous to 1900 before the procedures for civil-miltiary co­
operation were not properly settled; b) conflicts and misunderstandings occurred in 
areas where military intervention only took place very seldom; c) the interference of 
persons who were not acquainted with the bureaucratic procedures linked to the 
requisition of troops.
Most of the cases of uncertainty or open conflict occurred during the 1880s and 1890s 
before the standard operating procedures were properly established, known, and 
recognised by all the parts involved.83 In the early 1890s, much uncertainty existed
82 In particular, Louis Vincent made a virtue of informing the army coips commander about the 
intentions of his administration. Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C7 2.1.325, ‘Grèves. Dispositions à 
prendre, 1902-1909’ Letter of 28 October 1903 from the prefect of département Nord to the army 
corps commander. To his subordinate sub-prefects, he also insisted on the importance of always 
issuing formally correct requisitions so that the military commander could proceed with no risk of 
being accused afterwards for acting illegally. Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C./2.I.325, ‘Grèves. 
Dispositions à prendre, 1902-1909.’ Similarly, Louis Vincent was very keen on paying his respects to 
the officers and soldiers after the end of major cases of unrest, which gave him a reputation in the 
local press for making the army the auxiliary arm of his administration. Departmental Archives, Lille, 
M.6/20, Papiers personnels de Louis Vincent (1899-1911). His dossier contains a number of 
newspaper cuts on this subjects.
83 Departmental Archives, Arras, M.1641, ‘Rapports avec les autorités judiciaires, militaires, les élus, 
les administrés, les municipalités, 1878-1913*. Letter of 4 December 1880 from the Ministry of the 
Interior to the prefects. “M. le Ministre de la guerre vient d’appeler mon attention sur certaines 
irrégularités constatées dans la forme des réquisitions adressées aux autorités militaires et à la 
gendarmerie, à l’occasion de l’exécution des décrets du 29 mars 1880, et que je crois devoir vous 
signaler à mon tour. Dans un grand nombre de cas la forme de cette réquisition qui a été fixée par 
l’article 22 de la loi du 3 août 1791 et par l’article 96 du décret du 1er mars 1854 a été modifiée. 
Tantôt on ‘invite’ aulieu de ‘réquérir’, tantôt au lieu des expressions de ‘commander’ et de se 
‘transporter’ on a employé celle de ‘mettre à notre disposition’ qui impliquerait de la part de 
l’administration une immition dans les mesures à prendre qui est contraire aux articles 17 de la loi du 
10 juillet 1791, art.23 de la loi du 3 août 1791 et art.l 15 du décret du 1er mars 1854. Dans certains 
cas la réquisition a contrairement à l’article 17 de la loi du 10 juillet 1791 déterminé soit le nombre 
des hommes requis, soit le lieu où leur présence était nécessaire, soit le nombre des sentinelles et la 
nature de leur consigne. Parfois aussi l’objet de la réquisition qui doit toujours être clairement indiqué
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among the prefects in Lille and Arras about financial responsibility, which sometimes 
made prefects hesitate with their requisition until this question was settled. Until 1893, 
financial responsibility was determined for each case individually, but a decision of the 
State Council of July 1893 stated that in case of mobilisation of military troops for
était exprimé par une indication vague telle que celle-ci “pour concourir à l'exécution des décrets”. 
Enfin, bien que l'article 98 du décret du 1er mars 1854 décide que la gendarmerie ne doit être 
employée que pour assister Vautorité dans l’exécution d’un acte et pour assurer Veffet de la 
réquisition, elle a été dans quelques cas requise de procéder elle même, et sans la présence d'une 
autorité civile, à l’exécution complète des décrets, sommation, bris de portes, expusions, etc. Ces 
irrégularités proviennent, je n'en doute pas, de ce que les fonctionnaires de l'administration n'avaient 
pas sous les yeux lors de l’application des décrets les textes qui régissent la matière. J’ai en 
conséquence, l ’honneur de vous transmettre ci-joint, sous forme d’annexe un résumé des dispositions 
législatives ou règlementaires concernant la forme des réquisitions adressées à l'autorité militaire." 
Military Archive, Vincennes, MR /2172 or REC /2172, ‘Application des lois des congrégations'. 
Letter of 17 November 1880 from General Gallifet, army corps commander of the ninth army corps to 
the prefects of the départements 'Indre-el-loire*, ‘Indre’, ‘Vienne’, ‘Deux-Sèvres*, and ‘Maine-et- 
Loire’: “Lors de l’emploi des troupes pour assurer, dans l’étendue du territoire de mon 
commandement l’exécution des décrets rendus contre les congrégations non-autorisées, quelques 
malentendus se sont produits entre les autorités civiles et militaires. Désirant éviter à l'avenir ces 
malentendus et assurer l’exécution des lois avec le parfait accord des autorités militaires et civiles, j ’ai 
l'honneur de vous faire connaître que j ’ai rappelé aux Généraux Commandant les Divisions et 
subdivisions et aux Commandants d’armes de la 9e Région les prescriptions du décret du 13 Octobre 
1863 (...)”
Similarly, there was a case in 1893 when the prefect of Allier complained about a division 
commander who had told his subordinate commanders not to mobilise troops until they had a formai 
order from himself. The prefect made clear lhat this order was against the prescriptions of the law and 
unacceptable, although, as he admitted, the general had acted from the best of intentions to avoid 
abuse of the army by local mayors. National Archives, Paris, F .7.12773: ‘Instructions ministérielles; 
plan de protection, jurisprudence; emploi des troupes, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 
1849-1914’. Letter of 22 Februaiy 1893 from the prefect in Allier to the minister of the interior. “...je 
vous signale les embarras où j ’aurais pu être, au 1er mai 1890, par les instructions que M. le Général 
du Bessol, qui commandait alors en chef à Clermont Ferrand, avait adressées aux officiers placés à la 
tête des troupes du corps d’armée. Cet officier supérieur, dans un but assurément excellent, et pour 
éviter les moyens de répartir les troupes d’après les réquisitions diverses qu’il pouvait recevoir, avait 
ordonné au Général de Brigade, commandant la subdivision de Moulins, de ne mobiliser aucune 
portion de l’effectif qu’après en avoir obtenu de lui l’autorisation préalable. Ce système aurait, dans 
un cas urgent, exigé de longs délais, et occasionné des retard préjudiciables à l'ordre public: 
Réquisition du Préfet au général de brigade, échange de télégramme entre le général de brigade et le 
général commandant en chef. Les précautions prises par M. le Général du Bessol, excellentes, je le 
répète, au point de vue de la répartition des forces, pouvaient devenir dangereuses à cause du caractère 
absolu des ordres donnés. Toutes les fois qu’ils croient en avoir le temps, il est fort naturel que les 
Préfets se concertent avec les commandants de corps d'armée. Mais il doit rester parfaitement entendu 
que lorsqu'ils en voient la nécèssité, les préfets peuvent requérir directement, et immédiatement, les 
troupes qu’ils trouvent à leur portée. Les instructions que le Commandant de Corps d*Armée adresse 
aux officiers sous leur ordre ne peuvent évidemment pas supprimer ou restreindre le droit de 
réquisition directe que les Préfets tiennent de la loi. Afin d’éviter en toute éventualité des conflits, il 
serait, à mon sens, utile que l’attention de M. le Ministre de la Guerre soit appelée sur ce point."
The uncertainties about the procedures and the legal boundaries for the State actions to maintain 
public order were not restricted to co-operation with the army. In 1882, the prefect of Saône-et-Loire 
suggested measures to prevent striking miners from organising themselves, which clearly went 
beyond the powers of the prefect, such as allowing searches and préventive appréhension of suspected 
leaders. National Archives, Paris, F.7.12526, *4c Bureau de la Sûreté Générale. Evénements de 
Montceau-les Mines 1882-1883’. Such suggestions were unthinkable after the tum of the century 
when the prefects were generally much more aware of the limits of their compétence.
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internal purposes, the state was financially responsible.84 The settlement of this 
question helped to strengthen confidence among the prefects in using this measure. 
They could now be sure that a military intervention would not be followed by months 
of problematic negotiations with local communities and private companies who refused 
to pay and complaints from impatient military authorities who were eager to have their 
expenses covered.
A second category were misunderstandings. These also occurred quite frequently 
before the turn o f the century and continued to appear in areas where little unrest took 
place. Since requisition for military assistance only took place very occasionally, 
prefects and army corps commanders remained uncertain about the exact procedures 
to be followed as well as the legal definitions of civil and military authority.85 In 1901 
there was a great deal of hesitation among the prefects about the timing and the 
conditions for military intervention.86 Similarly during the spring of 1906 and during 
the wine growers’ revolt in the South of France over the summer of 1907, the 
hesitations about the standard operating procedures occurred mainly in areas without a
84 National Archives, Paris, F.7 /12773: ‘Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection, 
jurisprudence; emploi des troupes, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914’. 
Decision from the State Council announced to the Ministry of the Interior 18 July 1893. “Le Conseil 
d ’Etat saisi de la question de savoir si les dépenses militaires effectuées à l’occasion des grèves 
incombent aux communes sur les territoires desquelles les grèves ont éclaté, vient dans sa séance du 6 
juillet 1893, de se prononcer pour la négative. Le Conseiller d’Etat, Directeur de l’Administration 
Départementale et Communale, a l'honneur d’en informer Monsieur le Directeur de la Sûreté 
Générale suivant sa demande des 25 février 1892 et 25 avril 1893 et de lui transmettre ci-joint copie 
de l’avis de la haute assemblée qui tranche définitivement les difficultés à l’occasion des affaires de 
Revin et de Roanne.”
85 In the first implementation in 1897 of the provisions of a protection plan, the minister of the 
interior complained that some of the prefects had issued requisitions with a signature but without date 
and indication of number of troops. The intention was that the military commander could fill out these 
details when necessary. This procedure was immediately banned by the Ministry of the Interior 
(National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774 ‘Grèves’. Note from the minister of the interior of 24 August 
1897). Similarly, in 1898, many prefects addressed themselves to the Ministry because they were 
uncertain about how to procédé when calling for military assitance. Worst of all, the prefect of the 
Eastern Pyrenees addressed his requisition to the War Ministry. (National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774 
‘Grèves’ Letter of 10 November 1898 from the war minister to the minister of the interior).
86 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12778, ‘Grèves’. Notes to Waldeck-Rousseau the minister of the 
interior, 5 October 1901. “Est-il absolument indispensable que, la erève générale sera déclaré, tous les 
préfets des départements mineurs - sauf le Gard - prennent toutes les mesures prescrites ? Un certain 
nombre de préfets voient de sérieux inconvénients à procéder de cette façon et demandent à être 
autorisés à n’adresser leurs réquisitions aux autorités militaires qu’au moment où les évènements le 
nécessitent pour leur département. D’autres préfets demandent la latitude de ne pas envoyer de 
troupes sur certains points, la grève ne devant pas toucher ces points.”
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history of public disorder where the prefects and army corps commanders only entered 
into practical co-operation very few times during their careers.87
The third category comprises cases when un-authorised individuals addressed 
themselves directly to the military commander, a step that was followed by increasingly 
severe critisism from the Ministry of the Interior and the War Ministry.88 It is 
important to note that all these fa u x  pas were committed by people who were not 
ordinarily involved in the requisition of military troops, whereas the prefects and 
military commanders who were heavily involved in the maintenance of order never 
seemed to commit these types o f errors.
In a region like Nord-Pas-de-Calais where requisitions for military assistance happened 
more frequently than in most other areas, it is notable how the uncertainty with which 
prefects proceeded in the 1890s changed after the turn of the century, when the 
prefects had become increasingly confident about implementing these measures. The 
change in the self-confidence of the prefects in Nord-Pas-de-Calais between the early 
1890s and the first decade of this century is remarkable. A letter of 27 June 1891 from 
the prefect of département Nord to the minister of the interior shows the uncertainty
87 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12399 ‘Culte Catholique: Inventaires, 1905-1907’ Letter of 4 March 
from the war minister to the minister of the interior: “J ’ai reçu depuis quelques jours, à maintes 
reprises, des télégrammes de Préfets me demandant soit des troupes, soit des gendarmes pour assurer 
dans leur département le service d’ordre nécessité par les opérations des inventaires. J’ai l’honneur de 
vous prier de vouloir bien rappeler à ces hauts fonctionnaires que l’article 4 de l'Instruction du 24 
juin 1903 énumère les autorités militaires auxquelles les réquisitions peuvent être adressées et 
spécifie, dans chaque cas particulier, celle de ces autorités à laquelle incombe le soin de leur donner 
satisfaction. D’autre part, afin de me permettre d’exercer éventuellement des prélèvements sur les 
gendarmes d ’une région pour les diriger sur d’autres, je vous serais obligé de me faire connaître quels 
sont les départements où les inventaires des églises ont pris fin, au fur et à mesure de l’achèvement de 
ces opérations.”
88 In 1911, the minister of public works addressed a réquisition directly to the War Ministry when the 
building workers at a public site went on strike. Since the Ministry of Public Works was not normally 
involved in questions of maintenance of order, the minister did not know that he had no authority to 
request military assistance. The reaction from the minister of the interior was immédiate and severe. 
National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774, ‘Grèves’ Letter of 16 May 1911 from the minister of the interior 
to the minister of public works. “J’appelle votre sérieuse attention sur la nécessité que s’impose à 
toutes les administrations de ne pas requérir de troupes en cas de grève sans passer par 
l’intermédiaire, soit du ministère de l’intérieur, soit des fonctionnaires responsables de l’ordre public 
et qui ont seuls qualité pour adresser ces réquisitions. En dehors de l’illégalité du procédé, l’appel 
direct à l'autorité militaire peut avoir les plus graves inconvénients. Je suis surpris de n’avoir pas été 
averti des réquisitions de troupes, d’ailleurs irrégulières, que vous avez faites par dépêche d’hier et je 
vous prie de me fournir, sans retard, les explications qui me manquent.”
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which characterised the decisions o f the prefects in the early 1890s.89 This uncertainty» 
which in the early 1890s sometimes inhibited the prefects from calling for military 
assistance, seemed to disappear during the following decade. Due to frequent 
mobilisations, the civil authorities had a clearer idea about the conflicts in which their 
superior in the Ministry of the Interior would consider a call for military assistance 
appropriate. Moreover, given the high number of cases where troops were requested, a 
prefect who was criticised for his judgement in a particular situation would almost 
always be able to point to recent similar cases of unrest where identical measures had 
been implemented.
A break from the standard operating procedures would most often be commented on, 
but it seldom had practical consequences. Military commanders sometimes frowned if 
a requisition mentioned that the troops were ‘at the disposition* of the civil authorities. 
It would then be made clear by the army corps commander that the army could not 
legally be ‘at the disposition* but could only ‘deliver assistance* to the civil 
authorities.90 Similar corrections might be made if a civil authority had been too 
explicit in its demands for troops, thus hurting the sensitivities of the military 
commander. In practice however, these details of formulation had no consequences for 
the implementation of requisitions. Although the military commanders were obsessed 
with legality to cover their own backs, they tended to follow even slightly incorrectly 
formulated requisitions, as long as they could do so without compromising themselves. 
Only after the end of the mobilisation would the military commander concerned 
address a formal protest to the prefect that the standard procedures had not been
89 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12527 ‘4e Bureau de la Sûreté Générale. Evénement de Fourmies le 
1er Mai 1891’. “Je ne me dissimule pas que si les troupes sont retirées sans l’assentiement des 
autorités locales et qu’à un moment ou à un autre des troubles viennent à éclater, la municipalité ne 
manquera pas de jeter la pierre à l ’administration et de rappeler ses instances pour le maintien de la 
force armée. C’est pourquoi, Monsieur le Ministre, j ’ai tenu à vous soumettre celte question. Vous 
m’obligez en me faisant connaître si les principes que j ’expose ont votre approbation.”
90 Military Archive, Vincennes, l.A.C. /2.I.335, ‘Inventaires des biens des Eglises, 1906’. Lctter of 
13 March 1906 from the division commander General Chômer to the army corps commander General 
Lebon. “En exécution des prescriptions de votre lettre du 10 mars courant, j ’ai l’honneur de vous 
rendre compte que l’expression “ils seront à la disposition de l’autorité civile” concernant les 4 
militaires serruriers mentionnés dans mon télégramme du 9 mars a été employée à tort. La réquisition 
du Préfet du Pas-de-Calais en date du 9 mars indiquait que ces militiares isolés seraient placés sous 
les ordres du commandant de la gendarmerie, conformément aux ordres que j ’ai adressés, le 28 février 
1906, à tous les commandants d’armes du département du Pas-de-Calais, ordres dont je vous ai 
envoyé copie le même jour ainsi qu'à M. le Préfet du Pas-de-Calais.”
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observed, and the authority that issued the requisition would then be urged to do it 
correctly next time. Only on a few occasions were questions o f formality used to 
obstruct requisitions for military assistance.91 A notorious exception to this rule were 
the problems during the establishment of inventories over the possession of the 
Catholic Church in January-March 1906, when several local military commanders who 
were strongly opposed to the governmental policy used issues of formalities as a 
means of obstructing their participation.
The civil-military confrontations on that occasion also indicate the importance of the 
pre-established consensus and mutual confidence. Normally, in politically sensitive 
situations when disorder was to be expected, contacts were made with the military 
authorities weeks or even months before the actual conflict broke out. This was 
possible when a major strike was announced. It was also possible at occasions such as 
the annual May Day celebrations, general elections, or political meetings. The 
importance of the previous contacts between prefects and senior commanders becomes 
clear when looking at the problems which arose in January-March 1906, during the 
implementation of the law concerning the separation of the French state and the 
Catholic Church.
The establishment of inventories over the possessions within local churches triggered 
vigorous opposition from many Catholics. Since a large proportion of officers came 
from families with strong connections to the Catholic Church, their participation in the 
enforcement of the anti-Catholic legislation was particularly disagreeable. A certain 
number of individual officers attempted actions of disobedience or broke their military 
career over the issue. However, it was not the first time military troops had to help the 
civil authorities enforce laws against Catholic institutions,92 and on previous occasions
91 Examples have been found during the miners’ strikes in 1901 and 1902, when certain senior 
commanders complained about the number of troops demanded by certain prefects, and used small 
errors in the requisition to hinder mobilisation of additional troops. Similarly, in 1891, General 
Loizillon had no qualms about openly protesting when he thought that it was time to withdraw the 
troops from Fourmies two months after the bloody incidents on May Day incidents. (National 
Archives, Paris, F.7.12527, ‘4ème Bureau de la Sûreté Générale. Evénements de Fourmies le 1er Mai 
1891’).
92 The military troops were involved in the implementation of the anti-Catholic legislation at three 
previous occasions during the early Third Republic: the closing of illegal congregations Marchl880; 
the closing of illegal congregations after the restricted legislation o f 1903.
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the fact that many officers were also devout Catholics did not present major 
problems.93
The difference, however, is interesting when comparing the events of January-March 
1906 with the other occasions where military troops were involved in the execution of 
the laws against the Catholic Church. On the other three occasions, the measures 
foreseen to maintain public order in the case of demonstrations involved the military 
authorities from the beginning. During the implementation o f the laws against illegal 
religious orders, in March 1880 and again in 1902-1903, the army corps commanders 
received instructions from the Ministry of War about the possibility o f requisitions 
from the civil authorities.94 The army corps commanders had therefore instructed the 
local commanders about their duty to obey if a civil authority requested assistance. 
These ‘instructions’ was in fact to be considered as an order from a military superior. 
Thus, when the army corps commander had issued an informal order concerning the 
specific problem of enforcing the laws on illegal congregations, it was almost 
impossible for a local military commander to find an excuse for refusing a request from 
the civil authorities.
The closing of illegal religious orders in 1902-1903 was, in fact, a far more 
controversial issue than the establishment of inventories of the possessions of the 
Catholic Church in 1906. The opposition from individual officers in January-March 
1906, and the following crisis of discipline within the army, therefore, took both the 
civil administration and the senior commanders by surprise. The civil authorities had 
not expected such strong reactions from the Catholics and had not prepared the
93 Military Archive, Vincennes, MR 2172 or REC 2172 ‘Application des lois des congregations’. 
Letter of 17 November 1880 from army corps commander General Gallifet to the prefects of the 
départements of Indre-et-Loire, Indre, La Vienne, Les Deux-Sèvres, and Maine-et-Loire. In his 
account to the prefects within the ninth army corps, General Gallifet, as responsible commander 
admitted that there had been a few incidents during the expulsion of Jesuits, but these were due to 
misunderstandings between the civil and military authorities and the inexperience of implementing a 
requisition of troops.
94 Military Archive, Vincennes, MC 2172, ’Application des lois des congrégations. Exécutions des 
décrets du 29 Mars 1880 sur les congrégations’. Military Archive, Vincennes, l.A.G/2.1.325, 
‘Grèves. Dispositions à prendre, 1902-1909’ Letter of 23 August 1903 from the commander in 
Cambrai to the division commander in Lille.
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militaiy authorities for a possible requisition of troops.95 When troops were requested 
in a panic, the requisitions came from the local civil authorities and went directly to the 
local garrisons, and not, as was usually the case, as an order from the division general 
or the army corps commander. As a result, a certain number of local commanders 
found an occasion to be difficult about the formalities in the requisitions, thus 
postponing or impeding the mobilisation of troops. Discipline was restored when the 
senior commanders turned the requisition into military orders. However, the general 
governor of Paris, General Davignon, had difficulties making his subordinate officers 
obey. Other generals like Brugiere and Jourdy - though resentful against the 
government for requesting the soldiers to perform the role as simple labourers,96 - 
were above all horrified by the lack of discipline among the lower ranking officers.97
95 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12399, ‘Culte Catholique: Inventaires, 1905-1907.’ No mention of 
military réquisition occurs in the instructions from the minister of the interior to the prefects until 
February 1906, after several violent confrontations in January between demonstrators and public 
forces. In a ministerial circular from 25 February 1906, the minister of the interior for the first lime 
recommended the use of military troops in order to accomplish the inventories.
96 “En quittant l’Elysée, je vais au ministère de la guerre et je  parle au ministre des incidents de 
Saint-Servain. Je lui dis que je ne comprends pas qu'on se serve de l’armée pour enfoncer les portes 
des églises, que ce travail doit être fait par des ouvriers payés et que l’armée doit seulement les 
protéger.” General Brugière “Mes mémoires, 1841-1914” vol.6 (no pagination) unpublished 
memoirs. Military Archive, Vincennes, 1 K 160/1 Kmi 46.
“J ’allai trouver le Préfet, M. Trépont, et je lui déclarai que si, comme il en avait le droit, il requérait 
les troupes pour maintenir l’ordre dans la rue, je donnerai les ordres en conséquences, mais que 
l ’armée n’était pas faite pour crocheter des portes, même d’églises et que, par conséquent, je le priais 
de faire faire cette besogne par les électeurs, les radicaux-socialistes ne manquaient pas à Orléans.” 
General Millet 'Souvenirs’ unpublished memoirs (ca.1913) no pagination. Military Archive,
Vincennes, 1 K mi 9.
“L’incident à coup sûr, était sincèrement délicat. Il est incontestable que tout officier, appelé à faire 
crocheter des portes, à violer ouvertement des sentiments intimes qu’il peut partager, à expulser des 
religieux, des soeurs de charité, ne pouvait manquer d’estimer qu’il subit là une triste mission, 
drôlement étrangère à ses devoirs professionnels. La corvée était pénible, même pour les plus libres 
des libre-penseurs.” General Jourdy "Mémoires" unpublished manuscript ca.1911. Military Archive, 
Vincennes, dossier personnel 392/GD/3 pp.618-621
97 “En tout cas, il est inadmissible qu’un officier général ne puisse pas se faire obéir par trois de ses 
subordonnés. Le général Davignon aurait dû donner lui-même l’ordre aux sapeurs d ’exécuter le 
travail prescrit et faire comprendre au préfet et au sous-préfet qu’il ne fallait pas recommencer cette 
affaire." General Brugière 'Mes mémoires, 1841-1914’ vol.6 (no pagination) unpublished memoirs. 
Military Archive, Vincennes, 1 K 160/ 1 Kmi 46.
“Dans beaucoup de cas, les forces de police et de gendarmerie furent insuffisantes pour assurer le 
triomphe de la loi, il fallait faire appel à l ’armée. Il se passa alors des incidents très regrettables au 
point de vue de la discipline. Certains officiers refusèrent de se prêter à (unreadabîe) d’opération, les 
uns ouvertement, d’autres en ‘se défilant’ au moment psychologique. Il en résulta un scandale fâcheux 
au point de vue de la discipline.(...) J ’ajoutai que le refus d’obéissance de la part d’un officier porte 
gravement atteinte à la discipline, parce qu’il donne ainsi un exemple dangereux pour ses soldats 
(quand) l’armée (est) réquisitionnée pour le maintien de l’ordre public et pour l’application des lois. 
Le danger de cette théorie toute de casuistique apparaît dans sa crudité quand on invoque le cas du 
champ de bataille, mais il saute aux yeux même en temps de paix, où le cas de grève met souvent le 
soldat peut-être partisan ou camarade des grévistes parfois même leur parent aux prises d’angoisses
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General Millet - himself a Protestant - accepted the disobedience from the local 
commanders on the grounds of professional honour.98
Confronted with important demonstrations and with these obstructions from local 
military commanders and individual officers, the government had to give up the 
inventories, at least for some months. Eight months later, from the 19-23 November 
1906, the inventories were accomplished. Again this took place with a massive display 
of military force. However, this time, the campaign was carefully planned in co­
operation with the army corps commanders. A circular from the War Ministry 
informed the army corps commanders already on the 15 November about the 
forthcoming action.99 The requisitions sent from the prefects were pre-printed so that 
no doubt could arise about their legality, about the role of the military troops, or about 
the number of soldiers to be mobilised. The inventories were carried out within only 
four days, early in the morning, so that there was no time for demonstrators to 
mobilise significant opposition. Similarly, due to the involvement of the army corps 
commanders in the procedure of requisition, this time there were no problems of 
obstruction from local commanders or individual officers.
8.3.3. Organisational dependence on the army organisation and increasing 
dynamics in bureaucratic procedures
From the turn of the century onwards, the civil administration came to rely increasingly 
on assistance from the military organisation in situations of great and minor unrest. 
This was not only because the army was an indispensable part of the strategies 
elaborated in the plans for protection. Between the late 1890s and the outbreak of the 
First World War, the French army became an indispensable factor in the
semblables, isolément placé qu'il a été entre sa conscience et ses affections. Il est pourtant 
indispensable de compter qu’il sera fidèle à son service. Or, ce qui est vrai pour le soldat, dut l’être 
également pour l ’officier.” General Jourdy 'Mémoires’ unpublished manuscript ca. 1911. Military 
Archive, Vincennes, dossier personnel 392/GD/3 p.621
98 ’’Des scènes très pénibles s’étaient produites dans d’autres villes. Avant tout demeure (la question) 
si les officiers devraient faire ouvrir les portes des églises par leurs baïonnettes ? Certains, et je les 
approuve grandement, obéissant à leur conscience s’y aient refusés.” General Millet ‘Souvenirs’ 
unpublished memoirs, (ca.1913), no pagination. Military Archive, Vincennes, I K mi 9.
99 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C/2.I.335, ‘Inventaires des Eglises 1906.’ Letter of 15 November 
1906 from the war minister to the army corps commanders.
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implementation of the governmental policies by performing a variety of functions, both 
military and non-military.
In situations when strikes threatened to paralyse the entire society or impede the 
continuous work in the wider industrial sector, the army was used to fulfil non-military 
tasks thus ensuring the continuous functioning of public utilities and industries that 
were not involved in the conflict. Therefore, it became increasingly difficult to distance 
the army from the management o f internal crisis. During the process of continuous co­
operation, a series of forma] barriers which should have ensured the separation of the 
military organisation from the civilian sectors of the state were transformed or 
undermined for the sake o f efficient co-operation. Similarly, certain measures 
conceived for a state of emergency were kept in force for years in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, 
thus installing a permanent state of semi-military rule.
8.3.4. The break-down of formal barriers between the civil and military branches 
of the state
After the turn of the century, certain aspects of the army was even adjusted to fit its 
internal functions rather than pointed towards the defence of the national borders. This 
too was a new development. In 1898, the War Ministry had vigorously rejected 
suggestions from the civil administration that it should establish permanent military 
posts in certain turbulent areas in order to ensure efficient military assistance in urgent 
need.100 The argument by the war minister was that garrisons were to be established 
solely according to the strategic needs of the defence of the national borders. Thus, 
garrisons could not be established with considerations for the needs of the civil 
authorities for efficient assistance. Nevertheless, five years later, in 1903, a new 
garrison was established in the industrial area of the département Nord. This time, the
100 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12774, ‘Grèves: Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemins de 
fer*. Letter o f 10 November 1898 from the war minister to the minister of the interior conceming a 
suggestion fromthe prefect o f the Eastem Pyrenees.
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minister of the interior and the prefect openly admitted that the location of the garrison 
was primarily due to considerations of military assistance in cases of strikes.101
In addition to the practical dependence of the civil administration on the army, it is 
worthwhilst to look at how the institutional demarcation between the realms of the 
civil administration and the military was gradually perforated between 1900 and 1914 
for the sake of efficient co-operation. This was particularly relevant in Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais, but was in fact a phenomenon taking place in many areas of France. Ralston 
mentions that in the French state during the Third Republic, the army and the civilian 
sectors of the state had their particular spheres of competence, which were respected 
by the other.102 This could be said about the civil-military relations in many Western 
states, including the German Empire. Nevertheless, between 1890 and 1914 in France 
the separation of the ‘civil’ and the ‘military’ realms became significantly less clear-cut 
than it was in Prussia. Although the French army was left with a high degree of 
autonomy when it came to strictly technical military issues,103 the successive 
governments respected increasingly less the particular nature of the army as a separate 
institution primarily responsible for the sole task of defending the national territory 
against an exterior enemy.
There were a series of aspects to the perforation of the line of demarcation between 
the realm of the civil and the military. One of the key elements, as we have seen, was a 
slight change in decision making between the civil and military authorities, so that civil 
authorities had influence over the means and measures implemented by the army when 
called upon for internal peacekeeping, whilst the military authorities obtained influence 
over decisions about the conditions under which troops could be requested by the civil 
authorities. Thus, joint decision making gave influence to both civil and military 
authorities on matters from which they were formally excluded.
101 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12780, ‘4ème Bureau de la Sûreté Générale. Grève générale des 
mineurs’. Letter from the Prefect of the North to the minister of the interior, Combes, of 20 March 
1903.
102 David B.Ralston "The Army of the Republic: the Place of the Military in Political Evolution of 
France, 1871-1914” Cambridge 1967 p. 135.
103 This is Ralston’s main conclusion. Ralston (1967) p.373.
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On the other hand, one can observe an increasing tendency by the civil authorities to 
leave powers and decision making to the military commander, a move that was not 
foreseen in the formal distribution of powers. Similarly, the instructions concerning the 
requisition of military assistance formulated in 1903, 1905 and 1907 broke down a 
series of formal barriers that were meant to confine the army within strict institutional 
boundaries. In the first place, the procedures were simplified so that the military 
commander could start mobilising the troops as soon as he received the telegram 
requesting this from a civil authority.104 The simplification of the procedures around 
the requisition of the army and the increasingly easy access to military assistance that 
followed were all undertaken for the sake of ‘efficiency*.105
Another most significant example of the breakdown o f institutional barriers was the 
elimination - in part at least - of the distinction between a ‘state of normality* and a 
‘state of emergency* through the permanent opening o f the right to so-called ‘military 
requisition.* Not to be confused with the right of the civil authorities to request 
military assistance, the ‘military requisition* was the military authorities* right to 
demand food supplies and accommodation from the local population during periods of 
mobilisation.106 This right was to be 'opened* by the war minister, either for the entire 
national territory or for particular départements, arrondissements or municipalities. In 
principle, the right to military requisition was supposed to be opened only in the case 
of a general mobilisation.
During the strike wave in Nord-Pas-de-Calais of the early 1890s, with troubles taking 
place in various local communities over a vast territory, military troops had to be 
moved around quickly according to the development of the crisis. In this situation, the 
formal opening of the right to military requisition was a serious practical problem that 
could delay the quick installation of soldiers. During the long miners’ strikes of 1891 
and 1893, the right to ‘military requisition’ was granted exceptionally to the troops
104 Circular letter of 23 September 1905 and Instructions of 20 August 1907. Cit. Jauffret (1983) 
p.127.
105 Military Archive, Vincennes, 1.A.C./2.I.325, ‘Grèves. Dispositions à prendre, 1902-1909.’ Letter 
of 3 January 1905 from the prefect in Lille to the army corps commander "Les grèves (dans ce 
département) sont trop fréquentes et la nécessité d’assurer l’ordre au moyen de troupes s’impose trop 
souvent pour que toutes facilités ne soient pas laissées aux autorités civiles et militaires.**
106 This was defined by the law of July 3 1877 on military requisition.
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which were called out in Nord-Pas-de-Calais.107 By the turn of the century, use of the 
right to military requisition during operation within the national territory was already a 
well-established procedure. It had become customary, to provide the right to military 
requisition for several arrondissements or the entire département. Thus, the plans for 
protection from 1901 operated with military requisition as the basis for 
accommodation and provisions for men and horses. During the miners’ strikes of 1901 
and 1902, the right to military requisition was first opened for a period of two weeks, 
and was then supposed to be prolonged by the war minister if the conflict continued.108 
After the general miners* strike of 1902, the minister of war, General André, 
recognised that the formal procedures regarding military requisitions still impeded the 
efficient mobilisation and installation of troops. He therefore sent pre-printed forms, 
with his signature, to the commanding generals of all the divisions as well as to the 
commanders of the sub-divisions and the garrisons.109 Thereafter, it was up to the local 
commanders to insert the date if there was a need to prolong the right to military 
requisition. This step was taken for purely practical reasons, and with the full blessing 
of the civil authorities and the Ministry of the Interior.
However, the third and final step in the break down of the formal distinction between a 
‘state of normality’ and a ‘state of emergency* was yet to come. In December 1904, 
the army corps commander in Lille reported to the prefect of the département Nord 
that there had been no occasion to formally end the right to military requisition which 
had been opened for the entire département on the 12 February 1904 and then 
prolonged throughout the year. However, by each prolongation of the right to 
requisition this had to be publically announced in all municipalities concerned. This 
practice was becoming annoying. General Laplace therefore suggested to the prefect 
that the right to military requisition should be opened permanently for the entire region
107 Departmental Archives, Arras, M.4865, ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houillère 1891. Documents 
divers’. Letter of 18 November 1891 War Minister Freycinet to the army corps commander in Lille. 
Departmental Archives, Arras, M.4862, ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houiller 1893. 
Renseignements, Instructions, correspondance.’ Letter of 18 September 1893 from the prefecl of Pas- 
de-Calais to the minister of the interior.
108 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12780, *4ème Bureau de la Sûreté Générale: Grève générale des 
mineurs*.
109 Copies of these can be found in the Departmental Archives, Lille, M.626 /43, ‘Réquisitions 
militaires, 1902’.
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of Nord-Pas-de-Calais.110 Given the high frequency o f mobilisation of troops in the 
region, together with the nuisance and delay that this formality caused to an efficient 
and quick mobilisation of troops, the prefect of the département Nord agreed with the 
army corps commander to ask their respective ministers to allow a permanent opening 
of the military right to requisition.111 This was granted by the government without 
further comment, so for the following years, each 1 January, the war minister formally 
opened the right to military requisition for the entire year. Similar provisions were 
made for the département Pas-de-Calais after the great strikes in the spring of 1906.112 
By a ministerial decree o f 17 December 1910, this practice was extended to the all 
French départements.113 Thus for year after year, the entire region of Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais, and after 1910 all French départements, were - with respect to this particular 
aspect - in a permanent state of emergency.
8.3.5. The non-military functions of the army
Another significant example of the inter-penetration between the realms o f the civil 
authorities and the military within the French system was that the army performed a 
series of non-military functions, in particular the use of soldiers to undertake 
strikebound work. The idea of using soldiers for such purposes had already arisen in 
the 1870s, when the war minister allowed conscript soldiers, who were bakers in their 
civil fifes, to be ordered to provide the bread necessary in the event of a strike among
1,0 Departmental Archives, Lille, M.624 /13, ‘Mariniers. Documents généraux. Rapports. 
Réquisitions, 1904’. Letters of 12 December and 31 December 1904 from the army corps commander 
to the prefect of département Nord.
111 Departmental Archives, Lille, M.624 /13, ‘Mariniers. Documents généraux. Rapports. 
Réquisitions, 1904’. Letter of 3 January 1905 from the prefect of département Nord to the army corps 
commander. “En réponse à votre lettre du 31 décembre, j ’ai l’honneur de vous faire connaître qu” il 
convient, à mon avis, de laisser ouvert le droit de réquisition dans le départment du Nord. Les grèves 
y sont trop fréquentes et la nécessité d’assurer l’ordre à l’usage des troupes s’impose trop souvent pour 
que toute facilité ne soient pas laissé aux autorités civiles et militaires.’’
112 Archives de Vincennes : 1.A.C72.I.325, ‘Grèves. Dispositions à prendre, 1902-1909* Letter of 30 
October 1906 to the army corps commander in Lille. “Pour éviter, à l ’avenir, ces difficultés (je) vous 
demande qu’il soit pris pour le Pas-de-Calais une décision identique à celle du 28 décembre 1904 
précité et que le droit de réquisition ouvert pour ce département le 18 Mars 1906 ne soit pas fermé’
113 Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 115, ‘Mesures à prendre en vue d’assurer le maintien de l’ordre 
public notamment en cas de grève 1893-1918’. Note of 12 April 1912 from the General Staff of the 
War Ministry “D'après la circulaire du 17 Décembre 1910, le Ministre signe chaque année au mois de 
Décembre un arrêté ouvrant le droit de réquisition dans chaque corps d’armée.”
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the bakers in Paris.114 The aim was to ward off the most detrimental effects of strikes 
in the most essential professions. Several examples o f this use o f soldiers to undertake 
strikebound work were justified with reference to the interests o f wider society.115
However, once a precedent had been made for this use of soldiers, the same 
justification was all too easy to apply to the conflicts where the object was not so much 
to defend the interests of wider society, but to the interests o f the state as an employer 
during labour conflicts which public employees,116 or when specific skills were needed 
to enforce the policies of the government.117
The most inventive use of the army organisation occurred in October 1910, when rail 
workers from entire France went on strike. Instead of sending soldiers from the 
engineers to ensure basic services, as had been done by the rail strike o f 1898, the 
legislation on military service was used to prevent at least some of the rail employees 
from going on strike. Rail workers who were placed in the reserve of the army were 
called upon for military service, only to  be sent back to work in order to ensure the 
basic functioning of the railway service. By this procedure, the rail workers were 
placed under military legislation which meant that they could be court-martialed, if 
they failed to turn up for work. This type of measure had already been suggested in the 
first major strike among rail workers twelve years earlier. In 1898, there had been 
discussions both within government and among legal specialists about the possibility of
114 National Archives, Paris, F.7.12773, instructions ministérielles; plans de protection, 
jurisprudence; emploi des troupes, usage des armes; état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914’. Letter 
of 8 May 1876 from war minister General Cissey to the army corps commanders.
115 In 1889, soldiers were used during a strike among bakers in Marseilles; In 1891, the soldiers were 
called to substitute for gas workers in a factory in Le Havre; In December 1903, soldiers and military 
ovens were used when the bakers in Lille went on strike the day before Christmas. Military Archive, 
Vincennes, I.A.CV2.I.331. On the 8 March 1907, a general strike among electricians made the 
Parisians experience an evening without light. When the electricians wanted to repeat the success in 
October 1910, the authorities had long prepared themselves for this eventuality, and called out the 
engeneers to ensure the continuous functioning of the Parisian power stations. (Rolande Trempé 
(1995) p.323).
116 The plans froml897 concerning a nation-wide strike of the rail personnel were primarily aimed to 
protect the railways and to ensure the basic service with soldiers from the engineers. Similarly, in 
May 1899, during the first major strike among post employees, soldiers were used to distribute the 
mail. The same measures were implemented during the strike among postal workers in 1906 and in 
March and May 1909. (Rolande Trempé (1995) p.323).
117 During the establishment in 1906 of the inventories over the possessions of the Catholic Chuch, 
conscript soldiers who were locksmiths in their civil life were used to give access to the churches 
which were being locked by the local clergy.
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breaking a rail strike through use of the military legislation, and the ways in which such 
a measure could be implemented within the boundaries o f the recruitment laws o f 15 
July 1889.118 Although there were still doubts in 1910 about the legal validity o f such a 
procedure, this measure was now used without further discussion.
As these examples show, the use of the French army went far beyond simple 
requisition of troops in cases of urgent need to restore order. The army increasingly 
became an integrated part of the strategies that the government or the prefectoral 
authority could use to implement their policies. The procedures of co-operation with 
the military authorities were characterised by a high degree of institutional 
formalisation and practical organisation. This made the functioning of military 
assistance extremely efficient. On the other hand, it bound the civil administration to 
strategies that relied on the army since all existing plans for internal conflicts operated 
with military assistance from the very beginning of a conflict.
1,8 Military Archive, Vincennes, 7 N 127, 4EMA, Grèves des Chemins de Fer. Mesures à prendre, 
avril-juin 1898’ Note for the war minister of 25 May 1898. Ludovic Désveaux ’Les grèves des 
chemins de fe r  en France et à l ’étranger’ Paris: Marchai & Billard, 1899.
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8.4. Concluding remarks: The consequences of the institutionalisation 
of administrative procedures governing the civil-military co-operation
The use of the army to help the civil forces maintain public order in France was, 
particularly for the major conflicts o f the first decade of the twentieth century, argued 
to be justified by the number of people involved and the great potential for violence. 
However, the move' towards the use of the army to deal with labour conflicts had 
already been begun in the early 1890s, when the size of the conflicts - both in Nord- 
Pas-de-Calais and in generally in France - did not require such measures.
The plans for protection created the basis for efficient civil-military co-operation in 
internal peacekeeping by 1) defining the types of conflicts to which the army could or 
would be called; 2) setting standards for the number of troops agreed to be an 
appropriate reply for major conflicts; and 3) creating a permanent forum where the 
prefects, the Ministries, and other bodies concerned could meet with the relevant 
military commanders in informal discussions about their problems and needs in a 
situation of crisis. When the first plans for protection were established in 1897, the aim 
was not maintenance of order, but defence of a communication and transport system 
which was of clear military interest. However, by the first large-scale strikes in France 
between 1900 and 1902, there was already a strong precedent for calling out the army 
and thus decision makers considered that military involvement was an appropriate 
response to internal unrest. At the same time, there was a well-developed organisation 
and civil-military co-operation that made the requisition of military troops an easy, 
efficient, and relatively cheap measure to implement.
Parallel to this, and partly as a consequence of the intensified exchange between civil 
and military authorities, the border between the realm of civil and military affairs was 
slightly modified towards to make non-military use of the army easier. The result was 
significantly closer co-operation between the civil and the military authorities. Both the 
increasingly frequent calls upon the army and the use of troops for even minor cases of 
potential unrest, as well as the use of soldiers to perform non-military tasks must be 
seen as a result of this well functioning inter-institutional co-operation. The French
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authorities thus seemed to be stuck in what in organisational theory is known as a 
competency trap.119 The highly sensitive political and social situation in France during 
the first decade of the century left little space for experiments to be made in terms of 
crisis management. At the same time, the effectiveness of the civil-military co­
operation made it difficult and dangerous to change the policy and adopt strategies that 
involved a high risk of losing control.
In relation to the military leaders, the issue o f maintenance of public order allowed the 
general commanders influence over matters that concerned them directly. The pre- 
established agreements also prevented obstruction by military commanders against the 
frequent use of the army by integrating them into the decision-making process. On the 
other hand, once a military commander had agreed to the basic principles in the plans 
of protection, it became more difficult for his successors to break this pattern, even if 
they might have thought in individual cases that military assistance was not strictly 
necessary.
Moreover, the co-operation in plans for protection linked the military establishment 
more closely to other sectors o f the state. Civil-military co-operation on the issue of 
maintenance of public order thereby helped to re-integrate the army into the state after 
the disruption created by the Dreyfus affair. Despite protests from various parts of the 
military complex and from individual officers, one cannot overlook the willing co­
operation by the general commanders involved in the planning and execution of 
domestic military interventions. Maintenance of public order was a practical issue on 
which a fundamental consensus could be established between civil servants and military 
commanders. Despite their dissimilar commitments to the Republican regime, both 
groups were determined to defend the existing social and political order against 
challenge from revolutionary or socialist movements.
119 March & Olsen (1989) p.63.
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Chapter Nine. Civil-military relations in Westphalia: Two 
mutually separated bodies.
In his article on the attitude of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior towards the 
domestic use of troops, Hansjoachim Henning stresses two features which were central 
to the relationship between the Ministry of the Interior and the senior military 
commanders after 1889.1 The first, as we have seen, was the determination of the civil 
administration to take over all responsibility for internal peacekeeping and the 
following exclusion of the army from this type of issue. The second feature was the 
lack of appropriate preparation by the army authorities for a mass strike and inability of 
the relevant military commanders to respond adequately to this type of challenge.
The features described by Henning concerning the 1889 strike were equally 
characteristic of the military intervention in the general miners’ strike of 1912. In order 
to understand the move in Prussia towards ’de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping, 
it is important to pay attention to the relationship between the civil administration and 
the military authorities and especially the commitment of the former to detach 
themselves from dependence on military assistance. It also helps to explain why the 
Prussian military authorities - unlike their French counterparts - did not adapt 
themselves to the challenges of large-scale unrest, but were equally unprepared and 
inadequate in 1912 as they had been in 1889.
In comparison with Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the case of Westphalia reveals that, contrary 
to what happened in France, the Prussian system did not develop strong inter- 
institutional links between the state administration and the army organisation. In Nord- 
Pas-de-Calais, a set of informal rules was established for civil-military co-operation in 
the maintenance of public order, in the case of Westphalia these factors were lacking.
1 Hansjoachim Henning (1987) pp. 140-145
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This chapter presents an analysis of the relations between the state administration and 
the army corps commanders in Westphalia. It will point out a series of features that 
characterised the civil-military relations:
•  the infrequent and slow communication between the state administration and the 
military authorities (9.1);
• the tendency of civil-military co-operation to develop into strict distribution of tasks 
(9.2);
• the lack of co-operated planning or co-ordination of civil and military plans (9.3); 
and
• the general unhelpfulness of the military authorities towards the needs of the state 
administration (9.4).
The chapter argues that, in comparison with the case o f Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the inter- 
institutional exchange between the state administration and the army corps 
commanders was a slow and difficult process. This had two consequences which will 
be analysed in the section 9.5. In the first place, due to infrequent implementation of 
measures that involved the army, the procedures used in one military intervention 
would not create a precedent for later cases. During their entire period in office, the 
majority of the senior civil servants and army corps commanders only experienced co­
operation with their counterpart once, if at all. Accordingly, no precedents developed 
defining the details of the procedure and the distribution of duties and responsibilities 
between the civil and the military authorities.
Secondly, the Prussian civil and military authorities did not co-operate in establishing 
plans of protection for situations of major unrest. In France, the plans for protection 
formalised a series of details concerning procedures, distribution of powers, and the 
strategies to be implemented. No equivalent existed in Prussia. Each time the army was 
called upon, the details of the civil-military relationship had to be negotiated whilst the 
crisis was developing. Equally, there was general confusion about lines of 
communication and authority, and most of all financial responsibility for a military 
intervention had to be negotiated on each occasion. As a result of these factors, calling
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for the army in Prussian implied a significant degree of uncertainty for state 
administrators as well as for military commanders.
The chapter concludes that, although the civil-military co-operation during the three 
cases of intervention in 1889, in 1899, and in 1912 did not give rise to important 
conflicts between the civil and military authorities and that in general the military 
authorities closely followed the wishes of the civil administration, the state 
administration in Westphalia could not rely upon the support and good-will of the 
military establishment. Given that the call for military assistance was connected with a 
significant degree of uncertainty and factors that the state administration could no 
control, it preferred to deal with public unrest, even with a significant potential for 
violence and riots, without calling for military assistance.
9.1. Lines of communication: the low /eve/ of civii-miiitary 
correspondence and co-operation
9.1.1. The demands for civil-military co-operation
Like their French counterparts, the Prussian authorities were supposed to work 
together, and sustain each other in order to safeguard the interests of the state in terms 
of keeping internal peace, and providing the military with a good base in local society 
for its needs in terms of recruits, food and material. The principle of mutual support, 
stated in the Cabinet Orders of October 29 1819 and October 17 1820, was often 
mentioned by War Minister Verdy du Vemois in his instructions to the army corps 
commanders,2 in the service regulations of 1899 issued from the War Ministry,3 and
2 Central Archive, Potsdam (III), Reichskanzlerei R.43, film signature 12425-12426, ‘Militärische 
Massnahmen im Fall von Unruhen. Belagerungszustand 1890-1918’ (Document 2-4). Instructions of 
20 March 1890.
3 ‘Dienstvorschrift überden Waffengebrauch des Militärs' (1899) (II. 1) “Die Allerhöchsten Ordres 
vom 29 Oktober 1819 und 17.0ktober 1820 schreiben vor, dass Militär- und Civilbehörden sich 
gegenseitig Mittheilungen in erheblichen polizeilichen Angelegenheiten zu machen haben. Wenn also 
Verhältnisse und Vorgänge eintreten, welche die Öffentliche Ruhe bedrohende Auftritte voraussehen 
lassen, so sind die Truppenbefehlshaber, insbesondere die Festungskommandanten und der älteste 
kommandierende Offizier im Orte verpflichtet, den Gang der Ereignisse scharf zu beobachten und die 
nöthigen Vorbereitungen zu treffen. Es kommt hierbei vor Allem darauf an, die Organisation der 
Aufrührer kennen zu lernen und die Namen der Führer festzustellen.”
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again by war minister von Heeringen in 1910.4 The Prussian legislation also defined a 
series of situations in which the armed forces could be requested by the civil authorities 
to perform a series non-military functions, in case o f natural disaster (flood, fire, 
hurricane) or to assist in the search for missing persons (victims of accidents or crime, 
or escaped criminals),5 - duties that were not essentially different from those defined by 
the French legislation.6
J
Despite these repeated demands for co-operation and exchange of relevant 
information, the state administration and the military authorities in Westphalia showed 
a much lower degree of inter-institutional connection than was the case in Nord-Pas- 
de-Calais. The strict separation of the civil and military authorities was equally rooted 
in the formal distribution of powers. The very same paragraph that pleaded for 
exchange of information also stated that the civil authorities alone were in charge of all 
questions concerning maintenance of order until the moment of requisition of troops.7 
After this point in time, the military authorities would be in charge of all relevant 
decisions. This was essentially not different from the provisions in French legislation 
until the 1907. However, the differencelay in the practical functioning of civil-military 
co-operation in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and in Westphalia: in particular that the Prussian 
authorities - both the civil and the military - were very concerned with maintaining the 
integrity of their authority. Moreover, there was not, as in France, a strong inter­
ministerial linkage at the governmental level that could impose practical co-operation 
from above.
4 Münster HaStA: OP 6095 ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und Waffen­
gebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’ (document 103) Circular of 24 May 1910 from the war 
minister to the army corps commanders.
5 Decree from the War Ministry of 19 March 1891 ‘Allgemeine Gesichtspunkte für die Gestellung 
von militärischen Kommandos zur Hülfeleistung bei etwa eintretender Wassernoth’; Cabinet Order of
6 January 1899 ‘Bestimmungen über militärische Hülfs-Kommandos bei öffentlichen NothständenV
6 Decree of 4 October 1891 ‘Portant règlement sur le service des placées de guerre et de villes 
ouvertes.’ Article 63.
7 ‘Dienstvorschrift überden Waffengebrauch des Militärs ’ (1899) (11,1) Again with reference to the 
Cabinet Orders of 29 October 1819 and of 17 October 1820 the service regulations state “Es bleibt 
jedoch zunächst die Pflicht der Civilbehörde, mit ihr zu Gebote stehenden Polizeikräften solche 
Unordnungen in ihrem Entstehen zu unterdrücken und die Ruhe zu erhalten, und so lange steht auch 
ihr allein die Anordnung und Leitung der Massregeln zu.”
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Accordingly, whilst inter-institutional correspondence in the French system went in 
‘circular* lines between the French central and regional authorities (the French minister 
of the interior communicated continuously with the W ar Ministry and with the 
prefects, and both these authorities communicated regularly with the army corps 
commander), the lines of communications within the Prussian system primarily took 
place separately within each bureaucratic organisation: The Ministry of the Interior 
corresponded with the province and district governors, the War Ministry 
communicated with the army corps commanders, but little correspondence was 
exchanged between the two ministries.
9.1.2. Low levels of exchange of information between civil and military 
authorities
At the governmental level, the exchange of information between the Ministry of the 
Interior and the War Ministry was occasional. Most of the communications were 
issued by the Ministry of the Interior informing the War Ministry about activities that 
might concern the army. The War Ministry was given information mainly to prevent it 
from being obstructive. The minister of the interior was not in a position of authority in 
relation to the war minister, and the War Ministry was very jealous of its prominent 
position within government, insisting on the secret nature of most of its activities.8 
Within the Prussian government, neither the minister of the interior nor the 
Ministerpräsident were in a position to force the War Ministry to participate in inter­
ministerial co-operation.
At the regional level, the exchange of information between the prefects and the army 
corps commander was occasional and slow. The low degree of day-to-day information 
from the civil authorities to the military authorities about the problems of maintenance 
of order in the industrial areas was an important factor because the army corps 
commander in Münster was already much less informed than was his counterpart in 
Lille; in contrast to the French military commander, the Prussian army corps
8 Several examples of this attitude exists on issues such as the revision of the legislation applying to 
military officers, the question of political responsibility of the War Ministry, and the parallel 
diplomacy of the military attachés. Craig ( 1955) pp,241 -250, Deist (1991) pp.20-24,
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commander did not get day-to-day information through the gendarmerie about the 
state of affairs in his military region, since the Prussian gendarmerie only reported to 
the civil authorities and to the War Ministry. The army corps commander’s main 
source of information about the state of affairs in local communities within his military 
region was provided by the garrison commanders. However, garrisons were 
deliberately placed in rural areas, so that, for instance, there was no permanent military 
unit in the entire district of Amsberg, which was traditionally one of the main centres 
of labour unrest in the Ruhr area. The army corps commander of Westphalia was 
himself based very far from the industrial centres in a very quiet provincial town 
surrounded by rural areas. He could therefore easily ignore the minor and medium­
sized conflicts that took place in the industrial areas around the River Ruhr.
When it came to exchanges of information between the state administration and the 
military authorities about their professional activities, a pattern of mutual exclusion can 
be observed. The civil administration was not informed about military preparations and 
seemed not to know whether military plans existed at all.9 In the cases where the civil 
administration was informed about the existence of decrees from the War Ministry to 
the army corps commanders, the military authorities would insist on the secret nature 
of these communications and could be very reluctant about providing details to the 
civil administration.10
For their part, the state administration excluded the military authorities from 
information about the protection plans elaborated in co-operation with local 
authorities. The province governor of the Rhine Province even forbade his 
subordinates to provide information to the military authorities about the details of civil
9 The development of detailed plans for the case of domestic military intervention entirely depended 
on the initiative of the individual army corps commander and his general staff, and it seems that the 
majority of army corps did not have any plans. Even for an area such as Westphalia with a high 
potential of extended labour conflicts, the only formal military planning until 1907 seem to be the 
instructions and the very general plans developed by General von Albedyll during the 1889 strike.
10 This was the case with the circular letter of 8 February 1912 from the war minister to the army 
corps commanders entitled Verwendung von Truppen zur Unterdrückung innerer Unruhen. Copies of 
these recommandations about the role of the army in case of greater unrest were only given to the 
Ministry of the Interior in June 1913. Münster HaStA: OP 6095/ ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition 
militärischer Hülfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822,1840-1851,1876-1929* (document 204; 206-213).
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planning.11 In questions concerning the management of public order, the normal 
procedure was that whenever dealing with issues that would involve the army, issues 
would first be discussed at length between the Ministry of the Interior and the province 
and district governors.12 They would then - if relevant - be presented to administrative 
and police authorities at the local level. Only when all details were settled between the 
various civil authorities would the army corps commander be contacted.13
9.1.3. The slow pace of civil-military correspondence
The low degree of civil-military interchange becomes clear when considering the time 
it took for correspondence to move from the left wing of the Münster castle, which 
housed the offices of the province governor, to the right wing of the castle, where the 
army corps commander was based. In July 1904, six months before the outbreak of the 
miners* strike of 1905, a meeting was held by the district governor in Düsseldorf. 
Present at the meeting were the local governors within the Düsseldorf district and the 
city mayors from Mühlheim-an-der-Ruhr and from Oberhausen. The meeting was 
concerned with the measures to be taken in case of a major miners* strike, and one of 
the items on the agenda was the issue of to whom each local authority was to address 
its requisition in the case an immediate call for military assistance became necessary.14
After the meeting, the district governor in Düsseldorf presented the matter to the 
minister o f the interior. His suggestions were then sent from the Ministry of the 
Interior to the province governor of Westphalia on the 31 August 1904,15 who also
11 Henning (1987) p.160
12 For instance, the military authorities to whom requisitions were to be addressed; accommodation 
for soldiers and horses in case of requisition of troops; use of military horses for external police 
officers and gendarmes called to the area in case of great unrest; details concerning the persons to be 
arrested and the publishers houses to be dosed by the army in case of a declaration of state of siege.
13 In the wake of the 1889 strikes the discussions about how to organise accommodation and 
provisions for soldiers and horses during future requisition of military troops took place between the 
province and distrcit governors with the Ministry of the Interior. The issue was discussed at length 
between the civil authorities before presented to the military commanders in Westphalia and the 
Rhine Province. Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, HAI - Rep.77 - Title 2513,1) Beiheft 5 ‘Die 
Entsendung von Gendarmen und Militärs in die Ausstandsbezirke 1890’. (documents 90-104).
14 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, HAI - Rep.77 - Title 2513,1) Beiheft 9 ‘Die Entsendung 
von Gendarmen und Militärs in die Ausstandsbezirke 1901-1905.* (documents 124-130). Minutes 
from the meeting 7 July 1904.
15 Miinster Ha.St.A, Regierung Münster, VII - 57 Vol.l 1890-1905, (document 197). Letter of 31 
August 1904 from the minister of the interior to the province governor in Münster.
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received a communication concerning the same issue from his colleague in the Rhine 
Province, the province to which the Düsseldorf district belonged. The recommendation 
from the minister was that the two province governors should contact the military 
authorities within their respective province.16 Instead, the province governor of the 
Rhine Province advised his colleague to discuss these suggestions with the district 
governors of his province, and not to contact the military authorities until the issue was 
fully negotiated between the different sections of the state administration.17
From September 1904 onwards, there was a substantial correspondence between the 
province governor of Westphalia debating the issue with the district governors in 
Amsberg and Münster, as well as with the local governors in the industrial areas.18 By 
the end of December 1904, the civil authorities in the Rhine Province had reached an 
agreement and developed a plan deciding the military commanders to whom the local 
authorities were supposed to address their requisitions in case of extreme urgency. It 
was now ready to be presented to the army corps commander in Coblenz.19
Matters did not even move that quickly in Westphalia, where the district governor in 
Amsberg, in particular, had problems in administratively confirming the right of the 
local authorities to address requisitions to the nearest garrison.20 Then came the great
16 Münster Ha.St.A, Regierung Münster, VII - 57 Vol.l 1890-1905, (document 197). Letter of 31 
August 1904 from the minister of the interior to the province governor in Münster. “In bezug auf den 
Punkt 3 hat der Herr Oberpräsident in Coblenz vorgschlagen, mit Huer Exellenz gemeinsam an Hand 
der Bestimmungen über die Heranziehung militärischer Hilfe (Erlass vom 26.November 1899) mit 
der Militärbehörden in Verbindung zu treten. Diesen Vorschlag habe ich genehmigt."
17 Münster HaStA, OP 6095 ‘Notslandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und 
Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’ (document 37). Letter of 6 September 1904 from the 
province governor of the Rhine Province to the province governor of Westphalia. “Alsbald nach 
Eingang der Äusserungen werde ich nicht verfehlen, Euere Exzellenz behufs Prüfung der Vorschläge 
für die an Westfalen anstossenden Theile der Provinz weitere Nachricht zukommen zu lassen. Erst 
nach Abschluss dieser Vorverhandlungen dürfte es sich meines Erachtens empfehlen, mit den 
zuständigen Militärbehörden in Verbindung zu treten."
18 Between the 5 and the 15 October 1904, the issue was thoroughly debated with the local authorities 
of the counties of Bechum, Borken, Coesfeld, Lüdinghausen, Münster, Recklinghausen, Steinfurth, 
Tecklenburg, Warendorf. Münster HaStA, Regierung Münster, VII-52 V ol.l/ 39-2, 
‘Arbeitseinstellung und Streiks 1904-1911’ (documents 87-97).
19 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und Waffen­
gebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’ (document 54-57). Letter of 30 December 1904 from the 
province governor of the Rhine Province to the province governor of Westphalia.
20 Münster HaStA, OP 6896, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und Waffen­
gebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’ (document 46-50). Letter of 4 October 1904 from the district 
governor in Amberg to the province governor of Westphalia.
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miners’ strike in January 1905, which made the province governor reconsider whether 
it would be wise to recommend requisition at the local level. Whilststill pondering this 
question, the province governor of the Rhine Province recommended to his colleague 
in Münster not to present the issue to the military authorities until the civil 
administration in both provinces had reached a final decision.21 Towards the end of the 
year 1905, the province governor o f the Rhine Province contacted his colleague again, 
and declared that he had now informed the army corps commander in Coblenz and 
invited the Westphalian province governor to do likewise.22
The issue of determining to whom local authorities were to address their requisitions in 
case of immediate urgency had now been the object of intensive correspondence 
among the different sections of the state administration in two provinces for more than 
sixteen months. Nevertheless, the military commander in Münster was not contacted 
until the end of March 1906,23 after the province governor of the Rhine Province had 
once again asked his colleague to present the issue to the commander of the seventh 
military region.24 Twenty months had passed since the minister of the interior had 
asked the two province governors to contact their respective army corps commanders 
on this matter.
It would have saved a great deal of time and ink, had the Westphalian province 
governor contacted the army corps commander at an earlier stage, for it turned out 
that General von Bissing shared the view point of Province Governor von der Recke 
that requisitions were not supposed to be issued at all by local authorities to local 
commanders. General von Bissing, who insisted on his own right to command was
21 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und
Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’ (document 63). Letter of 20 April 1905 from the 
province governor of the Rhine Provice to the province governor of Westphalia.
22 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und
Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851,1876-1929’ (document 66). Letter of 23 November 1905 from the 
province governor of the Rhine Province to the province governor of Westphalia.
23Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und
Waffengebrauch, 1822,1840-1851,1876-1929’ (document 69-70). Letter of 28 March 1906 from the 
province governor of Westphalen to the army corps commander, von Bissing.
24Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und
Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’. Letter of 7 March 1906 from the province governor 
of the Rhine Province to the province governor of Westphalia.
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strongly opposed to the idea that troops could be moved unless on his explicit order.25 
However, the discussion continued. Over the summer o f 1906, the province governor 
of Westphalia corresponded with the minister of the interior explaining that he and 
General von Bissing agreed that requisitions should only pass to the army corps 
commander through the province governor.26 Only in October 1906 did the province 
governor inform General von Bissing of the response from the minister o f the interior: 
hence, there would be no question of formally deciding the lines of communication 
between civil and military authorities at the local level, even for the case of 
emergency.27 It was now more than two years after the issue had first been raised by 
the district governor in Düsseldorf.
This correspondence is interesting because it shows how a relatively minor issue could 
be discussed over a very long time, and indicates the heaviness and complications 
linked to the inter-institutional co-operation between the state administration and the 
military command. What is surprising is the lack of bureaucratic exchange of 
information, when one considers that the province governor of Westphalia and the 
army corps commander resided in the left and the right wing of the Münster castle 
respectively. Moreover, this correspondence took place before, during and after the 
great miners’ strike of January 1905 when requisition of military troops was 
extensively discussed within the state administration. Even this important event did not 
seem to hurry the correspondence about making civil-military co-operation more 
effective.
This example of slow correspondence was not uncommon. Nor does it seem to be 
specific to the area of Westphalia, since examples of infrequent communication even 
on important matters have been found in other provinces.28 Even information about the
25 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und 
Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’ (document 71). Letter of 6 April 1906 from general 
von Bissing, commander in Münster, to the province governor of Westphalia.
26Münster HaStA, OP 6095 ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und
Waffengebrauch, 1822,1840-1851,1876-1929’ (document 75-79).
27Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und
Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929* (document 80). Letter of 16 October 1906 from the 
army corps commander in Münster General von Bissing to the province governor.
28 In October 1903, the local governor in Welten, near Potsdam, asked the local garrison commander 
to keep troops in a state of preparedness for the case of a local strike deteriorating into riots. Without
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most important measures taken within the military organisation could take a significant 
time before reaching the relevant civil authorities. The decree of War Minister von 
Heeringen o f 8 February 191229 - one of the few guidelines defining the army’s role in 
domestic peacekeeping - was only released to the Ministry of the Interior in June 1913, 
fifteen months after it had been presented to the army corps commanders.30 Not only 
did the state administration not know the details of military planning, but in most cases 
they even failed to know whether the military authorities had made any plans or 
preparation at all for the case of a military intervention in a situation of greater unrest. 
When the instructions developed by General von Bissing for military intervention in the 
industrial areas of Westphalia became public in 1910, the existence of these plans was 
as much a surprise to the state administration as to the wider public.31
9.2. Elements of civil-military communication
If the civil and military authorities only communicated occasionally, what did they 
communicate and co-operate about? Apart from a few practical issues of the police 
forces and gendarmerie officers borrowing equipment from the local garrison,32 the 
main topic of civil-military correspondence was the measures to be taken against
informing the civil authorities, the military commander requested a train from the local rail company 
maintained with steam power (unter dampf) to be ready day and night to transport the troops. Only 
after one month did the military authorities ask the local governor whether he still needed troops to be 
held in a state of preparedness. The local governor had appearently forgot that he had asked for troops 
to be held in a state of preparedness and ignored that a train had been under steam day and night for 
more than a month. The final row arose when the rail company sent a bill at 1,200 Mark that both the 
military and the civil authorities refused to pay. Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin - Dahlem, H.A.l. - 
Rep.77. Titel 251,1) Beiheft 9, ‘Die Entsendung von Gendarmen und Militärs in die 
Ausstandsbezirke 1901-1905’ (documents 63-73).
29 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und 
Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’ (document 206-213). Decree of 8 February 1912 
entitled ‘Verwendung von Truppen zur Unterdrückung innere Unruhen’.
30 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und 
Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929* (document 204). Letter of 28 June 1913 from the 
Ministry of the Interior to the province governors.
31 Central Archive, Potsdam III, R.43, film signature 12425-12426, ‘Militärische massnahmen im 
Falle von Unruhen. Belagerungszustand 1890-1918.’ It appears from the correspondence between the 
province governors and the chancellor on this issue that such military instructions were not known to 
the civil administration.
32 This correspondence concerned demands for allowing the local police to use military material - 
everything from horses to chloroform or electric lamps in case of interruption of street light during a 
night operation. This type of correspondence - mostly from after the turn of the century - was quite 
random and required nothing from the army corps commander except his formal acceptance.
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subversive elements such as Social Democrats, Anarchists, and other politically suspect 
individuals or organisations.
9.2.1. The control of Social Democratic activities
A clear gap can be observed between the demands for civil-militaiy co-operation as 
expressed by war minister Verdy du Vemois in 1890, and the actual division of labour 
between the state administration and the military authorities at the provincial level. 
Deist argues that the instructions from the War Minister Verdy du Vemois33 after the 
abolition of the laws against the Social Democracy in 1890 provided the general 
commanders with a role in domestic politics that they had never had before.34 
However, even these measures against the Social Democrats, which were supposed to 
be an object of close civil-military co-operation, soon saw a strict distribution of tasks: 
whilst the civil authorities dealt with everything involving watching over the 
organisation and activities of the Social Democratic party, the military authorities were 
only concerned with the influence of Social Democratic ideas among recruits and 
reservists in the army.
Not only did the army corps commanders not participate in controlling the activities of 
the Social Democratic organisation in the local society, they also seemed to become 
less enthusiastic when it came to controlling and preventing the Social Democratic 
influence on the recruits and reservists.35 Year after year, the army corps commanders 
declared in their annual report to the War Ministry that they had not noticed any 
significant impact of Socialist ideas among the recruits and reservists. Only in 1910 did 
the commanders of the most industrialised areas admit that the influence of Social
33 Instructions to the army corps commanders of March 22 1890. Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 
/466 ‘Bekämpfung socialdemokratischer Bestrebungen, 1890-1892 : Verbot und Bestrafung der 
Teilnahme an geheimen Verbindungen, öffentlichen Versammlungen und politischen Vereinen z.Z. 
des Sozialistengesetzes’ or Central Archive, Potsdam III, R.43, film signature 12425-12426.
34 Deist (1991) p.25. ,
35 Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /467-470, ‘Bekämpfung socialdemokratischer und pazifistischer 
Bestrebungen, 1900-1912* mainly contains the yearly report from the army corps commanders. There 
are one or two pages for each army corps explaining in general terms that the men are motivated and 
that no strong sympathies for the social democracy can be traced.
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Democratic ideas had become significant.36 It was as late as 1911 when the war 
minister informed the general commanders that for the first time» a significant influence 
of Socialist idea had been noticed among recruits and reservists.37
Even when army corps commanders began to note an increase in the Social 
Democratic sympathies among recruits and reservists and admitted that the attempts 
from the anny to immunise and isolate the soldiers from Social Democratic agitation 
had been unsuccessful,38 several senior commanders began to argue that there was no 
reason for excluding these men from the military service since they most often proved 
loyal and disciplined soldiers.39 General von Haenisch, the commander of the fourth 
military region, went as far as to argue that the strong discipline among the members 
of the Social Democratic party actually made them very good soldiers.40 Even a hard­
liner such as von Waldersee did not consider the influx of Social Democrats into the 
army as being a problem for the time being, but he insisted on his right to discriminate 
between recruits and eliminate the few that he considered to be a potential problem.41
36 The third army corps (Berlin), sixth army corps (Silesia), seventh and eighth army corps 
(Westphalia and the Rhine Province), eleventh army corps (Kassel), and the eighteenth army corps 
(Frankfurt).
37 Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /468, ‘Bekämpfung socialdcmokratischer Bestrebungen, 1909- 
1911 \ Letter of 3.May 1911.
38 Since 1891 soldiers were forbidden to frequent certain shops and taverns because the shop-owner or 
inn keeper was known or suspected to have Social Democratic sympathies and to serve suspect 
customers. Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /467, ‘Bekämpfung socialdcmokratischer und 
pazifistischer Bestrebungen, 1900-1906’. The attempts in 1905 from General Eichhorn, army corps 
commander in Frankfurt, to expose the recruits to anti-Social Democrat propaganda were recognised 
in the following years as having little effect and might even have been counter-productive. Deist 
(1991) p.36; Messerschmidt (1980) p.70; Demeter (1965) p.172.
39 Demeter (1965) pp.171-172.
40 Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /466 ‘Bekämpfung socialdemokratischer Bestrebungen, 1890- 
1892 : Verbot und Bestrafung der Teilnahme an geheimen Verbindungen, öffentlichen 
Versammlungen und politischen Vereinen zur Zeit des Sozialisten-gesetzes.’ (document 134). “Da 
indess das Vorhandensein zahlreicher sozialdemokratischer Elemente unter den Mannschaften des 
Beurlaubtenstandes sich nicht leugnen lässt, so kann ich mich der Ansicht nicht verschliessen, dass 
die gemachten negativen Wahrnehmungen nur die straffe Partei-Disciplin bestätigen, welche in der 
Sozialdemokratie gehandhabt und welche gerade dadurch bethätigt wird, dass die Leute sich in ihren 
militairischen Verhältnissen nach der - wie ich nicht bezweifle - von der Parthei-Leitung ihnen 
gewordenen Weisung, ohne Tadel geführt haben. Die Äusserungen der sozialdemokratischen 
Abgeordneten im Reichstage, dass die Sozialdemokraten ihrer Pflicht gegen das Vaterland als 
tüchtige Soldaten nachkämen, dürften diese Ansicht bestätigen.’’
41 Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /466 ‘Bekämpfung socialdemokratischer Bestrebungen, 1890- 
1892: Verbot und Bestrafung der Teilnahme an geheimen Verbindungen, öffentlichen 
Versammlungen und politischen Vereinen z.Z.des Sozialistengesetzes*, (document 175-178). Letter of 
August 7 1891 from General von Waldersee, commander of the 9th military region, to the War 
Ministry.
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9.2.2. Establishment of lists of suspected subversive elem ents
The decree of war minister Verdy du Vemois also urged the commanding generals to 
remain continuously informed about politically suspect organisations, their local 
leaders, and their press.42 This information was supposed to be provided by the state 
administration which established lists of potentially subversive elements in the civil 
society, including lists of persons to be arrested and newspapers to be closed in case of 
a declaration of a state of siege. It appears, however, that these lists were not followed 
by an important amount of correspondence. Moreover, already by the tum of the 
century, the general commander was involved neither in the establishment of these 
‘black-lists’, nor in the preparation of the measures to be implemented against these 
subversive elements in case of a situation of war. The ‘black-lists’ were elaborated by 
the police authorities, revised every six month, and sent by the province governor to 
the army corps commander.
In November 1912, the minister o f the interior asked the province governor in Münster 
to make contact with the military authorities to establish lists of people to be arrested 
and publishing houses to be closed in case of a declaration o f a state of siege due to 
general strikes. This was a significant extension of the system of ‘black-listing’ since 
the previous lists had only been concerned with people who would be ‘suspect’ in a 
situation of a general mobilisation in case of war.43 However, nothing came of this 
initiative because the military authorities were not interested in dealing with such a 
matter. The army corps commander in Münster, General von Einem, sent a quick reply 
to the province governor saying that it was unnecessary and a waste of time to send 
these lists of Social Democratic leaders and Anarchists to the military authorities. In 
case of a declaration of a state of siege due to internal unrest, it would be sufficient if 
these lists were made available by the local police authorities to the military
42 Central Archive, Potsdam III, R.43, film signaturee 12415-12426, Instructions to the army corps 
commanders of March 22 1890: “Die Kommandanten bz. Garnisonsältesten haben sich über die am 
Orte bestehenden Verbindungen, welche unter das ‘Reichsgesetz vom 21.Oktober 1878 gegen die 
gemeinde-gefährlichen Bestrebungen der Sozialdemokratie* fallen, über deren Organisation, Führer, 
Agitatoren, Zeitungen und Flugblätter, in Gemässheit der Allerhöchsten Kabinets-Ordres vom 
29.0ktober 1819 und 17.Oktober 1820 durch Verbindung mit den bezüglichen Zivilbehörden, 
namentlich den örtlichen Polizeibehörden, dauernd auf dem laufenden zu erhalten.“
43 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und 
Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’ (document 190). Letter of 27 November 1912 from 
the minister of the interior to die province govemor of Westphalia.
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commanders.44 A similar wish was expressed by the army corps commander in 
Frankfurt when he was faced by the initiative from the ministry of the interior.45
9.23 .  The détachem ent of the military from civilian m atters 
The increasing lack of interest of the military commanders in dealing with Social 
Democrats and other ‘subversive’ elements was linked to a wider attitude of 
detachment from dealing with day-to-day control of internal enemies of the Prussian 
state, and their desire to focus exclusively on foreign affairs and defence of the national 
borders. It is in this light that one has to see the dismissive attitude of General von 
Bissing towards the attempts from the civil administration to improve civil-military co­
operation, notably in trying to determine the lines of communication between civil and 
military authorities at the local level. It was not that General von Bissing refused to 
imagine that the army could be engaged in civil conflicts: his instructions from 1907 
shows that he saw this as a likely possibility. It was rather that he was unwilling to 
commit the army to enter into continuous relations with the state administration on any 
matter. The attitude of General von Bissing seems to be characteristic of the army 
corps commanders of the younger generation. Certainly, the helpfulness and 
attentiveness towards the civil administration varied depending on the army corps 
commander, and General von Bissing was known to be particularly difficult. General 
von Hinem - a former war minister and far more politically minded than his predecessor 
- seemed to have a more courteous relationship with the province governor.46
44 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und 
Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’ (document 186). Letter of 10 January 1913 from the 
general command in Münster to the province governor: “Zur Vereinfachung des Geschäftsverkehrs 
und zur Verminderung der Schreibarbeit verzichtet das Generalkommando auf eine weitere 
Zusendung der namentlichen Listen über vorhandene Anarchisten, Agitatoren und Führer der 
Sozialdemokratie. Erforderlich bliebt jedoch dass nach Erklärung des Belagerungszustandes den in 
das Ausstandgebiet entsandten Befehlshabern von den Polizei pp.Organen Listen oder Angaben über 
oben bezeichnete Personen zwecks Veranlassung der Verhaftung zur Verfügung stehen.”
45 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und 
Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’ (document 187). Letter of 18 January 1913 from the 
province governor of Westphalia to the army corps commander in Frankfurt.
Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und 
Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929* (document 192). Letter of 25 January 1913 from the 
general command in Frankfurt to the province governor of Westphalia. Münster HaStA, Regierung 
Münster, VII-52 Vol.2/ 39-2, ‘Arbeitseinstellung und Streiks 1899-1916’ (document 78) Letter of 5 
February from the province governor of Westphalia to the province governor of the Rhineprovince.
46 See Chapter Four.
329
However, the degree of civil-military co-operation and exchange of information was 
equally low under General von Einem as it had been under very detached commanders 
such as General von Bissing or General von Albedyll.
In addition to the low degree o f co-operation and exchange of information with the 
civil authorities the military commanders adapted an attitude of strictly observing the 
borderline between the sphere of civil and military authorities. Early in March 1912, 
General von Einem sent a message to the province governor asking him how many 
copies of the ‘black-lists* were available from the local police authorities in the 
province. Interestingly, General von Einem makes clear that the question was posed 
for purely military considerations for the hypothetical case of a declaration of war, and 
had no relation to the on-going labour dispute in the mining sector.47 The reason for 
General von Einem to emphasise the last point may have been to avoid his letter being 
considered an invitation to the civil authorities to call for military assistance. It may 
also have been a way of making clear that he was not trying to interfere or influence 
the province governor in his handling of the on-going general miners* strike. This 
courteous avoidance of even touching upon the question of possible military 
intervention in an on-going labour dispute took place seven days before troops were 
mobilised for the most extended military intervention since 1889.48
The comment also indicates that, even when major unrest was about to break out, 
communication between the civil and military authorities about possible military 
intervention was only initiated at the very moment when the civil forces had to give up 
attempts to operate alone and call for military assistance.49 It should also be noted that
47 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und 
Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’ (document 157). Letter of 7 March 1912 from 
General von Einem, army corps commander in Münster to the province governor of Westphalia: “Ich 
unterlasse nicht die Bemerkung, dass dieses Schreiben mit der augenblicklichen Lohnbewegung im 
Ruhr-Gebiet in keinem Zusammenhang steht. Eine teilweise Neubearbeitung der Vorbereitungen ist 
viel mehr durch eine Aufstellung allgemeiner Gesichtspunkte seitens des Kriegsministriums nötig 
geworden.”
48 The general strike only broke out on the 10 March, but a major labour dispute with a high degree of 
potential violence had been on its way since January.
49 Similarly, as late as two days before the intervention, the daily report of 11 March 1912 from the 
local governor in Lüdinghausen to the district governor in Münster reveals that among the various 
measures to be taken in this county, no provisions have been made for the possibility of a military 
intervention. Münster HaStA, Regierung Münster, VII-14 Vol.5/ 37-3 ‘Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 
1912. Tagesberichte der Unterbehörden.’ (document 22).
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this avoidance o f touching upon the question of possible co-operation took place 
between a province governor and an army corps commander who otherwise claimed to 
have an excellent professional and personal relationship.50 This underlines the contrast 
with the practice of the French prefects of informing the military authorities weeks 
before a potential situation of tension.
Compared with the intensive exchange of information on the French side and the 
degree of practical co-operation about planning for the case of major strikes in Nord- 
Pas-de-Calais» the slow and inefficient progress of discussions of the question 
concerning civil-military co-operation through the Prussian administrative machinery 
gives a very good impression of the difficulty of making the civil and military branches 
of the Prussian state work together at the regional level. Whereas there was intense 
exchange of views and information between the prefects and the army corps 
commander in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the lines of communication between these 
authorities were both slower and less direct in Prussia. Issues were first discussed at 
different levels within the state administration» and then only presented to the army 
corps commander at a very late stage. Whereas the civil and military authorities in 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais exchanged ideas and minor suggestions with each other» the 
suggestions presented by the civil administration in Westphalia to the military 
commander were generally substantial and very elaborate. The result was a much less 
frequent exchange of views and information than was the case in Nord-Pas-de-Calais.
9.3. Examples of lack of civil-military communication: Planning for 
major unrest
The pattern of mutual exclusion which can be observed for general types of civil- 
military communication becomes all the more obvious when looking at the process of
50 “Mit dem Oberpräsidenten Prinz Karl von Ratibor und Corvey ergab sich eine vortreffliche 
Zusammenarbeit. Wir sind bis zu seinem Tode im Jahre 1931 Freunde gewesen. (...) Prinz Ratibor 
war ein edler Mensch, den jeder gern hatte, seine Untergebenen, die ganze Münsteraner Gesellschaft 
und alle Kreise der grossen, so wichtigen Provinz. Wo er helfen konnte, tat er es mit ehrlicher Freude 
und grösstem Wohlwollen. Seine hervorstechendste Charaktereigenschaft war nicht die Energie, 
sondern die Hilfsbereitschaft. Es ist interessant und lehrreich, dass der 'mörderische, ruchlose 
Polizeistaat Preussen’ derartige Persönlichkeiten an die Spitze der Verwaltungen stellte.” Karl von 
Einem ‘Erinnerungen eines Soldaten J853-J933' Leipzig, Verlag von K.F.Koehler 1933 p.168.
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establishing plans for protection in the event of major unrest. In the case of Nord-Pas- 
de-Calais, much of the communication and exchange o f information between civil and 
military authorities was linked to the establishment and up-dating of plans for 
protection. In Prussia, by contrast, the documents left behind by the Ministry of the 
Interior and the War Ministry which deal with plans for protection do not provide any 
evidence of civil-military co-operation on this issue. This also has to be seen in relation 
to the abundant documentation from the Prussian Ministry of the Interior concerning 
the establishment of nation-wide plans for distribution of available police and 
gendarmerie forces.51
For the Westphalian area, two types of plans existed for possible major unrest in the 
industrial area. First, there were the civil plans established by the province and district 
governors in co-operation with mayors and local police authorities. Second, there were 
the plans established by the general staff of the army corps commander. Before 1889, 
when most decisions concerning requisition of troops were taken between local 
authorities and local garrison commanders, the civil and military representatives would 
often meet to discuss the measures to be implemented and to address themselves 
jointly to the authorities in Berlin. As late as 1885, when a state of siege was declared 
in Bielefeld, the district governor had a meeting with the local garrison commander, 
the public prosecutor, and the city mayor of Bielefeld. It was these authorities who 
jointly decided to take the unusual step of declaring a state of siege.52
51 The collection from the War Ministry ‘Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von 
Unruhen 1889-1914’ (Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2/14) which contains all the documents relevant 
to the internal mobilisation of troops, has no trace of such plans. Similarly, the far more substantial 
collection of documents from the Ministry of the Interior that comprises all the documents relevant to 
the civil planning for greater unrest contains any reference to joint plans elaborated by civil and 
miltiary authorities. Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l - Rep.77 - Titel 2513, 1) 
‘Massnahmen gegen Arbeitseinstellung auf Bergwerken, Fabriken ff.’ vol.III-V 1890-1899’. 
Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l - Rep.77 - Titel 2513, 1) Beiheft 4-13, ‘Die 
Entsendung von Gendarmen und Militärs in die Ausstandsbezirke 1889-1912’. Geheimes 
Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2513, 1) Beiheft 20-29, ‘Die Massnahmen gegen 
Missbrauch der Koalitionsfreiheit (Schutz Arbeitswilliger bei Arbeitseinstellung 1886-1914’.
52 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l, Rep.77, Titel 508 - 3) ‘Die gegen Volksaufstände 
und Tumulte im Mindeschen Regierungsbezirk zu nehmenden Sicherheitsmassregeln. Vol.5 1851- 
1892* (documents 179-185). ‘Protokoll vom gestrigen Tage über eine mit dem Militärbefehlshaber, 
dem Ersten Staats-Verwalter und dem Oberbürgermeister von Bielefeld dortselbst gepflogene 
Verhandlung” dated 29 March 1885.
332
A completely different pattern appeared four years later during the great Westphalian 
miners’ strike. The most important meeting was held in Dortmund on the 10 May 
1889, five days after the military intervention. Practically all the authorities concerned 
with the maintenance of order were present at the meeting: the minister o f the interior, 
von Herrfurt, the province governor of Westphalia, von Hagenmeister, the district 
govenors of the three districts concerned (Münster, Arnsberg and Dortmund), the 
mining inspector, the city mayor of Dortmund, five local governors from the counties 
most concerned (Dortmund, Essen, Gelsenkirchen, Hörde, and Bochum), and finally 
the public prosecutors of Recklinghausen and Bochum.53 Despite the fact that the army 
was already involved and had taken supreme authority over the civil forces as well as 
the over military forces involved, and in spite of fact that the prospect of declaring a 
state of siege was discussed at length, there were no military representative at the 
meeting. The commanding general, von Albedyll, had handed over a copy of his 
instructions to the military commanders, mainly so that the civil authorities could know 
what the military would not do and expected the civil forces to deal with.54
Right after the end of the strike, in July 1889, a second meeting was held in Essen in 
order to draw lessons from the crisis.55 Various representatives of the central 
government as well as municipal authorities participated. However, there was no 
representative from the army.56 Close co-operation between various civil authorities 
about planning and preparation of measures against internal unrest took place right up 
till 1914. Between 1889 and 1912 at least four conferences were held in the Ministry 
of the Interior at which the province governors discussed the organisation and 
distribution of the gendarmerie forces and the Royal Guards in case of major unrest in
53 Report from the meeting in Düsseldorf, May 10 1889. Central Archive, Potsdam III, R.43 Film 
signature 11971-11972, ‘Handel und Gewerbe: Arbeitseinstellung 1889-1896 in der Rheinprovinz, 
Westfalen und Schlesien’ (documents 71-90). Similarly a copy at Münster HaStA, OP 14317, ‘Akten 
btrf. den Streik der Bergarbeiter im Ruhr-Kohlenrevier 1889’ (document 53-73).
54 Central Archive, Potsdam III, R.43, film signature 11971-11972, ‘Handel und Gewerbe: 
Arbeitseinstellung 1889-1896 in der Rheinprovinz, Westfalen und Schlesien’ (documents 91-92). 
Münster HaStA, OP 14317, 'Akten btrf. den Streik der Bergarbeiter im Ruhr-Kohlenrevier 1889’ 
(documents 74-75).
55 Minutes from the meeting Geheimes Staatsarchiv - Berlin, Dahlem: HA 1 - Rep.77 - Titel 2523, 1) 
“Die Arbeitseinstellung in den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westphalen und die daraus 
hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen in den Jahren 1889-1912" vol.5 (documents 227-232).
56 Under the présidence of von Berlepsch, governor of the Düsseldorf district, there were two local 
governors, the city mayor of Essen, and six counsellors from the mountain municipalities, and the 
assistant of the district governor.
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the most turbulent areas. The nation-wide designation lists resulting from this inter­
provincial co-operation were regularly updated and revised.57 Although the issues 
concerning the when and how to call for military troops in cases of major unrest, there 
was military participation by these meetings either.
Similarly, meetings were organised by the province or district governors with the 
participation of a series of local authorities. In the attempt to ‘de-militarise’ the task of 
internal peacekeeping, the state administration drew heavily upon the municipal police 
forces, which consisted of between a third and a half of the civil forces available. 
Accordingly, the mayors and local police authorities occupied a key role in the co­
ordination o f the different police organisations with the gendarmerie and the Royal 
Guards. In contrast to the case of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Westphalian municipal 
authorities were integrated into the negotiations to draw up protection plans for entire 
districts or provinces. Civil planning saw co-ordination of the civil forces available at 
the district as well as the provincial and national levels. The civil forces from an entire 
province might sent to the area of trouble, and plans existed at the national level 
whereby gendarmes and Royal Guards from the entire country could be moved to a 
district where major unrest was taking place.
Despite the commitment of the Prussian state administration to avoid requisition of 
troops, the complete exclusion of representatives from the military authorities is 
surprising since the idea of military intervention was never absent.58 At the meeting in 
Düsseldorf, in July 1904, two of the six points on the agenda concerned conditions for 
calling upon military assistance.59 Moreover, the items on the agenda reveal the
57 In July 1904, the district governor of Düsseldorf organised a similar meeting in order to determine 
the measures to be taken in case of a greater strike among the miners in this area which was the most 
important of the mining districts. Representatives from nearly all the interested authorities were 
present at the meeting: TTie district governor; the local governors of the county Ruhr, of Mühlheim; of 
Mors and of Essen; The city mayor of Mühlheim and the city mayor of Oberhausen as well as the 
chairman of the city council of Essen. Report of the meeting July 7 1904. Geheimes Staatsarchiv, 
Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2513, 1) Beiheft 9, ‘Die Entsendung von Gendarmen und 
Militärs in die Ausstandsbezirke 1901-1905’ (documents 124-130). Similarly, after the military 
intervention in March 1912, two meetings were hetd between all the relevant civil authorities, but 
without any representative from the army.
58 See Chapter Six.
59 Minutes from the meeting: Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2513,1) 
Beiheft 9 ‘Die Entsendung von Gendarmen und Militärs in die Ausstandsbezirke 1901-1905’ 
(documents 124-130)
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uncertainty about the whole procedure of requesting military assistance: Item 1 - In the 
case of a greater strike, would it be advisable to call for military assistance from the 
moment of the declaration or should the civil authorities endeavour to manage the 
crisis with police and gendarmerie forces ? Item 4 - If a military requisition became 
inevitable, to which authority should the civil authorities address its ‘suggestions' 
concerning where to send troops? Furthermore, should it be recommended to establish 
a plan over the locations to be protected and the number of troop needed at each 
point?
On the first issue, the participants in the meeting unanimously declared that it was 
preferable to try to manage even major strikes with civil forces and that the army 
should only be called in if the civil forces were incapable of preventing violence and 
riots. It is interesting to observe that the representatives of the civil authorities did not 
recommend the establishment of a general plan determining the places to be protected 
and the type and number of troops needed. On the other hand, it was decided to invite 
the minister of the interior to ask the was minister to ask the army corps commander to 
define who should be contacted by the civil authorities at the local level. The 
discussions at this meeting reveal that it was easiest to leave these questions to be 
decided by the military authorities. It also shows that the most efficient way to contact 
the army corps commander was through the minister of the interior, and not through 
the province governor.
In contrast to the detailed civil planning for cases of major unrest, the military 
preparations were strikingly under-developed. In Westphalia, the plans established by 
General von Albedyll during the 1889 strike seems to have remained the only military 
plans for a situation of major unrest until General von Bissing’s instructions of 1907.60 
The military plans suffered from a series of defects. In the first place, the plans 
elaborated by General von Albedyll, as well as the instructions from General von 
Bissing, were a series of indications rather than detailed plans. All information about 
the topographical, demographical and industrial conditions in the industrial areas 
would have to be provided by the local authorities when needed.
60 They were still referred to during the 1905 strike.
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Secondly, military planning existed only at the level o f military regions, but was not co­
ordinated at the national level. As late as 1912, a suggestion from the Ministry of the 
Interior to undertake a nation-wide co-ordination o f the military forces, was rejected 
by the War Minister von Heeringen as completely unnecessary. He pointed to the 
paragraph in the military service regulations of 1899 that insisted on the independence 
of military preparations.61
The most serious problem, however, was that the military plans were not co-ordinated 
with the civil plans. As a result of this, there was a gap between the two types of plans. 
The civil planning foresaw all possible situations that might occur, right up to the 
moment when a situation would require military assistance. This was where the civil 
plans stopped and the military planning was supposed to take over. However, the 
military plans started from the assumption that a military state of siege had been 
declared. Such a situation never occurred in the period between 1889 and 1914, which 
means that in all cases of domestic military intervention, the authorities operated in a 
vacuum which neither the civil nor the military authorities had foreseen.
Finally, the lack of co-ordination was a serious problem because, in the case of a 
military intervention, the army corps commander would become responsible for the 
organisation and command of all the forces within the military region, civil as well as 
military. However, the military plans only covered the military troops, and made no 
provisions for the role o f the civil forces under the army’s command. Moreover, the 
military authorities had no detailed knowledge of the size and organisation of the civil 
forces that would come under its command. Conversely, the military planning was - 
unsurprisingly - a military secret. Because the civil authorities had no access to the 
military plans, they could not inform the chiefs of the numerous police corps of their 
role in the case of a military intervention, and the policemen and gendarmerie officers 
had no idea about how the military authorities would use them in case of a major 
conflict.
6’Instructions from the War Ministry to the general commanders of February 8 1912. Münster HaStA, 
OP 6095, (documents 206-215): “Neben den auf Seite 26 der ‘Vorschrift über den Waffengebrauch 
des Militärs’ vorgesehenen Vorbereitungen sind von den meisten Kommandostellen weitgehende 
Anforderungen getroffen“.
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9.4. Military obstruction to co-operation with the civil administration
In contrast to the situation in France, where the army organisation was increasingly 
used for non-military purposes, the separation in Prussia between the realms o f the 
civil administration and the army remained very clear and became increasingly strict by 
the eve of the First World War. This is the reverse side of the ‘militarisation* of 
Prussian society which seemed to take place during the same decades.62 Whereas 
important aspects of civil society acquired military features, the Prussian army did not, 
as was the case in France, turn into an extension of the civilian police. On the contrary, 
the Prussian military authorities consciously prevented the army from organising and 
proceeding according to the needs of the civil administration. By the turn of the 
century, the army became less of an extended police force than it had ever been 
previously in the nineteenth century.
9.4.1. The question of the preventive mobilisation of troops
This development becomes clear when considering the question of whether the 
Prussian army could be mobilised preventively to hinder violent actions from taking 
place. Preventive mobilisation of troops to defend public order was not incompatible 
with existing Prussian legislation. Moreover, such measures were not uncommon 
during the 1870s and 1880s.63 After 1889, however, this procedure was increasingly
62 The ‘militarisation’ of the German society during the Imperial period, has been noted by 
contemporary observers as well as historians of the period. It consists in a series of phenomena both in 
politics and in wider society. At the political level in terms of aggressive foreign policy and societal 
preparation for war (Alfred Vagts (1959) "A History o f Militarism: Civilian and Military ” London: 
Allen & Unwin; Manfred Messerschmidt (1979) “Militargeschichte im 19.Jahrhundert 1814-1890” in 
Handbuch zur deutschen Militargeschichte 1648-1939 vol.2 Part. IV/1 (ed. Hans Meier-Welcker) 
Oldenburg: Munich; Volker R.Berghahn "Militarism: the history o f  an international debate 1861- 
1979" 1981; Forstner, Stig (1985) “Der doppelte Militarismus: die deutsche Heeresrustungspolitik 
zyvischen Status-quo-Sicherung und Aggression, 1890-1913” Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag). At the 
societal level, it has been linked to phenomena such as the large number of civilians joining the 
reserve officer corps and the numerous soldiers’ associations, thus linking a large part of the male 
population to the army throughout most of their lifetime. Similarly, it has been observed that the 
German civil society adopted many military symbols (uniforms for civil servants, military titles, 
stylistic features in art and music) as well as alleged military ethos (in particular values, codes of 
honour and modes of asserting male self-esteem).
63 Blackbourn (1993) brilliantly describes the difficulties of the Prussian authorities on several 
occasions during the Kulturkampf to explain how Catholic pilgrims could be considered a threat to 
public order and thus justify the presence of military troops. Similarly, in the 1880s military troops 




rejected by senior military commanders. Thus in Westphalia 1889, General von 
Albedyll saw little reason for a military presence unless violence had actually taken 
place.64 After nine days of intervention, Albedyll refused to deliver more troops and 
justified his decision by explaining to the minister o f the interior that there was no 
reason to mobilise troops when the area was peaceful and quiet.65 Similar views were 
expressed by General von Loë during the first May Day demonstrations in Coblenz,66 
and by Waldersee during the Hamburg dock workers* strike 1896-1897. Thus, the 
message from senior military commanders was clear: no troops would be mobilised 
unless actual violence had taken p lace.67 After the turn of the century, no examples of 
preventive mobilisation of troops have been found, although the military authorities 
were occasionally asked to keep troops in a state of readiness.
From the point of view of civil rights, this development could hardly be criticised. 
From the point of view of preventing a tense situation deteriorating into uncontrolled
64 "Ich bekomme fast alle zehn Minuten ein Telegramm, worin der Umsturz aller Dinge erklärt wird, 
wenn nicht sofort militärische Hilfe komme, und es ist noch absolut gar nichts geschehen, was einer 
Eigentumsbeschädigung auch nur ähnlich sähe. Die ersten Nachrichten aus Gelsenkirchen waren 
schon gelogen und übertrieben. Alle die Schwerverwundeten Gendarmen und Polizesten reduzieren 
sich auf zwei, die einen leichten Steinwurf erhalten haben; von den demoliert sein sollenden Häusern 
hat man mir nichts zeigen können." Letter of 11 May 1889 from General von Albedyll to General 
Waldersee. Alfred Graf von Waldersee ‘Aus dem Briefwechsel des General-Feldmarschalls Graf von 
Waldersee * (ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin, E.S.Mittler & Sohn, 1927, pp.288-289.
65 Central Archive, Potsdam III, R.43, film signature 11971-11972 ‘Handel und Gewerbe: 
Arbeitseinstellung 1889-1896 in der Rheinprovinz, Westfalen und Schlesien’ (document 139). 
Telegram of 14 May 1889 from General von Albedyll lo thè minister of thè interior. “Trotzdem die 
Ruhe überall ganz ungestört fortdauert und trotzdem die Nachrichten über Wiederaufnahme der 
Arbeit sich im Laufe des Tages mehren, ersucht mich der Oberpräsident von Westfahlen, eine 
erhebliche Verstärkung der Truppen im Kohlenrevier zu veranlassen. Ich kann hierfür nicht allein 
nicht die mindeste Veranlassung erkennen, sondern ich würde ein derartiges Verfahren im 
gegenwärtigen Augenblick sogar für sehr schädlich halten und habe dafür das Ansuchen des 
Oberpräsidenten abgelehnt."
66 "Es besteht nun die Tendez bei manchen Zivilbehörden, die Truppen als eine ständige 
Verstärkerung der Polizei zu betrachten und deshalb um präventiven militärischen Schutz zu bitten. 
Dieser Tendenz trete ich überall entgegen und bin im Begriffe, einen Antrag des Polizeipräsidenten 
von Aachen, welcher wegen grosser Entfernung der Kaserne und wegen der starken, fluktuierenden 
und unruhigen Arbeiterbevölkerung um eine Hauptwache inmitten der Stadt gebeten hat, abschlägig 
zu bescheiden.” Alfred Graf von Waldersee ‘Aus dem Briefwechsel des General-Feldmarschalls Graf 
von Waldersee' (ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin, E.S.Mittler & Sohn, 1927. Leiter of 24 April 1890 from 
General Loe to General Waldersee.
67 “Sehr viel wurde von dem unlängst hier ausgebrochenen Ausstand der Hafenarbeiter gesprochen.
Der Kaiser wünscht energisches Einschreiten, es ist dazu aber nicht die geringste Gelegenheit, da die 
Leute sich völlig ruhig verhalten. Noch auf dem Bahnhofe beim Abschied sagte er mir: ‘Fassen Sie 
nur ordenlich zu, und auch ohne anzufragen’. Ich versicherte ihm, dass mein Zufassen nichts zu 
wünschen übrig lassen soll, ich glaube nur, dass es dazu nicht kommen würde.” Alfred Graf von 
Waldersee ‘Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Alfred von Waldersee’ vol.2
(ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin: E.S.Mittler & Sohn, 1922, p.401
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riots and violence, the military’s refusal to provide assistance in a way that would meet 
the need for an appropriate response to situations of major crises, forced the civil 
authorities to abandon certain aims, such as protecting private property (officially 
declared impossible in the 1912 plans) and made it more difficult to prevent violent 
clashes between demonstrators and public forces. Despite great improvement in the 
size and organisation of the police and gendarmerie forces, the civil administration, by 
the crises of 1905 and 1912, were painfully aware of its inadequate forces, if 
widespread riots and violent confrontations developed. It knew that the only 
alternative to the strategies developed for relatively peaceful mass-demonstrations, was 
a civil-war-like military intervention over which they would have no influence or 
control.
9.4.2. Establishment of military garrisons
A similar development can be discerned concerning the location of garrisons. 
Traditionally, garrisons were placed within the main towns, with the specific intention 
of performing police tasks. This too changed in the 1890s, partly because the large 
cities, in particular industrial cities, were considered to have a negative influence on the 
conscript soldiers and officers. However, there was also a conscious choice by the 
military authorities to avoid being drawn into civilian conflicts. Confronted with the 
first May Day demonstrations in 1890, General Loë expressed himself in very clear 
terms in a letter to Waldersee: he argued that if local communities wanted protection, 
they should organise organise a sufficient police force and pay for it.68 A similar 
response was given to the province governor of Silesia immediately after the end of the 
miners’ strike of 1889, when he suggested that a military garrison ought to be 
established in the Waldenburg coal mining area.69 This request was refused from the
68 “Wenn die grossen Städte Truppen in ihren Mittelpunkten haben, aber auf das System, zuerst aus 
Erspamisrücksichten die Kasernen ausserhalb der Vorstädte zu drängen und dann, wenn ihnen das 
Wasser an den Hals steigt, nach kleinen Wachen innerhalb der Stadt zu schreien, lasse ich mich nicht 
ein. Mögen sie ihre Polizei für ihr Bedürfnis stark genug machen und bezahlen. Die Truppe ist nicht 
dafür da, als Ergänzung der Polizei zu fungieren.” Alfred Graf von Waldersee 'Aus dem Briefwechsel 
des General-Feldmarschalls Graf von Waldersee* (ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin, E.S.Mittler & Sohn, 
1927, pp.367-368
69 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l. - Rep.77 - Title 2513,1) Beiheft 4, ‘Die Entsendung 
von Gendarmen und Militärs in die Ausstandsbezirke 1889*, (document 221). Letter of 4 July 1889.
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War Ministry on the grounds that the military authorities saw no need for a military 
post in the Waldenburg coal mining district.70
Thus, after 1889, garrisons were placed solely according to strategic and military 
considerations. Accordingly, there was no garrison in the entire district of Amsberg, 
which was one of the most turbulent areas in the entire German Empire and included 
all the main industrial towns north of the River Ruhr (Dortmund, Essen, Bochum, 
Rechlinghausen, Gelsenkirchen, and Heme). In cases o f requisition of troops, soldiers 
had to be mobilised from the neighbouring district o f Düsseldorf. In contrast, the 
important Münster garrison was placed in a small provincial town in the rural part of 
Westphalia. This was very different from Nord-Pas-de-Calais, where several garrisons 
established in the years between 1890 and 1914 were placed in industrial areas with the 
explicit purpose of meeting the needs of maintaining order - sometimes even on the 
initiative of the military authorities.71
9.4.3. The use of military status and legislation
As shown in Chapter Eight, in France, civilians conscripts in the army or soldiers of the 
reserve could be ordered to perform non-military functions because of their military 
status (in particular, when the legislation on military service was used to force striking 
raii personnel back to work, and when conscript soldiers were ordered to undertake 
strikebound work in the conflicts between the French state and the public employees). 
Similarly, the civilian members o f semi-military organisations (i.e. members of the 
voluntary fire-brigade, customs officers, pupils in the military academies, and even 
members of a military orchestra) were occasionally requested to participate in the 
maintenance of public order.
In Prussia, by contrast, it seems that formal military status could be used to refuse 
assistance to the civil administration. A particularly illustrating example is the request 
made in December 1910 by the district governor in Düsseldorf to the local automobile
70 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.I. - Rep.77 - Title 2513,1) Beiheft 5 ‘Die Entsendung 
von Gendarmen und Militärs in die Ausstandsbezirke 1890’. (documents 19-20). Letter of 9 January 
1890 from the war minister to the Ministry of the Interior.
71 See Chapter Eight.
340
association - Das freiwilligen Automobilkorps - to borrow their cars to transport 
police units in case of a situation o f major unrest. That request was made in similar 
terms to the automobile association’s obligation to transport military troops in case of 
a general mobilisation. The refusal from the president o f the association was 
categorical and based on the particular status of the association as a military corps. 
Given the military status of the association in the case of a general mobilisation, the use 
of their cars was only possible as part of a requisition of military troops. Furthermore, 
the members of the association who were to drive the cars would be covered by 
military legislation and would have to drive their cars themselves, in military uniform.72 
The association’s argument was difficult to sustain since they would only obtain 
miltiary status in case of a general mobilisation and the requests from the state 
administration was made to the association as a civil organisation. However, it seems 
to have been sufficient to avoid further approaches from the state administration. The 
district governor immediately stated that it would not be worthwhilstto address the 
request to the War Ministry, and suggested instead to his colleague that they obtained 
the cars from private companies.73
The request from the war minister in 1911 not to use soldiers for ordinary crowd 
management on the occasion of an air display was similarly symptomatic of the 
increasingly sharp distinction between the realms of civil society and the army.
Despite the fact that aviation associations of the time were semi-military corps - as the 
automobile associations - and the aerodromes were usually in military fields, the 
soldiers would only be used if there were a military or strategic justification.74 One can
72 Münster HaStA, Münster Regierung, VII - 52 a. (document 22). Letter of 15 January 1911 from the 
district governor in Düsseldorf to the district governor in Münster. “...Es steht dem entgegen, dass das 
freiwillige Automobilkorps als eine militärische Truppe anzusehen ist, seine Verwendung also der 
Heranziehung von Militär gleich zu erachten wäre, ferner dass sich seine Mitglieder lediglich für den 
Mobilmachungsfall zur Verfügung gestellt habe und sie demnach nicht ohne weiteres bei inneren 
Unruhen herangezogen werden können."
73 Münster HaStA, Münster Regierung, VII - 52 a. (document 22). Letter of 15 January 1911 from the 
district governor in Düsseldorf to the district governor in Münster. “Unter diesen Umständen sehe ich 
davon ab die Angelegenheit dem Herrn Kriegsminister, dessen Genehmigung mit Rücksicht auf die 
Eigenschaft des Korps jedenfalls nötig wäre, vorzutragen. Ich habe vielmehr heute unserer 
Besprechung gemäss den Herrn Minister des Innen für meinen Bezirk um die Ermächtigung gebeten, 
für den Streikfall Automobile von gewerbmässigen Verleihern (...) zu dürfen.”
74 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und 
Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929’ (document 122). Letter of 16 April 1911 from the 
minister of the interior to the Prussian district govemors. “Nach einer Mitteilung des Herrn 
Kriegsministers ist die Verwendung von Militärmannschaften zu Absperrungszwecken bei Wettflügen
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therefore conclude that even with smaller questions linked to the wider issue of 
maintaining public order» the military status could be - and indeed was - used to avoid 
providing assistance to the civil administration.
9.4.4. The use of soldiers for non-military purposes
Given the unwillingness of the militaiy authorities to meet the needs of the civil 
administration in questions linked to the maintenance o f order, it is hardly surprising 
that there was even more reluctance over soldiers performing strictly non-military 
functions. Although sanctioned by law, the use of military troops for non-military 
purposes appears to have been a very rare event. For the Province of Westphalia only 
one case has been found between 1880 and 1914.75 This is also true for the use of 
soldiers to undertake strikebound work. For the entire German Empire, there seem to 
be only two recorded cases of this type.76
One of these cases took place in 1896, on the occasion of a strike among tin-men in 
Königsberg. Eleven soldiers from the engineers were sent to do the work. When called 
to explain in the Reichstag how soldiers could be used to undertake strikebound work,
zur Verstärkung der Polizei aus militärischen wie politischen Gründen unerwünscht. Eine 
Heranziehung von Truppen kann nur insoweit in Frage kommen, als eine solche Massnahme 
vorübergehend auf Exerzierplätzen (als Flug* oder Landungsplätzen) im militärischen Interesse nötig 
wird. Voraussetzung hierbei ist aber, dass der Truppendienst dies gestaltet. Die durch AKO von 
6.Januar 1899 erlassenen Bestimmungen über militärische Hilfskommandos bei öffentlichen 
Notständen können auf Veranstaltungen keine Anwendung Finden.”
75 Münster HaStA, OP 685, ‘Einsatz von Militär zur Unterdrückung beziehungsweise Verhinderung 
von Unruhen, 1848-1852, 1880-1881*. Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: 
Requisition militärischer Hülfe und Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929.’ In June 1880 
fifty hunters were called to help the civil authorities in the search for a body in a murder case That 
this type of requisition did not happen every other day may be explained by the fact that this was a 
very costly affair. In the present case, the provincial authorities of Westphalia had to pay the 
considerable sum of 5,902 Marks.
76 Martin Kitchen, in his work on the Prussian officer corps (1968) pp. 161-165, quite mistakenly 
describes the role of the army as strike-breakers - both by forcing the strikers back to work and the 
actual undertaking of strikebound work - as a frequent incident that the army was was more than 
willing to perform. His only concrete example of this use is the 1905 strike among the electricians of 
the AEG.
- In June-July 1918, after repeated strikes in the armament industry, the province governor of 
Westphalia and the deputy army corps commander discussed whether they should send soldiers to 
undertake the work or whether it was possible to submit the striking workers to military rule. It 
appears from the correspondence that this was not measures previously implemented. Münster HaStA, 
Münster Regierung, VII - 52 a. (documents 58-59). Report of 27 June 1918 Massnahmenför den Fall 
grösserer Arbeitseinstellungen in den Rüstungsbetrieben der Korpsbezirke.
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the war minister, Walther Bronsart von Schellendorf, made it clear that, in principle, 
the use of soldiers for such purposes was not allowed.77 His justification for this 
exceptional use of soldiers was that, in this case, the strikers were actually working on 
barracks, and that the use of troops was not an attempt to favour the employer against 
the employees, but rather the need for the army to have the work done immediately.78 
Bronsart von Schellendorf mentioned that soldiers could be used only for military 
purposes or if  the financial interests of the state were at stake.
Accordingly, in 1904, Prussian military authorities accepted that, in case of a strike 
among the rail personnel, soldiers could be sent to ensure basic service on the public 
and private railway lines.79 This was justified, as in France, by referring to the strategic 
importance of the railway system. However, in Prussia, military intervention in strikes 
among rail workers differed from the French case in three significant ways. In the first 
place, the use of soldiers was limited to lines of actual strategic significance, and it was 
the military authorities who determined whether and which lines were to be kept going. 
Secondly, the military assistance was only meant to ensure the rail service, but did not 
imply the defence of the rail lines, which remained a task for the civil forces. Finally, in 
contrast to French case, the military-strategic justification never developed into an 
argument for military defence of the interests of wider civil society. If a rail strike 
paralysed the transport of persons and goods or if it obstructed industrial production 
and foreign trade, this was not a concern of the army. The measures in the event of a 
strike among rail workers were never implemented but troops were used on one 
occasion to defend the interests of wider society. This was in October 1905 when there 
wsa a strike among electricians of the AEG company. Confronted with the possibility
77 Minutes from the Reichstag of 19 February 1896: “Nun. meine Herren, ich möchte vorausschicken: 
in der Armee ist es grundsätzlich untersagt, dass die Truppen sich einmischen in Lohnstreitigkeiten, 
dergestalt, dass dem Arbeitgeber als Ersatz für streikende Arbeiter Soldaten zur Verfügung gestellt 
werden.”
78 Minutes from the Reichstag of 19 February 1896: “Ausnahmen sind allerdings gemacht, wenn die 
Staatskasse oder das militärische Interesse dabei geschädigt werden. Ein solcher Fall lag in 
Königsberg vor; es handelte sich darum, dass der von Ihnen uns bewilligte Neubau der Pionierkaseme 
zum 1.Oktober fertig gestellt werden sollte.“
79 Münster HaStA, OP 6095, ‘Notstandsmassnahmen: Requisition militärischer Hülfe und 
Waffengebrauch, 1822, 1840-1851, 1876-1929* (documents 34-37). Regulations of June 1904 
'Gestellung militärischer Hilfe im Falle von Arbeitseinstellung der Eisenbahn-bediensteten 
einschliesslich des Personals des amtlichen Bahnsspediteure.’
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of Berlin being cut off from electricity, workers from the rail troops were sent to 
ensure the most basic service.80 ^
Despite these isolated cases of military defence of the interest of wider society, in the 
light of the insistence by the military authorities on their independence from the civil 
administration and their unwillingness to provide even minor practical assistance, it is 
hardly surprising that, when confronted with problems of internal unrest, the state 
administration preferred to co-operate with local police authorities and to spend 
significant resources in order to avoid dependence on military assistance. In contrast to 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais, where the state administration was preoccupied by intensifying 
and improving co-operation with the army, the Westphalian civil authorities after each 
major crisis were only concerned with improving the organisation and efficiency of the 
civil forces, in order to keep the army out of internal order issues. Accordingly, whilst 
strategies developed in France that increasingly depended on military assistance, the 
strategies developed by the Prussian state authorities in co-operation with local 
authorities did not rely upon the army, either to provide manpower, or to provide 
material.
9.5. Consequences of the civil-military separation for co-operation 
concerning maintenance of order
It is striking how, after each case of military intervention in Westphalia, both civil and 
military authorities praised their excellent mutual relationship. In the intervention in 
Heme of June 1899, the military commander on the spot, as well as the various 
branches o f the state administration, praised the excellent civil-military relationship 
during the crises.81 Similarly, the civil-military co-operation by the intervention in 
March 1912 was described as a success by both civil and military authorities.82
80 Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2/14 ‘Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von 
Unruhen 1889-1914’. (documents 216-221).
81 Münster HaStA, Regierung Arnsberg, 14321, ‘Bergarbeiterstreik im Ruhrkohlengebiet 1899’ 
Correspondence between the commanding colonel Taubert and the senior state administrators in 
Arnsberg ad Bochum, 10-13 July 1899; Report of 17 July 1899 from the district governor of Amsberg 
‘Zusammenfassender Bericht der Ereignisse im Hemer Bergarbeiterausstande’: “Zum Schlüsse darf 
ich mit Befriedigung und Genugthuung hervorheben, dass das gegenseitige Verhältniss des
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The background to this praise, however, seems to be that both authorities expected co­
operation to be extremely difficult. Because of the low frequency of military 
intervention and the low degree o f communication and co-ordination of plans, practical 
co-operation between civil and military authorities in case of major unrest was 
constrained by three elements that characterised the inter-institutional relationship 
between the state administration and the army. In the first place, where was a lack of 
mutual trust, since neither the civil nor the military authorities were entirely certain 
about the intentions of the other, and each suspected it would be trapped in activities it 
would rather avoid. The second element was a simple lack of knowledge about 
procedures and legal definitions, since a commander or civil servant would normally 
only be involved in practical co-operation with the other once in his time in service. 
Following the latter problem, there was also a lack of consensus about the procedures 
to be followed and the strategies to be implemented. These elements of uncertainty and 
points of potential conflict were as the heart of the relationship between the civil and 
military authorities in Westphalia. 82
herangezogenen Militärs und der sämmtlichen beteiligten Civil-Behörden ohne jede Ausnahme ein 
vorzügliches gewesen ist. Wie ich mit Dank anerkenne, sind die von Seiten der Militärbehörden 
getroffenen Massregeln zur Aufrechterhaltung der Ruhe und Ordnung und zum Schutze der 
Arbeitswilligen wahrhaft mustergültig gewesen. Dabei haben die Militärbehörden und namentlich der 
mit der örtlichen Leitung beauftragte Kommandeur des Infanterie-Regiments Herzog Ferdinand von 
Braunschweig, Oberts Tauben in jeder Weise das weitgehenste Entgegenkommen gegen die 
Civilbehörden dauernd an den Tag gelegt. Ich erlaube mir zum Beweise dessen das von dem Oberst 
Taubert an den Landrath Stude gerichtete Schreiben sowie den zwischen mir und dem Oberst 
entstandenen Briefwechsel im Anlage vorzulegen.”
82 ‘‘{About the military Intervention). Die Wirkung war durchschlagend: kein Schuss fiel, alles verlief 
völlig unblutig, und der Streik nahm bald ein Ende. Die Truppe war in fester Disziplin; keiner der 
vielen Bergleute in ihren Reihen hat versagt.(.„) Mit dem Oberpräsidenten Prinz Karl v.Ratibor und 
Corvey ergab sich eine vortreffliche Zusammenarbeit.” Karl von Einem 'Erinnerungen eines Soldaten 
1853-1933’ Leipzig, Verlag von K.F.Koehler 1933 p.168.
- Münster HaStA, Regierung Münster, VII-14 Vol.l/ 32-1, 'Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912’ 
(documents 5-10). Report of 20 May 1912 from the district govemor in Münster to the minsiter of the 
interior. “Der diesjährige Bergarbeiterausstand im Ruhrrevier stellte an die für die Aufrechterhaltung 
der öffentlichen Sicherheit, Ruhe und Ordnung verantwortlichen Behörden wesentlich schwierigere 
Aufgaben, als das bei früheren Bergarbeiterstreiks der Fall gewesen ist. (...) Das Zusammenwirken 
zwischen Militär- und Zivilbehörden vollzog sich glatt.”
- Münster HaStA, Regierung Münster, VII-14 Vol.5/ 37-3, ‘Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912. 
Tagesberichte der Unterbehörden.’ (document 41-42). Daily report of 18 March 1912 from the local 
govemor in Lüdinghausen to the district govemor in Münster: “...Dies Zusammengehen der 
Gendarmeriemannschaften mit dem Militär ist als ausgezeichnet anzusehen.”
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9.5.1. The lack of mutual trust r ->
Hesitations about military involvement in public order greatest for the civil authorities. 
The mobilisation of military troops always implied a certain risk of the civil authorities 
losing control over the actions o f the army. Since military intervention was not 
surrounded by shared norms for appropriate behaviour towards provocation and 
obstruction from a protest movement, there was always a risk that a local commander 
might take independent initiatives against the wishes o f the civil administration. Given 
that the military establishment was extremely sensitive to criticism of its members, it 
would be very difficult to prevent the commanders from making independent steps, or 
to hold the officers responsible afterwards.83 Although the actual cases of mobilisation 
of troops in Westphalia were characterised by little conflict between the civil and 
military authorities, and despite the fact that the military authorities tended to follow 
the wishes and instruction from the civil authorities, province governors could never be 
sure that this would be the case on future occasions.
If the military authorities in 1899 and in 1912 proved prepared to accommodate the 
wishes of the civil administration, this was not least because the military authorities 
themselves had no serious alternatives to the suggestions from the civil administration. 
In 1899 and in 1912, the military authorities were just as unprepared as they had been 
during the 1889 strike for intervention in domestic conflicts in which a state of siege 
had not been declared, since neither the plans established by the civil authorities nor 
the different military strategies developed by the military authorities operated with this 
possibility. Being unprepared, decisions had to be taken ad hoc at the moment when 
the crisis had already developed into a serious threat. In 1912, this left the army corps 
commander, General von Einem, with two options. He could either, as Albedyll did in 
1889, insist on his right of command and restore order with coercive military measures 
with no regards to the wishes o f the civil administration. The other option was to
83 The Zabern affair is only one of many examples of how the entire military establishment were 
prepared to defend at any prize the inappropriate behaviour of a first lieutenant, going as far as the 
war minister defending this member of the army before the Reichstag. Similarly, the army was 
impervious to criticism concerning the behaviour of the military troops (i.e. during the intervention 
in Marpingen in 1876, or the episodes of shooting during the 1889 strike). Even the very numerous 
cases where conscript soliders were beaten, cripeled or even mistreated with fatal consequences by 
their supperior officers, were dismissed by the military establishment.
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recognise that the civil authorities had both the detailed knowledge and the experience 
of dealing with labour conflicts.
In his memoirs, General von Einem insists that he alone was in charge of the handling 
of the measures implemented.84 The description in the reports from the civil authorities 
after the end o f the strike provides a slightly different view, according to which it was 
the civil authorities who in fact guided the military troops.85 Given that, in their 
requisition, the district governors had to provide the necessary detailed information 
about the number of policemen already in the area, the number of workers employed 
there, the geographical position of the mine shafts, as well as the locations most 
exposed to sabotage and bullying against strike-breakers, it is not surprising that they 
also provided recommendations as to how many soldiers were needed and where to 
send them.86 The later report from the district governor in Münster also indicates that, 
as a general rule, the military authorities followed the recommendations of the civil 
administration.87 It also appears quite unequivocally from the telegrams and letters
84 “So übernahm ich denn die vollziehende Macht und sandte in die bedrohten Gegenden starke 
Truppenverbände aller Waffen.” Karl von Einem‘Erinnerungen eines Soldaten 1853-1933’ Leipzig, 
Verlag von K.F.Koehler 1933 p.168.
85 Münster HaStA, Regierung Münster, VII-14 V o ll/ 32-1, ‘Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912’ 
(documents 5-10). Report of 20 May 1912 from the district govemor in Münster to the minsiter of the 
interior. “Gesetzlich stand zwar die Leistung den Militärbehörden zu, in Wirklichkeit geschah sie 
durch die Polizei-Behörden."
Münster HaStA, VII-14 Vol.l/ 32-1, ‘Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912* or Geheimes Staatsarchiv, 
Berlin-Dahlem, Rep,77 - Titel 2523 Nr.I adh.l.VoI.20, ‘Die Erfahrungen aus den Bergarbeiterstreik 
im Ruhrgebiet im März 1912’, ‘Niederschrift über die Besprechung am l.Juni 1912 im Königlichen 
Landrathsamt in Essen über die beim letzten Bergarbeiterstreik gemachten Erfahrungen.’: “Landrat 
Graf Merveldt : Übrigens hätten auch nach der Heranziehung des Militär die Polizei beamten die 
Leitung des Sicherheitsdienstes behalten. Den Militärpatrouillen, die immer mindestens eine Stärke 
von 3-4 Mann gehabt hätten, da die Soldaten einzeln nicht verwendbar seien, seien vielfach 
Polizeibeamte als Führer mitgegeben worden.”
86 Münster HaStA, Regierung Münster, VII-14 Vol.3/ 37-1, ‘Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912’ 
(documents 102-105). Leiters of 14 March 1912 from the district govemor in Münster to the army 
coq» commander. “Da mir weitere polizeiliche Hilfskräfte nicht zur Verfügung stehen, wie ich in 
meinen Schreiben vom heutigen Tage betr. Ersuchen um militärische Hilfe für den Kreis 
Recklinghausen des näheren erörtert habe, so bitte ich des kgl. Generalkommando ergebenst tunlichst 
bis Morgen Nachmittags 3 Uhr nach Radbor Truppen zu entsenden, es würden 1 Kompagnie 
Infanterie, etwa 1 Zug Kavallerie (...). Die Truppen würde vornehmlich der Schutz der Gegend 
südlich der grünen Linie auf anliegender Karte anzuvertrauen sein.”
87 Münster HaStA, Regierung Münster, VII-14 Vol.l /32-1, ‘Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912’ 
(documents 5-10). Report of 20 May 1912 from the district govemor in Münster to the minister of the 
interior. “...die Militärbehörde zeigte dabei das grösste Entgegenkommen indem sie auch die 
erforderliche Rüstung zur Verfügung stellte.”
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during the intervention that the General von Einem did little but closely follow the 
indications from the civil authorities.
Thus, in the 1912 strike in Westphalia, the military authorities seemed very attentive to 
the needs and recommendation of the senior state administrators. Nevertheless, despite 
the uncomplicated relationship with the military authorities during the actual cases of 
military intervention, the degree to which the civil administration was allowed to 
determine these essential points entirely depended on the individual army corps 
commander.88 The Prussian officers and general commanders were known for their 
strong declarations of intent, and the state administrators could never be sure what the 
army might do - with or without requisition from the civil authorities.89 Similarly, it 
appears from the correspondence in 1903-1904 between the district governor in 
Potsdam and the minister of the interior concerning the independent military initiative 
in Welten90 that the civil servants perceived the military authorities as a difficult, 
unreliable and often irresponsible partner for co-operation.9* Similarly, even a ‘good’ 
relationship with the military authorities was too frail to be seriously counted upon.92
88 Hindenburg in 1909 clearly insisted on determining all relevant details, independently from the 
civil authorities. Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2/14 ‘Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei 
Unterdrückung von Unruhen 1889-1914.’ (documents 246-248; 250-252). Hindenburg’s reports to the 
Emperor of 23 and 28 October 1909. Similarly, the general staff study of 1907 or the 
recommandations from General von Bissing do not count upon the civilian authorities at all. General 
von Bissing’s order of 30 April 1907 simply states that the moment military assistance becomes 
necessary is the moment to declare a state of siege - and thus charge the military authorities with all 
decision making. “Sobald die Polizei der Bewegung der Massen nicht mehr Herr werden kann und 
diese den Organen der Sicherheit und Ordnung gegenüber eine drohende Haltung einnehmen, ist der 
Augenblick gekommen über den rebellierenden Bezirk den Belagerungszustand zu verhängen.” 
Bundesarchiv Abteilung Potsdam (III); R 43 Film signaturee 12425-12426 ‘Militärische Massnahmen 
im Falle von Unruhen. Belagerungszustand 1890-1918’ (documents 47-50).
89 Waldersee in 1896-1897 openly and often expressed his intention to make moves independently of 
the civil administration if he saw this appropriate (in the case of the Hamburg strike he did not). As 
late as 1913, the Zabem-Affair indicated with all possible clarity that anything could be expected from 
(he side of the Prussian army.
90 See above note 28.
91 Geheime Staatsarchiv, Berlin -Dahlem, H.A.l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2513 I) Beiheft 9, ‘Die Entsendung 
von Gendarmen und Militärs in die Ausstandsbezirke 1901-1905’ (documents 63-66). Letter of 15 
January 1904 from the district governor in Potsdam to the minister of the interior. “Ich kann mir aber 
von Verhandlungen mit den Militärbehörden keinerlei Erfolg sondern nur viel Zeit raubendes und 
verstimmendes Schreibwerk versprechen (...) Ich habe daher dem Landrath von Wilms meine 
besondere Anerkennung für sein Verhalten während des ganzen Streiks sowie für seine erfolgreiche 
Vermittlung bei der noch vor Weihnachten zu Stande gebrachten Beilegung ausgesprochen. Ob er bei 
noch grösserer Vorsicht in seiner Korrespondenz mit den Militärbehörden das Missverständniss hätte 
vermeiden können, lasse ich dahingestellt.”
92 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2513 1) Beiheft 9 ‘Die Entsendung 
von Gendarmen und Militärs in die Ausstandsbezirke 1901-1905’ (documents 63-66). Letter of 15
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It is therefore hardly surprising that the state administration considered any practical 
co-operation with the military authorities as a potential source of trouble. It carried 
dangers that the military authorities might take independent initiatives, or obstruction 
to the needs o f the state administration. Similarly, with the military authorities* inability 
to recognise errors - however gross93 * or assume financial responsibility for errors 
committed by any military officer,94 there were many reasons for the state 
administrators to consider the army to be a difficult and unpredictable partner for co­
operation, no matter how good their experiences had been during actual cases of 
military intervention.
9.5.2. Lack o f knowledge about formal rules for civil-military co-operation
In addition to the lack of trust and reluctance by the civil administration towards the 
idea of depending on the assistance and good-will of the army, there was also a series 
of practical problems resulting from the low frequency of military intervention. During 
the Imperial period, the frequency of military intervention in Westphalia was never 
sufficiently high for standard operating procedures to develop concerning civil-military 
relationship, as they did in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. As a result, during the military 
interventions in 1889, in 1899 and again in 1912, there was much confusion by the 
authorities, both civil and military, about the formal distribution of powers between the
January 1904 from the district governor in Potsdam to the minister of the interior. “Diesen Offizier 
wird die Militärverwaltung zweifellos mit allem Nachdruck zu schützen suchen und alle bezüglichen 
Verhandlungen einschliesslich des Prozesses würden deshalb zweifellos dem guten Einvernehmen 
zwischen den Militär- und Civilbehörden Eintrag tun; sie würden vielleicht sogar einen ungünstigen 
Einfluss auf die bisherige dankenswerte Bereitwilligkeit der Militärbehörden militärische Hülfe zu 
gewähren, haben.”
93 The well documented and analysed cases of the military intervention in Marpingen in 1876 and in 
Zabern 1913 show how it was equally impossible for the military authorities to admit any error or 
responsibility by the eve of the First World War as it had been almost forty years earlier during the 
Kulturkampf.
94 In 1904, all province and district governors were informed by the Ministry of the Interior about the 
incident from East Prussia where a local military commander kept a special train ready for 
mobilisation for three weeks without informing the civil administration, (see note 28). The problem 
was not only the independent military initiative but also the refusal from the War Ministry to pay the 
bill presented by the private rail company. Eventually the Ministry of the Interior reluctantly accepted 
the financial responsiblity. Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2513 1) 
Beiheft 9, ‘Die Entsendung von Gendarmen und Militärs in die Ausstands bezirke 1901-1905’ Letter 
of 24 Mai 1904 from the minister of the interior to the province and district governors.
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State administration and the army.95 The commanding officers were often ignorant o f 
the legal definitions, particularly those concerning the rights of strikers.96 The formal 
rules only stated that the senior military commander acquired ‘full authority o f 
command/ but this still left many questions open as to how a civil administration was 
supposed to operate in practice. Moreover, since the transfer of the ultimate authority 
to the military power was necessarily a sensitive question, the senior civil and military 
authorities had never tried to reach a final agreement about the exact definition of this 
point. The practical relationship between civil and military authorities therefore had to  
be negotiated between authorities at all levels each time the military troops were 
mobilised.
Another significant element of uncertainty arose from the question of financial 
responsibility. The law stated that it was the requesting authority who has the financial 
responsibility. During the nineteenth century, when interventions were mostly local and 
isolated, it was possible to point out the private person or local representative who had 
solicited the state administration to call for military assistance, and thus where to place 
financial responsibility.97 However, the 1889 intervention was extended over so many 
administrative units, and the military intervention had been solicited partly by local 
authorities, and local governors, and partly by private companies, but was formally 
issued by the district and province governors. The financial cost of 366.345 Mark and
95After the 1912 Intervention, General von Einem complained about widespread ignorance among the 
civil servants about the legal definitions of authority in the case of a militry Intervention without a 
declaralion of state of siege. Münster HaStA, OP 6095, (document 177). Letter of 28 August 1912 
from General von Einem to the province govemor o f Westphalia.
96Münster HaStA, VII-14 Vol.l/ 32-1, ‘Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912’ or Geheimes 
Staatsarchiv, Berlin - Dahlem, H.A.l. - Rep.77 - Titel 2523,1) adh.l. Vol.20, ‘Die Erfahrungen aus 
dem Bergarbeiterstreik im Ruhrgebiet im März 1912’, ‘Niederschrift über die Besprechung am l.Juni 
1912 im Königlichen Landrathsamt in Essen über die beim letzten Bergarbeiterstreik gemachten 
Erfahrungen’: "Regierungspräsident Dr.Kruse, Düsseldorf: Die Heranziehung des Militärs müsse 
unter allen Umständen die ultima ratio bleiben. In seiner Heranziehung liege eine grosse Gefahr. 
Wenn die Truppe kommt, gehe nach den gesetzlichen Bestimmungen die Kommandogewalt auf den 
Befehlshaber über; die Zivilbehörden gäben dann ihre Gewalt aus der Hand; die Offiziere aber 
kennten die Verhältnisse und vielfach auch die in Betracht kommenden gesetzlichen Bestimmungen 
nicht, sodass leicht Fehlgriffe Vorkommen könnten. Er erinnerte an den beim letzten Streik 
vorgekommenen Fall, in welchen ein Leutnant ein Versammlung aufgelöst habe weil er irrtümlich 
verstanden habe, er solle die Versammlungen statt die Ansammlungen verstreuen. Es hätten deraus 
sehr schlimme Folgen entstehen können, da eine grosse Zahl von Personen aus den Fenstern 
gesprungen sei.”
97 After the military intervention in Marpingen 1876, the expenses of the miltiary and police 
intervention amounted to 4,000 Marks. Because these were solicited by the local mayor, the 
municipality of Marpingen carried the financial responsibility. (Blackboum (1993) p.314).
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75 Pfennig for the intervention by military troops and gendarmes in four military 
regions was almost impossible to place, and eventually the government accepted to pay 
the bill.98 In France, the state accepted to cover the costs of military interventions in 
labour conflicts as early as 1893.99 In contrast in Prussia, even if the state assumed the 
financial responsibility after the 1889 strike, this was to be considered an isolated and 
exceptional case. The question remained unsettled. Whenever the possibility of a 
military intervention became an object of discussion, there was general confusion 
amongst the civil servants responsible about who was to carry the significant costs.100 
In all the cases of intervention in Westphalia, the Ministry of the Interior eventually 
assumed the financial responsibility, but only after months of discussion.101 This 
uncertainty was a serious reason for province and district governors to hesitate about 
calling upon the army.
Factors such as the lack of military preparedness, confusion about the details o f the 
rules defining the distribution of powers, financial responsibility and the strategies to be 
implemented can be seen as both the result of the low frequency of military 
intervention, and as a reason for further decreases in the number of military 
interventions.
98 Decision of the Freeh State Council of 6 July 1893. National Archives, Pan's, F.7.12773 
‘Instructions ministerielles; plans de protection, jurisprudence, emploi des troupes, usage des armes, 
état chronologique des grèves, 1849-1914’).
99 Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin - Dahlem, H.A.l - Rep.77 - Titel 2523, 1), ‘Die Arbeitseinstellung 
in den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen 
Arbeiterunruhen in den Jahren 1889-1912’ Vol.5 (document 154). Letter of 15 July 1889 from the 
minister of the interior, Herrfun, to the minister of commerce.
100 In relation to the case from Welten, near Potsdam, in October 1903, when a local garrison 
commander, without informing the state administration, had solicited a steam train from the local rail 
company, it was suggested by the war minister that the bill should be paid by the municipality of 
Welten. The Ministry of the Interior refused with the argument that this would be a way of punishing 
the citizens of Welten who had behaved in a way so that the troops were not called upon. The 
Ministry of the Interior finally accepted to pay the bill. Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin - Dahlem: 
H.A.l, - Rep.77. Titel 251,1) Beiheft 9 ‘Die Entsendung von Gendarmen und Militàrs in die 
Ausstandsbezirke 1901-1905’ (documents 63-73).
101 After the intervention in June 1899, the issue was settled in December, and after the 1912 
intervention, the debate went on from March to November, and was only finally settled when the state 
accepted the financial responsibility.
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9.5 J .  Lack of civil-military agreements and lack of formalised procedures
The absence of standard operating procedures around the civil-military co-operation 
also left many important issues open to potential conflict, and the civil authorities, 
when calling for the army, had to operate with a high number of unknown factors. 
Within the French system, the insistence on consensus between the civil and milita^ 
authorities and the demand for joint decision making, provided a certain degree of 
mutual confidence. The civil administration acquired influence over the measures 
implemented by the military authorities, and, when occasionally a sensitive situation 
went badly wrong, the military commander would be much less exposed to criticisms 
concerning the measures implemented. In Prussia, throughout the Imperial period, both 
the King and the military commanders insisted strongly on the integrity of their 
powers.102 The military authorities were concerned with keeping up their image of an 
army entirely in charge o f legitimate violence in the eyes of the civil administration and 
in wider society.
The functioning in practice of the civil-military co-operation differed from this image. 
In 1889 as in 1899 and 1912, the pattern of requisition was the same: the civil 
authorities addressed the army corps commander who mobilised the troops, and only 
then informed the King about the issue.103 The King still insisted on his authority of
102 In 1889, General von Albedyl! made clear that his provision of a military unit according to the 
wishes of the province governor was to be considered as an exeptional concession to the civil 
administration. Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin-Dahlem, H.A.l - Rep.77 - Titel 2513, 1) Beiheft 2, 
'Die auf die Arbeitseinstellungen eingegangenen Telegramme, 1889' (documents 50-53). Telegram of 
13 May 1889 from von Hagenmeister, Province Governor of Westphalia, to the Emperor. “...Dankbar 
anerkenne ich, dass kommandierender General heute auf mein Ersuchen ausnahmsweise gestattet hat, 
zum Schutze der Gruben Maria-Anna und Steinbank in Höntrop bei Bochum eine Mililärabtheilung 
zu stationieren...”.
Similarly in his instructions to the civil authorities and the military commanders entitled 
Gesichtspunkte fü r  die Verwendung der in die Kohlenbergwerks-Gebiete entsendeten Truppen, 
General von Albedyll begins by stressing the independence of the military commander. “Des 
ausgedehnte Gebiet wird in einzelne Abschnitte getheilt in deren jedem ein Kommandeur, welchem 
einige Bataillone und Eskadrons unterstellt sind, die allgemeinen Annordnungen für die Aufstellung 
und Verwendung der Truppen selbständig zu treffen hat. (...) Die Abschnitts-Commandeure sind 
lediglich und ausschliesslich dem General-Kommando unterstellt (underlined in the original)” There 
is no other mentioning of the relations the military commander should have to the civil authorities. 
Central Archive, Potsdam III, R.43, film signature 11971-11972: ‘Handel und Gewerbe: 
Arbeitseinstellung 1889-1896 in der Rheinprovinz, Westfalen und Schlesien* (Document 91-92), or 
Münster HaStA, OP 14317, ‘Acten betreffs den Streik der Bergarbeiter im Ruhr-Kohlen-Revier, 
1889’ (document 74-75). Instructions o f 10 May 1889 from General von Albedyll.
103 Central Archive, Potsdam III, R.43, film signature 11971-11972, 'Arbeitseinstellung in Westfalen, 
Rheinland und Schlesien 1889-1896'. Telegram of 6 May 1889 from General von Hahnke to War
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command, but this appears to be rather a matter of form. In 1899, the King made the 
commanding general personally responsible for restoring order,104 and in 1912, the 
orders from the supreme commander were to use force recklessly against any 
opposition.105 Thus from the side of the supreme commander, the army corps 
commander had both legal authority and orders to implement whatever measures he 
considered appropriate, with no regard to the wishes of the civil administration. 
Nevertheless, in 1899, General Mikusch did not make much use of his right to 
independent decision-making. In all his telegrams he emphasised that for all the 
important decisions concerning when to mobilise, where to intervene, and when to 
send back the troops, he closely followed the wishes of the province governor.106 He
Minister Verdy du Vernois. “Kommandierende General 7 A.K. hat heute Vormittag Seiner Majstät 
gemeldet dass in Gelsenkirchen Arbeiterausstand von grösserer dimension ausgebrochen. 2 
Kompanien von Regiment 13 hingeschicht sind."
Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /14, ‘Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von 
Unruhen 1889-1914.’ (document 258). Telegram of 13 March 1912 from General von Einem to the 
Emperor. “Seine Majstät dem Kaiser und König melde ich, dass nach Mittheilung der 
Regierungspräsidenten von Arnsberg und Münster es nicht mehr möglich ist, im Kreise Dortmund 
und Recklinghausen die Ordnung durch Gendarmerie und Schutzmannschaft aufrechtzuerhalicn und 
den Schutz der Arbeitswilligen zu bewirken. Ich habe daher befohten, dass das Infanterie Regiment 
Prinz Friedrich der Niederlande und zwei Escadrons Husaren Regiments Kaiser Nikolaus von 
Russland nach Dortmund, Regimentsstab und zwei Bataillone Infanterie Regiments Herzog 
Ferndinand von Brauschweig und zwei Escadrons Kürassier-Regiments von Driesen nach 
Recklinghausen per Eisenbahn abgehen."
Similarly the telegrams sent by General von Einem to the King on the 14 March 1912. Military 
Archive, Freiburg, PH2/14 ‘Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von Unruhen 1889- 
1914/
104 Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /14 ‘Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von 
Unruhen 1889-1914.’ (document 187) telegram of 28 June 1899 from the Emperor to the Military 
Cabinet. “Ich habe auf die Meldung von den Bergarbeiterausschreitungen in Herne in Westfalen, zu 
deren Unterdrückung Polizei nicht ausreichte und ein Bataillon requiriert war, den kommandierenden 
General von Mikusch persönlich für die sofortige, energische, gruendliche Wiederherstellung der 
Ordnung verantwortlich gemacht und Meldung vom Veranlassten eingefordert. Wilhelm."
105 Military Archive, Freiburg, personal papers of General von Einem: N 324 /64 Telegram of 14 
March 1912 from the Emperor “Wo eingegriffen werden muss, Scharfschiessen, ohne Gnade! 
Maschinengewehre und auch Artillerie! Kein langes Postenstehen oder Parlamentiren! Füsilieren! 
Wilhelm R."
106 Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /14 ‘Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von 
Unruhen 1889-1914’. (document 188-189). Telegram of 28 june 1899 from General von Mikusch to 
the Emperor. “In Herne Kreis Bochum sind grobe Ausschreitungen von streikenden Bergleuten 
vorgekommen. (...) Auf Ansuchen des Oberpräsidenten habe ich soeben ein Bataillon Regiments 39 
angewiesen sofort mit Eisenbahn nach Herne zu fahren, um erforderlichenfalls zur Aufrechterhaltung 
der Ruhe und Ordnung einzuschreiten/’
Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /14 ‘Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von 
Unruhen 1889-1914’, (document 204). Telegram of 5 July 1899 from General von Mikusch to the 
Emperor. “Da Ruhe und Ordnung im bisherigen Ausstandsgebiet bei Herne und Recklinghausen 
andauern, habe ich im Einverständniss mit Oberpräsident heute zunächst ein Bataillon Infanterie 
Regiments 57 von Herne mit Eisenbahn in seine Garnison Wesel zuriickgesandl.”
Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /14 ‘Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von 
Unruhen 1889-1914’. (document 205). Telegram of 7 July 1899 from General von Mikusch to the
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thus detached himself from the responsibility which the King had placed upon him. 
Similarly in 1912, when General von Einem sent troops into the Westphalian mining 
areas, he strongly emphasised that he mobilised troops at the explicit request of the 
civil authorities.107
With incidents such as a general strike in the mining sector becoming increasingly 
politically sensitive, the position of the general commander also became more difficult, 
since it was not obvious what the King would perceive as a successful military 
intervention. Both a heavy handed and a smoother intervention might go badly wrong, 
- with people killed and damage to the prestige and standing of the army amongst 
traditionally supportive groups. In these sensitive situations, even an army corps 
commander needed to cover his back, and the insistence of General von Mikusch - and 
later of General von Einem - on the consensus with the civil administration seems to 
have been a way of detaching themselves from a disagreeable responsibility.108 Thus, 
there were powerful reasons for the commander responsible to follow closely the 
instructions of the province governor.
Emperor. "Im bisherigen Ausstandsgebiet sind besondere Vorkommnisse nicht zu melden. Da die 
Civilbehorde die Belastung von Truppen daselbst nach bis über Sonntag gewünscht hatt habe ich die 
Zurückziehung des Detachments von dort nach den Garnisonen für Montag den lOten Nachmittags in 
Aussicht genommen.”
Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2 /14 ‘Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von 
Unruhen 1889-1914’ (document 206). Telegram of 10 July 1899 from General von Mikusch to the 
Emperor. “Da im bisherigen Ausstandgebiet Ruhe und Ordnung andauern habe ich in 
Einverständniss mit Oberpräsident heute Nachmittags 4 Uhr die letzten Truppen des Detachements 
des Oberst Taubert von Herne und Recklinghausen in ihre Garnisonen zurückgesandt.”
107 Military Archive, Freiburg, PH2/14 ‘Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von 
Unruhen 1889-1914.’ Telegrams of 14 March 1912 from General von Einem to the King.
108 Similarly, during the Zabern Affair, Genera! von Deimling tried to justify the incidents by 
insisting again on the right to independent military decision making. However, the whole affair made 
the army look embarassingly ridiculous. General von Deimling therefore attempted to put the blame 
on the civil administration, as indicated by the inconsistencies between the printed version of his 
memoirs and the unprinted manuscript. Berthold von Deimling *Aus der Alten in die neue Zeit’ 
Berlin : Im Verlag Ullstein, 1930 pp.146-148, and his private papers Military Archive, Freiburg, N 
559.
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9.6. Concluding remarks: the refrain from the state administration to call 
for military assistance
Seen from the state administration's perspective, it could not rely on such a degree of 
co-operation by the army corps commanders. Until the end of the Empire, there were 
still strong headed military commanders of the old school, such as von Albedyll, von 
Waldersee, or von Bissing, who had no qualms about implementing military measures 
with no regard to the wishes of the civil administration. Between 1889 and 1914, 
Although the Prussian civil service developed an ability to deal with domestic conflicts 
through a careful balance of negotiation and display of force, senior civil servants were 
highly aware of the political implications of violent clashes between public forces and 
contesting movements. They also suspected that the military commanders might stick 
to their own ideas about a necessary display of force, and that the military authorities 
were out of touch with the needs for political flexibility in sensitive situations such as 
major strikes.
When calling for military assistance the Prussian state administrators had to operate 
with a high degree of uncertainty about the implications o f a military intervention. 
They did not know which measures which were going to be taken and the degree to 
which the army was simply going to stand by or whether it would actively repress the 
unrest. They could not foresee the reactions from the strikers or demonstrators nor 
public reactions to violent confrontations between civilians and the army. This was the 
background against which the state administration in Westphalia developed and 
pursued its policy of ‘de-militarisation’ of internal peacekeeping.
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Chapter Ten. General Conclusion and Wider Perspectives
The central questions of the thesis have been: Why did the French and Prussian 
systems adopt such markedly dissimilar strategies towards public disorder after 1890? 
Why did strong patterns of continuity develop in the strategies implemented towards 
public disorder in each country? And, lastly, why did the policies adopted in the early 
1890s continued and indeed became more pronounced during the following decades, 
that is right until the First World War? During the course of the previous chapters, 
three main observations have been made:
• that the dissimilar strategies developed and implemented were not directly linked to 
the size of the public order challenge faced or to the number of the civil forces 
available to deal with it;
• that after 1889, a strong pattern of continuity can be observed in Westphalia, as 
well as in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, concerning the strategies developed and 
implemented to deal with major cases of unrest; and
• that in both areas, the strategies to deal with major cases of unrest were developed 
and implemented by the senior state administration at the regional level and by the 
ministry o f the interior, policies which were, to a large degree, supported by the 
senior military commanders concerned.
10.1. Findings of the study and the challenge of existing interpretations
The findings of this thesis challenge a series of main interpretations concerning the use 
of troops for maintenance of order in Imperial Germany and Republican France 
respectively. In the first place, the argument that the ‘de-militarisation’ of internal 
peacekeeping in Westphalia, and in Germany in general, was due to the increase in 
number of civil forces after 1889 is challenged by the findings presented in Chapter 
Two which show that the Westphalian industrial areas remained badly policed despite 
the extension of the civil forces between 1889 and 1913.1 The finding that Nord-Pas-
1 Spencer (1984,1985,1992), Funk (1986), Henning (1987), and lessen (1991,1992).
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de-Calais was and remained better policed than the Westphalian industrial areas also
challenge the argument put forward in France that the frequent use of troops was due
*
to inadequate civil forces. Secondly, the findings also indicate that in terms of the size 
of conflicts and potential for violence, the authorities in Westphalia faced challenges 
which were no less serious than those presented to the authorities in Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais. Finally, the cases appearing in Nord-Pas-de-Calais show that military troops 
were often mobilised to conflicts where the threat to public order was only potential.
The findings that troops were used more frequently in Republican France than they 
were in Prussia and that the French military elite was more actively involved in 
managing internal crises than were their Prussian counterparts contradicts the idea of a 
direct linkage between the constitutional position o f the army within the two systems 
and the domestic role of the army. As shown in Chapter Three, a discrepancy can be 
discerned both in the case of France and Prussia between the formal rights of the 
military commanders and their use of these powers to assert influence on the strategies 
and measures developed to deal with public disorder.
The findings of Chapter Four question the idea of the use of the army as a result of co­
operation between various elites to repress emerging social and political protest 
movements.3 Even if senior officials, military commanders and local elites were all 
keen on defending the existing social and political order against a social revolution, the 
three groups did not work closely together. In both Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais, local authorities and industrial elites were excluded from asserting influence on 
decisions concerning the use of military troops. Secondly, in Westphalia, the state 
administration and the army avoided close co-operation, despite their common 
commitment to the existing regime. In France, by contrast, despite the potential 
conflicts between the state administration and the army and in spite of many military 
commanders’ lack of sympathy for the Republican regime, the two bureaucratic elites 
were capable of co-operating efficiently about maintaining public order with use of the 
army. *5
2 Serman (1982), Carrot (1984), Beriière (1993, 1996), and Bruneteaux (1993,1996).
5 Wehler (1973, 1995), Berghahn (1982, 1994), Saul (1974), Tenfeldc (1979) Tenfelde, Volkmann & 
Hohorst (1981), Rebérioux (1975), Agulhon (1990), and Trempé (1995).
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Finally, in Chapter Five the comparison of the French and Prussian case also challenges 
the arguments put forward that the ‘de-militarisation’ of the internal peacekeeping in 
Prussia was a direct consequence o f the arguments put forward in the debate about the 
disadvantages o f using troops to maintain public order.4 5Since the same arguments 
were put forward in France, where the negative effects for the legitimisation of the 
regime were potentially more damaging than in Prussia, the continuous use of troops in 
France indicate that these considerations were of secondary importance of the 
development of the dissimilar use of military troops. Similarly, the argument that the 
military commanders’ acceptance o f the domestic role of the army should be linked to 
their degree of professionalisation5 and their self-perception as ‘professional’ officers, 
cannot be used as an explanation for the dissimilar development in France and Prussia, 
since both the French and Prussian elites were highly professionalised corps. 
Moreover, the Prussian military elite, although reluctant to becoming involved in 
labour conflicts and repression of political protest movements, was highly politicised 
and involved in national politics and foreign affairs.
10.2. Main findings of the investigations: dissimilar strategies leading to 
diverging administrative practice
On the basis of the comparative analysis of the strategies developed in Westphalia and 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the present study proposes a model of interpretation that focuses 
on the bureaucratic procedures within each system in order to explain why the policies 
adopted by the French and Prussian authorities in the early 1890s were persistently 
pursued until the outbreak of the First World War.
Two aspects are central concerning the findings of dissimilar policies in Westphalia and 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Firstly, there is the question of why dissimilar solutions were 
adopted in order to solve similar problems, especially when the role attributed to the 
army within each system ran counter to what might otherwise have been expected
4 Funk (1986), lessen (1991), Krumeich (1980, 1994), Hobsbawm (1997).
5 Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1964), and Abrahamsson (1974).
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given the political profile of the two regimes? Secondly, there is the question why the 
dissimilar strategies adopted in the early 1890s, in both regions, were persistently 
pursued right up until the outbreak of the First World War.
10.2.1. The dissimilar policies adopted in the 1890s
It has been argued that the inclination of a bureaucratic system to use military troops 
for domestic purposes is linked to the degree of stability of the regime.6 It has thus 
been claimed that regimes that feared being overthrown by social or political 
revolution would tend to refrain from confrontations between the army and civilians. 
The findings of this study, however, indicate the opposite conclusion, namely that 
when the problem of mass protest movements arose in the the early 1890s, the 
strategies adopted depended on the degree to which the political executive and its 
representatives at the regional level had sufficient confidence in the stability of the 
regime to undertake a policy of ‘de-militarisation’ of the internal peacekeeping.
The policy of calling upon the army in France took place within a political and social 
context, in which the Republican regime survived on the basis of a fragile consensus 
between various forces, many of which were potentially hostile to the existing regime. 
Knowing that public unrest could lead to the overthrow of the regime, and doubting 
the army’s capacity to put down an armed revolt, French prefects tended to be very 
concerned with carefully controlling public gatherings of any significance. Although 
many senior commanders were not sympathetic to the Republican institutions, they 
shared the belief that public disorder could easily develop into the subversion of 
existing social and political order. Moreover, the French state authorities knew that the 
regime could not politically survive bloody confrontations between public forces and 
citizens. It was therefore essential to control even smaller instances of unrest in order 
to prevent these from escalating into riots and violence.
In contrast, by 1890 the Prussian authorities strongly believed in the army’s capacity to 
put down any armed revolt through military means. Furthermore, if violent
6 Hobsbawm (1997).
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confrontations between public forces and protest movements were to occur, they did 
not have the same devastating political significance as in France, since the Prussian 
regime never pretended to tolerate any opposition. When the problem of mass protest 
movements reared up in Westphalia during the strike wave of 1889-1893, the 
authorities could afford to experiment with strategies that did not involve the 
mobilisation of military troops, knowing that if these measures failed the army could 
always be called upon to settle any conflict. It was therefore possible for the voices 
within the Prussian state administration and the army who were in favour of leaving 
internal peacekeeping to the civil police to justify their policy of ‘de-militarisation.’
Thus, the strategies adopted by the two systems were due, firstly, to dissimilar 
perceptions of the challenge presented by public unrest, and, secondly, to a different 
degree of self-confidence within the regime.
10.2.2. Institutionalisation of policy priorities through their frequent 
implementation
The policies adopted in France and Prussia concerning the use of troops for domestic 
purposes were, in the early 1890s, a set of priorities however at first there remained 
possibilities for a change of strategy in both countries. The attempts in Westphalia to 
strengthen the civil forces did not immediately constitute an obstacle to the continued 
use of the army, but simply delayed the moment of military intervention. Similarly, the 
arrangements made between the civil administration and military command in Nord- 
Pas-de-Calais did not, at first, constitute a practical or institutional barrier to adopting 
other strategies that were less dependent on assistance from military troops. However, 
each time a conflict was successfully managed by implementing the strategy of calling 
or not calling upon military assistance, the civil servants and military commanders 
involved regarded this as a confirmation of the appropriateness and necessity of the 
strategy chosen. Rather than creating practical and formal obstacles to a change of 
policy, each type of measure, once adopted, tended to acquire strong elements of self­
perpetuation simply by being repeatedly implemented. Accordingly, the voices within 
the French and Prussian system which supported a change of strategy, found
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themselves confronted with bureaucrats who were increasingly convinced about the 
appropriateness and necessity of the particular strategy they had previously adopted 
and successfully implemented.
10.2.3. The development or absence of standard operating procedures
The repeated implementation of the strategy of calling for military assistance led to the 
development of a series of unwritten rules that defined the type and size of conflict for 
which it was considered appropriate to call for military assistance. Moreover, 
standards developed concerning the time at which it was considered appropriate to 
issue a requisition and about how many men to mobilise. Furthermore, a series of 
standard operating procedures developed around the civil-military co-operation that 
established in detail the powers, duties, and responsibilities of the civil servants and 
military commanders involved. In practical terms, this meant that civil servants and 
military commanders at all levels knew exactly whom they should address and what 
they were supposed to do in any given circumstances, thus eliminating a large number 
of uncertainties.
In France, military participation in planning for situations of major unrest directly 
linked the army authorities to the state administration’s policies. Behind these plans, 
there was an implicit recognition that the army had an essential role to play in the 
management of public order. The military members of the planning commission, in 
adopting a strategy of preventive mobilisation of troops, also accepted that, even in 
cases where there was only a potential threat to public order, it was appropriate to call 
on military troops to watch over locations which might constitute an object of violent 
attack. Having accepted this way of thinking, it became, in turn, difficult to draw a 
clear line between ‘serious’ and ‘not very serious’ instances which potentially 
threatened public order. Accordingly, it became extremely difficult in individual cases, 
for an army corps commander to enter into a discussion with the prefectoral authorities 
about the appropriateness or inappropriateness of mobilising military troops.
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Conversely, due to the low frequency of military interventions in Westphalia, no 
standard operating procedures developed concerning civil-military co-operation. Thus, 
any measure to be implemented by military troops had to be established on the spot by 
the military commander in charge. Given the increasing political sensitivity of labour 
conflicts and protest movements, this * ad-hoc* procedure was hardly reassuring. The 
uncertainties concerning the details of the practical implementation of domestic 
military intervention as well as the unforeseeable political consequences of 
implementing this unusual step made the Prussian senior civil servants increasingly 
reluctant to call for military assistance.
10.2.4. Plans of protection and organisational dependence
In the 1890s, the measures to be implemented to deal with public disorder were 
established during cases of unrest. However, around the turn o f the century, and under 
the pressure of increasingly large-scale cases of mass protest, the authorities in 
Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais began to develop detailed plans for dealing with 
future possible major unrest in industrial areas. With the formal planning for such an 
eventuality in place, the dissimilar strategies adopted in the early 1890s became 
institutionalised, partly through practical organisation and preparations, partly through 
the administrative practices that developed around the implementation of measures.
In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the integration of the military authorities into the planning of 
measures to deal with public disorder created the background necessary for the later 
perpetuation and intensification of the strategy of military intervention in civil conflicts. 
In particular, three factors can be pointed out which helped to perpetuate the strategy 
of military involvement in domestic conflicts. In the first place, the use of the army for 
internal purposes was formalised by the inter-ministerial plans for protection of the 
public order, established during the years 1897 to 1913. The participation of the 
military commander in the development of these strategies increased the stream of 
information flowing to the army corps commander about the strength and organisation 
of the forces of order in the local communities, the current state of affairs in industrial 
areas, and the local conflicts taking place or about to break out. This continuous flow
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of information to the military authorities about public order in local communities, kept 
the army in a permanent state of readiness for local intervention. The preventive 
mobilisation of troops was a key element in the move towards frequent military 
intervention because the plans for protection operated on the basis of potential rather 
than actual disturbances of public order. Thus, any gathering of a certain size might be 
met by intervention of military troops due to the fear of its escalation into major 
unrest. Secondly, since the strategies adopted implied the mobilisation of military 
troops at a very early stage of a conflict, it became increasingly difficult to manage a 
crisis without military intervention because no plans existed for managing public unrest 
with civil forces alone. Thirdly, the plans developed in the event of nation-wide strikes 
in specific professional branches (the mining, transport, and communication sectors) 
could easily be applied to smaller local cases too, as well as to other types o f conflict. 
Finally, the plans overcame a series of institutional and organisational barriers between 
the civil and military spheres. This was done for the sake of efficient co-operation but, 
at the same time, it cleared the way for the extensive use of military intervention both
in small local conflicts and also increasingly for non-military purposes.
' • ! ■
In contrast to the increasing dependence of the French administration on assistance 
from the army, the Prussian state administration remained independent of the army in 
organisational terms. As a result o f the continuous insistence of the Prussian military 
commanders on their right both to determine all details concerning military 
intervention and to keep their plans secret from the state administration, military 
intervention remained a measure which was external to civil planning. This meant that 
the civil forces in Prussia were organised to deal with larger conflicts than were the 
French civil forces, whilst a requisition of military troops completely involved reversing 
the existing plans, both those elaborated by the civil authorities and those established 
by the army corps commanders. Similarly, the institutional boundaries between the civil 
and military authorities remained and, in practice, the separation of the two seemed to 
widen. As a consequence calling for military assistance became an increasingly 
complicated procedure to undertake.
During the first decade of the twentieth century, the strategies adopted in Westphalia 
and Nord-Pas-de-Calais in the early 1890s were formalised through a series of plans 
for protection and linked to detailed practical organisation and procedures. 
Accordingly, the plans established in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais to deal with 
large-scale unrest led to the reinforcement of diverging trajectories within each 
country. It therefore became increasingly complicated and politically dangerous to 
undertake a radical change in policy towards major internal unrest.
10.2.5. Diverging trajectories in administrative practice
Whilst increasingly close civil-military co-operation took place in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, 
the opposite development can be observed in Westphalia. The Prussian civil and 
military authorities were, by 1889, already rather estranged from one another. 
Thereafter, they maintained their mutual isolation. Increasingly, the practical and 
organisational constraints on mobilising military troops for domestic conflicts 
prevented the supporters of a greater military presence in domestic conflicts from 
providing the army with a more active role.
In France, in the early 1890s, there was a great deal of uncertainty concerning a series 
of issues such as the distribution of authority, legal arrangements, standard operating 
procedures, and financial responsibility. These points were eventually settled through 
the frequent use of troops, thus creating strong precedents around the administrative 
procedures. Both the civil and military authorities became well acquainted with the 
details of their powers, duties and responsibilities, as well as the procedures to be 
followed. Uncertainties which occurred were cleared up for future occasions by the 
central government or the state council. The French authorities were very concerned 
with overall planning and formalisation of their policy. Given the sensitive and fragile 
alliance that existed between the major groups in France (the Republican regime, the 
army, the industrial bourgeoisie, and the workers), it was the formalisation of sensitive 
issues through negotiated plans that aided the functioning of the French administrative 
and political system.
In Prussia, by contrast, uncertainties surrounding the co-operation between civil and 
military authorities were numerous but were never settled. The Prussian state 
administration and the army constituted an apparently obvious coalition against 
disturbers of public order. However, this 'natural' alliance did not manifest itself in 
concrete strategies because conflicting interests between these bureaucratic elites could 
not be settled. The formal deiinitions that existed in the legal framework were open to 
further interpretation, which could not be settled since civil servants and military 
commanders alike insisted on the integrity of their sphere of authority. This also led to 
authorities overlapping in some fields and other areas that neither authority wanted to 
deal with, arguing that this was the responsibility of the other. At the same time, civil 
and military authorities were usually very careful not to offend the other institution by 
intruding into its realm o f competence. This made inter-institutional co-operation very 
complicated and, indeed, a civil servant or military commander who attempted to 
approach the other was at risk of violating the unwritten rule of conduct which 
demanded the strict respect for the integrity of the other’s field of competence and 
authority.
Therefore, in each individual requisition, the Prussian civil and military authorities had 
to reach agreements on the distribution of powers, standard operating procedures, and 
division of political and financial responsibilities. This type of ‘gentlemen's agreement' 
upon which other questions of civil-military relations were settled in Prussia was 
insufficient to be a basis for practical co-operation and decision making on such 
sensitive matters as military intervention. Seen from the point of view of the Prussian 
state administration, the military authorities were not only difficult to control, but was 
also an entirely unpredictable factor. In the first place, civil servants could not simply 
assume that military commanders would support their plans. Secondly, there was no 
way of preventing the military authorities from implementing measures against the will 
o f the civil authorities. In contrast to the increasing integration of the military 
commander into the decision making process in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, senior civil 
servants and army corps commander in Westphalia remained estranged at the 
professional level, even if their social contacts were more frequent and intense than 
was the case for their French counterparts.
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10.2.6. The outcomes: dissim ilar management of sm aller instances of unrest
The strategies developed within the French administrative system seemed to be an 
adequate response to major disturbances of public order. However, at the level of 
administrative practice, the smooth functioning of the plans and procedures developed 
for larger instances of unrest seemed to have a contagious effect on the use of troops 
for small conflicts. Excellent civil-military co-operation led the prefectoral authorities 
increasingly to draw upon the army organisation to perform a series of non-military 
functions. As a consequence o f the increasing practical dependence of the state 
administration on assistance from the army, the voices within and outside the military 
establishment who argued against the use of military troops - at least for smaller 
situations of unrest or strictly non-military functions - faced a significant problem 
because the military presence had over time lost a great deal of its significance. 
Between 1890 and 1914, the French army thus developed characteristics of ordinary 
public service and the domestic mobilisation of military troops was no longer in itself 
an indicator of serious conflict.
Conversely, in Prussia, the mobilisation of the army increasingly became an indicator 
that a really serious conflict was in the offing. Calling for military troops was in itself a 
measure that had great political significance, a factor which the Prussian authorities 
had to take seriously into consideration before taking this step. Moreover, in sensitive 
conflicts, involving the army could have a very pernicious effect on the development of 
a crisis. Due to these difficulties, the state authorities in Westphalia were increasingly 
hesitant in calling for military assistance, and only requested the army in situations of 
absolute necessity. During this process of trying to manage very serious crises without 
military interference, the Prussian administration experienced the full extent of the 
capacities of the civil forces. There seems to have been a self-sustaining dynamic 
between the strengthening of the various civil forces (the state police, the 
gendarmerie, and the municipal police forces) and the successful handling of larger 
instances of unrest, which then in turn led to improvements in the organisation o f the 
civil forces that prepared them for dealing with even large-scale cases of unrest 
without military assistance.
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If it was possible in Westphalia to develop strategies to deal with major situations of 
unrest by drawing solely upon the civil forces, this was not only because of the number 
of available civil forces, but largely because of organisation and experience. In 
contrast, the civil forces in Nord-Pas-de-Calais never reached such a level of efficiency. 
They remained mutually un-co-ordinated, and only the gendarmerie had real 
experience of management of crowds.
10.3. Theoretical and interpretational implications of the case study
We will now turn to the wider implications for the theoretical and interpretational 
debates relevant for the case study examined: 1) the importance of bureaucratic 
procedures for the strategies developed and the policies pursued; 2) the implications 
for the theoretical concepts around civil-military relations; 3) the implications for the 
idea of elite-co-operation; 4) the implications for the relationship between central 
power and local authorities.
10.3.1. Historical institutionalism
At the theoretical level, the thesis sustains the institutionalist argument that outcomes 
of administrative policy making can be closely linked to a particular bureaucratic mind­
set and to institutional logics developed within each administrative system.7 Thus, the 
main theoretical implication of this study has been to point to informal institutional 
patterns as the central explanatory factors in the persistent and different policies 
pursued in Prussia and France. Accordingly, the factors linked to the wider social and 
political context are not used as main explanatory factors, instead their place appears 
to lie further down the causal chain. This is not to pretend that the decision-making 
process should be detached from the wider social and political context. Rather, it is a 
way of stressing that within a given context of formal institutional organisation, wider 
political culture and social structures, there was space for various policies to develop. 
Thus, the outcome of bureaucratic policy making cannot be deduced from studying the
7 Krasner (1984), Hall (1986), March & Olsen (1989).
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wider social and political context, but has to be studied through close analysis of the 
decision-making process.
The case study also breaks with the idea of a direct relationship between individual 
instances of conflict and the responses to them. Instead, it points to the need to 
consider a state’s response to public unrest in relation to a general policy established 
over a period o f time. This, of course, is not a way of arguing that there was no 
correlation at all between challenge and response, but rather that the mobilisation of 
troops was not primarily related to the process of bargaining between authorities and 
protest movements in each individual conflict, as it is sometimes assumed.8
Similarly, the findings of the thesis suggest that the origins of the dissimilar policies 
pursued, as well as the standard operating procedures developed, were not closely 
linked to the institutional organisation and the formal distribution of powers between 
civil and military authorities. Within the existing formal institutional framework, there 
was apparently plenty of space for various types of civil-military relations to develop. 
The dysfunctional nature of civil-military co-operation in Westphalia was principally 
due to the uncertainties that existed in the formal definition of authorities and the 
failure to settle these points of ambiguity. Therefore, paradoxically, it was the Prussian 
system, in which the army was formally not excluded from interfering in civilian 
matters, that brought about a much higher degree of separation of the army from civil 
institutions than was the case in the French system where the formal definitions 
strongly emphasised the submission of the army under civilian authority and the 
separation of the military authorities from influence on civilian matters.
10.3.2. Reconsideration of the theoretical concepts around civil-military relations
The dissimilar functioning of inter-institutional co-operation within the French and 
Prussian system raises a series of further issues concerning civil-military relations. In- 
so-far as the civil-military relations observed in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais are 
representative of the features of the French and Prussian systems, it calls into question
8 Saul (1974), Tenfelde (1979), Tenfelde, Volkmann & Hohorst (1981), Rebérioux (1975), Agulhon 
(1990), and Trempé (1995).
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the traditional linkage between the separation of the civil and military realms and the 
extent of ‘modem* or ‘democratic’ structures of civil-military relations. In the light of 
normative interpretations - particularly those put forward in the Sonderweg thesis - 
which regard the Prussian regime as authoritarian and politically ‘backward’, as 
opposed to the ‘advanced* democratic regime of the French Third Republic, the 
findings of this study seriously question a previously accepted dichotomy. It thereby 
supports the voices in the recent debate on civil-military relations calling for 
abandonment of the conceptual definition of the civilian state and the military 
organisation as strictly separated entities.9
Arguably, the Prussian and wider German society of the Imperial era contained very 
significant features involving the militarisation of civil society. On the other hand, it is 
also important to note that the boundaries in France between the civil and the military 
were very fluid, albeit in a different way. Whereas in Germany it was civilian society 
that was influenced by military standards, in France it was the army that was being 
used increasingly for non-military purposes. In this respect, the findings of the study 
question the very nature of ‘civil supremacy*. The high degree of integration of French 
senior military commanders into the decision-making process on non-military matters 
makes it very difficult to define exactly where and when ‘civilian supremacy’ existed in 
cases of domestic military interventions. Conversely, in the Prussian case, there were 
strict limits as to what the Prussian military authorities could get away with. When it 
came to the measures and strategies implemented during major unrest, the actual 
influence of the Prussian military authorities was much less significant than that 
enjoyed by their French counterparts.
When comparing Prussian military authority in 1913 with that of the French, 
Schoenbaum adopts Ralston’s point of view that the French and Prussian armies were 
considerably closer than might at first be imagined.10 Just like Ralston, he stresses the
9 Claude E. Welch ‘Military disengagement from Politics: Paradigms, Processes, or Random Events* 
in Armed Forces and Society 1992 Vol.18, No.3/1992 pp.323-342; Rebecca Schiff (1995) ‘Civil- 
Military Relations Reconsidered: Theory of Concordance’ in Armed Forces and Society Vol.22, 
No. 1/1995 pp.7-24; R.S. Wells ‘The Thory of Concordance in Civil-Military Relations : a 
commentary’ in Armed Forces and Society Vol.23 No.2/1996.
10 Schoenbaum (1982) pp.59-60; Ralston (1967) pp.372-373.
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elements of military autonomy within the French system, pointing out that, in questions 
such as recruitment and promotion policy, leadership, and internal organisation, the 
French army - not unlike the Prussian - enjoyed a high degree of self-determination on 
the eve of the First World War. What distinguishes the French and Prussian systems is 
not so much civilian interference in technical military matters, as the management of 
the grey zone between the realm of civil and military authority. The findings of this 
study indicate that whereas the French authorities tended to undertake inter- 
institutional co-operation to reach a solution that both civil and military authorities 
could accept, the civil and military authorities in Westphalia were not very keen to co­
operate and avoided conflicts by avoiding the sphere of authority of the other. As the 
Prussian protection plans show, the result was that there were important areas of 
decision making in the maintenance of order which were not dealt with and which 
remained unsettled.
10.3.3. Co-operation and non-co-operation of elites
The study also leads to the reconsideration of the idea that the measures implemented 
against public unrest were the result of close co-operation between the state 
bureaucracy and local elites against emerging social and political movements. Both in 
the case of Westphalia and of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the findings run counter to the idea 
that social linkages between two bureaucratic elites determined their ability to establish 
efficient co-operation. The lack of linkage at the top of the Prussian-German system 
has already been pointed out11 12- strangely enough sometimes by historians who also 
stress the importance of elite co-operation for the continuation of the Prussian-German 
system of privileges and preservation of the ‘traditional elites."1 The findings of this 
study sustain the idea that the Prussian state was ruled by a series of mutually 
estranged functional elites. Accordingly, it points to the necessity of considering the 
Prussian state as a divided one rather than as a monolithic entity.
In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, on the contrary, the civil and military authorities were capable 
of establishing a basis of co-operation against what they perceived as a threat to the
11 Nipperdey (1992), Mommsen (1992).
12 Wehler (1985) pp.244-245; Berghahn (1982) p.ix
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existing order, although the bureaucratic and military elites in France were neither 
connected in social terms nor in terms of their commitment to the Republican regime. 
The findings indicate some patterns of cohesion and stability within the French state, 
which historians have tended to overlook because they run counter to some obvious 
features of conflict and instability. This helps to understand the striking 
accommodation of the French military establishment to the Republican system, despite 
the Dreyfus affair and the policies of successive governments after 1899. It inevitably 
leads to the question whether the French system was generally more capable o f  
mediating and organising co-operation between the various branches o f the state than 
was the Prussian system, where such attempts could be impeded by strong conflicting 
interests within the various branches of the state.
10.3.4. Questioning the relationship between central and local authorities
Finally, in relation to the local elites, the investigations show that in both France and 
Prussia it was possible for the state representatives to impose their measures on a local 
society. Despite the tradition in Westphalia of strong local powers and autonomy in 
relation to the Prussian state, it was equally difficult for Westphalian local authorities 
as for the local authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais to influence effectively the policies 
concerning local conflicts of the central power and state administration towards local 
conflicts. This breaks with the assumption that, within the Prussian system, with its 
strong features of local powers, the central government was less capable o f imposing 
its policies on local society than was the centralised French state. The issue of militaiy 
intervention in civilian conflict thus seems to be an exception to the general pattern of 
centre-periphery relations, since state authorities, with their monopoly o f legitimised 
use of coercion, could ignore demands from local authorities.
10.4. Concluding comments
The thesis therefore concludes that different patterns of military involvement existed in 
the main French and Prussian industrial areas, the Westphalian Ruhr district and the 
French region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais between 1890 and 1914. These different patterns
372
run counter to what has previously been assumed about the role of the French and 
Prussian army in political and social conflicts, claims which have been based on the 
constitutional position of the French and Prussian army within the state organisation 
and with respect to the involvement of the French and Prussian military elite in policy 
making in Paris and Berlin. By focusing on the bureaucratic procedures linked to the 
decision making and implementation of measures to deal with major public unrest, the 
study has shown how self-perpetuating administrative procedures helped creating and 
sustaining these dissimilar patterns.
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1. Appendix : Terms and their transiations
Army corps : the military unit organised within a military region. In the reorganisation 
between 1873 and 1876, eighteen French army corps were established; this number 
had increased to twenty by the outbreak of the First World War. The Imperial German 
Army at the beginning of the Imperial era consisted o f eleven Prussian, one Saxon, one 
Wurtemberg, and one Badish army corps, as well as one army corps in the newly 
acquired region of Alsace-Lorraine; by 1912, these fifteen army corps had become 
twenty-five.
Army corps commander (Commandant de corps d'armée and Kommandierender 
General) : the most senior general commanding a military region.
Arrondissement : the French administrative sub-division of a département presided 
over by a sub-prefect, technically, it was the counterpart to a Prussian sub-district.
Civil authorities : this term covers both the state administration and mayors, as well as 
the chiefs of the municipal police corps, all of whom were formally entitled to request 
military assistance.
Civil forces : the three sets of forces under direct civil command: the municipal police, 
the state police and the gendarmerie.
Département : the French administrative unit presided over by a prefect.
District (Regierungsbezirk) : the Prussian administrative unit presided over by a district 
governor ( Regierungspräsident).
District governor (Regierungspräsident) : a Prussian civil servant governing a district 
(Regierungsbezirk). Technically speaking, this person held a position parallel to that of 
a French prefect.
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Division /  sub-division : the largest sub-units of a military region.
Gendarmerie : a force under civil command; technically, however, it was a military 
corps constituted specifically for internal peace-keeping.
Local governor (Landrat) : a Prussian civil servant governing a county (Kreis); 
technically speaking, this person held a position parallel to that of a French sub-prefect.
Military region : the largest territorial unit in the military organisation at the provincial 
level. The Prussian seventh military region covered the three districts o f the province 
of Westphalia as well as the district of Düsseldorf; the French first military region 
covered the departments of Nord and Pas-de-Calais.
Prefect : a French civil servant presiding over a département. Technically speaking, 
this person held a position parallel to that of a Prussian district governor.
Province (Provinz) : the Prussian administrative unit presided over by a province 
governor. Technically, it was an area comparable to a French region although a French 
region did not constitute an administrative units.
Province governor (Oberpräsident) : a Prussian civil servant presiding over a province.
Public forces : comprising all the civil forces and military troops.
Royal Guards (königliche Schutzmänner): Prussian state police in the larger towns.
Sub-district (Kreis): the Prussian administrative unit presided over by a local governor 
(Landrat). Technically, it was the counterpart to a French arrondissement.
Sub-prefect : a French civil servant presiding over an arrondissement; technically 
speaking, the counterpart to a Prussian local governor.
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2. Appendix: Cases in Westphalia and Prussia, 1889-1913'
1) 1889,5-31 May,
Westphalian miners’ strike. The first meetings took place in the week 22-29 April 
1889, and the strike broke out on the 3 May 1889. At its peak, more than 90,000 
miners out of 104.000 were on strike in Westphalia, and together with the miners in 
the Saarland and Selisian coal areas, estimated 150,000 miners participated in the 
strike movement. Military troops were mobilised on the 5 May 1889, comprising ten 
infantry battalions (8,000-10,000 men) and eight cavalry squadrons (800-1,200 men). 
The last troops were sent back to their garrison on the 30 of May 1889
2) 1889, from  16 May - 4 June,
Waldenburg, Silesia. Following the strike among Westphalia coal miners, an 
unknown number o f miners went on strike in the Silesian mining areas. 15 infantry 
companies (1500-3750 men) and two cavalry squadrons (200-500 men) were
mobilised.
3) 1889, 19 May-4 June 1889,
Saarland coal areas. Following the Westphalian miners' strike, an unknown number 
o f miners went on strike in the Saar. Four infantry companies (800-1,000 men) and 
one squadron cavalry (150 men) were mobilised. Two infantry battalions (1,600- 
2,000 men) and four squadrons cavalry (600 men) were kept in a state o f 
preparedness, but not mobilised.
4) 1889, 24 October-6 November,
Saarland. An unknown number o f  miners went on strike in Saarland. Four infantry 
battalions (3,600-4,000 men) and two squadrons cavalry (300 men) were mobilised.
1 Twenty-seven cases where troops were either mobilised or kept in a state of preparedness.
*): indicates the incidents referred to where no contacts were made from the civil authorities to the 
army
italics : refers to incidents taking place outside Westphalia.
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5) 1890, Januaiy,
Westphalian miners* strike. Eight infantry battalions (6,400-8,000 men), six squadrons 
cavalry (900 men), and one company of hunters were kept in a state o f preparedness, 
but not mobilised.
6) 1890, March,
Waldenburg, Silesia. Strike among coal miners. One infantry battalion (800-1,000 
men) was kept in a state o f preparedness, but not mobilised.
7) 1890, 21-22 March,
Kopenick, Brandenburg. Public unrest. One infantry company (200-250 men) 
mobilised. One infantry battalion (800-1,000 men) was kept in a state o f  
preparedness, but not mobilised.
8 )  1890, 18-23 April,
One cavalry squadron (150 men) mobilised to the Austrian border by Petrzniowitz 
because o f a great strike at the other side o f the border.
9) 1890, 20 April-6 May,
Saarland. Strike among 8,000factory workers in Mulhausen. One infantry company 
(200-250 men) and two squadrons cavalry (300 men) mobilised.
10) 1890, 1 May,
Labour unrest in Danzig. Two infantry companies (400-500 men) mobilised. In all 
larger towns, troops kept in a state o f preparedness.
11) 1890, August,
Berlin. Riots. Two infantry battalions (1,600-2,000 men) in a state o f  preparedness.
12) 1891, April,
Westphalia. Unrest among 12,000 coal miners. All troops in the military region kept in 
a state of preparedness, but not mobilised.
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13) 1893» 10-23 January,
Westphalia. Unrest in the mining sector. Eight infantry battalions (6,400-8,000 men), 
eight squadrons cavalry (1,200 men) kept in a state of preparedness, but not mobilised.
14) 1893, 12 June,
Clausthal. Social Democrat demonstrations. One company infantry (200-250 men) 
kept in a state o f  preparedness.
* 1896, December - 1897, February.
Strike among 30,000 dock workers in Hamburg. General von Waldersee suggested 
calling a battle ship to the Hamburg port, but the Hamburg Senate never contacted 
the military authorities about assistance to the civil forces.
15) 1899, June-July,
Heme, Westphalia. On 22 June unrest began among 3,500 young Polish workers at 
eleven mines employing 18,000 miners. Between 28 June and 10 July, three batallion 
infantry (3,000 men) and one squadron cavalry (150 men) were mobilised.
* 1903, October-November,
Wilms, Brandenburg. Strike among factory workers. Military authorities contacted by 
the local governor about the possibility o f  requesting military assistance. On 
independent military initiative a train was kept in ready to trasport troops to the area, 
but these were never requested from  the side o f  the civil authorities.
16) 1905,1 February.
Troops called to guard the Russian border by Schopponitz because o f  a strike on the 
Russian side.
* 1905, January,
Westphalia. Miners* strike with participation of more than 200,000 out of 264,000 
workers. The military authorities were not requested.
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17) 1905, October, Berlin.
Lock-out o f 33,000 electricians at the AEG company. 700 infantry soldiers were kept 
in a state o f  preparedness to protect fourty men from  the ingeneers who ensured the 
basic service. Eventually, no troops were mobilised.
18) 1906, 20-23 January,
Berlin. Military troops kept in a state o f  preparedness in many larger cities due to 
Social Democrat demonstrations fo r  revision o f  the Prussian electoral system. In 
Berlin at least 4450 infantry soldiers were kept ready to intervene, but they were 
never mobilised.
19) 1908,19 September, Berlin.
Troops were kept in a state o f  preparedness due to large-scale political 
demonstrations, but not mobilised.
2 0 )  1909, 18 June,
Worms. Strike among construction workers. One battalion infantry (800-1000 men) 
were mobilised.
21) 1909, 13-16 August,
Karlsruhe, Baden. Strike among factory workers and followed by Social Democrat 
demonstrations. One company infantry (200-250 men) mobilised armed with two 
mashine guns.
22) 1909, 22 October-16 November.
Strike among 16,000 miners in the Mansfelder area near Magdeburg. Eight infantry 
companies (1,600 men) and one squadron cavalry (150 men) mobilised, and three 
companies hunters (750 men).
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23) 1910, February,
Neumiinster. Social Democrat demonstration. One infantry company (200-250 men) 
mobilised.
24) 1910, March.
Troops kept in a state o f  preparedness in many large cities due to Social Democrat 
demonstrations. No reports o f troops actually mobilised.
25) 1912, 26 January,
Schwertz and Mariewerder. Unrest in the wake o f the Social Democrat’s electoral 
victory. One company (200-250 men) mobilised
26) 1912 March,
Westphalia. Miners* strike with participation of at least 190,000 miners. Unrest began 
by the 4 March, and the strike broke out on the 10 March. On the 14 March, troops 
were mobilised to the area. The strike ended on the 18 March. In all 5,000 soldiers 
were called out between the 14 and the 22 March 1912.
27) 1913, November,
Zabem in Alsace. Miltiary intervention against the local population despite lack o f  





3. Appendix : Cases of domestic military intervention in Nord- 
Pas-de-Calais, 1889-1914
1) 1889, 10 March-April,
Strike among spinners in Lille and Armentières with more than 7,000 strikers out of 
50,000. An unknown number of troops were mobilised.
2) 1889, 9-30 October,
13,000 miners’ went on strike in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. At least 1,665 soldiers from the 
infantry, cavalry and engineers were mobilsed.
3) 1891, l.May,
(La Fussillade de Fourmies*. Fourteen striking workers killed during a May Day 
demonstration. 400-500 soldiers were mobilised in Nord-Pas-de-Calais for May Day.
4) 1891,17 May,
Textile strike in Roubaix and Lille. Two Squadrons in a state of preparedness.
5) 1891, 15 June,
Riots in Fourmies. 25 gendarmes and one cavalry squadron mobilised.
6) 1891, November,
Miners’ strike in Lens, Billy-Montigny, Liévin and Courrières (Pas-de-Calais). 
Approximately 13,000-15,000 miners participated. 16 companies (1.907 soldiers and 
80 officers) and 180 gendarmes were mobilised.
7) 1893,18 September-9 November,
A miners’ strike developed into strikes in a series of professional categories. The 
number of strikers was estimated to 42,000. Troop from the entire first military region 
(6,000-7,000) were mobilised, together with infantry and cavalry from neighbouring 
military regions. Local as well as external gendarmes were called to the region.
383
8) 1898, October,
Nation-wide strike among rail workers. Troops were kept in a state o f preparedness 
from 13 to 17 October, but were not mobilised.
9) 1900, August-September,
Strike among 2,000 dock workers in Dunkerque. An unknown number of troops were 
mobilised.
10) 1900 6 September,
One cavalry squadron mobilisd to maintain order in Dunkerque. Reason not stated.
11) 1901, February,
An unknown number of troops mobilised to Dunkerque due to a strike among the 
dock workers.
12) 1901, 1 May,
Troops mobilised to all the larger ports including Dunkerque. The same day, troops 
from the entire first military region were kept in a state of preparedness due to May 
Day demonstrations.
13) 1901, 21-29 July,
Elections in Roubaix. One squadron of hunters were mobilised while another two 
squadrons were kept in a state of preparedness in the garrison in Lille.
14) 1901, 27-29 July,
All troops from the garrison in Lille were kept in a state of preparedness due to 
elections.
15) 1901,15-25 September,
Troop were mobilised to ensure the security due to  an official visit by the Russian 
Czarina.
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16) 1901, October - December,
Nation-wide strikes in the mining sector touching all the mining areas of Nord-Pas-de- 
Calais. 24 companies infantry (2,400 soldiers) and 15 cavalry squadrons (1,500 
mounted men) were mobilised in département Nord while 37 Vi companies (more than 
3,500 soldiers) and 6 squadrons (600 men) were mobilised to Pas-de-Calais. The 
number of strikers is not stated, but the annual 'Statistique des grèves ’ registered 
10,844 strikers in département Nord for the entire year of 1901, and only 3,865 striker 
were registered in Pas-de-Calais that year.
17) 1902, March,
All troops in the first military region kept in their garrisons due to rumours about a 
major miners’ strike about to break out.
18) 1902, July-August,
Strike among workers in Vieux-Condé. The troops were prepared to mobilise 
according to the plans for protection. One cavalry squadron mobilised to Vieux- 
Condé.
19) 1902,8-11 August,
1,529 miners out of 3,246 went on strike in Anzin. 156 infantry soldiers and 130 
cavalry soldiers were mobilised together with 70 gendarmes.
20) 1902,1 October - 19 December,
Nation-wide miners’ strike which was joined by 71,000 out of the 87,000 miners* 
registered in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. 7,708 soldiers and 367 officers were mobilised in the 
département Nord and 8,240 soldiers and 400 officers were mobilised in Pas-de- 
Calais. In all 16,715 soldiers together with an unknown number of gendarmes.
21) 1902, October-November,
Strike among 4,000-5,000 dock workers in Dunkerque. 3 companies infantry (250-300 
solciers) were mobilised together with 73 gendarmes.
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22) 1903,9 January,
Mobilisation of two companies infantry (200 soldiers) and two units cavalry (number 
not stated) to maintain public order in Lille during a public execution.
23) 1903, May-June,
Troops mobilised at various locations to assist municipal police forces to maintain 
public order during the implementation of the anti-Catholic legislation.
2 4 )  1903,28 April-24 July,
Major strike among spinners in La Gorgue-Estaire {département Nord). An unknown 
number of cavalry and infantry troops were mobilised between 23 Aoril and 23 July to  
protect eleven factories.
25) 1903, 1 June,
Two cavalry squadrons (160-200 cavalry officers) mobilised to maintain public order 
in Dunkerque during a religious ceremony.
26) 1903, 27 June,
Cavalry mobilised to Dunkerque again at the occasion of a religious ceremony.
27) 1903, 14-15 August,
Cavalry mobilised to Dunkerque to maintain public order during a religious ceremony.
28) 1903, 15 August,
Troops moiblised in Saint-Pol-sur-Mer to maintain public order during a religious 
ceremony.
29) 1903, 6 September,
Strike among spinners in Baroeul. Cavalry were kept in a state of preparedness but not 
mobilised.
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30) 1903, 10 September,
Troops were mobilised to Boulogne-sur-Mer to maintain public order at the occasion 
of closing of an illegal religous order.
31) 1903,27 September - 14 November,
After a long period of unrest during since the spring 1903, a new strike broke out 
among textile workers. On 13 October 1903, a force o f 10,000 infantry soldiers and 
2,600 cavalry soldiers were mobilised in Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing, Armentières, and 
Quesnay. In addition there were 580 gendarmes. The same day, the number of strikers 
was estimated to be at 50,000.
32) 1903, October-November,
Major strike among textile workers in Hallouin (département Nord). An unknown 
number of troops were mobilised for weeks.
33) 1903,22,October-November,
Troops mobilised at various locations to maintain public order during the closing of a 
series of illegal religious orders.
34) 7 December 1903 - 14 April 1904,
Strike among 15,000 textile workers in Lille, Roubaix and Tourcoing. Troops were 
kept in a state of preparedness from 31 January 1904, but only mobilised in March. By 
18 March thirteen battalions (at least 5,600 infantry soldiers) and eleven squadron 
cavalry (880-1,100 men) were mobilised in Roubaix and Tourcoing together with 330 
gendarmes.
35) 1904,29-31 July,
One battalion infantry and two squadrons cavalry in a state of preparedness in 
Dunkerque in order to prevent unrest during an elections.
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36) 1904, August-December,
From June 1904, a nationwide strike was expected to break out among the sailors and 
dock workers. From 28 July smaller military units were kept in a state of preparedness. 
A strike among sailors broke out in August and reached Dunkerque by the 29 August. 
By 7 September, it was considered that the strike was over but on 15 October a new 
strike broke out that lasted until December. Troops were mobilised on the 29 October 
and only sent back by 12 December.
37) 1905,6 February,
Soldiers from the engineers called out to undertake strike bound work during a strike 
among electricians.
38) 1905,4 March,
One company infantry (80-100 men) mobilised in Calais at the occasion of a visit of the 
Czarina of Russia.
39) 1905, March,
4,000 dock workers on strike in Dunkerque. One battalion infantry (ca.375 men) and 
four squadrons cavalry (400 men) were requested on 28 March.
40) 1905, 10 June,
Four infantry companies of 310 men, and six squadrons cavalry (600 men) mobilised in 
Calais at the occasion of the Spanish king passing through the town on his way to 
England.
41) 1905,3-6 September,
Mobilisation of one battalion infantry (375 men) to a strike among 350 dock workers 
in the port o f Boulogne-sur-Mer.
42) 1906, late January - 14 March,
Military troops mobilised in the entire region at the occasion of the implementation of 
the laws on separation of the French state and the Catholic Church.
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43) 1906,10 March - 27 April,
Troops mobilised on the 10 March to maintain order after a major catastrophe in a 
mine at Counière. This developed into demonstrations and strikes against poor 
working conditions in the mines, that spread to other professional categories and lasted 
until May. The number of regisered strikers in the départements Nord and Pas-de- 
Calais for 1906 did not exceed 90,000, however the number of troops mobilised to the 
region between March and May exceeded 38,000, a ministerial source even mentions a 
number as high as 52,000.
44) 1906, 15 October,
Confrontations in Nord and Pas-de-Calais between military troops and an unknown 
number of strikers.
45) 1906, 19-23 November,
The army requested to protect the state functionaries in their task to finish the 
inventories over the possession of the Catholic Church.
46) 1907,9 February,
Two companies infantry mobilised to Calais to maintain public order at the occasion of 
King Edward VII and Queen Alexandra passing through the town on their way back to 
Britain.
47) 1907, March,
Troops in a state of preparedness due to a strike at the ship building yard ‘Chantier de 
France* in Dunkerque.
48) 1907, May,
The mayor of Valenciennes requested troops to maintain public order during a 
religious procession.
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49) 1907, 31 May - 7 June,
Strike among 625 seamen in Dunkerque. The conflict had been under way since the 6 
April. When the strike was finally declared on the 31 May, an unknown number of 
infantry soldiers were mobilised in order to protect the installations in the port against 
sabotage.
50) 1907, June,
Strike among an unknown number of workers in a paper factory in La Vallée de l’Aa. 
One squadron cavalry and one company infantry, altogether 104 men, were kept in a 
state of preparedness from the 3 June and mobilised between the 5-12 June.
51) 1908, 17 April,
One company infantry mobilised in Calais at the occasion of King Edward VII passing 
through the town.
52) 1908, 18 April,
On company infantry mobilised at the occasion of the Czarina of Russia passing 
through Dunkerque.
53) 1908,4 May,
The troops in the entire region kept in a state o f preparedness due to general elections.
54) 1908,4 May,
125 infantery soldiers mobilised to Calais at the occasion of King Edward VII and 
Queen Alexandra passing through the town on their way back to Britain.
55) 1909, 13-25 March,
Nationwide strike among postal workers. In the entire region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
troops are kept in a state of preparedness until 23 March.
5 6 ) 1909, May,
Again nationwide strikes among postal workers. The troops in the entire region in a 
state of preparedness but not mobilised.
57) 1909,11 October - December,
Strike among textile workers in Lille. The strike was declared on 11 October and the 
12 October the army was prepared for intervention. The 13 October 2,400 textile 
workers were on strike but no incident had happened. On 16 October, the prefect 
requested four infantry companies (320-400 men) and a squadron cavalry (100 men) to 
maintain public order in Lille, if it happened to be disturbed. The troops were sent 
home by 28 October but the strike continued until 24 December.
58) 1909,15 December - 1910,12 May,
Strike among tile workers at Ruyoulcourt. The strike broke out on 8 November, but 
the infantry company was only mobilised 15 December.
59) 1910,12 February,
One day requesition of a unit of less that one hundred infantry soldiers at the occasion 
of a strike among Icelandic sailors haboured in Dunkerque.
60) 1910,1-5 March,
Great unrest in Hallouin on 1 March. 1-5 March, 893 soldiers, 37 officers and 153 
gendarmes were mobilised to this town.
61) 1910, 24 M arch-26  May,
Strike among construction workers and 4,000 dock workers in Dunkerque. From 31 
March, the port in Dunkerque was occupied by three companies infantry (260-300 
men) to prevent sabotage on the installations of the port, while more than 1,000 
soldiers were mobilised to Dunkerque. By 8 April the number of troops exceeded 
3,000, and at the peak of the conflict around 5 May, 5,700 soldiers and 220 gendarmes 
were mobilised to Dunkerque. The last troops were sent back to the garrison on the 26 
May.
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62) 1910, 8-9 May,
Troops from the entire region in a state of preparedness at the occasion of general 
elections to the National Assembly.
63) 1910,27 Ju ly -3  August,
Lievin (Pas-de-Calais) 3,000-5,000 strikers out o f 8,000. The strike broke out on 14 
June, but troops (four officers and 106 infantiy soldiers) were only mobilised 27 July 
and were sent back on 3 August.
64) 1910, 24 August,
The mayor of Maubeuge requests an unknown number of troops for the day at the 
occasion of a political demonstration.
65) 1910, October-November,
Nationwide strikes among rail workers with 15,809 striking workers out of 37,123. 
The exact number of striking railworkers in Nord-Pas-de-Calais is unknown, but 
violent clashes took place between strikers and the public forces, during which a 
commanding officer was killed. At the same occasion, striker were called upon in their 
capacity as military reservists, and thus forces back to work under military legislation.
66) 1910, 15-20 October,
Miners’ strike at Billy-Montigny (Pas-de-Calais) with participation of 1,600 out of 
9,500. An unknown number of troops mobilised.
67) 1910,5 December,
Two battalions infantry (500 men) and four squadrons cavalry (400 men) kept in a 





1,500 out of 3,800 dock workers in Dunkerque on strike, an unknown number of 
troops mobilised.
69) 1911,9-14 February,
Strike among textile workers in Hallouin. Cavalry mobilised 4-11 February.
70) 1911, August-September,
Bread riots in the entire region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais. No information has been found 
stating the exact number of troops moiblised. However, troops participated from all 
the garrisons within the first military region as well as from the second, third, fourth, 
sixth, nineth, tenth and eleventh army corps.
71) 1911, September-October,
Strike among dock workers in Calais. Two squadrons cavalry mobilised the 24 and 25 
October.
72) 1911, October,
Strike among dustmen in Lille. Soldiers were called out to take away the dirt that was 
considered pernicious for the hygienic standards.
73) 1911,8-29 December,
Strike among the workers at the municipal gas station in Tourcoing. Two officers and 
seventy soldiers were called out to maintain public order and to ensure the basic 
service at the gas station.
74) 1912, 11-25 March,
Strike among 5,800 miners out of 26,000 département Nord and 36,000 strikers in 




Troops requested to Dunkerque at the occasion of an official visin of the Czarina of 
Russia.
76) 1912, 9-20 July,
4.000 dock workers in Dunkerque on strike. More than 2,000-2,300 infantry soldiers 
and cavalry called to Dunkerque.
77) 1913 November,
73.000 miners out of 92,000 on strike. 1,759 gendarmes mobilised and all the troops 
foreseen in the protection plans kept in a state of preparedness.
78) 1914,31 July,
Six Battailons infantry (2,525 men) and a cavalry squadron moblised to Dunkerque at 
the occasion o f a visit from the president of the Repbulic.
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1/13 ‘Die Arbeitseinstellung in den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz
Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen in den 
Jahren 1889-1912'
1/14 ‘Die Arbeitseinstellung in den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz
Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen in den 
Jahren 1889-1912' (1905-1907)
1/15 ‘Die Arbeitseinstellung in den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz
Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen in den 
Jahren 1889-1912'{1907-1911)
1/16 'Die Arbeitseinstellung in den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz
Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen in den 
Jahren 1889-1912'(1911-1912)
1/17 ‘Die Arbeitseinstellung in den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz
Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen in den 
Jahren 1889-1912'
1/18 ‘Die Arbeitseinstellung in den Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz
Westphalen und die daraus hervorgegangenen Arbeiterunruhen in den 
Jahren 1889-1912'(1912)
1 /20 ‘Die Erfahrungen aus dem Bergarbeiterstreik im Ruhrgebiet, 1912'
1/21 ‘Die Verurtheilungen wegen Vergehen aus Anlass des
Bergarbeiterstreiks im Ruhrgebiet 1912'
1 ¡22 *Die Verurtheilungen wegen Vergehen aus Anlass des
Bergarbeiterstreiks im Ruhrgebiet 1912*
1 /23 'Anzeigen über die Heranziehung von Gendarmen anlässlich der
Bergarbeiterbewegung 1912, ihre Zurücksendung nach beendigtem 
Streik und ihr Wiedereintreffen in ihren Standorten'
1 /24 'Arbeiterbewegung im Rheinisch-Westfälischen Bergwerk 1905'
Polizeiabteilung H.A.1- Rep.77 - Titel 2524 * Arbeitseinstellungen in den 
Bergwerksbezirken der Provinz Westfalen1
1/1 'Die Arbeitseinstellungen in den Bergwerksbezirken, Westphalen'
(1893-1899)
1 ¡2 'Die Arbeitseinstellungen in den Bergwerksbezirken, Westphalen'
(1900-1904)
3 /I 'Die Arbeitseinstellungen und Lohnbewegungen, Westfalen '
(1899-1911)
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3 12 ‘Die Arbeitseinstellungen und Lohnbewegungen, Westfalen'
(1912-1915)
3 /Adhang 1 ‘Streik und Aussperrungen der Metallarbeiter in Minden, Kreis
Iserlohn, August 1912/März 1913*
Polizeiabteilung H.A.l- Rep.77 - Titel 2525 *Arbeidseinstellung Rheinprovinz*
1 /I ‘Arbeitseinstellungen in den Bergwerksbezirken der Rheinprovinz *
(1892-1905)
1 /2 ‘Arbeitseinstellungen in den Bergwerksbezirken der Rheinprovinz ’
(1892-1905)






‘Arbeitseinstellungen in den Bergwerksbezirken der Rheinprovinz' 
(1892-1905)
‘Die Arbeitseinstellungen und Lohnbewegungen in der Rheinprovinz* 
(1899-1906)
‘Die Arbeitseinstellungen und Lohnbewegungen in der Rheinprovinz* 
(1907-1913)
‘Die Arbeitseinstellungen und Lohnbewegungen in der Rheinprovinz* 
(1913-1915)
3 /Adhang 3 ‘Bergarbeiterbewegung im Saarrevier* (December 1912-January 1913)
H.A.l - Rep.89 - Geheimes Zivilkabinet
2.2.1. No 13717-13738 ‘Inneres: Westfalen 1808-1918 - Verwaltung*
2.2.1. No 13723 ‘Akta des Oberpräsidenten der Provinz Westfalen 1825-1918' 
(No reference number) ‘Inneres: Westfalen 1816-1918: Verwaltungsberichte *
H.A.l - Rep.90 - U.II.l Preussisches Staatsministerium: ‘Sicherheitspolizei - Schutz
der öffentlichen Ordnung*
1 ‘Massregeln zur Aufrechterhaltung der allgemeinen Sicherheit und
öffentlichen Ordnung gegen Aufruhr, Ruhestörungen ff., 1798-1848*
2/1 ‘Bestimmungen über die Verhängung des Kriegs- und
Belagerungszustandes, 1848-1914*
3 /1 ‘Verfügung des (Belagerungszustandes) Ausnahmezustandes,
1848-1888*
3 12 ‘ Verfügung des (Belagerungszustandes) A usnahmezustandes,
1889-1919*
1 /I ‘Verpflichtung der Gemeinden zum Ersatz des bei öffentlichen
Aufläufen verursachten Schadens,1848-1920*
HAI - Rep.92 Personal papers
- Emil von Albedy11 (1824-1897)
- Friedrich von Kühlwetter (1809-1882)
- Konrad von Studt (1838-1921)
- Alfred von Waldersee (1832-1904)
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Reichsamt/ Reichsministerium des Innern 
R 15.01/ 12215 'Der Kriegszustand 1910-1915*
R 15.01/ 12451 'Das Kriegsministerium 1867-1920*
R 15.01/ 12900 *Der Kriegszustand Februar 1872-November 1918 *
R 15.01/ 12901 *Der Belagerungszustand in Elsass-Lothringen Juni ¡891-Mai 1892 * 
R 15.01/ 12902 'Der Kriegszustand in fremden Staaten 1899-1905*
R 15.01/ 12908 'Äusserungen der Presse über den Waffengebrauch des Militärs und 
die Mitwirkung desselben zur Aufrechterhaltung der bürgerlichen 
Ordnung. Januar-März 1914*
1.2. Zentrales Staatsarchiv (Bundesarchiv Abteilung Potsdam Ui)
Alte Reichskanzlei ‘Militärsachen*
R 43 Film signature 12425-12426:
'Militärische Massnahmen im Falle von Unruhen, 1890-1918*
R 43 Film signature 12429-12430:
'Angelegenheiten höhere Militärpersonen 1879-1900'
R 43 Film signature 12449-12450:
'Kommandierende Generale 1901-1917; Kommandoangelegenheiten* 
R 43 Film signature 12453:
'Drückvorschriften usw. 1900-1916*
Alte Reichskanzlei ‘Polizei’
R 43 Film signature 12543-12544:
'Polizei, Oeffentliche Ruhestörungen 1906-1908*
Alte Reichskanzlei ‘Handel und Gewerbe*
R 43 Film signature 11971-11972:
'Arbeitseinstellung in Westfalen, Rheinland und Schlesien 1889-1896 * 
R 43 Film signature 12029-12030:
'Arbeiterstatistik 1904-1913*
Alte Reichskanzlei ‘Elsass-Lothringen*
R43 Film signature 11811-11812:
‘Massnahmen betreffs die militärische und politische Sicherheit des 
Reichslandes, 1900-1918*
R 43 Film signature 11813-11815:
'Unruhen in Zabem *
R 43 Film Signatur 11822-11823:
'Militärische und administrative Massnahmen im Interesse der politischen 
Sicherheit des Reichslandes 1883-1899*
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PH2 - Papers from the Prussian war ministry
On the maintenance of order and measures against the Social Democracy 
PH2 /14 'Eingreifen der bewaffneten Macht bei Unterdrückung von Unruhen,
1889-1914'
PH2 /15 ‘Die sozialdemokratischen Bestrebungen 1905-1907*
PH2/16 * Deutschfeindliche Bestrebungen, Januar-September 1913'
PH2 /361-368 *Bekämpfung sozialdemokratischer Bestrebungen, 1877-1911 *
PH2 /466-470 * Bekämpfung sozialdemokratischer Bestrebungen, 1890-1912*
1.3. Bundesarchiv -  Militärarchiv, Freiburg.
Correspondence, issues of competence, laws and decrees 
PH2 /370 ‘Reichtagsmaterial* (1861-1914)
PH21385-398 Index of the correspondence of the war ministry “Journal der Postein- 
und -ausgänge, mit Angaben zum Inhalt, 1888-1913 ”
PH2 /433 ‘Auseinandersetzungen über die Zusammenarbeit zwischen zentralen 
und kommunalen Behörden 1907’
PH2/455 ‘Verzeichnis der gesammelten AKO, Gesetze, Urkunden, Ordnungen’ 
PH2 /639 ‘Verhalten gegenüber der Sozialdemokratie, 1878-1912 ’
On waee administration and financial responsibility
PH2 f l  'Besoldungsvorschrift fü r  das Preussische Heer im Frieden vom
26. Oktober 1911 ’
PH2 /264 ‘Besoldungsvorschrift fü r  das preussische Heer im Frieden.
Anwendung des § 49 (Kommandos auf Veranlassung von 
Zivilbehörden und Privaten): Schriftwechsel mit dem 
Justizministerium. 1890’
PH2 /278 ‘Besoldungsvorschrift. Zulagen fü r  militärische Hilfskommandos im
Interesse von Zivilbehörden: Schriftwechsel mit dem Justizministerium. 
1908-1910’
On various issues
PH 21216 ‘Garnison Paderborn. Antrag der Stadt Paderborn und Verlegung des 
3. Bataillons des I.R.158 in die dortige Garnison. 1913’
PH2 /258 ‘Katastrophenhilfe durch das Militär. Schreiben an das
Justitzministerium. 21.März 1889’
PH 6 General Command. 1867-1919
PH6. 1 /83 ‘Über die Dienstpflicht 1905-1909’ by General Eichhorn, army corps
commander o f the XV11Imilitary region (Frankfurt)*
PH6. 1 197 ‘Dienstanweisung fü r  den Kommandanten des Hauptquartiers, 1910*
PH6. 1 /261 *Taktische Aufgaben und Besprechungen des Kommandierenden
Generals des XVI A K  Graf von Haeseler* (ca. 1891)
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Personal papere
General Otto von Below N 87
General Berthold von Deimling N 559
General von Eichhorn N 513.
General Karl von Einem N 324
General Herman von Francois N 274 
General August von Goeben N 188
General Colmar von der Goltz N 80 
General Paul von Hindenburg N 429 
General Alexander von Kluck N 550 
General Bruno von Mudra N 80
General von Schlichting N 313
MSgl ‘Militarbiografische Sammlung*
M Sgl/ 188; 189; 193; Papers from General Victor von Lignitz 
Msg I / 1935 Walther Bronsart, correspondence, 1894-1917 
MSgl /2039 Friedrich Bronsart’s memoirs, 1864-1942 
MSgl /1090 Colmar von der Golz
MSg 109 Ottomar von Krug, biographical data on Prussian generals, ca. 1875ff.
1.4. Münster Hauptstaatsarchiv (HaStA)
Oberpräsidium fpolice. m ilitaryl
OP 684 'Ausschreitungen, Einsatz von Militär, Stimmungsberichte, 1848*
OP 693 'Ausschreitungen, Einsatz von Militär, Stimmungsberichte, 1848-1849 *
OP 688 'Politische Unruhen, Einsatz von Militär, 1849-1850,1874 *
OP 653 'Einsatz von Militär zur Wiederherstellung von Ruhe und Ordnung *
(1822-1848)
OP 686 ‘Politische Unruhen, Ausschreitungen, Einsatz von Militär 1848-1850*
OP 685 'Einsatz von Militär zur Unterdrückung bzw. Verhinderung von
Unruhen enthält 1848-1852, 1880-1881*
OP 6095 ‘Notstandsmassnahmen 1822, 1840-1851,1876-1929*
OP 6681 ‘ Verstärkerung der Polizei im Ruhrgebiet bei Arbeiterunruhen *
(1906-1911)
OP 6889 ‘Verstärkerung der Polizei im Ruhrgebiet bei Arbeiterunruhen *
(1912-1919)
Oberpräsidium (strikesl
OP 2847b 'Berichte des Generalkommandos des VII Armeekorps betreffs den
Bergarbeiterstreik* (1889; 1897)
OP 2849,7 ‘Bergarbeiterstreik 1905: Lageberichte; Zusammenstellung der
polizeiliche Massnahmen in den Regierungsbezirken Arnsberg und 
Münster, 1904-05*
OP 2832,1 ‘Verstärkung der Gendarmerie und Polizei bei Arbeiterunruhen im
Ruhrgebiet, 1889*
402
OP 2832,2 ‘ Verstärkung der Gendarmerie und Polizei bei Arbeiterunruhen im
OP 2832,3
Ruhrgebiet, 1889-1890’
'Verstärkung der Gendarmerie und Polizei bei Arbeiterunruhen im 
Ruhrgebiet, 1890-1894’
OP 2832,4 ‘Verstärkung der Gendarmerie und Polizei bei Arbeiterunruhen im
OP 2832,5
Ruhrgebiet, 1895-1905*
* Verstärkung der Gendarmerie und Polizei bei Arbeiterunruhen im 
Ruhrgebiet, 1905-1906’
OP 2832a ‘Zusammenstellung der Bestimmungen betrifs Verstärkung der 
Gendarmerie bei Arbeiterbewegungen im Ruhr gebiet’
OP 2832b ‘Plan zur Verstärkung der Gendarmerie bei Arbeiterunruhen in den 
Regierungsbezirken Arnsberg und Münster, 1899-1900’
OP 2832c *Plan zur Verstärkung der Gendarmerie bei Arbeiterunruhen in den 
Regierungsbezirken Arnsberg und Münster, 1905*
OP 2832d ‘Plan zur Verstärkung der Gendarmerie bei Arbeiterunruhen in den 
Regierungsbezirken Arnsberg, 1899-1900*
OP 2832e ‘Plan zur Verstärkung der Gendarmerie bei Arbeiterunruhen in den 
Regierungsbezirken Münster, 1899-1900*
Reports from the state administration in Westphalia
OP 2934 *Zeitungs- und Verwaltungsberichte: Erstattung der Zeitungsberichte *
OP 1407
(1860-1891; 1903-18)
‘Zeitungs- und Verwaltungsberichte der Regierung Arnsberg * 
(1903-1913)
OP 1406 ‘Zeitungs- und Verwaltungsberichte der Regierung Münster ’ 
(1873-1893)
OP 1408 'Zeitungs- und Verwaltungsberichte der Regierungen Arnsberg, 
Minden, Münster’ (1914-1918)
OP 7029 ‘Instruktion fü r  den Oberpräsidenten 1825-1888; 1900-1913’
Documents from the district governors in the Arnsberg district 
IP r/2 9 8  ‘Militärangelegenheiten, 1876-1895’
IP r/2 9 9 ‘Militärangelegenheiten, 1896-1913’
IP a /2 3 2 *Einsatz von Militär bei Unruhen: Instruktion über Waffengebrauch 
des Militärs 1851 ’ (1840-1851)
IP a /2 3 3  
I Pa/249
‘Zusammenarbeit von Polizei und Militär 1845-1860’
‘Zusammenziehung und Verstärkung der Gendarmerie bei grösseren 
Arbeiterunruhen’ (1889-1899)
I P a /1 4295 






I P a /14320
‘Arbeiterstreiks * (1874-1889)
‘Arbeitseinstellung der Bergarbeiter im Ruhrkohlenbezirk, 1889-1892* 
‘Arbeitseinstellung der Bergarbeiter im Ruhrkohlenbezirk, 1889-1892’ 
‘Arbeitseinstellung der Bergarbeiter im Ruhrkohlenbezirk. 1889-1892* 
*Bergarbeiterstreik im Ruhrkohlengebiet 1889*
‘Bergarbeiterstreik im Ruhrkohlengebiet 1889’
‘Bergarbeiterstreik im Ruhrkohlengebiet 1893*





IP a/14323  
I Pa/14325
'Bergarbeiterstreik im Ruhrkohlengebiet 7899’
'Bergarbeiterstreik im Ruhrkohlengebiet 1899'
*Bergarbeiterstreik im Ruhrkohlengebiet 1899' 
'Bergarbeiterausstand im Ruhrkohlenrevier 1912'
Documents from the district govemors in the Münster district 
I Pr /2904 *Militärwesen: Verschiedene Militärangelegenheiten 1889-1911'
I Pr /V -11 *22 ‘ Vervaaltungs- und Zeitungsberichte '(1887-1902)
I Pr /V-11 -23 *Verwaltungs- und Zeitungsberichte '(1887-1902)
M 1-1 'Constituierung des Militär- und Civil- Gouvernement fü r  die
Königlich-Westphälischen Provinzen und des General-Commandos, 
1813-1921'
M 1 -2 ‘Der Correspondenz mit den Militärpersonen'
VII-14-1 /3 2-1 *Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912 '
V II-14-3/37-1 'Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912 '
VII-14-4/37-1 ‘Der Bergarbeiterausstand von 1912 '
V II-14-5/37-3 'Der Bergarbeiterausstand, 1912. Tagesberichte der Unterbehörden'
VII-52-1/39-2 'Arbeitseinstellung und Streiks 1904-1911'
VII-52-2/39-2 'Arbeitseinstellung und Streiks 1899-1916'
VII-52-3/39-2 *Arbeitseinstellung und Streiks 1912-1913'
VII-52-a/31-l 'Massnahmen beim Bergarbeiterstreik 1910-1918'
VII-57-1/40-1 ‘Das Verfahren bei Bekämpfung von Arbeiterunruhen, insbesondere 
Heranziehung von Gendarmen. 1890-1905'
VII-57-2/40-2 'Das Verfahren bei Bekämpfung von Arbeiterunruhen 1904-1911 ’ 
VII-57-3/40-2 'Das Verfahren bei Bekämpung von Arbeiterunruhen 1912-1916' 
VII-57-4/40-1 ‘Das Verfahren bei Bekämpfung von Arbeiterunruhen 1906-1914* 
VII-57-5/37-5 ‘Nachweisung der fü r  den Fall des Ausbruchs grösserer
Arbeiterbewegungen zur Verwendung in der Provinz Westphalen 
bestimmten Gendarmeriemannschaften 1913’
Documents from the local governors in the Münster district 
Arnsberg /3 0 1 ‘Die Erstattung der Zeitungsberichte ' ( 1898-1913) 
Gelsenkirchen /53 'BergarbeiterausstandJuli 1899'
Documents from the local governors in the Arnsberg district 
Lüdinghausen/389 'Aufläufe, Aufruhr, Belagerungszustand, 1848-1905' 
Lüdinghausen/696 *Aufläufe, Aufruhr, Belagerungszustand, 1905-1908' 
Lüdinghausen /840 'Streiks, Aussperrungen 1907-1920'
Lüdinghausen/253 ‘Bergarbeiterunruhen 1910-1914'
Lüdinghausen /841 'Bergarbeiterbewegung 1912'
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Recklinghausen ¡15 4Streiks, 
Recklinghausen /78 'Streiks, 
Recklinghausen H l ‘Streiks, 
Recklinghausen /80 ‘Streiks, 
Recklinghausen /79 ‘Streiks, 
Recklinghausen ¡16 ‘Streiks, 
Recklinghausen ¡13 ‘Streiks, 
Recklinghausen ¡14 ‘Streiks, 
Recklinghausen/51 ‘Streiks, 
Recklinghausen /82 ‘Streiks, 
Recklinghausen ¡55 ‘Streiks, 
Recklinghausen /68 ‘Streiks, 
Recklinghausen /8 1 ‘Streiks, 
Recklinghausen /72 ‘Streiks, 
Recklinghausen /69 ‘Streiks, 
Recklinghausen /50 'Streiks, 
Recklinghausen ¡66 ‘Streiks,
Überwachung von Arbeitervereinigungen, 1890-1893’ 
Überwachung von Arbeitervereinigungen, 1893 ’ 
Überwachung von Arbeitervereinigungen, 1894-1896’ 
Überwachung von Arbeitervereinigungen, 1896-1897’ 
Überwachung von Arbeitervereinigungen, 1897-1898’ 
Überwachung von Arbeitervereinigungen, 1898-1899’ 
Überwachung von Arbeitervereinigungen, 1899-1900’ 
Überwachung von Arbeitervereinigungen, 1900-1901 ’ 
Überwachung von A rbeiterverein igungen, 1901-1902 ’ 
Überwachung von Arbeitervereinigungen, 1902-1903’ 
Überwachung von Arbeitnehmervereinigungen, 1905 ’ 
Überwachung von Arbeitervereinigungen, 1905-1906 ’ 
Überwachung von Arbeitnehmervereinigungen, 1906 ’ 
Überwachung von Arbeitervereinigungen, 1906-1907’ 
Überwachung von Arbeitnehmervereinigungen, 1907’ 
Überwachung von Arbeitervereinigungen, 1907-1908’ 
Überwachung von Arbeitervereinigungen, 1908-1912’
Schwelm/214 ‘Grössere Unruhen, Bergarbeiterausstände, Heranziehung




4Volksversamlungen, politische Vereine, Anarchistische 
Umtriebe, politische Stimmung der Bewohner, 1848-1878’
‘Politische Verbrecher, Socialdemokratische Bestrebungen, 
öffentliche Versammlungen und Vorträge, 1888-1921 ’
4 Übertreten der Vorschriften gegen Tumult und Aufruhr,
1843-1924’
1.5. Archives Nationales
Papers from the French ministrv of the interior: 'Police Générale*
F 7 13321 ‘Anniversaire de Draveil ¡909-1912 ’
F 7 12399-12404 ‘Culte Catholique : Inventaires 1905-1907’
F 7 12526 *Evénements de Montceau-les Mines 1882-1883 ’
F 7 12527 ‘Evénements de Fourmies 1891 ’
F l  12528-13271 ‘Premier mai 1898-1911’
F 7 12722 ‘Police générale, pouvoirs des préfets en matière de police municipale.
Emploi de la troupe pour le maintien de l ’ordre, 1902-1916’
F.7 12773 ‘Instructions ministérielles; plan de protection, jurisprudence; emploi 








*Grèves ; Mesures à prendre en cas de grève des chemins de fe r ’
‘Plans de protection par département’
4Plans de protection par département ’
‘Grèves : Protection des ports en cas de grève des dockers ou mineurs’ 
‘Grèves ; Mesures à prendre en cas de grève générale des mineurs ’
4Grèves ; Mesures à prendre en cas de grève générale des mineurs ’
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F.7.12780 'Grèves : Grève générale des mineurs *
F.7.12781 ‘Grèves des mineurs, 1901-1908*
F.7.12782 ‘Grèves des mineurs,1900-1910'
F .7.12783 ‘Grèves, marts-april 1906*
F.7.12784 ‘Grèves 1906’
F.7.12785 ‘Grèves 1906‘
F.7.12786 ‘Grèves, Hennebout Morbihan, avril-août 1906'
F.7.12787 ‘Grèves diverses par département, 1908 *
F.7.12788 ‘Grèves diverses par département, 1908*
F.7.12789 ‘Grèves diverses par département, 1908 *
F.7.12790 'Grèves diverses par département, 1908 *
F.7.12791 ‘Grèves diverses par département, 1908*
F.7.12792 ‘Grèves: PTT 1909 *
F.7.12794 ‘Révolte des vignerons du Midi, 1907*
F 7 12828 ‘Fonds Secrets 1884-1907,1912 *
F 7 12848 ‘Catastrophe de Montceau-les-Mines, 1895*
F.7 12912 ‘Rapports divers de la sûrété générale. Statistiques. Projets de lois.
Mesures de protection protect, 1884-1907*
F 7 12913 ‘Commissions et sous-commissions instituées en vue d*examiner les 
mesures à prendre en cas de grèves, 1908-1909*
F 7 12914-12917 ‘Grève de Draveil-Vigneux, 1908*
F 7 12918 ‘Grève des employés des P.T.T. mars-mai, 1909*
F 7 12920 ‘Emeutes provoquées dans le Midi par la crise viticole, 1907*
Papers from the French ministrv of the interior: Administration of the départements 
F.2.2595 ‘Nord, recettes et dépenses diverses, 1889-1939*
F.2.2600-2602 ‘Nord, Finances communales, 1889-1939*
F.2.2624-2625 ‘Pas-de-Calais, Finances départementales, 1909-1940*
F 30.431-432 ‘Correspondance du ministère des finances avec le ministère de la 
guerre, 1878-1910*
Personal papers Série AP
General Antoine Chanzy. Personal papers, AP 270 
Marchai Hubert Lyautey. Personal papers, 475 AP
1.6. Archives de Vincennes: Service historique de Varmée de terre
Papers from the French war ministrv.
5.N.2 ‘Cabinet du Ministre : documents de principe et réglementation,
1890-1895*
5.N.5 ‘Cabinet du Ministre : Correspondance Générale, 1878-1914*
5.N.6 ‘Cabinet du Ministre, bureau de la Correspondance Générale,
1905-1906; Troisième bureau 1886-1914*
5.N.7 ‘Cabinet du Ministre, 1905-1911, section adminitrative,
section militaire *
406
5. N.8 ‘Réquisition des Gendarmes ’
6. N.146 * Maintien de Vordre 1907-1917’
7 N 12 'EMA: Circulaires : grèves, 1871-1914. Gendarmerie. Garnisons ’
7 N 25 'EMA: Réquisitions*
7 N 100 *EMA: Au sujet des mesures à prendre en cas de grève, 1901 ’
7 N 104 'EMA: Projet d'instruction relatif à l ’emploi des troupes
réquisitionnées pour le maintien de Vordre public (janv.-juin 1904)’
7 N 105 'EMA: Instructions du 18 oct.1907 relative à l'emploi des troupes 
réquisitionnées pour le maintien de Vordre public, mise à jour à la 
date du 15 avril 1914*
7 N 107 'EMA: Instruction du 18 oct. 1907 relative à l ’emploi des troupes 
réquisitionnées pour le maintien de Vordre public, mise à jour à la 
date du 30 janvier 1911 *
7 N 114 'Troupes réquisitionnées pour le maintien de Vordre public,
15 avril 1914*
7 N 115 'Mesures à prendre en vue d ’assurer le maintien de Vordre public
notamment en cas de grève, 1893-1918*
7 N 127 'Grèves des Chemins de Fer. Mesures à prendre, avril-juin, 1898’
•Mémoires et Reconnaissances*
MR.2172 'Application des lois des congrégations *
MR.2224 'Décret du 24 Messidor an X lî sur les Honneurs et Préséances *
MR.2226 ‘Cérémonies publiques et religieuses, préséances’
MR.2366 'Comparaison des dépenses militaires et des effectifs en France et en 
Allemagne (EMA 2e bureau, août 1911)’
Documents from the garrison in Lille
2.1.286 ‘Elections, maintien de Vordre public '
2.1.325 'Grèves dispositions à prendre 1902-19091
2.1.326 'Grèves, dockers de Dunkerque, mars-avril 1910’
2.1.326 'Grèves, renseignements sur les troupes détachés aux grèves, 
1901-1902’
2.1.327 ’Grèves, 1903, 1904, 1906'
2.1.327 'Grèves Bassin houiller du Pas-de-Calais mars-avril 1906*
2.1.327 *Inventaires des bien des Eglises ’
2.1.328 'Grèves, rassemblement de la troupe, 1906-1909’
2.1.329 ‘Grèves diverses 1904-1907’
2.1.330 'Grèves diverses 1908-1913 *
2.1.331 ‘Grèves. Intervention de militaitres suite à des grèves ’
2.1.332 'Grèves. Réquisitions préfectorales, rapports de gendarmerie situation 
des troupes, 1901-1902*
2.1.333 'Grèves. Industrie textile, ouvriers détacheurs, éléctriciens, papetiers, 
terrassiers, chemin de fer. 1903-1910’
2.1.334 ‘Grèves. Bassin houillers, briquetiers, dockers, charretiers, gagiers, 
1910-1912’
2.1.335 ‘Inventaires des Eglises 1906 ’
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2.1.224 ‘Honneurs militaires rendues à différentes personalités (an XII-1910) ’
2.1.224 ‘Cérémonies publiques, préséances, ordres des autorités 1907'
2.1.224 'Cérémonies publiques: obsèque des victimes du ‘Pluviôse ' 1910 '
2.1.224 ‘Fêtes publiques, 14 Juillet, 1905-1913 '
2.1.225 ‘Cérémonies publiques, 1905-1913*
2.1.225 ‘Voyages en France de personnalités étrangères et cérémonies 
publiques, 1889-1914*
2.1.226 ‘Entrées et visites officielles dans les villes de la 1er Région 
1898-1901*
2.1.2 ‘Correspondance générale confidentielle (Régistre) 1880-1888 '
2.1.1 *Enregistrement de lettres au Cabinet du général 1877-1882; 1882-90*
2.1.15 ‘Correspondance reçue par le ACC, 1904-1908*
2.1.21 ‘Notes et observations du General commandant du 1er CA. 1911-12’
2.1.21 ‘Cahier d  'enregistrement de la correspondance confidentielle expédiée 
par la section chancellerie de l*état-major du I.A.C. 1912-1914*
2.1.210 ‘Correspondance administrative 1889*
2.1.211 ‘Correspondance du 1er CA. 1891-1920*
2.1.215 ‘Correspondance générale 1904-1908 '
2.1.217 ‘Correspondance avec les Préfets et les maires 1905-1912 *
2.1.218 ‘Gouverneur de Lille, Correspondance, 1909’
2.1.218 * Correspondances diverses reçues par le A CC, 1909-1911 ’
2.1.220 ‘Correspondance générale 1910-1913*
2.1.221 ‘Gouveneur de dunkerque, correspondance expédié 1912 '
2.1.212 ‘Correspondance générale, G al.Jeannerod30.aug.1898-29.juni1900'
2.1.82 ‘Peluriers de la correspondance relative aux grèves expédiée par le 
1er bureau de l'état-major du 1er corps d'armée 1900-1902 '
2.1.83 ‘Peluriers de la correspondance expédiée par le ACC ¿900-1903 ’
2.1.103 ‘Peluriers de la correspondance relative aux grèves expédiée par le 1er
bureau de l'état-major du I.A.C. 1902-1903’
2.1.114 ‘Peluriers de la correspondance relative aux grève expédiée par le 1er
bureau de l'état-major du l.C.A. 1903'
2.1.149 ‘Peluriers de la correspondance relative aux grèves expédiée par le
1er bureau de la section active de l'état major du LA.C. 1906-1907*
2.1.227 ‘Ordres généraux 1885-1893; 1893-1904; 1909-1914 '
2.1.228 ‘Rapports de place 1910’
2.1.228 ‘Rapports de Place 1912-1914 *
2.1.229 ‘Rapports de place 1911-1912-1914'
2.1.229 ‘Rapports de place 1913-1914'
2.1.230 ‘Rapports de la le  division d'infanterie du I.A.C., 1885-1914'
2.1.282 ‘Soldes et indemnités, correspondance ministerielles, 1889-1899; 
1904-1912'
2.1.283 'Soldes, indemnités et frais de route, 1898-1906'
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Sérié GD: Personnel files of the general corps 
Général Emile Jourdy 392/GD/3
Sérié k : Personal papers
Général Henri Brugière 1 k 160 / 1 Kmi 46 
Général Charles Millet 1 k mi 9
U . Archives départementales de Lille
1 M.6/ 1-20 : Papers from the prefects 
M 6/7 Paul Cambon (1877-1881)
M 6 H  Jules Cambon (1882-1887)
M 6/19 Henri Vel-Durand (1890-1897)
M 6 /13 André Laurenceau ( 1897-1898)
M 6/19 Paul Vatin (1898-1899)
M 6 /20 Louis V incent ( 1899-1911)
M 6/18 Jean-Baptiste Trépont (1911-1916)
‘Administration générale*
M. 109/ 8 'Réquisition de la force armée ' ( 1847-1900)
M.109/ 12 ‘Correspondance chiffré' (1862-1904)
M.109 /14 *Circulaires’ (1889-1912)
‘Police politique*
M 145/8 ‘Voyagesprésidentiels en France. Mesures de sûreté, 1907-1910’
M 146 /33 ‘Projet de voyage à Lille de M.Briand, ministre de l'instruction 
publique à l'occasion des fêtes universitaires - Danger d ’une 
manifestation hostile, 1907’
M 146/37 ‘Voyages ministériels divers, 1907-1909’
M 149 /I ‘Instructions ministérielles, 1905*
M. 14912 ‘Rapports généraux * ( 1880-1881)
M 149/3 ‘Rapports mensuels des sous-préfets ‘ (1887-1910)
M.150/ (1) 29-34 *Correspondance du cabinet du Préfet' (1906)
M.151/1-38 ‘Rapports des Commissaires ’
M 153/51 ‘Exécution de Ferrer - Manifestation 1909’
M. 154-161 : ‘Partis politiques; sociétés politiques; détenus politiques; dossiers
induviduels; réunions publiques; manifestations 1 Mai; fête  du 14 
juillet; fêtes diverses’
M 159/1-3 ‘Manifestations du 1er mai, instructions et circulaires; rapports par 
année 1889-1904’
M 159 /4-20 ‘Manifestations du 1er mai, instructions et circulaires; rapports par 
année 1889-1904*
Commerce and Industry : Relevant dossiers for various professional categories 
‘Grèves des Chemins de Fer*
M 622 /1 * Circulaires et instructions '(1898-1901)
M 622 /2 'Révision du plan de protection en cas de grève ’ (1901-1907)
M 622 /3 * Rapports et mesures d  'ordres. Réquisitions 1898 ’
M.622 /4 * Mesures d* ordres. Réquisitions 1902 '
‘Grèves des Postes*
M 623 /1 * Mesures prises dans l 'éventualité d *une grève ’ (1906)
M 623 f l  ‘Rapports, correspondances* (1909)
‘Grèves Ouvriers des ports*
M 624 f l  'Ouvriers du port de Dunkerque. Réquisitions militaires '(1901-1902)
M 624 /8 ‘Ouvriers du port de Dunkerque ' ( 1903)
M 624 /9 ‘Ouvriers du port de Dunkerque ’ (1904)
M 624 /10 ‘Ouvriers du port de Dunkerque ' ( 1905)
M 624 / I l  *Ouvriers du port de Dunkerque ' ( 1906)
M 624 /12 ‘Ouvriers du port de Dunkerque ' ( 1906-1908)
M 624 /13 'Mariniers. Documents généraux. Rapports. Réquisitions ’ ( 1904)
‘Grèves parmi les ouvriers des textiles*
M 625 /4 ‘Grèves de textiles de 1903-correspondance du préfet avec le ministre ’
M 625 /8 *Grèves des textiles : Armentières, rapports et télégrammes * ( 1903)
M 62519 ‘Grèves des textiles : Armentièresf réquisition de troupes ' (1903)
M 625 /10 'Grèves des textiles : Armentières, réquisition de troupes ' (1903)
M 625 /2 1 *Grèves générales des textiles, oct. 1903’
M 625 /24 'Grèves générales des textiles, jan-avril 1904 ’
M 625 /26 ‘Grèves générales des textiles, jan-avril 1904 ’
M 625 /31 ‘Grèves générales des textiles, oct.-dec.1909’
‘Grèves des Mineurs'
M 626 /18 ‘Grèves de mineurs: Aniche, Vie oigne ’ (1889)
M 626 /19 ‘Agitation aux mines du Nord '(1891)
M 626 /28 ‘Grèves des mineurs: réquisition militaires, 1901 ’
M 626 /29 ‘Grèves des mineurs: emplacement des troupes 1901 ’
M 626 /40 ‘Réquisitions prises dans l ’éventualité de grève des mineurs, 19021 
M 626 /4 1 ‘Instructions ministérielles et préfectorales, 1902 ’
M 626 /42 ‘Instruction confidentielles. Correspondance avec le Corps d ’Armée’
‘Conférence avec le ministre de l ’intérieur 1902’
M 626 /43 'Réquisitions militaires, 1902 ’
M 626 /48 ‘Statistique des mineurs, nombre journalier des grévistes, 1902 ’
M 626 /50 *Plan d ’occupation du bassin houiller du Nord, 1902 ’
M 626 /51 ‘Rapports journaliers, 1902’
M 626 /52 ‘Rapports journaliers, 1902 ’
M 626 /56 ‘Grèves, Dunkerque, 1903-1904. Réquisitions’
M 626/57 ‘Bassin d ’Anzin: agitation, 1903’
M 626 /59 ‘Instructions préfectorales, 22 avril 1906’
M 626 /60 'Réquisition de l ’armée. Protection du travail des chemins-de-fer’




M 627 /I 4Rapports et correspondance * ( 1863-1880)
M 627 ¡2 *Grève à Lille: rapports, J880"
M 627 /3 'Rapports et correspondance * ( 1884-1893)
M 627 /4 4Grève à Trith-St.Léger, 1900*
M 627 /5 4Grève de la compagnies de Fives-Lille, 1904-1906 '
M 627 /6 4Grève de F  erré re-la-G rande, 1905*
M 627 P  4Grève à Saint Amand, 1906*
M 627 /8 4Grève à Jeumont et à Maubeuge, 1907*
M 627 /9 "Grève à Raismes, 19109 
M 627 /10 4Grève des ouvriers mouleurs à Lille, 18669
M 627 / I l  4Grève des ouvriers mouleurs à Cambrai, 18849
M 627 /12 4Grève des ouvriers mouleurs, 1905-1906*
M 627 /13 ‘Grèves ¿es ouvriers mécaniciens, 1869-1906*
M 627 /14 4Grèves des puddleurs, 1869-1883 *
M 627 /15 4Grèves des fondeurs, 1881-1882*
M 627 /16 4Fonderie de zinc, Auby, 1903*
M 627 /17 4Grève des tourneurs en fer, 1882 *
M 627/18 ‘Grève des massiers, 1889*
M 627 /19 ‘Grève des zingueurs, 1906*
M 627 /20 ‘Grève des aciéries, 1907*
M 628 /1-5 ‘Grèves des verriers, rapports et correspondance 1861-1893; rapports 
par région; Grève de Fourmies 1903*
•Grèves des ouvriers du bâtiment*
M 629 /I ‘Grèves générales à Dunkerque 1910 ’
M 629 /2 ‘Grèves des terrassiers * ( 1879-1907)
M 629 /3 ‘Grève des briquetiers, Lille, 1910 *
M 629 /4 ‘Grèves des maçons et manoeuvres ’ (1867-1911)
M 629 /5 ‘Grève des plombiers, 1882 *
M 629 16 ‘Grève des plafonneurs, 1893*
M 629 f l  *Grève des peintres * ( 1872-1906)
M 629 /8 ‘Grève des charpentiers-menuisiers * ( 1863-1909)
M 629 /9 ‘Grève des scieurs de long, 1890*
S
}
Série N *Administration et comptabilité départementales* 
Minutes from the Conseil de général du Nord (1887-1914)
Série Z Documents from the sub-prefects in Avènes. Cambrai. Douai. Dunkerque. 
Hazebrouck. Valenciennes
2 Z 119-627 Sous-préfecture d’Avènes: 4Correspondance des communes de l *arron­
dissement avec la sous-préfecture d*Avènes*
5 Z 920-1009 Sous-préfecture de Dunkerque: 4Affaires Militaires*
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1.8. Archives départementales d'Arras (Pas-de-Calais)
M 4882 'Rapport sur la situation générale du département ’ (1912)
M 4883 * Rapport sur la situation générale du département' (1913)
M 4887 'Rapport sur la situation générale du département' (1890-1896)
M 4888 *Rapport sur la situation générale du département' (Aug.-Dec. 1906)
M 4889 ‘Rapport sur la situation générale du département ' (Jan.-June 1907)
M 4890 ‘Rapport sur la situation générale du département' (July-Dec. 1907)
M 4894 ‘Rapport sur la situation générale du département' (Jan.-June 1908)
M 4895 'Rapport sur la situation générale du département' (July-Dec. 1908)
M 4897 ‘Rapport sur la situation générale du département ' (Jan.-June 1909)
M 4896 ‘Rapport sur la situation générale du département ’ (July-Oct. 1909)
M 4891 ‘Rapport sur la situation générale du département ' (Oct.-Dec. 1909)
M4948 ‘Rapports divers, 1905-1913'
M 2464 ‘Rapports de police 1895-1914, Rapports divers’
M 2465 ‘Cabinet. Rapports de police. Télégrammes reçus '(1891-1914)
M 2466 ‘Elements de rapport mensuel du préfet, rapport du commissarriat 
central de Calais’ (Januaryl909 - January 1912)
M 2440 ‘Agitations diverses dans les mines Grèves ' ( 1840-1902)
M 2488 ‘Agitation ouvrière et syndicale. Grèves diverses ' ( 1900-1901)
M 4859-4861 ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houiller 1893. Télégrammes '
M 4862 ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houiller, 1893. Renseignements,
Instructions, correspondance'
M 4864 ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houiller, 1893. Correspondance avec 
les autorités administrative et militaires'
M 1231 ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houiller, 1889. Documents divers'
M 4865 ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houiller, 1891. Documents divers '
M 4868 ‘Grève générale dans le bassin houiller, 1893. Provocations,
réquisitions*
M 4863 ‘Grèves diverses, 1887-1896’
M 1793 ‘Tentative de grève générale et partielle des mineurs ' ( 1900)
M 1794 ‘Grève générale des mineurs * ( 1900-1901)
M 1795+2439 ‘Grève générale des mineurs' (1902)
M 1799 ‘Grève générale des mineurs ' ( 1900-1903)
M 1800 ‘Grève générale des mineurs' (1908)
M 1810+1796 ‘Grève générale des mineurs ’ ( 1906)
M 1797 ‘Grève générale des mineurs ’ ( 1906)
M 2284 ‘Grèves, émeutes, manifestations ' ( 1885-1914)
M 1187 ‘Grèves, émeutes et manifestations arrondissement de Béthune, 1901 '
M 1185 ‘Grèves des bassins houillers ' ( 1893-1906)
M 1785 ‘Calais. Grèves ouvriers’ (1890-1907)
M 2111 'Calais. Grèves tuiliers ’ ( 1898)
M 1733 ‘Calais. Grèves tuiliers ’ ( 1890-1898)
M 1735-1736 ‘Calais. Grèves tuiliers’ (1900)
M 1783 ‘Calais. Grèves tuiliers’ (1909)
M 1798 ‘Calais. Grèves des dockers '(1911)
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M 1787 4 Calais. Grèves des dockers1 ( 1900-1908)
M 1788 *Calais. Grèves des dockers" (1911-1913)
M 2465 'Calais. Grèves des ouvriers du Port, 1904; Grève des marins
pêcheurs ’ (1912)
M 1801 4Grèves des employés des chemin de fer, 1910 *
M 2291 'Grèves des employés des chemin de fer, oct.1898 *
M 1791 * Grèves des employés des PTT, 1909 *
S 1476 *Mines de Courrières. Catastrophe de Courrières du 10 mars 1906:
Envoi de la troupe, effectif, télégramme ; mesures de police *
Série Z : Documents from the sub-prefects 
1 Z 12.224 4Grèves* (1887-1893)
4 Z 660 ‘Grèves Saint Orner. Emploi de troupes réquisisitionnées pour le
maintien de l *ordre publicf (1904; 1921)




2.1. German memoirs and biographies
Berlepsch, Dr. Hans Freiherr von (1925) 'Sozialpolitische Erfahrungen und  
Erinnerungen ' Mönchen-Gladbach: Volksvereins-Verlag
Bemhardi, Friedrich von (1927) ‘Denkwürdigkeiten aus meinem Leben * Berlin: 
E.S.Mittler & Sohn
Bemin, Gerhard (1903) * August von Goeben in seinen Briefen ’ Berlin: Emst Siegfried 
Mittler & Sohn
Brabrant, Arthur (1924) ‘Generaloberst Max Frhr. von Hausen. Ein deutscher Soldat 
- Nach seinen Tagbiichem, Aufzeichnungen und Briefe * Dresden
Bremen, Walther von (1901) * Denkwürdigkeiten des Preussischen Generals der 
Infanterie Eduard von Fransecky ’ Bielefeld und Leipzig: Velhagen & Klasig
Clemenz, Bruno (1919) * Generalfeldmarschal von Woyrsch und seine Schlesier. 
Eigenhändige Auszüge aus seinem Kriegstagebuch ’ Berlin: Carl Flemming
Conrady, C. von (1889) ‘Graf August von Werder. Kgl. preussischer General der 
Infanterie' Berlin: E.S.Mittler & Sohn
Deimling, Berthold von (1930) 'Aus der alten in die neue Zeit' Berlin: Im Verlag 
Ullstein
Dürckheim-Montmartin, Graf Eckbrecht von (1910) 'Erinnerungen alter und neuer 
Zeit ’ Stuttgart: J.B Metzlerschen
Einem genannt von Rothmaler, Karl von (1933) Erinnerungen eines Soldaten 1853- 
1933’ Leipzig: Verlag von K.F.Koehler
Foerster, Wolfgang (1938) ‘Mackensen, Briefe und Aufzeichnungen’ Leipzig
Gerog, Wilhelm (1915) ’Unser Emmich. Ein Lebensbild’ Berlin: August Scherl
Goltz, Colmar von der (1929) 'Denkwürdigkeiten ’ Berlin: E.S.Mittler & Sohn
Hindenburg, Paul von (1920) ‘Aus meinem Leben ’ Leipzig: S.Hierzel
Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst, Chlodowig von (1907) ‘Denkwürdigkeiten' Stuttgart, 
Leipzig
Kluck, Alexander von (1929) 4Wanderjahre - Kriege - Gestalten* Berlin: Verlag 
R.Eisenschmidt
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Körting, Georg (Unpublished memoirs about general von der Goltz in Königsberg) 
Military Archive, Freiburg, Colmar von der Goltz: N 80/18
Krieg, Dr. Thilo (1903) Konstantin von Alvensleben. Ein militärisches Lebenbild' 
Berlin: E.S.Mittler & Sohn
Krieg, Dr.Thilo (1911) *Hermann von Tresckow, General der Infanterie und 
Generaladjutant Kaiser Wilhelms L  Ein Lebensbild' Berlin: E.S.Mittler & Sohn
Leopold, Prinz von Bayern (1983) ‘Aus den Lebenserinnerungen' (ed. Körner) 
Regensburg: Pustet
Loe, Walther Frhr. von (1906) Erinnerungen von meinem Berufsleben 1849-1867' 
Berlin: E.S.Mittler & Sohn
Schricker, Dr. A (1881) ‘Eduard von Moeller, Oberpräsident von Elsass-Lothringen, 
Ein Lebensbild * Cassel: Verlag Theodor Kay
Seeckt, Hans von (1938) ‘Aus meinem Leben, 1866-1917' Leipzig: Hase & Koehler
Waldersee, Alfred Graf von (1922) ‘Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls 
Alfred von Waldersee' Vols.1-3 (ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin: E.S.Mittler& Sohn
Waldersee, Alfred Graf von (1927) 'Aus dem Briefwechsel des General- 
Feldmarschalls Graf von Waldersee * (ed.H.O.Meisner) Berlin, E,S.Mittler & Sohn
Wartensleben, Elisabeth Gräfin (1923) 'Herman Graf von Wartensleben-Carow, ein 
Lebensbild 1826-1921' Berlin: E.S.Mittler & Sohn
Witzleben, E. von (1913) 'Adolf von Deines. Lebensbild, 1845-1911' Berlin: Verlag 
der Liebelschen Buchhandlung
Wölbe, Dr. Eugen (1917) *Alexander von Kluck' Leipzig: Verlag Otto Spamer
2.2. French memoirs and biographies
André, Louis (1906) ‘Cinq ans de ministère' Paris: Louis Michaud
Barail, François du (1913) “Mes Souvenirs” Paris
Brugière, Henri (circal913) ‘Mes Mémoires, 1841-1914* (unpublished manuscript) 
Military Archive, Vincennes, 1 K 160/ 1 Kmi 46
Cambon, Paul (1946) ‘Correspondances 1870-1924' Paris
Combes, Emile (1956) 'Mon ministère. Mémoires 1902-1905' Paris: Plon
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Cuny, Léon (1911) 'Quarante-trois Ans de vie militaire' Paris: Henri Charles- 
Lavauzelle
Donop, Raoul-Marie (1907) ‘Lettres d ’un vieux cavalier, 1870-1907' Paris 
Erlanger, Philippe (1968) ‘Clemenceau ' Paris: Grasset
Freycinet, Charles (1913) ‘Souvenirs* Vols.2, 1878-1893, Paris: Charles Delagrave
Gallifet, Gaston (1902) ‘Souvenirs’ in Le Journal des Débats, August 1902
Herriot, Edouard (1949) ‘Jadis* Vols. 1-2, Paris: Armand Colin
Jourdy, Emile (circa 1913) ‘Mémoires* (unpublished manuscript). Military Archive, 
Vincennes, 392/GD/3
Julliard, J. (1965) ‘Clemenceau briseur de grève * Paris: Julliard
Lépine, Louis (1929) ‘Mes souvenirs' Paris: Payot
Lyautey, Hubert (1924) ‘Choix de lettres 1882-1919* Paris: Armand Colin
Lyautey, Hubert (1948) ‘Paroles d'action, Madagascar, Sud-Oranais, Oran-Maroc, 
1900-1926' (private correspondence) Paris: Armand Colin
Millet, Charles (circal913) ‘Souvenirs' (unpublished manuscript) Military Archive, 
Vincennes, 1 K mi 9
Monerville, Gaston (1968) ‘Clemenceau* Paris: Fayard
Sorlin, Pierre (1966) ‘ Waldeck-Rousseau ' Paris: Armand Colin
Wormser, Georges (1961) ‘La République de Clemenceau’ Paris: PUF
Zédé, Charles (1933-1936) ‘Souvenirs de ma vie’ in Les carnets de la sabretache 
(1933: pp.481-504; 1934: pp.40-56, 116-135, 202-223, 254-276, and 377-396; 1935: 
pp.33ff.; 1936: pp.156-165, 236-251, 323-332, and 413-447)
Zurlinden, Emile (1913) ‘Mes Souvenirs depuis la guerre, 1871-1901' Paris: Henri 
Charles-Lavauzeile
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2.3. Books and Articles on Various Subjects
Anonymous (1891) ‘L'Armée et Vordrepublic’ Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle
Anonymous (1894) 'L'Armée sous le régime civil et les questions militaires 
pendantes ’ Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle
Desveaux, Ludovic (1899) *Les Grèves de chemins de fe r  en France et à l ’étranger ’ 
Paris: Marchai & Billard
Donop, Raoul Marie (1908) ‘Le rôle social de Vofficier’ Paris
Goltz, Colmar von der (1890) *Dos Volk in Waffen. Ein Buch über dos Heerwesen ' 
Berlin: E.S.Mittler & Sohn
Guyot, Yves (1911) ‘Les Chemins de fe r  et la Grève* Paris: Félix Alcan
Hermant, Abel (1887) ‘Le Cavalier Miserey, 21e chasseur, moeurs militaires 
contemporaines’ Paris
Jaurès, Jean (1915) ‘L ’Armée nouvelle * Paris
Laurent, E. capitaine du 28e d’infanterie (1904) ‘Impressions de grève ’ Paris: Henri 
Charles-Lavauselle
Lémétayer, Capitaine (1912) *Aide-Mémoire de Vofficier aux grèves* Paris: Henri 
Charles-Lavauzelle.
Lyautey, Hubert (1891) ‘Le rôle social de l'officier’ in La Revue des Deux Mondes, 
March
Messimy, Adolphe (1913) ‘Le problème militaire ’ Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle
Sila, Commandant (1907) ‘Une Vie infernale. Mémoires d ’un officier de cavalerie* 
Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle
Stein, Lorenz von (1872) ‘Die Lehre vom Heerwesen’ Stuttgart: Cotta (Reprint: 
Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1967)
Thilo, Lucien (1914) ‘Pouvoir civil et pouvoir militaire’ Paris: Rousseau
Thoumas, General (1887) ‘Les transformations de l ’armée française’ Paris: Henri 
Charles-Lavauselle
X... (1891) ‘L ’armée et l ’ordre public’ Paris, Henri Charles-Lavauzelle
Le Lieutenant Z. (1904) ‘L ’armée aux grèves. Grève générale des mineurs octobre- 
novembre 1902 ’ Paris: Société nouvelle de librairie et d’édition
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3. Relevant legal texts
3.1. Constitutional texts on the state administration and the army
France
- Decree of 28 February 1790 ‘Sur la constitution de Varmée*
- Constitutional law of 3 September 1791 restricting the king's right to mobilise the 
army
- Constitutional law of 24 June 1793 subordinating military troops to the civil 
authorities
- Constitutional law of 25 February 1875 subordinating armed forces to the President 
of the Republic
Prussia - Germany
- Decree of 30 April 1815 on the organisation o f the state administration
- The Prussian Constitution of 31 January - 6 February 1850
- Decree of 11 - 27 March 1850 on the organisation of the state administration 'Kreis- 
Bezirks- und Provinzial-Ordnung fü r  den Preussischen Staat’
-The Imperial Constitution of 16 April 1871
- Law of 2 May 1874 ‘Reichsmilitärgesetz'
- Law of 26 July 1880 ‘über Organisation der allgemeinen Landesverwaltung *
- Law of 30 July 1883 'über die allgemeine Landesverwaltung ’
3.2. On public disorder and the domestic role of the army
French legislation
- Law of 6 -12 December 1790 *concernant Vorganisation de la force publique ’
- Law of 8 - 10 July 1791 ‘concernant la conversation des places de guerre *
- Law of 27 July - 3 August 1791 'sur la réquisition et Faction de la force publique ’
- Law of 7 June 1848 on crowdings ‘Sur les attroupements
- Law of 9 August 1849 on military states of siege
- Law of 3 July 1877 on military requisitions
- Law of 3 April 1878 on military states of siege
- Decree of 4 October 1891 ‘Sur le service des places de guerre et de villes ouvertes ’
- Instructions of 24 June 1903 ‘Relative à la participation de l ’armée au maintien de 
l'ordre public ’
- Instructions of 20 August 1907 'Relative à la participation de l ’armée au maintien 
de l ’ordre public '
- Instruction of October 1913 ‘Sur les pouvoirs de police de l ’autorité militaire sur le 
territoire national en état de siège ’
The Prussian-German legislation
- Circular decree of 30 December 1798 on *Zirkularverordnung über militärisches 
Eingreifen bei Tumulten und Aufläufen au f Requisition der Zivilbehörden ’
- Cabinet Order of 17 October 1820 on 'Mitwirkung der Militärbehörden zur 
Herstellung der Ordnung, wenn die öffentliche Ruhe durch Excesse gestört wird ’
- Instruction of 31 December 1825 to the province governors
- Decree of 17 August 1835 on ‘Verordnung zur Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen 
Ordnung und der dem Gesetz schuldigen Achtung’
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- Law of 20 March 1837 'Gesetz über den Waffengebrauch des Militärs’
- Law of 4 June 1851 ‘Gesetz über den Belagerungszustand'
- Service Regulations of 23 March 1899 ‘Dienstvorschrift über den Waffengebrauch 
des Militärs und seine Mitwirkung zur Unterdrückung innerer Unruhen ’
- Service Regulation of 19 March 1914 on the military use o f weapons
3.3. On municipal powers and policing
French legislation -
- Decree of 19 Vendémiaire Year IV (1795) on municipal police
- Law of 28 Germinal Year VI (1798) on the organisation of the gendarmerie
- Law of 28 Pluviôse Year VIII (1800) on municipal police
- Law of 5 April 1884 on municipal powers
- Decree of 20 May 1903 on the requisitioning of the gendarmerie
The Prussian legislation
- Law of 5 February 1794 on ‘Allgemeines Landrecht fü r  die Preussischen Staaten *
- Decree of 11 November 1808 ‘Für sämmtliche Städte der Preussischen Monarchie *
- Edict of 30 July 1812 on the gendarmerie
- Decree of 17 August 1835 ‘Verordnung zur Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen 
Ordnung und der dem Gesetze schuldigen Achtung bei Aufläufen und Tumulten *
- Law of 11 March 1850 ‘Gesetz betrefend die V erp flich tung  der Gemeinde zum 
Ersatz des bei öffentlichen Aufläufen verursachten Schadens’
- Decree of 31 December 1872 ‘Kreisordnung ’ on municipal powers 
-Decree of 31 July 1886 ‘Kreisordnung’ on municipal powers
3.4. On labour organisation, strikes, and public demonstrations
French legislation
- Law of 25 May 1864 legalising strikes and labour organisations
- Law of 25 March 1868 legalising non-political assemblies
- Law of 30 June 1881 on assemblies
- Law of 21 March 1884 legalising trade unions
Prussian-German legislation
- Law of 1869 abolishing the prohibition of strikes and labour organisations
- The Anti-Socialist Laws of 19 October 1878
- Decree of 11 April 1886 ‘The Puttkamer Decree’ on strikes and labour organisations
3.5. French legislation on honours and rank.
- Decree of 24 Messidor Year II (1793) *Relatif aux cérémonies publiques, 
préséances et honneurs civils et militaires ’
- Law of 15 - 20 June 1907 on honours and rank
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